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Abstract 
 
 
During the war medical missionaries were able to demonstrate fully their raison 
d’être of service and professionalism to the Chinese and their fellow countrymen.  
In retrospect it can be seen that the war proved to be a golden age of opportunity 
for individual medical missionaries providing them with professional, personal 
and religious opportunity. It was a period when they felt both needed and wanted 
in China, and they showed great resourcefulness in response to the constraints 
placed upon their professional work as a result of military action. When those in 
occupied China lost all contact with their home bases medical missionaries 
shouldered additional administrative responsibilities which increased their already 
heavy workload. Whether in Free, or occupied China, medical missionaries were 
forced to make their own decisions in the field, and the bureaucratic-professional 
relationship with their home bases became strained. On the ground they 
experienced a flowering of inter-denominational co-operation.   
 While responsible for the health of their fellow internees in the internment 
camps some medical missionaries were unexpectedly subjected to accusations of 
inexperience and nepotism. Shared hardship did not forge solidarity. The 
internment of medical missionaries, combined with Japanese religious policy, 
which deliberately sought to weaken Chinese Christian ties with foreigners, gave 
Chinese Christians the opportunity to manage mission hospitals and clinics 
without western supervision. Post-war, supported by the National government’s 
National Health Administration policies, this newly experienced autonomy 
accelerated and reinforced the movement of Chinese personnel into positions of 
authority within mission hospitals.  The end of the war thus marked not only the 
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ebbing away of the medical missionary golden age but also pointed to the demise 
of medical missionary work in China since even without the Communist take-
over, as more Chinese medical personnel graduated, medical missionaries were 
likely to become less needed and wanted. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 It was an experience not to be forgotten, a hard life, with much in it 
to sadden and depress you if you gave it the chance, but in another 
sense it was a grand life and one we wouldn’t have missed for 
anything. We, there in the hospital, nurses, doctors, evangelists and 
other workers were drawn closer together in team work than ever 
before and inspired and challenged to renewed loyalty to each 
other and above all to our Team Leader in the great adventure. 
 
Dr. Keith Gillison, Surgeon and Medical Superintendent, 
Union Hospital Hankou, 1939.1 
  
 
When medical professionals enrolled for mission work in China they can not have 
envisaged they would be called upon to work through the night operating on 
wounded civilians and soldiers during Japanese bombing raids. Neither can  they 
have anticipated working in bombed out hospital theatres under muslin sheets 
hastily erected to protect them from falling plaster, or that they would gain 
valuable clinical experience through the treatment of hundreds of gunshot wounds. 
It would have been inconceivable to them that, in the mid-1930s, diabetic patients 
under their care would die because insulin supplies had become exhausted and 
                                                 
1 Gillison, K., “Hankow in the Storm”, in The Chronicle of the LMS, February, 1939, p. 31. 
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fresh supplies were unavailable. Yet medical missionaries experienced all these 
and similar occurrences in both Free and occupied China during the war years 
1937–1945. 
 The combination of National government and Japanese actions and 
policies, in different locations at different times, coalesced to undermine any 
stereotypical idea we may have of wartime experience. Medical missionaries from 
different generations, mission societies and countries subscribed to their own 
perspectives concerning the medical missionary role. In addition, relationships 
with Chinese Christians and the unresolved question of devolution and Chinese 
Christian management of hospitals all impacted, in different ways, upon medical 
missionaries. There were, however, commonalities of experience and while there 
has been much research concerning missionaries in China, few studies have dealt 
in detail with medical missionaries, particularly during the wartime period. 
Monographs have ended in 1937 or begun in 1945 and this thesis aims to provide 
greater knowledge of, and enhance our understanding, of medical missionary 
experience during the period of war-time change from 1937 to 1945. 
 In the mid 1930s Christian missionaries had every reason to believe they 
were on the cusp of a golden age for missionary work. They had lived through the 
anti-Christian disturbances/anti-foreign boycott movement of the 1920s and, in 
consequence, were making tentative efforts to improve relationships with their 
Chinese colleagues by appointing some to positions of authority. 2   Chinese 
                                                 
2 For an account of the anti-Christian disturbances see Lutz, J.G., Chinese Politics and Christian 
Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920–28, Notre Dame, Ind, Cross Cultural 
Publications, 1988. For post anti-Christian disturbances relating how missionaries began changing 
their attitude towards their Chinese colleagues see Bickers, R., “Changing British Attitudes to 
China and the Chinese, 1928–1931”, D. Phil Thesis, University of London, 1992, pp. 208–245, 
especially pp. 221–223 for ‘weeding out’ of personnel unsympathetic to sinification of mission 
work. BMS China Secretary, E.W. Burt, regarded the 1927 mission field evacuations as a positive 
event freeing the Chinese Church from dependence upon foreign leadership and allowing ‘the 
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attitudes towards foreigners had become more positive and there was “… no 
opposition other than here and there interference by Communists or bandits”.3  
Medical missionaries, in association with the National Health Administration 
(NHA), were beginning to participate with the National government to work 
towards improving the welfare of the people.  An increasing cooperation between 
Christian and non-Christian agencies was regarded as “proof of a friendly and 
appreciative attitude towards Christian effort”.4  Optimism concerning the future 
was encouraged by the Christian conversion of the leader of the Chinese National 
government, Jiang Jieshi.  Furthermore, the launching of the New Life Movement 
suggested an affinity with Protestant moral values. Medical missionaries, such as 
the American doctor Ailie Gale, tended to ignore the militaristic features of the 
movement and supported and welcomed the aspects perceived as attempting 
social reforms.5   
 Not withstanding the destruction and chaos, the war-time period was to 
prove a golden age for medical missionaries.  It was not, however, to be the 
anticipated age of growth that missionary pre-war optimism had hoped for.  
Rather, this thesis will argue that the war was a golden age for individual medical 
missionaries providing them with professional, personal and religious challenges 
and opportunities. Most importantly, this period was perhaps the only time when 
medical missionaries were recognised by the Chinese government, and the people 
of China, as being needed in China and when they felt wanted.  Moreover, under 
                                                                                                                                     
unsuspected latent powers of our Chinese leaders’ to shine through. Cited by Stanley, B., The 
History of the Baptist Missionary Society, 1792–1992, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1992, p. 316. 
3 Editorial, “China’s Present Attitude to Christianity”, in Chinese Recorder, Vol., LXV, No. 11, 
November, 1934, pp. 674–5. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Zaccarini, M.C., The Sino-American Friendship as Tradition and Challenge: Dr. Ailie Gale in 
China 1908–1950, Bethlehem, PA, Lehigh University Press, London, London Associated 
University Presses, 2001, p. 123.  
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war-time conditions medical missionaries experienced life and death situations 
with their Chinese staff, sharing fear and tragedy, not only weaving closer ties 
with these staff but also with their fellow countrymen.  The invisible walls that 
existed between denominations were breached and unprecedented co-operation 
emerged, not just between Protestants and Catholics but also between the various 
Protestant denominations.   
 
The State of the Field 
The main characteristics of medical missionary work during the war have been 
reported in the literature but not studied closely in any great detail. In this material 
it is often the case that only one chapter refers to the war within which medical 
missionary work is only a small part.  A standard text relating to medical 
missionaries in China during the 1930s is Cheung’s Missionary Medicine in 
China: A Study of Two Canadian Protestant Missions in China before 1937. 6  
Cheung evaluated the success of two missions as “change agents” aiming to 
change the health orientation and behaviour of their Chinese patients by 
comparing each one’s hospital and dispensary work, medical education and public 
health achievements.7 This study has a strong regional focus comparing a South 
China Mission in Guangdong with a West China Mission in Sichuan.  In his 
conclusion, Cheung proffers some general observations on medical missionaries 
and one of the points he stresses is the lack of homophily between missionaries 
and the Chinese.  By this he is referring to “the degree to which pairs of 
                                                 
6 Cheung, Y.W., Missionary Medicine in China: A Study of Two Canadian Protestant Missions in 
China before 1937, Lanham MD, University Press of America, 1988. 
7 Ibid., p. 3. Cheung refers to Rogers’ Theory of Innovations which describes a change agent as 
“an individual who influences innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change 
agency”.  With reference to medical missionaries the innovation was western scientific medicine. 
Rogers, E.M., Diffusion of Innovations, New York, Free Press, 2003, p. 27. 
 18 
individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes” such as education, social 
status, social participation and “cosmopolitanness”.8  This thesis will argue not all 
medical missionaries were at odds with their Chinese colleagues. One issue 
Cheung considers very briefly regarding medical missionaries is the Two-fold 
Call, which he refers to as the physician-evangelist role conflict. 9  This time 
management problem had its origins in the nineteenth century and its dwindling 
importance amongst the younger generation of medical missionaries during the 
war is considered in detail in the second half of this chapter. Cheung states that 
the divesting of medical missionaries from evangelical responsibilities, the move 
towards a “team effort” in hospitals, and the upgrading of the status of medical 
missionary work eased this role conflict.10  However, he offers no evidence to 
support this and, as his study ends in 1937, does not take into account the medical 
missionary war-time experience nor does he quote any individual missionary 
voices concerning this subject.  
Ling has proposed the war brought changes to the relationship between 
missionaries and the Chinese Church.  In her critical analysis of the situation in 
The Changing Role of British Protestant Missionaries in China, 1945–1952 she 
notes that following the war, missionaries were aware of their change of status:11 
 By 1945 the missionaries realised that their place in the Chinese Church 
would never revert to what it had been before the war.12 
 
Ling attributes the abolition of the unequal treaties and the war as providing the 
major catalysts for this change. Ling’s thesis is that post 1945 missionaries did not, 
in general, fully understand they were still tainted, in Chinese minds, with the 
                                                 
8 Cheung, Y.W., Missionary Medicine, 1988, p. 5. 
9 Ibid., p. 19. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ling, O.K., The Changing Role of British Protestant Missionaries in China, 1945–1952, 
Cranbury NJ, Associated University Presses Inc., 1999. 
12 Ibid., p. 220. 
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unequal treaties and that their cooperation with the Guomindang (GMD) laid 
them open to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charges of partisanship and 
collaboration. As a result, although they were aware that change had taken place, 
missionaries were unable to convince their Chinese colleagues and congregations 
that they themselves had changed and were ready to hand over more 
responsibility to the Chinese Church. While providing a thoughtful contribution to 
post-1945 Sino-missionary history using missionary archives, the wartime period 
is not the main focus of Ling’s study so she naturally offers only a brief précis of 
these war years.  Also, although she provides a thorough account of the 
consequences of the war regarding the general missionary she provides little 
material specific to medical missionaries whose wartime experience was quite 
different.  As her work is a general overview she does not include a detailed 
regional analysis nor does she utilise oral history. Neither Ling nor Cheung 
examine the war period from the medical missionary perspective and it is my 
intention to fill this lacuna by examining the period post 1937 where Cheung 
finishes, and work towards 1945 where Ling begins. 
 Monograph-length studies that recount medical missionary experience 
during the war include Austin’s Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the 
Middle Kingdom, 1888–1959 and Kessler’s The Jiangyin Mission Station: An 
American Missionary Community in China, 1895–1951 although in neither do 
medical missionaries take centre stage. 13   Similarly, Selles, in “Many Points of 
Contact:  The Story of Christianity in Rugao, 1921–1966”, while weaving the 
career of Dr. Lee Huizenga through his thesis, does not give medical missionaries 
                                                 
13 Austin, A.J., Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 1888–1959, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996. Kessler, L.D., The Jiangyin Mission Station: An 
American Missionary Community in China, 1895–1951, Chapel Hill and London, University of 
California Press, 1996. 
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during the war years much attention.14 Austin, Kessler and Selles have all written 
mission histories spanning several decades of which the war years are only a 
small part, and where medical missionary war-time experience is only briefly 
touched upon.  Conversely, Grypma’s Healing Honan: Canadian Nurses at the 
North China Mission, 1888–1947 spans almost sixty years and over several 
chapters provides a comprehensive account of Canadian nurses in Henan (Honan) 
leading up to, during, and after the war.15  Grypma approaches her study from a 
gender history perspective and concludes that medical missionary nursing 
provided an “unparalleled opportunity for personal and professional growth 
because of its cloistered nature”.16 She argues that the compound’s physical walls, 
and the socially constructed boundaries related to the women’s gender, such as 
having male missionaries to protect and care for them within these walls, created 
an opportunity for the nurses to flourish. In contrast, this thesis will argue it was 
the disruption and breaking down of inter-denominational boundaries, the forging 
of external relationships, and the chaos of war removing medical missionaries 
from their cloistered existence, that created medical missionary professional and 
personal opportunity.   
 The 1940s period in Henan is investigated by Christensen in In War and 
Famine: Missionaries in China’s Honan Province in the 1940s. 17  This is an 
informative, mainly narrative, account focusing upon one mission with which the 
author’s family were connected and, although it does not refer only to medical 
missionaries, it does consider their work in detail. As with Grypma and many 
                                                 
14  Selles, K.D., “Many Points of Contact: The Story of Christianity in Rugao, 1921–1966”, 
Nashville, TN, University of Vanderbilt, D.Phil Dissertation, 2005. 
15 Grypma, S. J., “Healing Honan: Canadian Nurses at the North China Mission, 1888–1947”, D. 
Phil, Dissertation, Edmonton, University of Alberta, 2005. 
16 Ibid., p. 336.  
17 Christensen, E.J., In War and Famine: Missionaries in China’s Honan Province in the 1940s, 
Montreal, London, Mc-Gill–Queen’s University Press, 2005. 
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other regional studies, there is no attempt to provide an overview of medical 
missionary work in China during the war years, an omission this thesis will rectify.  
Latourette’s work is a most comprehensive study of missionaries from all 
denominations making it an important source.18  His chapter “The Course in War-
Smitten, Revolutionary China” provides a general account of both the Catholic 
and Protestant Church from the eve of World War One to the mid-twentieth 
century. Balme, himself a missionary, has written an informative historical 
account of medical missionary development up to the 1920s with an excellent 
bibliography on early missionaries that is a good starting point for background 
study. 19   However, he writes little about the tensions concerning medical 
evangelism, and whether this is an oversight or a desire to conceal a poor 
conversion result is unclear.  Choa’s “Heal The Sick” Was Their Motto is another 
important text narrating the history of Protestant medical missionaries in China 
but, as a retired university lecturer in medicine, his focus in his treatment of the 
war years falls firmly upon the education of wartime students from Hong Kong 
University in Free China.20  This is not to suggest that this focus is unwelcome 
but rather to point out that Choa’s focus on medical missionaries during the war is 
narrow.  
Like Latourette, Lutz is also a recognised authority on missionaries, and 
while perhaps best known for her writings on the anti-Christian disturbances, she 
                                                 
18 Latourette, K.S., A History of Christian Missions in China, New York, Macmillan Press, 1929.   
and Christianity in a Revolutionary Age:  A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, Vol., V, : The Twentieth Century Outside Europe, Vol. V., London, Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1950, pp. 371–411. 
19 Balme, H., China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development, London, 
Livingstone Bookshop, 1921. 
20 Choa, G.H., “Heal The Sick” Was Their Motto: The Protestant Medical Missionaries in China, 
Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990. 
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has also written on China and the Christian Colleges.21  Of particular interest to 
this thesis, because of its connection with a medical missionary interviewed by 
the writer, is her citing of Qilu (Cheeloo) Medical School in Jinan (Tsinan) as 
illustrating the differing viewpoints of some Chinese in Free China, regarding 
interaction with the Japanese, with those in occupied China.  Not to be openly 
defiant or evacuate, as will be shown, was seen by those in Free China as 
tantamount to collaboration, yet those who stayed to keep the University open 
regarded themselves as making “the best of a difficult situation until 
liberation…”22   
Brook argues that Japanese religious policy during the war attempted to 
erase denominational differences by encouraging a Christian Union that 
deliberately sought to weaken the link between missionary societies and the 
Chinese Church which propelled the Chinese Church into self-governance. 23  
Following Pearl Harbor, the internment of western missionary personnel served 
further to distance Chinese Protestants from western influence.  This cutting off of 
missionary support forced the Chinese Church to become self-supporting and, in 
the context of this thesis, raises the question: to what extent did the internment of 
medical missionaries aid the Chinese Christian progression towards hospital self-
governance?  Very little research has been done on Japanese religious policy in 
China, and it is hoped that by the use of medical missionary letters and reports, 
this thesis will add to our knowledge by analysing medical missionary thoughts 
and actions in the face of this policy.   
                                                 
21 Lutz, J.G., China and the Christian Colleges, 1850–1950, Icatha and London, Cornell 
University Press, 1971. 
22 Ibid., p. 368. 
23 Brook, T., “Toward Independence: Christianity in China under the Japanese Occupation, 1927–
1945”, in Bays, D.H. (ed.), Christianity in China from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 316–337, p. 330. 
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Sources  
(i) Printed and Archival Sources 
Periodicals, reports and documents from mission societies and other associations 
have helped to piece together medical missionary experience during the war. 
These include the missionary society periodicals Kingdom Overseas (MMS), 
China Division Reporter (SDA), China’s Millions (CIM), The Missionary Herald 
of the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS), Kineseren (The Chinese) and Utsyn 
(Outlook) (both NLK), District of Hankow: The Newsletter, Forth and Spirit of 
Missions (all ACM).24  As well as illustrating how medical missionaries were 
portrayed within the pages of their mission societies’ publications, these journals 
are a valuable source for studying the public face of mission policy.  They provide 
maps and photographs of the mission fields and information on the work and 
movements of individual medical missionaries and their families. There is, 
however, often a hagiographical element to some of the reports on individual 
missionaries. 25  The various mission society archives provide administrative 
information, correspondence between the executive and the practitioners in the 
field, and, through personal correspondence, they illuminate the private face of 
medical missionaries and their families. Many missionary accounts were written 
specifically for fund-raising purposes, and reports and letters were published, or 
made into small inexpensive pamphlets, for general circulation.26   
The official mission society papers consulted include District Committee 
Minutes, Policy Memoranda, China Committee Reports, Annual Reports and, 
most importantly, Annual Hospital Reports which not only include clinical 
                                                 
24 ACM was also known as PEC or PECUSA. 
25 Refer account of Dr. Edward Stedeford’s work and his being described by some Chinese as “our 
living Buddha” in MMS, “Three China Missionaries”, in Kingdom Overseas, March, 1937, p.72. 
26 For example: MMS, Missionary Letters from Central China, MMS, 1934, and LMS, Bombs on 
China: War Letters from Missionaries, London, Livingstone Press,  [194-?]. 
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statistics and evangelical reports but also feature yearly reviews.  The Conference 
of British Mission Societies (CBMS), as an interdenominational body, proved to 
be a helpful source of correspondence.  Mission archives consulted in person 
include: The London Mission Society; The Methodist Mission Society and the 
English Presbyterian Mission in the School of Oriental and African Studies 
Special Collections at the University of London; The American Church Mission 
papers at the archives of the Episcopal Church in Austin, Texas; The Norwegian 
Mission Society papers at Fjellhaug Skoler in Oslo; The Church of Scotland 
Mission archive in Edinburgh; The Baptist Mission Society Archive held in the 
Angus Library, Regents College, Oxford; and The Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU)  
archive of The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in London.27   
The Cram family archive, through personal correspondence and diaries, 
chronicles the lives of Fred Cram, an MMS minister and Hospital Superintendent, 
and Mary Cram (née Redhead), an MMS surgeon.  These papers were deposited 
in the Lincolnshire archives, Lincoln, in 2007; as well as covering the war years 
in Hubei they also include accounts of work in the province up to the family’s 
expulsion from China in 1949. Information was also obtained from the Seventh-
Day Adventist and the Swedish Evangelical Mission (CovMS) archives.28  
 International missionary publications consulted include The Chinese 
Recorder, International Review of Missions, and International Bulletin of 
Missionary Research. The Chinese Recorder, published in Shanghai with a strong 
American readership, is a rich source of twentieth century academic inter-
                                                 
27  The ACM Episcopal Mission to China covers the period 1839–1954. Unfortunately the 
Personnel files are only open to 1922 but the writer was permitted limited access to Bishop 
Gilmans’s papers, the Bishop of Hankou during the city’s occupation period.  Text excerpted from 
sources in the Archives of the Episcopal Church, USA, are reprinted by Permission of the 
Archives of the Episcopal Church, USA, hereinafter referred to as ACM archive. 
28 For CovMS see: The North Bank University of Chicago, Covenant Archives Historical Library. 
www.campus.northpark.edu/library/archives/   (Much of the material prior to 1930 is in Swedish.) 
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denominational Protestant missiological thought up to 1941.29 The International 
Review of Missions, published in London and New York, has provided 
contemporary papers written and read by missionaries during the wartime period, 
for example Miao’s The Christian Church in ‘Occupied’ China which documents 
Japanese policy towards missionaries and Chinese Christians.30  The International 
Bulletin of Missionary Research provides professional research papers of interest 
on historical missiological issues, for example Sharpe’s Reflections on Missionary 
Historiography which stresses the inter-disciplinary nature of missiological 
studies.31 
 The 1936 Handbook of the Christian Movement in China under Protestant 
Auspices provided the material for the detailed analysis of the geographical 
distribution of medical missions in chapter three.32  Two major problems face the 
researcher compiling a record of the distribution of medical missionary work in 
the China field on the eve of hostilities: first obtaining the material and secondly 
ascertaining its validity.  Under the auspices of the National Christian Council of 
China, the 1936 Handbook lists the number, supporting mission society, name and 
location of Protestant mission hospitals in 1936. This publication however is not 
without inconsistencies and acknowledges this in its introductory material with 
the statement that: 
                                                 
29 For a history of Chinese Recorder see: Rawlinson, J.L., Rawlinson, The Chinese Recorder and 
China’s revolution: a topical biography of Frank Joseph Rawlinson,1871–1937,  Indiana, Cross 
Cultural Publications Inc., 1990. 
30 Miao, C.S., “The Christian Church in ‘Occupied’ China”, in International Review of Missions, 
Vol., 35, No. 35, 1946, pp. 278–282. 
31 Sharpe. E. J., “Reflections on Missionary Historiography”, in International Bulletin of 
Missionary Research, Vol., 13, No. 2, April, 1989, pp. 76–81. 
32 Boynton, C.L., Boynton C.D., 1936 Handbook of the Christian Movement in China Under 
Protestant Auspices, The National Christian Council of China, Kwang Hsueh Publishing House, 
Shanghai, 1936. 
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… all totals are incomplete. It is best in quoting these figures 
therefore to say “There are reported ---” rather than to say “The 
total number of --- is ---” One will then be well within the facts.33   
 
Without checking the records of every individual mission society operating in 
China in 1936, which even if they were all available is outside the scope of this 
thesis, it is impossible to verify with absolute accuracy the exact number and 
location of the Protestant missionary hospitals.  This does not mean, however, that 
a useful retrospective attempt cannot be made and Boynton’s Handbook provides 
a conscientious contemporary attempt at listing Protestant medical mission work 
in 1936 that can be revised as and when discrepancies with mission society 
primary sources become apparent.34   
 Regarding validity, this writer has assumed that mission society archives 
provide records that are more likely to be accurate than material in second party 
listings. For example, the Swedish Missionary Society entry in Boynton records 
only one hospital in Hubei Province at Shashi (Shasi) but a society publication 
records a small hospital at Huanggang (Hwangchow). 35   Similarly, Chinese 
government statistics, where there is a discrepancy with individual missionary 
society material, have been regarded as being less accurate than a mission 
society’s own records. Thus, although not without difficulty, it has been possible 
to ascertain the approximate number and location of medical missions in 1936/7 
to provide a more accurate starting point for future research than is at present 
available.  
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.x. 
34 Bays points out that the Chinese Christian churches, such as the Jesus Family and the True Jesus 
Church were ignored by Boynton and that the estimation in the preface of 5,000 communicants 
was too low. “The Growth of Independent Christianity in China, 1900–1937,” in Bays, D H. (ed.), 
Christianity in China From the 18th Century to the Present, California, Stamford University Press, 
1996, pp. 307–316,  p. 309. 
35Boynton, C.L. and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 1936,  p.284, and Stenstrom, G., Kyrkorna Vid 
Yangtsefloden / The Churches Along the Yangtse River,  Svenska Missions Forbundet, The 
Mission Covenant Church of Sweden, 1990,  p. 22. 
 27 
 Relating to my research, the most valuable section of Leck’s Captives of 
Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China 1941–1945, is to 
be found in the nominal rolls for the internment camps. 36  These include the 
names, occupations, ages upon entry, nationalities, transfer details and, where 
applicable, the deaths of all civilian internees in the internment camps. This is the 
only source available listing all civilians in the Japanese internment camps in 
China. Leck compiled these rolls using contemporary letters and diaries, 
International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) reports, material from the US 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), US State Department 
records, Japanese National Archives, British Foreign Office records, wartime 
papers, class B and class C war crimes trials and information from members of 
the Association of British Civilian Internees Far Eastern Region (ABCIFER).37    
 Professional medical publications such as The Chinese Medical Journal 
(CMJ) or Zhonghua yixue zazhi 中華醫學雜誌, The Lancet and British Medical 
Journal (BMJ) have provided clinical, administrative and academic information. 
The CMJ was the official organ of the Chinese Medical Association (CMA) or 
Zhonghua yixue hui 中華醫學會 , which supported a Council on Medical 
Missions (CMM) that reported in the journal on a regular basis.  Many Chinese 
medical personnel were members of the CMA and wrote papers in English and 
Chinese for inclusion in the CMJ which record their activities during the war.  A 
bulletin for the Nursing Association of China (NAC) or Zhonghua hushi hui 中華
護士會, was issued in English and Chinese.  Finally, British Foreign, War and 
Consular Reports from the National Archives helped to place medical missionary 
                                                 
36 Leck, G., Captives of Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China, 1941–1945, 
Bangor, PA, Shady Press, 2006. 
37 Leck, G., in correspondence, December 10th, 2008. 
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work during the war in a political context.  Regrettably, I have been unable to 
trace any complete copies of the Central China Post which would have cast light 
upon the lives of the foreign community in Hubei. This English language 
newspaper was launched by John Archibald in 1904 and published news from 
Hubei and surrounding provinces. According to Chinese sources it maintained 
publication in Wuhan until, following Pearl Harbor, its offices were sealed by the 
Japanese on December 8th, 1941.38 However, a Foreign Office despatch reported 
that the Central China Post ceased publication in August 1941, partly because of 
Chinese demands for higher wages and partly due to “outside pressure” related to 
political intrigue which would not have been possible without “Japanese 
connivance”.39 
 
(ii) Personal Diaries 
There are numerous medical missionary accounts that describe medical services 
within the internment camps.40  Differing from the standard descriptions of life in 
these camps that chronicle daily life is Gilkey’s Shantung Compound: The Story 
of Men and Women Under Pressure, which describes in detail the gulf between 
missionaries and the other internees.41  Besides describing his own internment 
                                                 
38 The daily price per war-time copy was 600 fen.  Hankou zuzie  zhi  bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.),  
Hankou zujie zhi 汉口租界志 (Records of the Hankou Foreign Concessions), Wuhan, Wuhan 
chubanshe 2003, pp. 316–317.   
39 FO371/27701/F6592/858/10. 
40 Gale, G., Interned in China, London, Livingstone Press, 1946;  Adolph, P.E., Surgery Speaks to 
China: The Experiences of a Medical Missionary to China in Peace and in War, Philadelphia,  
China Inland Mission, 1945; Gillison, K,H., The Cross and the Dragon: A Medical Family in 
Central China, Nottingham, Hawthorne’s, 1988; Cliff, N., Courtyard of The Happy Way, 
Evesham, Arthur James Limited, 1977 and Prisoners of the Samurai:  Japanese Civilian Camps in 
China, 1941–1945, Rainham Essex, Courtyard, 1998;  Michell, D., A Boy’s War,  Singapore, 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1988. For a child’s-eye view of internment see: Previte, M.T., A 
Song of Salvation of Weihsien Prison Camp, San Francisco, The Spring Inc., 1985. 
41 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound: the Story of Men and Women Under Pressure, London: 
Antony Blond, 1966. 
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experience, Gilkey concentrates on personal interactions between internees. The 
result is an account of the experiences of an insider narrated as if viewed by an 
outsider. Using his own internment diaries for reference, Gilkey documents the 
tensions and problems caused by the lack of privacy and he documents the 
theological arguments that arose between liberal and conservative missionaries. 
The MMS medical missionary Pearson’s account of the beginning of the war is 
also different from many others because he was a Conscientious Objector (CO)  
opposed to the war on moral grounds. 42  Most medical missionaries appear to 
have been, if not publically in support of China, at least sympathetic in the face of 
what they perceived as Japanese aggression. Rowland’s End of an Era – Stories 
from Central China during the War Years provides an eye-witness account of the 
Japanese occupation of Wuchang and Hankou.43    
Historical records reflect the conditions in which they were created, and 
records fashioned during periods of hostility understandably reflect the chaos of 
war, being subject to physical destruction by enemy action and retreating forces. 
As an example, the correspondence in the Chinese Recorder offices was burned 
following Pearl Harbor, by office employees, specifically to prevent it falling into 
Japanese hands.44  Records may also be incomplete, or the situation may have 
been so chaotic they were never created in the first place. 45 For example, District 
of Hankow: The Newsletter ceased publication in 1941 and did not resume until 
December 1947. Records that do exist, for example internment diaries, may have 
been surreptitiously scribbled in difficult circumstances, or censored, making 
them awkward to decipher bringing risk of misinterpretation. Such records, 
                                                 
42 Pearson, G.H., Get Up and Go, London, Epworth Press, 1968. 
43 Rowlands, E., End of an Era – Stories from Central China during the War Years, London, 
Livingstone Press, 1947. 
44 Rawlinson, J.L., Rawlinson, 1990, p. 5. 
45 For example: cessation of Annual hospital reports. 
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written under duress in captivity by frustrated and disorientated individuals 
provide an insight into the world of internment.  The difficulties of working with 
these sketchy sources and their limitations could be one of the reasons why 
historians have been reluctant to undertake detailed research on medical 
missionaries during the war.   
A pertinent example of personal wartime primary sources is the 
internment camp diary of Gladys Stephenson (1889–1981) Matron of the 
Methodist General Hospital (Pu’ai yiyuan普愛醫 院) in Hankou, and Principal of 
the School of Nursing. Stephenson was a founder of the NAC and its President in 
1924. 46  Available for study are her diaries, NAC and Matron’s reports. 47  Of 
particular significance is the diary Stephenson kept in 1945, in letter format, while 
interned in Longhua camp.48  This document highlights some of the difficulties 
referred to above when examining a diary account written under demanding 
conditions; the writing is very small and difficult to decipher.  The value of 
Stephenson’s diary is its immediacy, which unlike her retrospective official 
reports, provides an uncensored insight into her personal internment experience as 
it unfolded.  
 There are other diary accounts of medical missionary experience during 
the war, such as an account of the first days of the Japanese occupation of Hankou, 
written by Dr. Mary Redhead. 49  This record has an immediacy and urgency 
missing from many retrospective accounts. Experiences recorded at the time have 
proved to be a much richer source than records collated retrospectively. This is 
                                                 
46 The NAC was a self-supporting professional organisation of registered nurses.  While not 
attached to any missionary society, the majority of its members were missionaries who had been 
trained in, or who had worked in, mission hospitals.  Boynton, C.L. and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 
1936, p. 144.  
47Stephenson Box, Methodist Missionary Archives, MMS 642/643, MF1359. 
48 Ibid., MF 1393. 
49 Redhead, M., Diary, Cram/Papers/69, Lincolnshire Archives, Lincoln, UK. 
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particularly noticeable in the case of ACM Nurse Emeline Bowne who wrote 
letters to her family each week recounting her experiences during the war. 50  
Unable to send them when completed, she accumulated them until opportunities 
for despatch arose.  These are vibrant, on-the-spot reports, containing fascinating 
minutiae, and consequently, the everyday moments of wartime are captured. In 
contrast, Bowne was interviewed many years later, in 1985, but although she 
retells the same events, her account is flat and dull in comparison to her 
contemporary writings. 51   Whether this is through boredom, because she has 
forgotten the details that make her war-time account so informative, or a 
consequence of the method of transcription it is impossible to tell, but the contrast 
in liveliness, and content, between the two versions is noticeable.  
 
(iii) Oral History 
Despite the passage of time retrospective oral histories of the period are useful; 
although, because these may have been recorded and transcribed many years 
following the event, memories can become blurred, recollections muddled,  
‘improved’ or dulled. For example, when Redhead’s son, Professor John Cram, 
(1940–2008) was interviewed he related how he and his parents had left Hankou, 
travelled on a Japanese boat to Vancouver and arrived just three weeks before 
Pearl Harbor. 52  En route Cram’s father had enquired of the Japanese ship’s 
captain what would happen if war broke out and was told that the ship would turn 
and head for Japan.  Arriving just three weeks before the outbreak of the Pacific 
War, the Cram’s were fortunate to arrive just in time.  However, when Cram’s 
                                                 
50 Bowne, E. to her family, 1937–1945, RG270, ACM archive. 
51 Bowne, E., Oral History Transcript, August, 1985, ACM archive. 
52 John Cram was born in Hubei during the war, the son of Rev. Fred and Dr. Mary Cram, née 
Redhead. Following the war the family returned to Hankou where they remained until 1949. 
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father’s diaries were studied, it became clear that the family had arrived in 
Vancouver in April 1941, many months before Pearl Harbor. When he discovered 
this, Professor Cram was genuinely mystified and said he distinctly remembered 
his father telling him they had only just arrived in time, but he accepted that the 
re-telling was, in fact, a false mistaken memory.53  This illustrates the importance, 
and value, of placing oral testimony alongside the written records of the period.  
However, despite this type of factual inaccuracy, oral reminiscences can provide 
valuable information about work routines, housing and, in the case of medical 
missionaries, hospital and clinic procedures.  Oral history also provides an insight 
into the human detail and opinions lacking in official institution, government and 
military accounts. 
The opportunity to interview medical missionaries, internees and their 
relatives was a privilege that added greatly to my understanding of the period. Of 
these interviewees Norman Cliff was interned as a young man and was able to 
confirm that the liberal-conservative debates described in the literature were 
present in Weixian camp. He has published his experiences and the writer of this 
thesis was able to supplement these with his 2007 oral testimony. 54  Medical 
missionaries naturally took up positions within the camp hospitals which gave 
them an advantage over many of their fellow internees keeping them occupied 
and providing their lives with a purpose that others lacked.  Dr. Frances McAll, 
from Xiaochang and Qilu University, who was interned with her infant daughter 
and husband Kenneth, also a doctor, was able to describe conditions in Pudong 
(Pootung) Camp.55 Two Chinese nurses, Jin Feipa and Zhang Fuyin,  interviewed 
                                                 
53 Cram J., in conversation, November 9th, 2007. 
54 Cliff, N., Courtyard, 1977, and Prisoners, 1998.   
55 Frances McAll’s appointment as an LMS medical missionary set a precedent in that, prior to her 
marriage, she was self-supporting but recognised as an LMS missionary.  In practice, this applied 
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in Wuhan in 2007, had both worked as nurses in Hankou and were able to furnish 
details of their training under medical missionary supervision.  Jin Feipa 
described how he was taught English and read medical books in English, but 
always read the Bible in Chinese. Both nurses evacuated west to Chongqing so 
were unable to supply details of Hankou under the Japanese occupation. Dr. 
David Landsborough (b. 1914) a former medical missionary who worked in 
Fujian Province during the war years in Free China, recounted how the FAU 
supplied medical missionaries with medical supplies in Fujian Province.56  He 
also remembered receiving post that came into China via The Hump and was able 
to confirm that mail was able to get through to Fujian during the war years.57   
Particularly relevant, in the recording of oral history, are the interviewer’s 
questions and the avenues pursued, so the interviewer must remain aware of 
her/his own reflexivity.  As a writer with no missionary connections, it is perhaps 
easier to retain greater objectivity in interviewing, transcribing and analysing the 
material for this thesis than it would have been for those with familial missionary 
ties. However, disassociation and distance from a historical period is also to an 
interviewer’s disadvantage. Moore has noted there is a specific language used by 
those who have shared experiences and that such language, rooted in the event, 
inevitably excludes outsiders.58  For the wartime interviewee there is the dilemma 
of how everyday wartime language will be interpreted by the post-war interviewer.  
Should the interviewee self censor his/her account assuming the interviewer, who 
                                                                                                                                     
only to her journey out to China as she married soon upon arrival in 1939. Cocker Brown, T., to 
Busby, N.M., May 12th, 1939, CWM/LMS CH/16, 1941–50, North China District Committee: 
Correspondence: Secretary, file E.  
56 Landsborough, D., in correspondence, February 12th, 2007. 
57 Ibid. The Hump was the wartime air route over the Himalayas between India and China. 
58 Moore, A., “The Problem of Changing Language Communities: Veterans and Public Memory in 
Post-war China, Japan and Taiwan”, Conference, How To Tell the Tale: The Wartime Generation 
and Historical Memory in Postwar East Asia, St, Antony’s College, University of Oxford, China’s 
War with Japan Programme, May 17th, 2009. 
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‘was not there’, will not understand?  How is the everyday ‘banter’ and ‘slang’ of 
camaraderie in the theatre of war to be translated for those of a different 
generation? Can the interviewer break through this barrier of exclusion or is 
he/she forever distanced from the experience?  Positively however, as Moore also 
notes, the interviewee is motivated by the desire to tell his/her story, to set the 
record straight, to make sure that the ‘truth’ (their truth) is recorded.  This creates 
a strong incentive for the interviewee to attempt to connect with the interviewer. 
Moore notes that the self-published memoir allows the writer the most leeway in 
telling the tale, particularly if they do not have a public voice. While the writer 
interviewed Frances McAll she referred several times to The Moon Looks Down, 
an account written by herself and her husband of their lives under Japanese 
occupation.59  As McAll referred to events recorded in the book she took great 
care to explain small details, in particular supplying background information 
concerning the chaotic process of repatriation selection in Shanghai  which will be 
referred to again in chapter six.  
 
(iv) Chinese Material 
The Protestant medical missions in Hubei province have not been the subject of 
detailed research for the wartime period although some work has been undertaken 
on the Methodist hospital in Hankou by Kang Zhijie 康志杰  of Hubei 
University.60 Two recent publications were invaluable in providing material on 
the provision of health services in Wuhan:  the Records of the Hankou Foreign 
                                                 
59 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon Looks Down, London, Darley Anderson, 1987. 
60 Kang Zhijie 康志杰 “Yizhi binghuan, yi zhang jidu zhi ai” – Yingguo xundao hui Hankou Pu’ai 
yiyuan yanjiu (1864–951) “医治病患，以彰基督之爱” –  英国循道会汉口普爱医院研究 
(1864–1951) (“Treating sickness displaying Jesus Christ’s love” – Research on the English 
Methodist Society Pu’ai Hospital, (1864–1951)), Hubei University, unpublished, 2007.   
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Concessions61  and The Hygiene Records of Wuhan City.62 The first focuses upon 
the history of the foreign concessions providing lists of hospitals, dates and 
medical statistics with information on daily life concerning banks, industrial and 
manufacturing concerns, newspapers and such like. The Hygiene Records relate 
more specifically to medical matters. Both these publications provided useful 
material for cross-referencing Chinese and foreign mission hospital and staff 
records.  The Records of the Pu’ai Hospital63 are a celebration of the hospital and 
its foreign and Chinese staff providing further information. 
 In Wuhan, the Hubei Provincial Archives despite my receiving open 
access to the index, were disappointing, yielding mainly post-war United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) reports and public sanitation 
papers for Hankou under the Chinese puppet government administration.64 I had 
especially hoped to find contemporary Chinese references to the mission 
hospitals’, and others’, contribution to work amongst refugees and the wounded 
during the war. Material specifically referring to medical missionary work 
consisted of Annual Hospital Reports in English. Similarly, most of the papers in 
Chinese in the archives at Central China Normal University, which owes its 
origins to ACM, were concerned with educational syllabi, nominal rolls and exam 
results.  There were papers in English but these were photocopies of educational 
papers from Yale University. The East-West Cultural Exchange Research Center, 
of the university had an excellent library of published western Christian material 
                                                 
61 Hankou zuzie zhi, 2003. 
62 Wuhan difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Wuhan shizhi: Weisheng zhi,  武汉市志: 卫生志 
( The Hygiene Records of Wuhan City), Wuchang, Wuhan daxue chubanshe,  1993. 
63 Wuhan difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Pu’ai Yiyuan Zhi   普爱医院志, (Pu’ai Hospital 
Records), Wuhan, Wuhan chubanshe, 2002.  
64Hankou tebie shi zhengfu si zhounian shizheng gaikuang: Weisheng 漢口特別市政府四周年市
政概況:卫生（Hankou Special City Government, Four Year Annual Review Sanitation Record, 
1942,）bB13 7, Hankou City archives, p. 70.  
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from many countries, but again, there was no Chinese material relevant to my 
research.  The Hankou City Archives department of the Provincial Archives 
presented a different problem in that the index was not made freely available to 
the public and I had to rely on the archivists to produce material they thought 
relevant. Although useful information in official published documents was 
produced, it proved impossible to deduce exactly what lay within this archive. 
The diaries and personal correspondence found in abundance in western archives 
appeared to be absent in all the archives consulted in Wuhan.  This does not seem 
to be unique to the Wuhan archives as other researchers have commented on this 
lacuna in Chinese archives.65  With reference to memoir literature, Coble notes 
that not only was having private documents dangerous during the Cultural 
Revolution when Red Guards were searching homes for evidence of “enemy 
agent” activity, but also that: 
Anyone in China old enough to have been active in the war and literate 
enough to keep letters or diaries has been through the events of the Mao 
years. Could such a person go back and “remember” without going 
through the prism of struggle sessions, life histories and worries of the 
consequences of “historical remembering”?66  
 
How much harder, then, it is to ‘remember’ working for a western, imperialistic, 
medical institution. It appears that such memories have been either physically 
destroyed or mentally laid to rest. 
 Chinese records relating to foreign medical missionaries’ Chinese 
colleagues and patients are also sparse because so many of the latter were 
illiterate. Not only, therefore, is there a dearth of archival material but also a 
                                                 
65 Selles notes that while successful in piecing together “a picture of many of the Christians in 
Rugao, I have been able to hear only whispers of their voices”. This he attributes to the destruction 
of documents in the 1950s and 60s and he notes existing documents are difficult to obtain being 
deemed politically sensitive. Selles, K.D., Many Points, 2005. 
66 Coble, P.M., “China’s ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–
1945”, in The China Quarterly, Vol., 190, June, 2007, pp. 394–410, p. 407. 
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shortage of opinions. The societies did, however, use articles about their Chinese 
colleagues in their fund raising magazines to enlighten those at home concerning 
the Society’s work in the field.  Two articles were written about Dr. Chiang  
(Jiang Huchen 江虎臣), of the Hankou Pu’ai yiyuan for the Foreign Field of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church Journal. 67  Having trained in Edinburgh, Chiang 
wrote with full fluency in English, as illustrated by the letters he wrote to the 
Home Board requesting a rise in his salary in 1919.68  Chiang would have been 
able to document his personal experiences in Chinese, and English, but does not 
appear to have done so.  
Chinese doctors, educated in the West, and who were fluent in a European 
language, do not appear to have left personal memoirs of their working lives. 
There are some Annual Hospital Reports in western archives written by Chinese 
medical professionals, such as Dr. Chiang. However, Annual Hospital Reports are 
official documents that reveal few, if any, of the personal thoughts and feelings of 
the writer. The vast majority of personal accounts of the wartime period are those 
written by returning missionaries who interviewed staff, and thus the period from 
1942 to the autumn of 1945 can only be explored second hand through a western 
perspective. Regarding this thesis this has resulted in a bias towards western 
material and interpretation.  There is however, some SDA material in Zhonghua 
sheng gong shi 中華聖工史 (History of Sacred Work in China), which is a 
collection of interviews with Chinese missionaries and includes some medical 
                                                 
67 Gedye, E.F., “The Story of Dr. Chiang”, in  Foreign Field of the Wesleyan Methodist Church,  
April 1917, pp. 148–9;  Minty, C.S., “Tending the Chinese Wounded”, in  Foreign Field of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church, December, 1927, pp. 63–66. 
68 For a comprehensive account of Chiang’s correspondence with the society see Chang, N.J., 
“Tension Within the Church: British Missionaries in Wuhan, 1913–1928”, in Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol., 33, No. 1, 1999, pp. 421–444. For an example of his correspondence see Chiang, 
H.T., to Hill, J.K., May 14th, 1918, WMMS Box 7, MF 310. 
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missionary life histories.69  While these are mainly of a narrative character it has 
been possible to glean some facts about these missionaries unavailable elsewhere. 
 Some personal Chinese oral history accounts can be found in the Wenshi 
ziliao 文史资料  (Collections of Historical Materials) which are a national, 
provincial and city/county collection of materials on economic, social and cultural 
matters.70  Because these accounts were created post-1960 they have to be treated 
with caution as they were written under strong Communist constraints.71  The 
Wenshi ziliao are retrospective accounts and therefore have possibly undergone 
revision and, as officially published accounts, they are edited.  However they 
remain useful in providing an insight into relations between Chinese and 
foreigners, and produce links to other relevant information. A number of these 
records take the form of autobiographical accounts of life during the Republican 
Period. For example: “My fifty Years in Hubei Parish”.72   
Hunt and Westad, in discussing research problems in the PRC in 1990, 
stressed the sensitivity of some of the Chinese archives and noted: 
The state and the party still regard the past as well within its sphere of 
control and hence claim the prerogative to direct the development of the 
[research] field along politically acceptable lines.73   
 
                                                 
69 SDA, Zhonghua sheng gong shi, xia ce,  中華聖工史 ,  下册 (History of Sacred Work in China), 
Vol., 2, Chinese Union Mission of the Seventh-day Adventists Jidu fulin anxiri hui – huaan 
lianhehui,  基督复臨安息日會 – 華安聯合會, Hong Kong, 2002. I am grateful to Professor and 
Mrs. Sylvia Dudbridge for alerting me to this publication and for allowing me to access their 
translations.  
70 Kampen, T., “An Introduction to the Wenshi ziliao ”, Institute of Chinese Studies, University of 
Heidelberg 2004,  http://www.sino.uni-heidelberg.de/database/wenshi/intro.htm  accessed August 
28th, 2009. 
71 Ibid., p.1. Compiled iIn response to a speech given by the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai 
on April 29th, 1959 stressing the importance of recording historical material since 1898. 
72 Zhu, Yunguang, 朱运广, “Wo zai Hubei jiaoqu wushi nian” 我在湖北教区五十年 (My Fifty 
Years in Hubei Parish), in Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian, Beijing, Zhongguo  wenshi chubanshe, 
1986, Vol., 25, pp. 825–833. 
73 Hunt, M.H., Westad, O.A., “The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs:  a Field 
Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems”, in The China Quarterly, No. 122, 
June, 1990, pp. 258–272, p. 264. 
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Even in 2009 an awareness of the Chinese government’s sensitivity to foreign 
criticism must be borne in mind when dealing with Chinese material. At the time 
of writing this thesis, medical missionaries seem to be regarded as being the least 
controversial by the CCP.  In April 2008, a three-day conference on “Body, Soul 
and Nature: Christian Medical Missions and Social Works in China” under the 
auspices of the Ricci Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural History and the 
Center for Judaic and Inter Religious Studies of Shandong University was held at 
Jinan.74 The papers presented covered all denominations and included, amongst 
others, “The Educational Significance of Christian Medical Work” and “The 
Testimony of Life: An Appraisal of Modern Christian Medical Work”. 75 This 
public acknowledgement and academic interest in medical missionary work in 
China will, however, probably be too late to encourage the last few survivors to 
record their experiences retrospectively. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Having presented the main arguments of this thesis and considered the relevant 
scholarly literature and outlined the methodology the remainder of this chapter 
will examine the medical missionary role. The second chapter will explore the 
medical missionary group legacy and individual motivation and will also attempt 
to explain why medical missionaries chose to remain in China when others 
                                                 
74 Ricci Institute, “Shenti, linghun, Zhongguo jidujiao yu yiliao, shehui shiye yanjiu”  身体，灵
魂，中国基督教与医疗，社会事业研究 (Body, Soul and Nature: Christian Medical Missions 
and Social Works in China), unpublished papers, Ricci Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural 
History and the Center for Judaic and Inter Religious Studies of Shandong University, April 18th–
20th, Jinan, 2008. 
75 Liu Xinli 刘新利 (Shandong University), “Jidujiao yiliao shigong de jiaoli yiyi” 基督教医疗事
工的教理意义 (The Educational Significance of Christian Medical Work), pp.23–26; Kang Zhijie
康志杰, (Wuhan Provincial University), “Shengming de jianzheng: jindai jidujiao yiliao shigong 
pingyi”  康志杰,生命的见证：近代基督教医疗事工平议 (The Testimony of Life: An Appraisal 
of Modern Christian Medical Work)，Ricci Institute, Shenti, 2008, pp.45–58. 
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retreated. Chapter three will provide an overview of medical missionary work in 
China during the war to place the Hubei case study in perspective. In chapters 
four and five the focus falls upon the Hubei province regional study in which 
urban and rural medical missionary work can be examined and the medical 
missionary wartime experience evaluated.  The records of medical missionaries 
from eight mission societies provide the foundation for these regional study 
chapters.76  The internment experience is considered in chapter six, and reveals 
that some medical missionaries experienced unexpected reactions from their 
fellow internees while highlighting the contribution medical missionaries made to 
medical work within the camps. Chapter seven examines the immediate post-war 
period with a continued focus on Hubei.  
 
The Medical Missionary Role 
(i) Theological and Generational Tensions  
Despite the new found inter-denominational co-operation that, as will be argued, 
grew up between missionaries during the war, a long-standing problem within 
Protestantism that exercised Mission Board executive and missionary minds 
persisted; the liberal-conservative theological argument.77 The conservatives had 
little regard for social work or political or economic issues and believed their role 
was to evangelise and convert as many people as quickly as possible.  The 
millennium could arrive at any time, souls had to be saved from eternal suffering 
and damnation and, despite China’s economic and social problems, in the 
                                                 
76 LMS, MMS, ACM/PEC, SDA, CSFM, NLK, SMF, CovMS. See Appendix II for key to these 
acronyms. 
77 Conservatives and fundamentalists shared the same doctrine but the latter were actively 
aggressive towards liberals whereas the conservatives were prepared to show tolerance towards 
them. Varg, P.A., Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary 
Movement in China, 1850–1952, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958, p. 212. 
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conservative view, the missionary’s role must be essentially spiritual. 78   The 
liberals and conservatives were, in effect, operating opposing methodologies with 
the shared aim of bringing Christianity to China. Liberals, also known as 
modernists, were less concerned than conservatives with prioritising evangelism 
and more intent on illustrating God’s Word through western medicine and 
education.79  The Bible Union of China, an anti-modernist movement, complained 
that Christianity in China was being subordinated to social work.80   
In particular the YMCA and YWCA were considered to be at fault for not 
emphasizing the evangelistic side of Christian work and Mission Boards were 
criticised for failing to demand from evangelists the high standards they expected 
from their teachers and doctors.81  Hutchison writes that liberals were considering 
a more collaborative approach to non-Christian religions and non-western 
cultures.82  In short, liberal missionaries were regarded by fundamentalists and 
conservatives as subordinating conversion. One pre-war conservative critic 
publicly called for a decrease of emphasis on education, medicine and social 
service. 83  We shall see, in chapter seven, that despite wartime change some 
missionaries retained their conservative views. One missionary interpreted war 
time change, increased cooperation with the National government and increasing 
Chinese autonomy as an opportunity to pass all responsibility for education and 
medicine to the Chinese government so that all missionary work could be directed 
                                                 
78 Cliff, N., “A History of the Protestant Movement in Shandong Province, China, 1859–1951”, 
D.Phil Thesis, University of Buckingham, 1994, p. 269  
79 Ibid., p. 215. 
80 Hutchison, W.R., Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions, 
London and Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 139. 
81 Ibid.   
82 Ibid., p. 145. 
83 Ibid., p. 140.W.H. Griffith Thomas, a British conservative Old Testament Scholar who began 
teaching in Toronto in 1910 first expressed this view in the 1920s.  
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towards evangelising Christianity.84 Such opinions had always infuriated liberal 
medical missionaries but were particularly exasperating to them in the post-war 
period when they wanted to build upon the foundations they had laid down during 
the war. 
Generational tensions were linked with this liberal-conservative debate. 
Young medical missionaries, such as Drs. Kenneth and Frances McAll and Dr. 
David Landsborough who all arrived in China in the late 1930s, had the advantage 
of modern scientific medical training and, as a generation, were much more 
influenced than their predecessors by the ideas of the new social consciousness of 
the Social Gospel.85  They were more liberal in outlook than their predecessors 
and were motivated more by scientific professionalism than the spiritual. This 
younger generation regarded their Chinese colleagues as competent equals in 
contrast to some of their predecessors, who retained paternalistic attitudes towards 
their colleagues, although this began to change in the 1930s with the appointment 
of Chinese Christians to positions of authority.86  However, these appointments 
were too insignificant to result in any major transformation of practice and failed 
to completely open the doors to Chinese management of medical institutions. As a 
result of their out-dated attitudes the older medical missionaries, such as Lee 
Huizenga (b.1881), were unable to advocate fully the stand-alone Chinese 
Christian Church which had been the proclaimed goal of the Protestant mission in 
China, since 1869.  Although outwardly these medical missionaries espoused The 
                                                 
84 Rowlands, W.F., “Some Notes on LMS Policy in China”, February 1947, CWM/LMS CH/51, 
1941–50, Notes on North and East China, Rowlands file. 
85 This movement grew out of the industrialisation of American cities.  In China the Social Gospel 
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on literacy.  For a missionary account of Jimmie Yen’s educational  work with the one thousand 
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86 For example: Dr. David Landsborough’s respect for the Chinese surgeon at Putien.  Refer p. 60. 
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Three Selfs (san zi 三自 ) goal of self-support, self-government and self- 
propagation, most remained unable to hand over the reins perhaps realising it 
would signal their own redundancy.87  Had the younger generation held positions 
of greater authority, perhaps the appointment of Chinese Christians to positions of 
authority would have been more numerous. 
Mission Board executives and missionaries of all kinds also theorised over 
the “Christ–culture” tensions of missionary work. These tensions arose between 
Christianity, the missionaries’ religion, and their own civilisation or society and 
are described by Hutchison as consisting primarily of three forms. 88 In its first 
form missionaries preached Christianity yet originated from a civilisation that had 
a hidden darker side that included the slave traders and land grabbers who had 
originally paved the way for the missionaries. Missionaries attempted to conceal 
their conflicts with their fellow commercial, military and diplomatic 
representatives from the foreigner parishioners to whom they were preaching in 
order to present a united front but, when at home, they complained about how 
their work was undermined by these fellow compatriots. Secondly, there were 
tensions concerning the unspoken, but underlying quandary, of whether Western 
civilization was, in fact, superior to indigenous culture and thirdly, the question 
was asked as to how much of their culture were missionaries employed to 
transmit?89  However, for medical missionaries the most often discussed tensions 
surrounding their work concerned the question: what exactly was the medical 
missionary role? 
 
                                                 
87 The Three Selfs were advanced by Rufus Anderson (1796–1880) Secretary of the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1869 as a theory for missions.  Cliff, Norman, 
“A History”, 1994, p. 165. 
88 Hutchison, W.R., Errand, 1993, p. 9. 
89 Ibid., p. 9–12. 
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(ii) The Two-fold Call 
Medical missionaries had, over the years, theorised over tensions related to their 
mission role and debated to what extent they were practising medicine, and to 
what extent satisfying their own, or their Mission Boards’, evangelising 
requirements.90  This issue separated them from other missionaries and extended 
beyond the individual medical missionary to the medical ministry: 
Whether the captive audience of proud Moslems or Buddhists in a 
hospital ward were to be preached to and prayed over, or just healed, was 
the sort of symbolic and practical issue that could determine the nature, 
and sometimes the fate, of any missionary endeavour.91 
 
 Should a medical missionary’s primary allegiance be the propagation of 
the Gospel or the practice of medicine? In what role did medical missionaries 
perceive themselves and how did others perceive them? To what extent did 
medical missionaries inherit their role as a historical legacy?  Was this role 
revised as a result of the changes experienced during the war? An attempt to 
answer these questions will aid our understanding of some of the tensions 
underlying war-time medical missionary work and help identify the outcomes.  
 In the nineteenth century, medical missionaries in China were used by 
their mission societies as an advance guard to convey Christianity.  Fanning out 
from the cities into the rural areas they operated a ‘wedge’ tactic whereby 
medical missionaries would gain access into an area and pave the way for other 
missionaries - ‘God’s Soldiers’ - to follow.  The mission societies’ aim was that 
potential converts would be drawn to medical missions for western medical 
                                                 
90 This issue was referred to as a ‘two fold mission’ by Balme, H., in China, 1921,  p. 7; in 1937  
H.O. Chapman, a medical missionary in Hankou, refers to the ‘two fold aspect’ of medical 
missionary work in “The Function of Christian Medical Work in Modern China”, in Chinese 
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91 Somervell, “Medical Missions”, 1946, p. 13. 
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treatment simultaneously providing a captive audience that could be presented 
with the Gospel.  Following treatment, patients would return home and relay the 
Word of God. As a result, Christianity would spread throughout China and an 
indigenous self-propagating Chinese Church would evolve.  
By 1913, medical missionaries, as a professional body, perceived the 
advance guard role thrust upon them by their mission societies negatively and, at 
a meeting of the China Medical Missionary Conference, resolved that:  
Medical missions are not to be regarded as a temporary expedient for 
opening the way for, and extending the influence of, the Gospel, but as 
an integral coordinate and permanent part of the missionary work of the 
Christian Church.92   
 
(iii) The Medical Missionary and his Peers in the  Nineteenth Century  
In February 1838 the first medical missionary association in China, the “Medical 
Missionary Society in China,” was established in Canton by the Presbyterian 
Peter Parker (1804–1888) who is generally acknowledged as the first medical 
missionary to China.  The first two aims of the society’s manifesto provide a clear 
indication of the society’s underlying philosophy; to encourage western medicine 
and pass the benefits of western science to the Chinese. It is not until the third aim 
that the Gospel is introduced:  
 3. To cultivate confidence and friendship, and thus introduce the Gospel 
 of Christ in place of heathenism. 93  
 
Thus, the first medical missionaries in the newly founded Chinese field perceived 
their role primarily as medical with propagation of the Gospel playing an 
auxiliary role. 
 The “body-soul dichotomy”94 that characterised the Two-fold Call in the 
                                                 
92 Cited in Shields, R.T., “Medical Missions in China”, in IRM, Vol., 33, 1944, p. 288.  
93 Association’s aims cited by Balme, H., China, 1921, p. 42.  
94 This term appears to have first been used by Grundmann, C., “Proclaiming the Gospel by 
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 nineteenth Century was complicated by a secular argument in the official journal 
of the British Medical Association (BMA), The Lancet.95   This argument was 
motivated more by the BMA’s desire to protect its professional reputation than 
from a desire for genuine debate concerning the medical missionary role. 96  A 
Lancet editorial reported it had been approached by the London Missionary 
Society (LMS) seeking to place an advertisement for medical missionaries for 
China but it was not published in that edition because space would not allow.97 
Whether this was accurate or not it is not now possible to ascertain but this writer 
would suggest it likely that The Lancet perceived an opportunity, via its editorial 
column, to solicit opinion on the placing of such an advertisement. Otherwise why 
mention it?  The editorialist advises its readers against any haste in taking up such 
an appointment: 
We feel assured, however, that no members of our profession… will 
hastily close with the proposals which the Society have to make.98 
 
   The advertisement appeared the following week under “Proposal of the London 
Missionary Association to Introduce Christianity into China by the Agency of 
English Surgeons” 99   The LMS expressed very definite ideas concerning the 
quality of applicant by seeking men of “true piety” who would not expect 
profitable remuneration and who could “endure hardships and sacrifice personal 
comforts”. 100  
                                                 
95 Published in London since 1823. The BMA was founded in 1832. 
96 Young, T.K., “A Conflict of Professions: The Medical Missionary in China, 1835–1890”, in 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol., 47, No. 3, May–June, 1973, pp. 250–272. 
97 Cited by Young, T.K., “A Conflict of Professions: The Medical Missionary in China, 1835–
1890”, in Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol., 47, No. 3, May–June, 1973, pp. 250–272. 
98 BMA, The Lancet, London, Vol., 2, June 24th, 1837, p. 490.  
99 Ibid., Vol., 2, July 1st, 1837, p. 520. 
100 Ibid. 
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Two weeks later, The Lancet published a letter from the MMS in China 
taken from the Canton Press of November 1836 which concerned the poor results 
of fundraising for an Ophthalmic Hospital in Canton. 101  
 We [the Medical Missionary Society in China] hoped that the foreign 
community at Canton would come forward with liberal subscriptions, to 
advance these benevolent plans.  Some subscriptions have been received 
but the public (so liberal on other occasions) has but coldly co-operated 
with the promoter of the medical missionary scheme and funds are not 
forthcoming very readily.102 
 
While providing no editorial comment the unspoken message is clear; work in 
China was unsupported by the foreign community and it would be unwise to 
consider taking up such an appointment. Thus discouragement from the medical 
professional body, the BMA, added to the complications surrounding the body-
soul dichotomy. 
 In the second half of the nineteenth century the medical profession was 
beginning to regulate itself and attempting to improve its public image. 103   If 
good medical work was practised abroad the BMA required credit to pass to the 
missionary in his role as a professional doctor, not as a missionary.  Certainly the 
editor of The Lancet, Thomas Wakley, who had been the editor throughout the 
correspondence referred to above, remained definite in 1855 that medicine and 
theology did not blend; he feared religious fervour would take the place of sound 
scholarship.  
…and the man who, like the Pharisee in the Temple, has taken pains to 
perform his devotional exercises with judicial ostentation, is preferred to 
the most able and accomplished student of medicine.104 
 
                                                 
101 Canton Press 1835–1844,  newspaper owned by Dent & Co.  
102 Lancet, Vol., 2, July 15th, 1837, p. 608. 
103 The 1858 Medical Act established the General Medical Council, regulated the qualifications of 
medical practitioners and established a register of qualified physicians. 
104 Lancet, Vol., 1, January 13th,, 1855, p. 44. 
 48 
 The medical establishment, as represented by The Lancet, therefore, was 
against medical missionary work fearing an eclipsing of the profession by 
missionary evangelism.  Members of the BMA had good reason to fear their 
professional standards might be compromised by medical missionary work.  The 
BMS Missionary Herald in 1880 reported that some brethren considered a shorter 
course in surgery and medicine than that normally provided by medical schools 
would suffice for medical missionary work.  As noted above, this was contrary to 
the proclaimed aims of the first medical missionary society in China. The 
Missionary Herald  proposed medicine should only be seen as secondary to: 
  the one great purpose of all missionary toil in China or elsewhere – ‘the 
Preaching the Gospel of the blessed God’; and this is exactly the view 
which the Committee at home take with regard to the special medical 
training of missionary candidates.105   
 
This illustrates BMS’ priorities were firmly rooted in the evangelistic side of its 
medical missionary work, but the proposed dilution of medical professionalism by 
a shorter course, and relegation to an auxiliary role, was precisely what concerned 
the BMA. 
 There were those, among the missionaries, who acknowledged the 
significance of the ‘wedge’ tactic yet regarded it as imperative that medical 
standards in the field should be upheld. Writing in 1886 to BMS headquarters, the 
Rev. Alfred Jones (1846?-1905) acknowledged the usefulness of the tactic writing 
that it was “irrefragably true of China” that medicine was the “best pioneer”.106  
In the same letter, Jones went on to appeal for several medical missionaries to be 
sent to China and stressed the need for continuity, for men who were “fully 
qualified” [Jones’ emphasis], and able to cope with professional and social 
                                                 
105 The Missionary Herald of the Baptist Missionary Society, May 1st, 1880, p. 153. 
106 Jones, A.F., to Baynes, A.H., March 25th, 1886, CH/6 Letters to Baynes, 1886 file, BMS 
archive.  
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isolation. 107   Despite acknowledging the usefulness of the ‘wedge’ tactic, Jones, 
in common with the views held by the medical establishment at home, was of the 
opinion that healing and preaching could not be performed by one man, without 
standards being compromised. William Lockhart (1811–1896) of LMS shared a 
similar view, although his position was that, while medical missionaries should 
evangelise as they worked, and hand out Christian literature, they should be 
professionally trained physicians, not pastors, as a man could not follow two 
professions.108   
 Jones also stressed the importance of competent linguistic skills for 
medical missionaries since treating patients necessitated being able to understand 
their symptoms. He shared the view that medical professionalism was all 
important but, as outlined below, BMS, as a society, did not adopt his 
recommendation that medical missionaries should separate healing from 
preaching. The society, in common with other societies supporting medical 
missionary work, perceived their medical ministry as, essentially, a tool to aid the 
propagation of Christianity.  Medical work held an auxiliary position within the 
hierarchy of the foreign mission, and this stance inevitably impacted upon the 
bureaucratic-professional relationship between society executives and their 
medical professionals. Mission societies were constant in their evaluation of 
medical missionary work as primarily a purveyor of evangelism, and had no 
qualms about combining religion and medicine whereas some of their medical 
missionaries, working in the field, questioned their priorities and this led to 
discord. 
                                                 
107 Ibid.  
108 Lockhart opened the first mission hospital in Beijing in 1844. Lockhart, W., Medical 
Missionary in China: A Narrative of Twenty Years Experience, London, Hurst and Blackett, 1861, 
pp. 117–119.  
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 Another issue supporting the BMA’s fears that the medical missionary’s 
professionalism would be subordinated by his/her dual responsibility as medical 
professional and evangelist lay in the genuine concern that medical missionaries 
travelling to China were unnecessarily placing their lives at risk. From an 
emotionally-detached perspective, there was also the concern that early death 
resulted in a squandering of a medical missionary’s professional skills. Such 
concerns were not ill-founded as exemplified by one missionary doctor’s life; 
Robert Schofield, (1851–1883) M.A., M.S.Oxon., B.Sc.Lond., F.R.C.S.E., had a 
brilliant career gaining a first-class honours degree in Natural Science, an Open 
Scholarship in Natural Science and a Radcliffe Travelling Fellowship. Schofield 
died of Typhus at the age of 32 in 1883 after only two years in China. His Lancet 
obituary stated: 
It was now that he [Schofield] announced his intention to devote himself 
to medical missions abroad; and to that resolve, in spite of all opposition, 
he steadfastly adhered.109  
 
It is not apparent whether the “opposition” stemmed from his professional peers 
or his family and friends. Young focuses upon Schofield’s life as an example of a 
medical missionary who was able to combine medicine and evangelism: 
[Schofield] always kept the more directly spiritual part of his work in 
view, not only conducting the daily morning service for the patients 
himself, but in the Sunday meetings, in the street chapel, tea-shops, or 
crowded thoroughfares. 110 
 
However his death serves also to highlight the health dangers faced by medical 
missionaries.    
The Two-fold Call in the nineteenth century was therefore not only a 
professional matter for individual medical missionaries to ponder but also a 
                                                 
109  Lancet, Vol., 2, October 20th, 1883, p. 711. 
110 Ibid, cited by Young. 
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subject of debate within the medical establishment, which continued into the 
twentieth century.  
 
(iv) Serving the Two-Fold Call in the Twentieth Century  
Moving to the twentieth century, Chapman (1884–1972), an MMS surgeon at the 
Hankou Union Hospital during the war, who qualified as a doctor in 1907, 
publicly endorsed the Two-fold Call as a central factor in twentieth century 
medical missionary work.  In “The Function of Christian Medical Work in 
Modern China” he wrote: 
This [the Christian Church’s medical work] has always a two-fold 
aspect: on the one hand it is eager to heal the body as well as the 
soul of those who suffer: and on the other it is deeply concerned 
with the character and spirit of those whom it employs in this 
work.111  
 
Chapman’s “two-fold aspect” consisted of the body-soul facets of medical 
missionary work, and the development of the hospital staff’s Christian character. 
He considered the hospital a beacon of Christianity as well as a place of healing. 
Chapman’s paper was written in response to a League of Nations report on 
medical work in China in 1936 by Andrija Stampar. 112  Chapman interpreted the 
report as maintaining that the foreign medical missionary contribution to China 
had been less valuable than it might have been because medical missionaries had 
refused to pool resources and not paid enough attention to rural areas.  While this 
argument is certainly a valid one Chapman’s response was to cite the Two-fold 
aspect of medical missionary work to demonstrate there was more to medical 
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founders of the World Health Organisation. 
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missionary work than just healing. His article illustrates that the body and soul 
dichotomy of medical missionary work remained relevant to some medical 
missionaries, on the eve of the war.  
Not all medical missionaries prioritised their profession over the spiritual 
side of their work. During the war years, the medical missionary role was 
theorised over by Huizenga of the Christian Reformed Church (CRC) in 
Rugao.113  Huizenga (1881–1945) was a leprologist and active member of the 
CMA who regularly submitted papers to the CMJ. He was a conservative 
theologian and, in comparison with some medical missionaries during the war 
years, was an older-generation missionary having been born in 1881.114  Huizenga 
argued that medical missionary service had three stages: “Go”, “Preach”, and 
“Teach” and he upheld that the second stage was the most important.115  If a “high 
standard of service” is maintained in the third stage then this, he asserted, would 
lead naturally to a fourth stage – an indigenous church, a viewpoint he elaborated 
upon: 
The healing of the body is and always has been the inseparable 
companion of the preaching of the Gospel, and will remain so until the 
forgiven soul re-enters the resurrected body. As to what is most 
important let us rest ourselves at the thought that both are important and 
that no Christian physician will deny the necessity of the care of soul’s 
diseases, no more than any evangelist denies the necessity of the 
Christian healing of physical diseases… As to priority, the spiritual takes 
preference to the physical, even as the breath of God existed before the 
formed clay.116   
 
Huizenga’s priority of soul over body indicates not only his conservative 
theological perspective, but also that there were medical missionaries during the 
war years who gave evangelism a higher priority than healing.  For him, and those 
                                                 
113For an account of this mission and Huizenga’s work see Selles, K.D., “Many Points”, 2005. 
114 The conservative perspective was that China’s problems were essentially spiritual, not social or 
economic.   
115 Huizenga, “The Ultimate Need for the Christian Ministry of Medicine”, in Chinese Recorder, 
Shanghai, November, 1938, pp. 557–563, p. 560. 
116 Ibid., p. 561. 
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who held similar views, the war was an opportunity to evangelise amongst 
refugees and wounded, and an opportunity to further the pre-war goal of 
evangelising throughout China:  
 During these war times the medical missionary ministry has shown its true 
nature.  It lingered longest in the war torn areas, it returned first, it served as 
a handmaid, not to governments, not to individuals, not to evangelists, but to 
the evangelization of a country. It served the cause, not persons. Refugee 
camps too became evangelization workshops and the Christian medical 
service led the way, true to its nature”.117 
 
Huizenga was alert to the evangelistic possibilities of the situation, as he saw 
them, and resolute in considering the cause of evangelism superior to all other 
aspects of the medical ministry. Dr. Wilfred Flowers (1898–1958) of the BMS 
was also alert to this war-time opportunity, recognising the evangelistic 
opportunity it provided but he also recognised that others held different priorities: 
 Admittedly our ordinary missionary propaganda is going to be difficult 
of achievement [sic] with the Chinese mind supremely occupied with the 
one subject of the Japanese aggression. Bible reading has had to take 
second place to the reading of the latest war news.118  
 
 Chapman, Flowers and Huizenga were of the senior generation of medical 
missionaries active during the wartime period born in the nineteenth century.  We 
therefore only have access to their letters and official reports, and these official 
publications were, of necessity, formal, for public consumption and subject to 
mission board editing. 119  
 Adolph, born in 1901, a China Inland Mission (CIM) surgeon in China 
until 1941 followed CIM policy and evangelised while he worked.  He was aware 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 Flowers, W.S., to Chesterman, C.C., September 17th, 1937, CH/58, Flowers file, BMS archive. 
119 Bickers, R.A., Seton, R., Missionary Encounters, Sources and Issues, Richmond: Curzon Press,  
1996, p. 4, “…the missionary letter reprinted and circulated as a pamphlet by a grassroots worker 
might be the product of several blue pencils and publicists’ rewrites.  It is no sure guide to the 
thoughts of that individual: but it is sometimes the only surviving indicator of them.” 
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that medical missionaries ran the risk of being accused of using “Bible bashing” 
methods to browbeat their patients into conversion:   
Sometimes we meet folks in America who imagine that we force 
“religion” down the throats of helpless hospital people. This was not true.  
For those of us who had felt constrained by the love of Christ to leave 
friends and comforts back in America and had come to China for the 
purpose of helping the Chinese, it was only natural that, as we helped the 
Chinese back into physical health, we should also be impelled to share 
with them that which we believed was important for their spiritual 
health.120  
 
Without wishing to cast aspersions upon Adolph’s sincerity, it should be noted he 
was writing under the editorial auspices of the CIM mission board. By 1945, the 
date of publication of his memoirs, there was, as we shall see, greater sensitivity 
and a questioning of the medical missionary role in China, particularly by the 
mission society executive.  As a result, mission societies were anxious to deflect 
potential criticism of any perceived “Bible-bashing” form of evangelism and 
Adolph’s memoirs reflect this revised stance. 
 T. H. Somervell’s (1890–1975) 121 interpretation of the Two-fold Call was 
that of the ‘imitati Christi’ role of the medical missionary founded on the belief 
that Christ healed for love and, therefore, medical missionaries should aim to 
imitate Christ. He wrote that he always gave of his best because he imagined all 
his patients were Jesus and he highlighted the privilege of being called to be a 
medical missionary.  
 I feel amazed that God in His mercy has granted to me, with all my faults 
and shortcomings, the wonderful privilege of being in the humblest way 
associated with the great and glorious work of bringing His love to men 
and women and children who need it.122 [Italics added.] 
 
                                                 
120 Adolph, P.E., Surgery, 1945, p. 40. 
121Somervell took a Double First in Natural Sciences from Cambridge and worked in a Casualty 
Clearing Station in France during the First World War then became an LMS surgeon in India.  He 
joined the 1924 British expedition to Everest. 
122 Somervell, T.H., “Medical Missions”, p. 7. 
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 During the war, BMS used its official publications to present medical 
missionaries actively evangelising while they worked. This is illustrated by a 
dialogue written for the Missionary Herald by Dr. Ellen Clow, a wartime medical 
missionary in China. The dialogue, “A Doctor’s Job”, written to answer the 
question “What does a missionary doctor do?” provides an example of how a 
medical missionary’s daily work was portrayed to BMS’ supporters.123  Costumes 
for this dialogue could be hired from the BMS Lectures Department for 
performances at missionary meetings.  
  A small child and her mother are consulting a woman doctor (British) 
wearing a white coat, with stethoscope and pen.  After establishing the child has a 
painful wrist the doctor asks:  
 DOCTOR: “How long has he had it? How many years?” 
 MOTHER: “Since two years ago when he lost his temper.  Then it 
 dissolved, and each time he loses his temper it gets swollen and 
 painful.” 
 DOCTOR: “Tell him not to lose his temper.” 
 MOTHER; “How can anyone help losing their temper?  It can’t be helped.” 
 DOCTOR: “If you will come to church on Sunday we will tell you all 
 where you can get help not to lose your tempers.” 
 MOTHER: “His father would never let him go into a foreigner’s worship 
 hall.  He only let him come here because we had tried all the other doctors 
 in the town in vain, and because he is so precious. All our other children 
 are only girls.” 
 CHILD: “Those doctors needled me. I won’t be needled.  She will want to 
 put in needles and let out the evil. I won’t! I won’t! 
 DOCTOR: “73, [his name] if you keep quiet I’ll give you a sweet.” 
 MOTHER: “ 73, if you don’t keep quiet the doctor will beat you.” (Child 
 cries silently) 
 DOCTOR: “The worship hall is not foreign.  It is Chinese and the pastor is 
 Chinese and Jesus the Spirit who will help you, isn’t a Westerner.  Jesus is 
 Asiatic. Come and See.”…124 
 
While obviously artificially composed for educational discussion and 
fundraising purposes, this dialogue illustrates the society’s policy was to present 
                                                 
123 Clow, E.M., “A Doctor’s Job”, in The Missionary Herald of the Baptist Missionary Society, 
Vol., 123, August, 1941, pp. 84–85.  
124 Ibid. LMS operated a Medical Missions Exhibition with illuminated models and panels of 
photographs to aid visualisation of the work of their medical missions. LMS,  “A Medical 
Missions Exhibition”, in The Chronicle: A Magazine of World Enterprise, June, 1937, LMS,   
p. 128. 
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the medical missionary as carrying out pro-active evangelism while healing. This, 
therefore, was the sanctioned public face of BMS’ medical missionary work.  
The complications of the war years were to bring changes to medical 
missionary work which impacted upon the Two-fold Call aspect of their work as 
professional demands constantly subordinated and undermined any pro-active 
evangelical role. As a result of their increased work load, medical missionaries 
became further and further removed from their societies’ perception of the 
medical missionary role as first and foremost purveyors of evangelism. On a 
practical level they just did not have the time to engage in evangelical work if 
they were to maintain peacetime professional standards of care under wartime 
conditions.  Ronald Still, (1908–1985) a doctor at the BMS Foster Hospital in 
Zhoucun (Chouts’un), in justifying his request for additional administrative help 
at the hospital pointed out to the society that under the circumstances [1939]: 
… it is impossible for the medical staff to spend more than a very small 
proportion of their time in direct evangelistic work if clinical work is to 
be done satisfactorily.125   
 
Despite his reference to the hospital staff carrying out direct evangelism 
Still’s personal motivation regarding his Christian beliefs was that he was 
convinced that “the way he lived his life was the most important statement 
he could make about what he believed”.126   
David Landsborough was newly qualified and in his twenties during the 
war years and therefore, with Still, a member of the junior generation group of 
medical missionaries.  A Presbyterian medical missionary in Fujian Province in 
                                                 
125Still, R. J., to Chesterman, C.C., and Williamson, H.R., May 21st, 1939, CH/65, China 1936-
1940, Still file, BMS archive.  Still was 27 when he took up his post at the Foster Hospital in 1937. 
126 Salters, A., Bound with Love: Letters Home from China 1935–1945, St. Andrews, Agequod 
Publications, 2007, p. 175.  
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Free China, Landsborough initially expressed surprise when asked in 2007 for his 
personal view on the Two-fold Call aspect of medical missionary work. He wrote: 
You have taken up a question which very few people ask! – i.e. How 
much “preaching” or means to bring the Christian faith – i.e. “preaching” 
do medical missionaries actually do?? May I write to you again about 
this??  It is hoped that what nurses and doctors, and all personelle [sic] in 
a “mission” or “Christian” hospital actually do are in line with the 
Christian faith in which we believe.127 
 
In further correspondence Landsborough was more definite about his definition of 
preaching: 
 You asked me earlier about “preaching”! Our work was – I hope done in 
the spirit of the Good Samaritan. Medical missionary service is medical, 
and done, as far as we can, in the spirit of Christ and in the love of Christ 
– (Which sounds portentious [pretentious?]). Preaching therefore is 
almost entirely through action rather than words. But when a doctor does 
explain or encourage faith people are influenced.128 
 
Landsborough’s experience, in common, as will be illustrated, with many of his 
contemporaries, was of spreading God’s Word through subtle lifestyle example 
rather than via pro-active evangelism.   
Frances McAll (1916–2007), like Landsborough, was a junior generation 
medical missionary who worked, with her husband Kenneth (1910–2001) for 
LMS at Xiaochang (Siaochang) in North China and in Qilu during the war.  
McAll found the concept of a Two-fold Call strange:  
 
 McAll - You went as a Christian primarily, and you offered your skills as 
a doctor, your skills as a teacher or your skills as a minister…if it’s your 
life it [religious faith] comes out in your conversation, your attitude to 
people, it’s all one, you can’t box, what’s the word? 
 Chatterton – Compartmentalise? 
 McAll – No, you can’t.  It’s all one, you don’t think now I’m going to be 
a Christian, now I’m going to be a doctor.  It comes out in the way you 
care for people.  That is what wins people.  It’s just what you are… the 
point is wherever you are in the world you are your message and then so 
it’s all one…it [the Two-fold Call] would only be said by people that 
hadn’t a clue what it meant.129 
                                                 
127 Landsborough, D., in correspondence, January 2nd, 2007. 
128 Ibid., May 9th, 2007. 
129 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
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McAll (LMS), like Landsborough (EPM) and Still (BMS), regarded her medical 
missionary work during the war as an integral part of her Christian way of life.  
The way she lived her life as a Christian was the way she evangelised her faith so 
the concept of the Two-fold Call was not a legacy she wished to adopt. 
   Dr. Joan Pillow (born 1911) appointed in 1938, another junior generation 
MMS surgeon in Hankou, recalled: 
 Her [Pillow’s] appointment was solely to do medical work, and of course, 
by her work and attitude to be a Christian witness, but with no 
requirement for preaching or evangelistic work.130   
 
She related there was no “hard pressure” evangelism within the hospital. “Ward 
prayers were held each morning and at Christmas there was carol singing and a 
nativity play on each ward”.  In communion with Drs. Frances McAll, 
Landsborough, and Still, Pillow perceived Christian example as being more by 
attitude and behaviour than by direct evangelism. John Cram, Mary Redhead’s 
son wrote:  
My mother never did any preaching in China. ‘Just getting on with the 
job in hand’ is exactly the matter-of-fact attitude I was aware of, thinking 
back.131   
 
 Thus, by the mid-1930s, the Two-fold Call remained the cornerstone for 
debate, as it had always been amongst some of the senior generation of medical 
missionaries but for the junior medical missionaries it had become an irrelevance. 
Bickers has documented tensions arising from “generational differences” between 
conservative older missionaries and the post First World War generation in the 
early 1930s.132  The young doctors born in the twentieth century arrived in the 
field with the benefit of up-to-date training in western scientific medicine and 
                                                 
130 Dr. Pillow was interviewed on my behalf by her daughter Mrs. Margaret McDermott. 
131 Cram, J., in correspondence, March 8th, 2007. 
132 Bickers, R., “Changing”, 1992, p. 210. 
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their priorities were at variance with those of the senior generation medicals. 
Their views reflected the influence of a growing scrutiny of the Bible and a 
questioning of its literal interpretation.  This questioning had begun in Germany 
and England in 1880 and thence spread to North America with European 
immigrants. 133   Ecumenicalism, church unity, was the liberal goal and this 
theology was grounded in the Social Gospel that grew out of the industrialisation 
of American cities. A growing awareness of the corporate wealth of Protestant 
benefactors such as the Rockefellers and Vanderbilts, and the Social Gospel 
movement reflected a new social consciousness towards industrial workers. 
Liberal theology and the Social Gospel together promoted beliefs of Christian 
service and example as legitimate methods of evangelisation. 134   The Social 
Gospellers supported wide ranging social work in America’s industrial cities and 
were opposed to aggressive evangelism. Between the two World Wars, the Social 
Gospel became more idealist, humanist and pacifist.135 In China the Social Gospel 
was translated into medical social schemes such as vaccination programmes.  The 
junior generation of western medical missionaries carried their liberal views with 
them to China and as a result, because they supported the new social 
consciousness amongst workers, found it easier to work alongside their Chinese 
colleagues on more equal terms than previous generations. It was also likely that 
professionally the medical missionaries and their Chinese counterparts had 
                                                 
133 Marty, M., “North America”, in McManners, (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary of 
Christianity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 384–419, p. 411. 
134 Hutchison, W.R., Errand, 1993, p. 111. 
135 Richardson, A. (ed.), A Dictionary of Christian Theology, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1969, p. 
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received the same level and quality of medical training which would have served 
to foster greater professional empathy between the two.  Landsborough walked 
for a total of four days over difficult terrain to consult a Chinese surgeon whose 
opinion he valued as senior to himself.136  
There was a senior; a very fine Chinese surgeon based North of 
Chuanchow. Putien, there was a hospital run by the Church Missionary 
Society, Anglican.  It was a jolly good hospital and a very good Chinese 
surgeon and he was fully trained, a FRCS which is not easy, a Fellow of 
the Royal College of Surgeons… We would sometimes ask him things 
and even so you had to get from Chuanchow to Putien and it was 2 days 
walking you know…It was very nice to have a very experienced Chinese 
surgeon two days away who we could consult sometimes. 137  [Italics 
added] 
 
During the war, it will be illustrated in this thesis that hardship, shared dangers 
and population displacement combined to strengthen many foreign and Chinese 
Christian relationships despite vestiges of paternalism amongst some of the senior 
generation. 
 While the junior generation dispensed with the Two-fold Call concept, 
Huizenga, Chapman, and Somervell, representatives of the senior generation of 
medical missionaries, continued to ponder the body-soul aspect of medical 
missionary work. Huizenga’s writings illustrate that even in the mid 1930s he 
regarded himself and his medical colleagues as labouring under the time-
honoured medical missionary ‘wedge’ tactic of opening China at the point of a 
lancet: 
 In its relation to the evangelical work, the medical missionary service 
 goes before as a wedge, it aids as it progresses, steps in in emergencies 
 and often is last to leave.138 
 
 Huizenga, it will be recalled, advocated “Go”, “Preach”, and “Teach”, and 
promoted the spiritual over the physical.  His conservative theological stance was 
                                                 
136 Landsborough, D., in conversation, February 24th, 2007.   
137 Ibid. 
138 Huizenga, L., “Ultimate Need”, 1938, p. 561. 
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reinforced by the fact that he was one of the few medical missionaries operating 
in an area of China in the 1930s that had been virtually untouched by 
Christianity. 139   Rugao, in Jiangsu province where Huizenga was based, was 
isolated from Shanghai’s main transportation routes, and in the missionary 
movement’s thrust towards the interior of China had been overlooked.  The 
medical missionaries of the CRC therefore perceived themselves as part of an 
advance guard, utilising, like so many of their predecessors, the ‘wedge’ tactic. It 
is not, therefore, surprising that Huizenga associated himself more closely with 
the concept of the Two-fold Call in comparison to those working in well 
established areas with Chinese evangelists. Younger generation medical 
missionaries, in their twenties, who arrived in China in the mid-and late-1930s, 
were working in areas that had experienced Christianity for some time, where 
missionaries were familiar figures, and there was less need for any aggressive 
evangelism.   
The medical missionaries and their descendants available for interview at 
the time of writing indicate that, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, the junior 
generation of medical missionaries represented in this thesis were secure in 
regarding their role first and foremost as providers of a professional scientific 
medical service.  They did not perceive themselves as actively taking part in any 
advance guard for Christianity and appear to have been content to leave pro-active 
evangelism to paid Chinese evangelists. Within their peer group, they referred to 
each other as ‘medicals’ illustrating this was how they first and foremost regarded 
themselves, whereas other missionaries generally referred to their peer groups as 
‘other folk’.  In comparison with previous generations, the junior generation 
                                                 
139 Selles, K.D., “Many Points”, 2005. 
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perceived their role to encompass both physical health and social conditions, yet 
they were working alongside older colleagues in authority over them whose 
motivation, while medical, leant more upon the spiritual side of medical 
missionary work.  The senior generation, and medical missionaries before them, 
had laid the foundations of medical missionary work and nurtured it under their 
foreign leadership; support from the junior generation and wartime change would 
enable China’s medical professionals to build upon these foundations in the post-
war era of medical work in China.  While perhaps not recognising it at the time, 
foreign missionaries played an important part in encouraging post-war autonomy 
within China’s medical fraternity. The handing over of responsibility for mission 
work prior to internment, the cementing of closer relationships as a result of 
shared hardships in hospitals in both Free and occupied China, and an 
increasingly public acknowledgement of growing respect for their Chinese 
colleagues’ professionalism all went some way towards supporting the Chinese 
medical profession’s belief that they could supervise and run hospitals free of 
foreign assistance. 
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Chapter Two:  
 
The Medical Missionary in China in Context. 
   
Love your enemies, bless those that persecute you: I don’t.  The Japanese 
are persecuting the foreigners alright. Here’s a month therefore in & 
there’s no mail nor likelihood of it: no way out or in… Previously I 
hadn’t realised the Japs would try so systematically to obstruct Third 
Powers. 
  
Dr. Mary Redhead, MMS Surgeon, Pu’ai yiyuan, Hankou, 1938.1 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to place medical missionaries and their work in a general 
context within the China of the 1930s and, in an attempt to set the scene, briefly 
outlines their relations with the National government, the Communists and the 
Japanese. This will be followed by a consideration of individual personal issues 
which, in tandem with broader social, economic and institutional issues, 
encouraged medical missionaries as a group to remain at their posts when war 
broke out.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Redhead, M., Diary entry, November 21st, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 29. 
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Institutional Context 
(i) The Mission Board and the Medical Missionary in the 1930s 
That any change emanating from ‘the field’ would be slow to be adopted by home 
bases is understandable since mission society committees were often headed by 
ex-missionaries who had served in China and whose ideas remained framed by 
their own experiences.2  As Hood noted: 
 The controlling body of such [missionary] societies, their Boards and 
councils were largely self-perpetuating bodies to which members were 
elected in recognition of their devotion and diligence in the Cause of 
Mission.3 
 
 Most mission society administrators had been doctors of divinity, or 
educationalists, rather than doctors of medicine and could not always appreciate 
the medical perspective.  Thus, the financial and evangelical often took priority 
over the clinical. In addition it was difficult for administrators to perceive how 
things had changed since their own day and they may have been reluctant to 
accept any increasing Chinese Christian competence or to embrace the more 
liberal outlook of the younger generation. Pillow confirmed this problem 
regarding MMS and reported:  
…the [MMS] Mission Board in England was lagging behind 
development on the ground with still an anachronistic and paternalistic 
approach which was resented by the Chinese and ignored by the 
missionaries on the spot!4 
 
                                                 
2 For example, Thomas Cocker Brown, B.A., B.D., a missionary’s son, was a pastor and an 
educational missionary for LMS in China from 1907 until 1933 becoming China and Africa 
Foreign Secretary in 1933 until 1948. The Rev, Harold.B. Rattenbury B.A. B.D., (1878–1962) 
began his missionary career in Wuchang in 1902 for WMMS and was appointed the China and 
Burma Home Organisation General Secretary in 1938. 
3 Hood, G., Neither Bang nor Whimper: The End of a Missionary Era in China, Singapore, 
Presbyterian Church in Singapore, 1991, p. 33. 
4 Pillow, J., April 4th, 2007. 
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In the early 1930s Turner, coordinating the “Home Base and Missionary 
Personnel” section of the Laymen’s Foreign Missions Inquiry5 proposed a change 
in the worldwide missionary service that was to prove particularly pertinent for 
post-war medical work in China:  
The missionary must decrease and the native leader must increase…  The 
missionaries, now in the prime of their lives in missionary service, are 
finding this change in relationships exceedingly difficult.  No longer are 
they to be “in charge of the work,” with their native colleagues working 
under their direction; they must now work with the native leaders who 
are to be in charge of the work, missionaries serving under their native 
brethren.  Some useful men and women will find it impossible to remain 
on the mission field in this relationship.6 [Italics added]. 
 
The above is quoted in order to support the argument that during the 1930s, 
attention was being directed at the missionary role as perceived by the worldwide 
missionary body. The movement towards Chinese autonomy required a 
subordination of the concept of foreign superiority and a fresh evaluation of 
Chinese competence. The changes brought about by the war, in combination with 
a viable government health policy, accelerated the progression towards Chinese 
management of mission hospitals. Two processes were at work; the increasing 
professionalism of Chinese medical personnel and a growing awareness that 
Chinese management could be a realistic option.  However, as cautioned in 
Turner’s quotation above, some “useful” medical missionaries of the senior 
generation, even in the post-war period, expected to remain “in charge of the 
work” in China’s hospitals and could not let go. 
                                                 
5 The Laymen’s Foreign Missions Inquiry was the final report of a three year study by seven 
Protestant bodies on foreign missions in China, Japan and India funded by John D. Rockefeller.  
“The study was made to consider the purposes of missions, their bases of support and their 
methods of work…The Commission said that missions should continue but that far-reaching 
changes were obviously needed”. Landis, B.Y., “Organised Religion”, in The American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol., 38, No. 6, May, 1933, pp. 905–912, p. 908.  
6 Turner, F.P., “Missionary Personnel in India, Burma, China and Japan”,  in Petty, O.A. (ed.), 
Laymen’s Foreign Missions Inquiry Home Base and Missionary Personnel, Vol., V11, Part Two, 
New York, London, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1933, pp. 155–193, p. 192. 
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Bureaucratic direction from above, and mission society paternalism 
towards missionary staff, had previously discouraged self reliance on the ground 
when operative decisions could be vetoed by Mission Board executive.7  This 
thesis will illustrate that war aggravated what had already proved to be a strained 
“bureaucratic-professional” relationship between medical missionaries and their 
home bases. While the home bases effectively directed operations, by controlling 
major finances, such as allocation of international budgets, it was the medical 
missionaries in China that interpreted these Mission Board directives. Medical 
missionaries had daily contact with the Chinese and when, during the war, 
communications with home became impossible they were forced to take up the 
home base’s mantle. This autonomy, thrust upon medical missionaries by wartime 
conditions, appears to have been embraced. 
 
(ii) Medical Missionaries and the National Government 
Until 1928 there were no recognised effective official regulations in China to 
safeguard the practice of medicine, so any charlatan could set up in business as a 
medical practitioner.8  In some cases men had enrolled to train as nurses and then 
resigned to set themselves up as medical practitioners.   
We learned to our sorrow that the average man nurse who came in to us 
took nurses’ training as a shortened medical course and then went out 
and practised medicine. The girls didn’t! 9   
 
                                                 
7 Hood has illustrated the hierarchical committee structure of mission societies:  Hood, G., Neither 
Bang, 1991, pp. 10–25.  
8 In 1922 the Ministry of Interior attempted to introduce licences for traditional and modern 
practitioners but it was not until the establishment of the Nanjing government that effective 
regulation was achieved. Crozier, R.C., Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science 
Nationalism and the Tensions of Cultural Change, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1968, p. 133.  
9 Dizney, H., Oral Transcript, China Missionaries Oral History project, Henry Luce and Claremont 
Graduate School, California, 1970, p. 6. 
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It is also likely that many missionaries, away from the towns, who were not 
medically qualified, provided some form of unofficial unregistered and, to a large 
extent, unrecorded primary care medical service. In rural areas western scientific 
medicine was of little threat to existing traditional practices and missionary 
medicine undertook a curative rather than preventative role.10   
 1928 to 1936 saw a consolidation of medical work under National 
government auspices in an attempt to raise standards.  Public health was linked to 
the state of the nation and thus became a legitimate concern of the state. As a 
result, the wellbeing of the nation became intertwined with the country’s 
reconstruction as much as it concerned improving the population’s health.11 On 
October 30th, 1928, the new government established a Ministry of Health which 
brought together medical practice and public health under central government 
control.12In December “Regulations for the Registration of Medical Practitioners” 
were drawn up requiring the official registration of physicians, pharmacists and 
midwives during 1928–29, dentists by October 1935 and nurses by January 
1936.13  In 1930 hospitals were informed they would be required to register with 
the government but by 1931 any urgency seems to have lapsed and it is only in 
June 1936 that nursing schools were required to register.14  A concerted attempt 
                                                 
10 Unschuld, P.U., Medicine in China: A History of Ideas, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,  
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12 Ibid., p.46. 
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was being made to create a viable health service that would reach the long 
neglected rural areas. 
 The government oscillated between whether to adopt a preventative state 
system or a scientific model such as that favoured in the United States. In effect 
the choice was between a system of public-health programmes or a clinical 
practice based upon sophisticated laboratory research with a medical registration 
system. The question was whether it was better to try and produce as many highly 
trained health workers as possible from lower medical schools or whether to 
concentrate on investing in special medical colleges that would produce highly 
trained specialists in western scientific medicine.  A committee was formed in 
1928 to address this question of medical education and the League of Nations was 
approached to provide an expert to report.15  Dr. Knud Faber (1852–1956) was 
sent to China on behalf of the League of Nations and produced the Faber Report 
which recommended China institute both types of tertiary medical education; 
lower schools and higher colleges that would produce practitioners of a high 
grade who would be trained to teach and act as administrators. The overall 
recommended aim was to work towards increasing the numbers graduating from 
the higher colleges.16  For mission hospitals access to large numbers of highly 
trained Chinese physicians offered the prospect of considerably easing staff 
recruitment although their very existence, in the long term, could have been 
regarded as potentially threatening leading to foreign medical missionary 
redundancy. 
  In April 1931, economic considerations linked to the general depression 
forced cut backs in the government’s plans, and the Ministry of Health, which had 
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been created as an autonomous body was reorganised into a semi-autonomous 
body; the National Health Administration (NHA)  Weishengshu 衛生署.17  The 
NHA announced a Three-Year Plan of hierarchical healthcare consisting of four 
different units. At the grass roots level 100 families would have access to one 
part-time worker and, at the subsequent level, every 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants 
would have access to a substation with a trained nurse in charge.  Next, one 
doctor, one midwife, a general nurse and a sanitary inspector would care for 
between 50,000 and 100,000 people in a health station.  The apex of the system 
would be the county (xian) health centre with a hospital providing at least 30 beds 
and a hygienic laboratory. 18  The establishment of this government-sponsored 
health-care system became, for medical missionaries, “a very live issue”.19  While 
welcoming what could only be a rise in the country’s health standards, medical 
missionaries were now confronted with the question of whether or not to 
voluntarily register with the government’s scheme or wait until registration was 
imposed upon them. 
 Concerns were expressed in the CMJ regarding the viability of private 
medical practice by non-missionary medical practitioners in the large cities.20  
However, medical missionaries were unconcerned over the viability of private 
practice, should state medicine be introduced, and some embraced the scheme.  
They reported on their co-operation with the government with pride and 
enthusiasm, recognising an opportunity to increase their influence within China’s 
medical administration as shown by the Hankou Union Hospital’s 1935 annual 
medical report:   
                                                 
17Yip. K.C., Health and National, 1995, p. 50. 
18 Chapman, H.O., “Function”, 1937, p. 630, and Yen, F.C., “Medicine of the Future in China” in 
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19 Chapman, H.O., “Function”, 1937, p. 630. 
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More and more it is being recognised that medical work is a matter for co-
operation not only between the different Missions and Churches but also 
between the Missions and the public bodies in the localities where the work 
is carried on… It means that instead of being outsiders “butting in”, we 
become an important factor in national life, and our influence is thereby 
vastly increased.21  
 
Dr. Edward Cundall (1887–1954) also of the Hankou Union Hospital, wrote:  
 We are taking every opportunity of helping the authorities in Public 
Health work.  China is very enthusiastic about it and the government is 
craving for statistics.22  
Chapman, in Chinese Recorder, expressed the view that working alongside the 
government was acceptable but, in line with his view of the Church as a beacon of 
Christianity, the missionary input must receive full recognition, and missionary 
work must not be weakened. Medical missionaries were anxious that credit for 
good work done by them would be siphoned off by the National government: this 
echoes the fears expressed by the medical hierarchy in the nineteenth century in 
The Lancet who feared subordination of the medical by the spiritual.  Chapman, 
whose views on the Two-fold Call stressed the importance of the Christian 
character, was fearful that the missionary element of the mission hospital would 
be diluted in the “far-flung net of a rural health service”23 and that the “team 
spirit”24 of Chinese/foreign, Christian/non-Christian, mission hospitals could not 
be reproduced under a state-controlled system.  At the same time he envisaged the 
training of doctors and nurses as the medical missionaries’ greatest practical 
function and envisaged Christian hospitals being given a great opportunity to 
assist the government as base hospitals for rural workers.  Despite striving to 
maintain the distinction of being willing to work alongside the government but 
not supporting it politically, accusations of political collaboration arose later from 
                                                 
21 MMS Annual Report, China Medical Mission Report, 1935, p. 91. MMSL MG309. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Chapman, H.O., Function”, 1937, p. 632. 
24 Ibid. 
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the Communists based upon missionary association with Jiang Jieshi. 25  Ling 
makes the point that missionaries were driven by serving God’s purpose and that 
as a result they analysed events from a providential perspective.  They regarded 
their involvement in China as working God’s purpose out untainted by economic 
or political exploitation. They ignored the means – for example the unequal 
treaties and interference in Chinese politics – through which they achieved their 
own ends of propagating the Gospel.26 However, by their association with secular 
agencies such as the GMD they carried the stigma of “emissaries and agents of 
their governments”. 27   For example: Dr. Homer Bradshaw of the American 
Presbyterian Mission North (PN) Van Norden Hospital at Lianzhou (Linchow)  in 
Guangdong was arrested by the Communists in 1951 for spying and expelled in 
1955. 
Rosenbaum  (interviewer) – What do you think was the real reason for 
the Communists denouncing you [in 1951]? 
 Bradshaw – We were American “imperialists” and as far as they were 
concerned, We were spies, and that was the only reason we were out 
there.  I was just posing as a  doctor and the others were just posing as 
this, that and the other thing.  It was an official  government Communist 
plot… We were American spies trying to take over China and  exploit 
China28 
 
 Similarly: Virginia Hebbert, (b. 1911) a nurse instructor and hospital 
social worker at the ACM St. James Hospital at Anqing (Anking) related that 
within the first week of the Communist Liberation of the city in April 1949, the 
hospital staff were being accused of being spies.  
 … they were sure that we were in communication with President Truman, 
that we were sending, that we were like the C.I.A. would be, you know; 
that we were sending messages. They asked us very carefully, they 
inspected our radios.29 
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It was not only Americans who were to be denounced as spies.  Dr. Flowers 
reported that a Swedish missionary, Miss. Linell, was given a public trial, accused 
of taking money from the poor, of wasting people’s time by holding church 
services, of spreading poisonous propaganda by preaching the Gospel, and of 
acting as a spy.  She was found guilty on all charges and “handed over to the mob, 
together with the church elders, to be beaten to death by sticks, there and then”.30  
While missionaries would have vehemently denied operating as spies and agents 
of any government there could, however, be no denying that they were observers 
from the very fact of their being in China.  
 It was but a short step for the CCP to categorise foreign missionaries not 
only as agents of their own government but also as agents of the GMD.  Although, 
as Ling noted, many missionaries supported the GMD only as an alternative to 
Communism and these same missionaries were critical of Jiang Jieshi in the later 
years of his rule. She cites John Leighton Stuart, the last U.S. Ambassador to 
China as a missionary teacher who was openly anti-Communist and a supporter of 
the GMD.31   
 James Paterson (1884–1952), a senior missionary doctor working in the 
Lester Chinese Hospital (LCH) in Shanghai, reported that cooperation with the 
government had smoothed relations with local officials and, as an example, stated 
this had made vaccination schemes much easier. 32   With an astuteness and 
foresight he could not possibly have appreciated at the time, Paterson queried 
whether increasing control of hospitals and closer co-operation with non-Christian 
                                                 
30 Flowers, W.S., to Williamson, February 9th, 1948, CH/58, Flowers correspondence, BMS 
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officials and gentry would cause problems, and if not at the present time [1937], 
would it do so in the future?33  (Paterson may have lighted upon officials and 
gentry as representative of groups with which medical missionaries had limited 
contact although we cannot be sure.)  In the immediate post-war period it was to 
be Paterson’s hospital, the LCH, which was to pave the way for post-war Chinese 
autonomy. Paterson did not envisage co-operation with the government’s health 
scheme as potentially problematic, or anticipate it would result in any 
secularisation of the hospitals.  His positive perception was that new contacts 
would be made and some of the smaller local chapels and meeting places could 
attain greater status which would increase evangelical opportunity. Viewed 
externally, however, the type of co-operation with the National government 
Chapman and Paterson advocated was to place upon medical missionaries the 
label of ‘agents of the GMD government’. As noted, this propaganda title was 
used with great success by the Communists in their attempts to denounce 
missionaries in the late 1940s. Missionary and Chinese Christian failure to 
question the status quo caused them to be regarded by the CCP as “allies of the 
reactionary forces in society”.34  They were accused of being uncritical of China’s 
economic and social structure because they treated rich and poor equally failing to 
identify with the victims of oppression. 35   Although in respect of medical 
missionaries, an argument could be made that the poor were given preferential 
medical treatment in mission hospitals because fees were waived when patients 
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could not pay. 36  However, the Communist perspective was that all treatment 
should be free.37  
 The thoughts voiced by the western mission commentators of the time, as 
might be expected, dwelt on the effects of co-operation with the National 
government from the mission perspective of maintaining a Christian influence. 
Dr.Yen, Superintendent of the Chinese Red Cross Hospital in Shanghai, writing in 
the same edition of Chinese Recorder in 1937 as Chapman, provided the Chinese 
Christian medical missionary perspective, which took a “what is best for China” 
stance rather than an evangelical perspective. Yen regarded the ultimate adoption 
of state medicine as the logical end result of the NHA scheme.38  He asked the 
same question as the western writers; what would become of Christian medical 
work?  In tandem with them, he supported medical missionary co-operation with 
the government while stating that:  
 Christian medical work must become more definitely related to the life 
of China. While retaining its independence, it should be integrated with 
the health programme of the government.39 
 
In what was effectively a crie de coeur for Chinese self-government he also wrote:  
It may mean turning some hospitals over to the care of responsible 
Chinese Christian physicians, to be operated with the aid of local 
Christian hospital boards.40 
 
Yen did not mention that, at the time of writing, there were mission hospitals 
under the supervision of Chinese physicians, such as Dr. Chiang at the MMS 
General Hospital in Hankou, perhaps because they remained firmly under foreign 
management.  Yen perceived the mission hospitals as “indispensable units in 
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China’s health program” which, if prepared to “become naturalised in the soil 
ready to fit in with the government’s health programme” would, provided they 
maintained their high standards of practice and teaching, be “certain to have a 
permanent place in China”. 41  Yen supported the western medical missionary 
presence but the unspoken implication was that the success of the scheme would 
ultimately force mission hospitals to operate under Chinese supervision.  He 
recognised medical missionary support was crucial in working towards a 
successful NHA, but he looked forward to the time when China could support its 
own health care. Thus, in 1937, as the war began, medical missionaries were 
gravitating towards co-operating with the National government in the 
implementation of its NHA’s policies.  
 An increasingly professional Chinese medical service, requiring official 
registration of institutions, medical and nursing schools and medical personnel 
had an impact upon western medical staff.  Despite the relatively strong position 
that mission hospitals held in China new medical recruits were aware of the new 
situation even before they arrived in China.  Before taking up his first post 
Landsborough suggested to his Home Board that, considering the National 
government’s new registration regulations, it might be advisable for him to study 
at post-graduate level after qualifying: 
 This [post-graduate work] is also perhaps especially important in view of 
the Chinese government’s campaign for up-to-date medical services – and 
their demands on mission hospitals. 42   
 
 With the onset of war, the government turned to medical missionaries for 
support. Madame Jiang Jieshi was not only particularly fulsome in her praise of 
medical missionaries but also made statements that described all missionaries in 
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China as examples to mankind. 43   Given such apparent interest in medical 
missionary work and with Madame Jiang being resident in Wuhan it is 
understandable that hospital matron, Gladys Stephenson, no doubt with pride in 
her hospital’s work, would forward a copy of the Pu’ai Hospital’s latest [1937] 
Annual Report to Jiang and his wife. While Madame Jiang’s response upon 
receipt of the report, on behalf of her husband, could be dismissed as a rather 
standard reply, she did bother to reply in person.  Such gestures could only serve 
to foster good relations between the medical missionaries and the National 
government which, even if writing in a private capacity, Madame Jiang ultimately 
represented.  
Wuchang, 2 April 1938… 
 
The Generalissimo and I appreciate the splendid work which the hospital 
has been able to do, especially in aiding the victims of the terrible war in 
which we have been plunged. We wish continued success to the Hospital 
in its excellent work. We also thank you for the encouraging expressions in 
your letter.  
Yours sincerely,  
 
Mayling Soong Chiang.44 
 
A personal letter from the Generalissimo’s wife, issued from the Government’s 
Headquarters, was indicative of the highest support.  Madame Jiang also wrote to 
a friend in the United States praising the work of the medical missionaries:  
 Our people are learning of the great sacrifices Christianity is prepared to 
make as evidenced by the courage of the missionaries in defying the 
Japanese so that they may give help, protection, and comfort to our people.  
Throughout the regions where the barbarism of Japan has been 
unrestrained the missionaries have stood their ground and have saved the 
lives of great numbers of our people.  For all this the Generalissimo and I 
have publicly expressed our deep gratitude. 45  
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It is however, recognised by the writer of this thesis, that at this time China was 
looking to the United States for support and, to be cynical, a letter giving fulsome 
praise to missionaries in China – of which the greater number were American - 
would not have harmed China’s cause.  
  Hankou, the war capital of the National government for a short period 
before it fell to Japan in October 1938, served as an International Red Cross 
Committee (IRCC) and Central Government relief centre, with personnel being 
provided mainly from the Christian churches. The Hankou IRCC received 
$200,000 from the Central Government to assist mission hospitals with the care of 
wounded soldiers and Madame Jiang made an initial personal grant of $50,000.46 
However, not all government requests were acceded to. The National government 
requested the names of doctors and nurses for service at the front, but the Union 
Hospital declined to provide the information.47  This reluctance to disclose the 
names of their staff was to guard against them being enticed away; a problem 
which became more and more acute as the Japanese army advanced, and staff, 
pushed by fear of the Japanese and enticed by higher wages, changed their 
allegiance from missionary work to military hospitals, a topic discussed further in 
chapter three. 
 That the missionaries, as a whole, were happy to support the government 
is understandable because the Generalissimo and his wife were Christians, which 
inspired confidence. The Rev. Findlay from Mukden speaking at a religious 
conference in Scotland in 1939 summed up the general attitude:  
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Yet in no sense were they [the Japanese] breaking down the spirit of 
young China, led by the great Christian general, Chiang Kai-Shek, 
inspired by that great Christian lady, his wife.48    
 
Initially, this would appear to be a ringing endorsement of the Generalissimo; 
these words, however, were quoted in The People’s Tribune: A Fortnightly 
Review of China and the Far East, an English language periodical emanating 
from Chongqing, another of the government’s wartime capitals. Clearly Jiang 
Jieshi had no qualms about using missionary quotations as propaganda to bolster 
his cause but the traffic of information was not all one way.  Jiang was 
approached by the LMS Chronicle and asked if he would care to send any word to 
them for insertion in their “China Number”.  A Wong Wen replied on Chiang’s 
behalf with a message of “… congratulations upon past achievements and of 
goodwill for future success” which was duly published. 49   Such public 
declarations would provide further evidence to support future Communist claims 
that missionaries had been ‘hand in glove’ with the National government. 
 The People’s Tribune provided a clear message for its readers regarding 
its perspective on the medical missionary role. The April 1939 edition cited “with 
sincere gratitude” the words of an un-named English missionary whom the 
periodical described as a “friend of the Chinese”: 
If the missionary carries on with his ordinary work he is definitely 
assisting the Japanese. The holding of church services at such a time is 
helping the Japanese to establish law and order. ...Hospitals should remain 
open to meet the needs of the sick, but their work should not make a 
positive contribution to the reconstruction of the area. Missionaries should 
be working in refugee camps, because the very existence of such camps 
will hinder the people from returning to their homes and being forced to 
co-operate with the enemy.50 [Italics added.] 
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This policy of absolute resistance reduced the available choices to a narrow black 
and white question of “for us or against us”, which insinuated that those not 
actively working against the Japanese were guilty of supporting the Japanese war 
effort and therefore were, by inference, collaborators.  Yet, at the same time there 
is a message for medical missionaries that carrying on with “ordinary work” aided 
the Japanese while hospitals should remain open.  Thus, there was confusion over 
the medical missionary wartime role even within publications emanating from 
Chongqing.  Frances McAll, who worked at the Qilu University hospital after it 
was occupied, when asked her opinion as to whether it was accurate to accuse 
those who had remained in occupied China of collaboration replied: 
 We certainly weren’t collaborating with the Japanese we were putting 
up with them…. There is a big difference in putting up with them and 
collaborating.51 
 
Medical missionaries in occupied China operated in a no man’s land; technically 
the Japanese were not, under International Law, the medical missionaries’ enemy 
until Pearl Harbor. Consequently, medical missionaries found themselves in a 
delicate position regarding the Japanese occupation; they were physically within 
the theatre of war, and, while they professed to be apolitical and therefore 
politically removed from it, through their association with National government 
hospital and relief work, even if they did not regard themselves as a part of this 
theatre, the National government, and the Communists, did. 
   
(iii) Medical Missionaries and the Communist Party 
Medical missionaries could not be accused of complicity with the CCP. 
Incompatible ideology lay at the heart of the Communist–missionary relationship 
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since religion and Communism could not happily co-exist but as always, real life 
was more complex, and at least they shared commonalities such as serving the 
people and supporting the underprivileged. Zhu De is quoted by the LMS 
Chronicle as saying, in August 1938: 
  The 8th Route Army has no prejudice against missionaries. On the 
contrary, we welcome them.  For our war of resistance fights not only for 
the independence and freedom of the Chinese nations, but also for the 
maintenance of world peace.  In this respect our goal is just the same”.52 
 
Similarly Zhou Enlai is cited by Bates as saying “We are not against religion, 
especially not against Christianity, with which we have so much in common”.53  
Such statements appearing in missionary publications during the war served to 
foster hopes that the CCP was sympathetic to Christian missionary work although 
Bates writes that the period prior to 1937 was one during which Communists were 
“professedly hostile” to Christian missions.54  
 However, despite such public declarations of support, Communist leaders 
such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai had no desire to convert missionaries to their own 
cause, and in some areas Communists remained openly hostile; expelling 
missionaries and destroying mission stations.  The mission station at Xiaochang 
was completely destroyed by Communist forces almost as soon as the LMS 
missionaries withdrew although whether this was due to Communist hostility or a 
desire to make the buildings uninhabitable for Japanese use is unclear.55 Certainly 
the departing medical missionaries, the McAlls, interpreted the action as hostile 
rather than defensive.  
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 Not withstanding isolated episodes of hostility, Fitzgerald argues that 
Communism bears a strong resemblance to a religious organisation through, in 
part, its “complete belief and unquestioning acceptance of a dogmatic creed”.56 
Contact with Christian missions and first-hand knowledge of their work proved 
useful to the Communists in later years.57 That medical missionaries thought 
that there was Communist sympathy towards Christianity is shown by 
Stephenson’s 1937 Hankou Union Hospital Matron’s Report. 58   There were 
memories of “bitter treatment” being meted out by the Communists ten years 
previously to the “despised Christians” and so to hear that there had been a “real 
change of heart” on the part of some of the Communists was worthy of some note:  
At a meeting held in the Y.W.C.A. to welcome some secretaries from 
Shanghai, we heard from a veteran missionary leader that the previous day 
one of the most notorious Communist leaders had visited him and talked 
with him on the question of Christ’s constructive policy versus the policy 
of Communism.  The wife of another of these leaders, a very vigorous 
personality, who had lately come from the Eight Route Army, was present 
at the meeting and gave a very impassioned speech.  She said she had 
studied Marx and Lenin but had come to realise that only the spirit of 
Christianity could achieve world peace and defeat military might.  We 
could scarcely believe our ears, it was such a tremendous change.59 
 
That this was deemed noteworthy enough to form a major part of the hospital 
Matron’s official report indicates how importantly medical missionaries 
perceived their relations with the Communists. However, it is noted this 
information had been transmitted second-hand, not having been witnessed by the 
report’s writer.  
 While Paterson, in 1937, had been aware that participation in NHA 
schemes might cause problems in the future it is doubtful whether, when they 
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decided to remain in situ during the war, medical missionaries anticipated that 
after the war issues of collaboration might focus upon them just because they had 
carried on with their ordinary work.60  They could not have anticipated that the 
Communists would adopt a strong line concerning those they regarded as having 
collaborated with the Japanese and also with the Nationalist government or that 
they themselves would be included in this category.  Austin notes that such CCP 
total non-negotiable condemnation included Chinese who were “opposed to ‘the 
will of the people’” such as landlords, money lenders and intellectuals and also 
hospital directors.61  The Communists extended this attitude beyond their fellow-
countrymen to include western imperialists of which medical missionaries were 
highly visible symbols. However, such animosity was not apparent during the war 
years. 
 Medical missionary attitudes towards the Communists were not totally 
antagonistic. Dr. Clarence Holleman, an American medical missionary with the 
Reformed Church of America, who was captured for a short time by Communist 
soldiers in 1929 and who was Superintendent of the Hope and Wilhelmina 
Hospital in Xiamen (Amoy) during the war, in retrospect expressed respect for 
their policies and sincerity.62   
 I am not pro-Communist and I don’t want you to get the idea that I am 
speaking in favor [sic] of them, but they did have sharing of the land 
with the people and the cooperatives they established everywhere and 
things of that nature which Communism preaches. And practised at times. 
Because whatever else you may say about the Communists, you cannot 
deny that they are 100% sincere. 
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(iv) Japanese Religious Policy and Medical Missionaries  
Japanese religious policy was to play a substantial role in preparing the way for 
the shift towards Chinese hospital management in the post-war period.  This was, 
however, an unintentional result. Prior to Pearl Harbor westerners were “Third 
Party Nationals” and, therefore, under International Law, technically not enemies 
of Japan.  In Nanjing the International Committee of Westerners offered to co-
operate as equals, but this was politically unacceptable to the Japanese authorities 
because if Japan was to create a “New Order for East Asia” it must be distanced 
from western influence. Brook notes Japan’s perception that Christianity held a 
political identity.  
 [Christianity] was part of the hegemonic ideology of Western nations 
whose power Japan aspired to exclude from the New Order in East 
Asia.63   
 
The “New Order for East Asia” was announced in November 1938 and became 
the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in August 1940. This New Order, it 
was stated, would replace the old order of Anglo-American power. 64  The 
Japanese aim was to rescue China from the Nationalism and Communism it had 
‘contracted’ from the West and the policy attempted to isolate Chinese Christians 
from western influence.65  The Japanese wanted to be seen by the Chinese as 
China’s saviour from nationalism, communism and western imperialism; as a 
result they could not appear to be on equal terms with westerners. The Japanese 
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were also aware that western support favoured Jiang Jieshi, not least to protect 
western business interests in China.66  
 The irony of the eventual outcome, as Brook argues, was that the Japanese 
policy of Church Union served to strengthen the indigenous Chinese Church.67 
Under the Chinese Christian Union Policy, all Christian denominations were to 
merge and become detached from western supervision. By removing western 
influence, this policy allowed the Chinese Christian Church to attain an 
independence it could never have achieved while western missionaries remained 
in leadership positions. Looking through a medical missionary lens, Chinese 
Christians working as medical personnel for western missions, in some areas 
during the war, but not all, proved they could successfully administer medical 
work and mediate with Japanese officialdom, despite the withdrawal of western 
missionary support. Japanese religious policy thus added impetus to the 
progression to a Chinese Christian Church and also towards Chinese administered 
hospitals. 
   The Japanese adopted a policy of integration and supervision. Nurse 
Bowne wrote to her family in April 1938 from Anqing that: 
 … the latest rumour is that the Japanese plan to take over the Church 
paying the preacher’s salaries and using them as agents!!! They do have 
brilliant ideas!!! It probably means that some of our clergy will be shot 
when they refuse to accept the post of Japanese agent. We do live in 
perilous times.68  
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In Shanghai, after their sanatorium was destroyed, the SDA were allowed to 
continue in their clinic under the directorship of the Chinese physician-in-chief, 
Dr. Andrew Chen, but later the army appointed a Japanese Seventh Day 
Adventist’s wife, a Japanese nurse, to take complete charge.69 
 The irony of the situation was not lost on Payne, a BMS missionary, who 
wrote that Japanese pastors in North China, described by him as being under the 
direction of the Japanese military, began holding large classes for “spiritual 
training” in Beijing and Jinan.70  The intention was to “inspire” Chinese Church 
leaders with the spirit of “Greater East Asia”.71  It was at these meetings, whose 
attendees numbered over a thousand church leaders that the Chinese were ordered 
to break off their Anglo-American connections.72  Missionaries were accused of 
hypnotising people with the Gospel and working to protect their governments’ 
assets and imperialistic ambitions.73  Payne observed that the Japanese pastors 
were acting in the same vein as the Americans and British, following the same 
imperialist path and he reported that Japanese generals had informed the Chinese 
that to disobey their new masters would involve being “severely punished”.74 
 Still, writing in 1947, recognised that being forced to disband their 
original groupings and form a United Church of Christ cut worshippers off from 
their local denominational churches.  He regarded this as a positive development: 
“a form of Church Union for which many had hoped for in vain in times of peace 
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has now arisen as a military necessity”.75  Still’s description of Japanese religious 
policy at Zhoucun reinforces Brook’s argument that this policy fostered Chinese 
Christian unity.  
 Compared with other aspects of medical missionary experience during the 
war, there is a paucity of reference to the Japanese religious policy of Church 
Union in the missionary society archives and personal papers consulted for this 
thesis.  As this was a policy targeted at the Chinese it was only after Pearl Harbor 
when the missionaries had evacuated, been removed by internment or repatriation, 
that the Japanese were able to implement the policy aggressively enough to make 
a noticeable impact. Consequently, because they did not actively observe its 
implementation in the field or experience its true impact at the time, the 
missionaries may either have thought it was in the past and of little relevance to 
post-war China or did not feel able to reflect it accurately having heard about it 
only via third-party hearsay.  In 1948, LMS medical missionary Ivy Greaves 
recognised internee isolation from this Japanese policy: 
 We in the camp just let the world go by, but they [the Chinese] had the 
great strain of living under Japanese rule which for those in positions of 
leadership in the compulsorily united “North China Church” was specially 
heavy…76 
 
 Frances McAll confirmed the missionary presence was perceived as 
representative of the West and her opinion was that westerners were a nuisance to 
the Japanese: 
Their [Japanese] main reason for getting us out of the way was that we 
represented the West to local Chinese and meant they had to maintain a 
presence in our area to keep an eye on our activities when they had other 
things to think about.77 
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 Just by being in China, missionaries acted as eye witnesses particularly to 
major events such as the occupation of Hankou in October 1937 and the bombing 
of Canton in June 1938, and this also made the Japanese uncomfortable with their 
presence. In Fujian a PEC missionary, R. Tully, is listed in the society’s archives 
as acting as a Reuters’ correspondent in Gulangyu (Kulangsu), although it was 
remarked upon that “…after they [journalists?] get the news from Reuter, they 
have a great habit of ‘enlarging’ what is actually sent to them.”78 Missionaries 
were considered by some to be experts, to a greater or lesser degree at evaluating 
Chinese domestic events, even though they were generally political amateurs. Up 
until Pearl Harbor missionaries were able to play the role of unofficial mediators 
between the Japanese and their governments.79  As the situation worsened and 
Japanese anti-western policy became more aggressive, why did medical 
missionaries not evacuate and retreat when they realised war was imminent? 
 
Remaining in the Field 
(i) Motivation 
International governments began issuing instructions to their nationals in the 
autumn of 1937 advising them to leave China. Craft suggests the American 
government advised all its citizens to withdraw, not just for their own protection, 
but also in part to protect America from becoming embroiled in the war as a result 
of imprudent actions by its nationals.80  This reflected America’s post-World War 
One isolationist policies: its refusal to join the League of Nations, the imposition 
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of import tariffs on European goods, and its immigration quotas. However, while 
the American government was outwardly maintaining this isolationist position, 
the country’s economy was benefiting from the Sino-Japanese hostilities; 
American firms were supplying Japan with much of its war material, a decision it 
would later regret.  In 1937 the United States supplied Japan with US$22,103,000 
of crude oil, US$20,644,000 of refined oil and US$37,418,000 of scrap iron and 
steel.  In 1938 the value of crude oil exported to Japan had risen to 
US$29,858,000 and in 1940 the value of refined oil exported to Japan had risen to 
US$35,303,000.81  American missionaries were aware of the situation: 
EMBARGO OF WAR SUPPLIES TO JAPAN. The irony of protesting 
against the barbaric bombing of the civilian population in Canton and 
simultaneously supplying Japan with the bombs, airplanes, scrap iron, 
gun, cotton, war chemical, lubricating oil and aviation gasoline---and 
even the money --- to make those bombings possible, is striking an 
increasing number of leaders and organizations in this country…  
 On April 30th 1938, the General Conference of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, South, passed a resolution calling upon the American 
President and Congress to take such measures as may be necessary to 
prevent the material and financial resources for the government or 
citizens of this country [U.S.] from being used either directly or 
indirectly to aid Japan in her war of aggression upon China.82 
 
Robert McClure (1900–1991), a United Church of Canada (UCC) surgeon, 
publicly accused the Canadian government of exporting nickel to Japan in a 
speech in Toronto in 1940. He was summoned to Ottawa and given the choice of 
apologising for making such accusations or face a jail sentence. It was made clear 
that he had not been misinformed but should not have made the information 
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public. McClure chose to apologise, feeling he would not be much use to China in 
jail.83  
 British policy towards the Sino-Japanese hostilities, put simply, was one 
of benevolent neutrality.  Britain was militarily far too overstretched in the Far 
East to confront Japan, and intended to support British interests in China while 
simultaneously attempting to maintain her relations with Japan. The British 
administration thought the war would eventually lead to a stalemate between 
China and Japan and that, after dealing with its problems in Europe, Britain could 
then turn its attention to the Far East. By lending money to Jiang Jieshi’s 
government at such a stage of stalemate Britain would then be in a position to 
secure its interests in China.84  Consequently, British officials, like their American 
counterparts, were wary of imprudent actions by nationals that might spark off 
international incidents as can be gleaned in the advice given to a BMS missionary 
in Xian (Sian) on 10th, March 1938, by G. S.Moss, the Hankou Consul General:    
   …Should the Japanese arrive in Sian you must be guided by 
circumstances, and act with prudence and common sense.  Keep indoors 
and try to avoid contact with any parties of troops without officers of 
apparent discipline… Do not attempt any quixotic protection of people 
you cannot protect. Be realistic, restrict your movements and activities at 
first, but feel your way and test your position warily… And if God gives 
you strength and resolution to stay your example may have an enormous 
steadying effect for good. But don’t be obstinate and do not add 
avoidable international incidents to the difficulties we already have if 
you can possibly help it.85 
 
 Dr. Flowers at Zhoucun sought advice on medical missionary neutrality 
from the British Ambassador but received an unhelpful reply: 
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 A society or a neutral country can only afford the assistance of its 
medical personnel etc., to a belligerent with the previous consent of its 
own Government and authorisation of the belligerent concerned. H.M. 
Embassy suggest that the best course would be to get in touch with the 
headquarters in the United Kingdom of the Voluntary Aid Detachment 
Council whose constituent societies are all recognised by H.M. 
Government, asking them to consult with the Foreign Office.86 
 
After Flowers had relayed this information to London the society replied to him 
that the Embassy’s response was “interesting”, and couched in terms that avoided 
any “compromise internationally”.  The society recommended the hospital treat 
cases brought in to it without asking any questions.87   Flowers was advised not to 
take part in any Red Cross work behind either Japanese or Chinese lines but, 
while commenting that from the society’s point of view the situation was 
“perfectly clear”, it also recognised Flowers’ position was “not very enviable”.88  
Whether the course of action advised by the Ambassador was taken up is unclear 
but we can see that medical missionaries and their respective societies were alert 
to the fact, early in the war, that there were going to be ethical problems for third 
party nationals operating in a war zone. 
 Most medical missionaries from all societies in Hubei remained at their 
posts deciding only to evacuate some wives and children.  Other missionaries, 
according to LMS Superintendent A.J. Gedye, were less happy to remain and he 
notes that “there is a curious evacuation mentality among our missionaries”.89  In 
particular he commented that it was the younger missionaries who had arrived 
around 1927 or just after, that thought more easily of evacuation. This was not the 
case with medical missionaries.  Dr. Logan Roots, the Bishop of Hankou’s son 
and surgeon at the ACM Church General Hospital in Wuchang, decided that he 
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and his wife, a nurse, and their two small children would remain in the city 
indefinitely. Roots and his wife “felt the call to stay where their professional 
services would be in special demand”.90  This ‘call to stay’, primarily based on 
service to others also had a vocational basis. Not only did they have a moral and 
medical responsibility towards their patients, staff and converts but to some 
doctors and nurses the prospect of caring for refugees and the wounded served to 
reaffirm their vocation.  
  At a time when the most recent medical missionary arrivals to the China 
field subscribed to the view that the best method of bringing converts into the fold 
was by personal lifestyle example, a retreat would have been unthinkable. There 
was also the personal embarrassment that medical missionaries would experience 
if they left and a fellow medical professional subsequently arrived in China to 
take their place: 
 We have had urgent messages from the American Consul to the 
Americans to get out and a meeting of the medical group [in Qilu] was 
called to decide policy.  At this meeting Jock (Dr. Smyly) read a message 
from the British Consul commending to our notice an appeal from China 
to all nations for first aid and for medical supplies.  The contrast was 
remarkable and it was obvious that Jock had no [sic] given a thought to 
going, and for us other Britishers that appeal clinched matters. We 
should look fools getting out if complete strangers from home 
volunteered for what is really our job.91 
 
To place this issue in the war-time language of the day, medical missionaries had 
no wish to be classified as ‘LMF’: Lacking Moral Fibre.92 
  
(ii) The Martyrdom Legacy of Duty 
By refusing to flee in the face of danger, medical missionaries were following in 
the footsteps of their predecessors supporting the Roll of Honour tradition that 
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recognised stoicism in the face of suffering and potential martyrdom in the field. 
Memorialised with the “Boxer Martyrs” and others, and having a basis in fact, 
these deaths transcended into the realm of myth.  They became a shared element 
of the medical missionary legacy whether death was as a result of disease, 
accident or violence. This Roll of Honour marked suffering and martyrdom as a 
recognised possible consequence of medical missionary work.  It created a legacy 
of responsibility to remain when danger threatened and contributed towards the 
decision of medical missionaries to remain at their posts when war broke out in 
1937.  
 The deaths of Dr. Henry Wyatt, Nurse Beulah Glasby and their Chinese 
chauffeur illustrate that the martyrdom tradition remained in place during the 
wartime period. Wyatt, Glasby and two missionaries, while travelling from Jinan 
to Taizhou (Taichow) in a chauffeur driven lorry, and possibly because the 
vehicle was chauffeur driven, were mistaken for Japanese officers and fired upon 
by Chinese irregulars. Wyatt went to the rescue of the injured chauffeur and 
despite waving the Union Jack “volley after volley” was fired into both men.93  
Glasby refused to take shelter away from the lorry and was also killed.  The two 
remaining missionaries, the Rev. and Mrs. Jasper, were held captive and beaten 
until eventually they were able to convince their Chinese captors they were in fact 
British.  When the error was realised there were “obviously sincere expressions of 
regret”.94  That these deaths were as a result of mistaken identity makes them 
particularly poignant and Wyatt’s eulogy recorded: “The manner of his death 
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redeems it from tragedy and transforms it into an epic of missionary history”.95 
Wyatt was the sixth BMS doctor to lose his life in China but the first to die a 
violent death.  His obituary, which does not distinguish his death from the non-
violent deaths, places his sacrifice firmly within the martyrdom tradition:  
  In quality of character and service Harry Wyatt was altogether worthy of a place 
 beside these others [the five other doctors] of fragrant memory.96   
   
 
(iii) Conscientious Objectors and Pacifists 
The war created personal dilemmas for some individuals, such as pacifists and 
Conscientious Objectors (CO), who had to confront their personal principles. 
There were precedents: Dr. George Pearson, a CO during the 1914–18 war, was 
called to attend a tribunal when he declined a post with the Royal Army Medical 
Corps (RAMC).97  He was exempted from military service on condition that he 
left the country within three months for relief work with the Friends Relief Units 
in Russia. When war broke out in China in 1937 he was working in an MMS 
hospital in Shaoyang.  He found himself under suspicion when he offered to 
vouch for the neutrality of some German missionaries from the CIM Associated 
“Liebenzeller Mission” to prevent them being interned by the Chinese. His 
vouching was accepted but only if he housed them in his own house.  This led to 
“a lot of talk locally” with one Chinese Christian commenting that “This is just as 
though a Chinese family had taken a Japanese family into their home”.98  There 
appear to have been no actual repercussions and the Germans remained with him 
for the duration of the war.  Pearson was called home to England before the 
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Japanese overran Shaoyang and so his pacifism was not tested regarding treating 
Japanese wounded.  
 The official MMS position was published in the 1937 Minutes of 
Conference following a December 1936 meeting of ministers and laity who were 
unable to reach a consensus on individual participation in a wartime situation. As 
a result Conference presented two statements: one from “members of the 
Committee who accept the Pacifist position” and one from the “members of the 
Committee who do not accept the pacifist position”.99  Other than presenting the 
two sides of the argument MMS did not officially direct their members but did 
recognise that war was contrary to the Gospel, that Methodists should strive to 
overcome evil with good, that governments should aim for a peaceful 
international order and that the Methodist Church upheld liberty of conscience. In 
effect the society was allowing it members to act as their loyalties and conscience 
dictated. 
 A medical missionary whose attitude changed when confronted by the 
realities of war was Owen Beynon (1894–1977), an LMS pharmacist at the LCH 
in Shanghai, who had considered war a crime against humanity and held the view 
that “pacifism was nothing if not absolute”.100  His wartime experiences however, 
made him question this ‘absolutism’ so that by 1941: 
 The realization came to me when thinking again and again quietly over 
this problem that to be an absolute pacifist would mean just this; that I 
would be the bully’s best friend and ally.101 
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Writing to the Presbyterian executive prior to taking up his appointment at 
Quanzhou, Fujian, Dr. Norman Tunnell (1916–1976) (PCE) stated that if called 
up for military service he would:  
… absolutely refuse to fight, but I feel rather doubtful about any work in 
the armed forces as I cannot see any justification in Christianity for war 
in any circumstances at all.102   
 
The executive replied with sympathy while pointing out that as a doctor his way 
“might be clearer than that of others”.103   
 The Seventh-Day Adventists published a guide for their members which 
clearly laid out the society’s policy regarding pacifism: primarily Seventh-Day 
Adventists were unable to observe the Sabbath because on that day they were 
unable to undertake any kind of work, and fighting was the “hardest kind of 
work”. 104   
 Confronting their principles caused some to question their previously held 
medical missionary role. The pacifist Society of Friends (Quakers) permitted 
some British and Canadian medical COs to join the FAU. 105   The FAU felt 
strongly that their pacifist outlook should not be compromised. After learning that 
Dr. Graham Milne, of the New Zealand Mission, who was not a pacifist, was to 
join them, the FAU made the decision that he would be regarded officially “not as 
a Unit member but as a member of the Presbyterian Mission on secondment”.106  
Milne spent only four months with the FAU but it affected the way he viewed his 
                                                 
102 Tunnell, N., to Mr. James, September 2nd, 1938, PCE/FMC/Series 1 Box21, file 4. 
103 Mr. James to Tunnell, N., September 7th, 1938, PCE/FMC/Series 1, Box21, file 4. 
104 Wilcox, F.M. (ed.), Seventh Day Adventists in Time of War,  Washington, D.C., Review and 
Herald Publishing Association, 1936, p. 37  
105 For an account of Canadian pacifists in the FAU see Socknat, T.P., “The Canadian 
Contribution to the China Convoy”, in Quaker History: The Bulletin of Friends Historical 
Association, Vol., 69, No. 2, 1980, pp. 69–91.  For the British Conscientious Objector Tribunal 
process and FAU training camp regime prior to service in China see Simpson, J.E., Letters from 
China: Quaker Relief Work in Bandit Country, Cambridge, Ross-Evans, 2001.   
106 Cameron, C., Brodie, J., Brodie, A. (eds.), Go Anywhere, Do Anything,: New Zealanders in the 
Friends’ Ambulance Unit in China, 1945–1951, Wellington, New Zealand, Beech Tree Press, 
1996, p. 45.  
 96 
medical missionary role, and most significantly occasioned a change in how he 
prioritised his work. While watching a colleague nurse a dying woman he found 
the experience conflicted with the view he had previously held which was to 
attempt to convince those close to death to accept God so they could be received 
into heaven. Milne’s witnessing of the nurse quietly caring for and comforting the 
dying woman put him out of step with the “traditional missionary thinking” that 
prioritised evangelism.107 Milne’s witnessing of the nurse and the dying woman 
provides an example of a medical missionary during the war coming face to face 
with the Two-fold Call aspect of his work and, as a result of this experience, 
changing from a position that prioritised evangelism, to one where comforting the 
dying took priority, even though the case was clinically hopeless. Milne’s major 
concern from that point became people’s physical suffering; he wrote: “…and I 
really was prepared to leave the question of their souls…to the Good Lord 
himself”.108 
 
(iv) Evangelistic Opportunity  
While the war raged it provided new opportunities to evangelise, a prospect that 
was welcomed by conservative medical missionaries who would be supremely 
placed to impart The Word to vast numbers of distressed refugees and the 
wounded. In their imagination the movement of refugees westwards potentially 
promised a captive congregation of hundreds of thousands, and perhaps God’s 
Word would seem attractive and helpful to these people in their time of crisis. As 
one SDA missionary noted: 
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 When people are sick they are more susceptible to the gospel and it is the 
privilege of the missionary doctor and nurse to minister to both body and 
soul109 
 
A similar attitude was described by Flowers writing of the BMS mission in 
Zhoucun: 
  Under such prevailing uncertainty, with all their props knocked out from 
under them, there has been a remarkable turning to the church for leading 
and sanctuary. Many have sought sanctuary simply for personal safety – 
Christians wear a badge which guarantees a measure of immunity from 
the more unpleasant actions of the Japanese – but they are being trained 
and taught the Christian way of life and sent forth to live it.  A large 
influx has great promise but naturally at such a time carries with it great 
danger.  Our pastors and evangelists are grasping the opportunity with its 
responsibilities, and seeking to build up healthy Christian lives. 110 
 
How many of these ‘wartime Christians’ turned to Christianity as a measure to 
obtain their protective badge and how many from a true desire to learn about 
Christianity is impossible to ascertain.  However, from a conservative perspective 
the opportunity for evangelism was presenting itself as a direct result of people’s 
suffering during the war. With such an opportunity to spread The Word there 
could be no question of abandoning the people who needed them.  
 Although, as we shall see in greater detail below, much emphasis was 
placed on the evangelistic opportunity provided by the war, reports on the results 
of this opportunity are noticeably silent. There is much mention of interest and 
enquiry but a general lack of statistical data to back up any great conversion to 
Christianity. For example: a report for May 1939 noted evangelism had been 
“outstandingly successful during the past year” with over 40 baptised on 
Christmas Day.111  This initially reads well; although over 40 (but presumably 
closer to over 40 than to just under 50) seems rather sparse for a wartime period 
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of evangelistic opportunity. The report proceeds to say that 30 of these were 
adults who had undergone a long preparation which suggests a period well over a 
year as was usually the case for preparation for baptism. Reading between the 
lines possibly only just over ten were new converts or, perhaps more likely, 
children of the baptised since the fact that 30 were “adults” is singled out for 
mention.  Even with the most optimistic interpretation the report does not actually 
provide evidence of the “outstandingly successful” evangelistic year it claims to 
report. 
(v) Economic Considerations  
A total withdrawal of medical services would have caused enormous damage to 
mission society capital assets. School books and hymn books could be easily 
transported, but delicate, often expensive, medical equipment was awkward to 
transport over long distances of broken transportation lines, even if arrangements 
could be made to transfer such material to a place of safety. Although Chinese 
factories, businesses, universities and hospitals were being efficiently moved 
westwards with government and private business support, it was no simple matter 
for a mission hospital to relocate its equipment. The average medical missions did 
not have access to the funds, manpower or transportation required to realise a 
long-distance move.  Hospitals and dispensary buildings, where owned by the 
missions, were immoveable capital assets and abandonment left them subject to 
Japanese requisition and possible destruction. Placing them in the care of Chinese 
staff, at a time when home bases did not credit their Chinese staff with a great 
deal of competence, was not, at the time, seen as a potential solution to the 
problem.  
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 Anxiety relating to the wanton destruction of mission goods was not 
limited to those on the ground but was relayed to the American public via the 
American press fuelling concerns at home.  The Herald Tribune on March 1st, 
1938, under the headline banner of “EPISCOPAL CHURCH SUFFERS FROM 
$350,000 SHANGHAI LOSS” reported: 
 … It seems that the Japanese go out of their way again and again to loot 
and burn deliberately, and otherwise destroy foreign mission property, 
giving the impression of deliberate anti-foreignism,” the Rev. Mr. Smith, 
[ACM] said. “Of forty-five mission stations outstanding in this diocese 
[Shanghai], only nine are functioning at present.  And of these, four are 
in the International Settlement and French Concession.  Mission 
buildings, churches, schools, hospitals and residences have been 
destroyed by bombing or deliberately burning after Japanese occupation.  
Many mission buildings and compounds still are occupied by Japanese 
military units. The churches are, in some cases, used as stables and 
otherwise desecrated.:112 
 
Such reportage fuelled the very real fear both in the mission field and at home, 
that a withdrawal by medical missionary personnel would almost certainly 
occasion the sacrifice of valuable medical equipment, supplies and buildings.   
 
(vi) Mission Society Evacuation Policy in 1939   
Before war was declared in Europe, missionary society policy was to continue 
with field work wherever possible. Concerns were expressed regarding unmarried 
women, wives and children but missionaries were left to make their individual 
decisions regarding evacuation. After the declaration of war in Europe in 
September, 1939, concern was expressed in London at a meeting of the Medical 
Advisory Board (MAB), a sub-committee of the Conference of British Missionary 
Societies (CBMS), that medical personnel would resign from the mission field 
                                                 
112 ACM, “Episcopal Church Suffers From $350,000 Shanghai Loss”, in Herald Tribune Report 
March 1st, 1938. This is an example of a $ amount that is most likely to be American dollars but 
could be Chinese $. Newspaper cutting inserted in the Gilman Papers – RG 64 69–13, ACM 
archive. 
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and volunteer for duty in active service.113 Still considered whether he should 
volunteer for national service but was informed by the Consul General in Qingdao 
that there was “no immediate pressing need for medicals at home”. 114  The main 
problem appears not to have arisen with those in China, but with those at home on 
furlough who, actually being in Europe, were much more aware of the situation at 
home and for whom joining up for national service would have been relatively 
simple. Flowers, Still’s superior at Zhoucun, volunteered for national service 
while on furlough serving for two years at the Wharncliffe Hospital in Sheffield 
before returning to Free China to work for the British Red Cross.115 
 The minutes of the MAB meeting provide an indication of its deliberations. 
The MMS representative announced two of their doctors were considering joining 
up for the duration of the war which would lead to understaffing in the field but 
MMS policy was to return missionaries to the mission field whenever possible.116   
The LMS representative reported the society did not think their missionaries 
would join up for national service because “they would seriously embarrass work 
of the society”.117 Deputising missionaries would have to remain longer in a place 
but “the missionary witness was to continue in spite of difficulties”.118 The First 
World War was cited as a precedent when no LMS missionary had been allowed 
to take up national service unless their work in the field was provided for. 
Nevertheless, LMS conceded no-one would be refused permission to apply for 
national service if their position in the field was covered either by a colleague in 
                                                 
113 The CBMS, an association of more than 40 Protestant missionary societies, was founded in 
1912 following the 1910 Edinburgh Conference.  
114 Still, R.J., to Chesterman, C.C., September 28th, 1939, CH/65, Still, China 1936-1940 file, 
BMS archive.   
115 Obituary, W.S. Flowers, British Medical Journal Vol., 2, November 1st, 1958, p. 1109. 
116 Medical Advisory Board, Minute No. 421, “Plans regarding Medical Missionary Service in 
Wartime”. MAB, CBMS Box 506. Representatives: Dr. A.W. Hooker, MMS, Dr. Thompson, 
LMS, Dr. C.C. Chesterman, BMS. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Ibid. 
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the field or a Chinese colleague. CMS cancelled all furloughs and urged their 
medical missionaries to remain although they too acknowledged at the meeting 
that those wishing to apply for national service could do so if their position in the 
field was covered.  BMS also recalled the First World War when it had 
experienced post-war difficulties as a result of its failure to send out new recruits 
during the hostilities and they were attempting to avoid a repeat of this.  Strong 
signals were thus being sent from the mission boards in London in 1939 that they 
would prefer their medical missionaries to remain in the field even though war 
had broken out at home.119  
 
Summary   
 Medical missionaries, by 1937, were publicly co-operating with the 
National government and its NHA. This was perceived as a satisfactory 
progression by most, although a few expressed anxieties that medical missionaries 
would be perceived as serving the government which would nullify their avowed 
apolitical stance. When war broke out, the National government sought to 
emphasise the Christian connections of its leader and his wife as they looked to 
medical missionaries for support. This served only to confirm to CCP onlookers 
that medical missionaries were in collusion with the National government. 
 Although the personal motivations of all the medical missionaries when 
war broke out cannot now be ascertained, official reports and interviews suggest 
they were motivated by their personal beliefs and the example of their Christian 
faith to use their medical skills to help others.  The decision to remain is not 
particularly remarkable, although had all missionaries known exactly what they 
                                                 
119 Ibid.  Many educational missionaries moved west with the evacuation of their schools. 
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were committing themselves to in experience and time their decisions may have 
been more measured. Medical missionaries had to confront their individual 
principles but these were secondary to the ‘call to stay’, the opportunity to 
evangelise, the ethos of providing Christian example, concern for their Chinese 
staff’s spiritual welfare, and the protection of medical equipment, supplies and 
buildings.  All these combined to take precedence over home government advice 
to evacuate, which conflicted with mission board encouragement to remain, and 
personal concerns over the physical dangers of living in an active war zone. There 
was also the strong motivation that having decided upon a medical missionary 
career in the first instance, making difficult decisions concerning family, health 
and salary, to make further sacrifices in the line of duty was not something they 
would have shirked from. Whatever their motivation, whether as a result of a few 
of the factors outlined above or a combination of them all, the vast majority of 
medical missionaries chose to stay in China rather than withdraw and many even 
returned, during the war years, from furloughs abroad. Having considered medical 
missionary legacy, belief and motivation, we can now examine their actual 
wartime experiences. 
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Chapter Three   
 
Disturbed Times: Change and Opportunity 
 
 
Today is the day of great opportunity in China. War cannot stop God’s 
work.  Buildings can be destroyed, but the spirit of this message in the 
hearts of our believers can never be destroyed, and that’s what counts, 
after all.  
 
N.F. Brewer, Seventh-Day Adventist Counsel Officer, 1941.1 
 
 
Introduction 
An investigation of medical missionary work in China to place Hubei and Wuhan 
within a wider context is the objective of this chapter. Based on a discussion of 
the available statistical data on medical missions in China as a whole, this thesis 
will highlight characteristic features of medical missionary experience in Free and 
occupied China within both urban and rural areas. The qualification for inclusion 
within this chapter has been that each area, personal history, or hospital 
investigated should contribute to our general understanding of medical missionary 
experience in all China and material will be provided that can be compared with 
the experiences of medical missionaries in Hubei.  This will enable the following 
                                                 
1 Brewer, N.F., “China Division Symposium”, in The Advent Review, June, 1941, SDA, 
RH1941/28, p. 154. 
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question to be addressed in this thesis’ conclusion: Was medical missionary 
experience in Hubei during the war representative of medical missionary 
experience in China as a whole? 
 Wartime changes occurred within distinct time periods in an environment 
characterised by constantly fluctuating geographical boundaries. The major 
geographical division was the boundary demarcating occupied from Free China. 
This boundary, which generally ran along transportation routes was particularly 
fluid. The most significant change, after the outbreak of war itself, followed the 
attack on Pearl Harbor when missionaries experienced an overnight change, 
exchanging their third party national status for enemy non-combatant. As a result, 
they were to experience events in a similar way to their Chinese colleagues. While 
medical missionaries had no control over the theatre of war, their experiences, 
reactions and strategies provide us with an insight into the changes the hostilities 
brought. Before documenting these changes and experiences it is helpful to focus 
attention on the geographical distribution of medical missionary activity in China 
on the eve of war to obtain an outline of the missionary presence.  
 The listing of clinics and dispensaries poses a problem for the researcher 
because there appears to have been no officially recognised definition of what 
exactly constituted either, and the terms appear to have been used interchangeably 
in society records. Boynton records 50 separate dispensaries in China of which 48 
are American supported and 38 of them PN.2  The Norwegian Lutheran Mission 
(NLK) Hubei dispensary at Macheng is an example of a dispensary omitted from 
this list. All hospitals appear to have operated some form of out-patient 
department which could lend itself to classification as either dispensary or clinic. 
                                                 
2 Boynton, C.L., and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 1936, see mission station listings pp. 243–303. 
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Hospitals, by virtue of the fact that they treated in-patients, provide a more 
reliable indication of committed medical investment by mission societies than 
dispensaries and clinics.  Hospitals did, however, vary considerably in size; for 
example the ACM St. Luke’s hospital in Shanghai supported 170 beds while the 
LMS General Hospital in Hweian, Fujian Province supported only 48.  Boynton 
records a total of 16,492 mission hospital beds for 1936.3 
 The recording of the number of nursing schools has also proved 
problematic when trying to quantify medical missionary activity, with different 
sources quoting quite different figures.  For example, Matron Stephenson reported 
183 Schools of Nursing in 1937 whereas the 1938 China Yearbook lists 109 
registered nursing schools and 31 unregistered.4  As a result of these statistical 
irregularities this thesis has focused on hospitals as reliable indicators of mission 
society commitment to medical missionary work. 
 
The Medical Mission Ministry  
(i) Statistical Data 
The 1937–1943 government sponsored China Handbook records 268 Protestant 
mission hospitals describing this as pertaining to approximately 75% of civilian 
hospital beds.5  Shields quotes the secretary of the CMA, Dr. Sze, writing in 1935 
that there were 235 mission hospitals. 6   However, as the hospitals are not 
individually listed it is impossible to cross-check these figures. Boynton lists 232 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 186. 
41. Stephenson, G., “The Story of Christian Nursing in China”, p. 25. A copy of this report was 
made available to me by Dr. Andrew Pearson’s wife Mrs. Jean Pearson.  
2. China Yearbook 1938, Council of International Affairs, Shanghai, North China Daily News and 
Herald Ltd., 1939, p. 453. 
5 Chinese Ministry of Information China Handbook 1937–1943, New York, Macmillan Co., 1943, 
p. 776. 
6 Shields, T.R., “Medical Missions”, 1944, p. 290. 
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hospitals and branches for May 1936.7 This thesis identifies 246 mission hospitals 
operating in China just prior to the war.  
 Medical missionary work in China, in the mid 1930s, as illustrated by 
Table 1, was dominated by North America with 131 of a total of 230 single-
society hospitals having their supporting base in America, and 12 in Canada.8  
This dominance in the field was reinforced by North American medical 
missionaries associated with CIM, which, although officially classified as an 
international society, recruited many of its missionaries from the North American 
continent.9  Individual mission stations of all nationalities usually, but not always, 
supported one hospital per mission station.   
Supporting 
Country  
Mission Societies  Medical Mission 
Stations  
Hospitals  
United States 30 124 131 
Canada 1 11 12 
Britain 10 57 61 
International 
(CIM and SA) 
2 16 16 
Norway 2 3 3 
Sweden 1 2 2 
Finland 1 1 1 
Germany 2 3 3 
New Zealand 1 1 1 
Totals: 50 218 230 
Table 1: Single-Society Supported Mission Hospitals by Country10 
                                                 
7 Boynton, C.L., and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 1936 p. 188. 
8 Bates notes, Canadians were not rare in North American organisations but rarely reported as such. 
He puts the Canadian organisations as being 9% of the North American total.  Bates, S.R., “The 
Theology of American Missionaries in China, 1900–1950”, in Fairbanks, J.K., The Missionary 
Enterprise in China and America, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1974, [Harvard 
Studies in American East Asian Relations], p. 136.  
9Ibid. 
10 Data obtained by analysing mission station information listed in Boynton pp. 243–303 and 
society records. 
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In addition to the 230 single-supported hospitals five hospitals were supported by 
more than one society, and 11 were connected to seven mission supported tertiary 
level educational establishments.11 
Type of  Hospital Number of 
Hospitals 
Single-society supported 230 
Jointly supported    5 
Attached to 7 medical school/higher 
education establishments 
 11 
Total: 246 
 
Table 2:  Types of Mission Hospitals Operating in China in 193612  
 
(ii) Geographical Distribution, 1936/37  
The treaty ports sustained the greatest concentration of Protestant medical 
institutions. This concentration is not unexpected considering the protection, and 
density of foreign population that treaty ports offered in the early days, and this 
also reflects provision of medical care for missionaries themselves. It did not, 
however, necessarily follow that a major treaty port city supported a large number 
of hospitals. For example, in Nanjing, the Union Hospital, attached to the city’s 
university and supported by MEFB and UCMS, provided almost the only western 
medical care in the city and this hospital was to evacuate westwards during the 
war.  Similarly, in the frontier post Yunnan region none of the treaty ports had 
Protestant medical missions: the four hospitals for this region being situated in 
towns that had no treaty port status.  The reasons underlying the choice of these 
                                                 
11 St. John’s University, Shanghai; Women’s Christian Medical College, Shanghai; University of 
Nanking, Nanjing,; West China Union University, Chengdu; Hackett Medical College, 
Guangdong; Qilu University Hospital, Qilu; Yale in China, Changsha. 
12 Data obtained by analysing mission station information listed in Boynton pp. 243–303 and 
society records. 
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towns are unclear. The ten ports defined by the Chinese Maritime Customs as the 
Yangtse Ports all had Protestant medical mission stations.  Likewise all those 
under the Central Ports category were served by medical mission stations and of 
the Southern Ports nine out of the 13 had medical mission stations. The 16 
Northern ports were mostly Japanese with two medical missions at Tianjin (LMS 
and WFMS) and Yantai (Chefoo) (PN and CIM). 
 Protestant mission hospitals, which are listed in full, by province, in 
Appendix III, were not alone in providing western medical care during the war 
years. As well as hospitals operating under government auspices there were also 
266 Catholic hospitals and asylums for the infirm.13  Large Japanese hospitals 
operated in Shanghai and Tianjin with the latter described as providing some of 
the finest medical facilities in China.14 The Japanese Dōjinkai 同仁会,Universal 
Benevolence Association hospitals were funded by Boxer funds that supported 
four hospitals established in China in 1914: in Beijing, Qingdao, Jinan (Tsinan) 
and Hankou.15  Although these Japanese hospitals were open to Chinese residents, 
Chinese attendance fluctuated over the years registering patient response to the 
state of political relations between China and Japan.16  Following the outbreak of 
hostilities in July 1937, Japanese hospitals closed then later re-opened to co-
ordinate with military requirements specifically to “take care of Japanese and 
                                                 
13 China Handbook 1937–1945, 1946, p. 571. 
14 Peattie, M.R., “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937”, in Duus, et al. (eds.), 
The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1875–1937, 1989, pp. 166–209, pp. 176 and 198.  
15 Plans for a medical school in Shanghai never materialised although one was established in 
Qingdao from 1924 to 1930.  The hospitals employed both Chinese and Japanese staff with the 
latter out-numbering the former by approximately 3:1. Lo, M.C.M., Doctors Within Borders: 
Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
2002, p. 155. Chapter 6 documents Dōjinkai projects in China, pp. 151–180.  
16 Lee, S., “The Foreign Minister’s Cultural Agenda for China:  The Boxer Indemnity”, in Duus et 
al. (eds.), Japanese Informal, pp. 272–313, p. 299. 
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Chinese patients and facilitate the pacification teams of the Military”.17 Lo notes 
that the Japanese were intent upon their medical work being seen as specifically 
Japanese to be distinguished from American or British work of a similar nature.18 
  Mission societies followed differing policies in the geographical 
distribution of their hospitals with some appearing to have operated an ad hoc, or 
unplanned, development plan over time, such as the American Presbyterians (PN 
and PS) supporting 42 hospitals in ten provinces. (For hospital distribution maps 
refer to Appendix – Maps.) Another example of an ad hoc development society 
was CMS which supported 13 hospitals, eight in Fujian and one each in 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan and Zhejiang respectively. The 
impression is that these hospitals were established as and when the opportunity 
arose rather than under any pre-formulated strategy while other societies preferred 
to spread their hospitals more strategically using a planned provincial 
development plan. CIM, in particular, followed this strategy supporting 15 
hospitals in 11 provinces duplicating only in Henan, Hunan, Gansu and Shanxi.  
Neither the American Presbyterians nor CIM participated with other societies in 
any jointly supported hospitals. Twenty societies supported only one hospital in 
China, which provided them with a strong, focal, medical spotlight, for their work. 
However, the expectation of success for these individual hospitals must have been 
high and the responsibility on the hospital Superintendent to maintain a successful 
‘medical flagship’ to promote fundraising in the home country relentless.  In 
addition, societies funding only one hospital would perhaps have been less 
amenable to change over time since they had more to lose if their only hospital 
failed.  For example, a move towards Chinese self-support might have been 
                                                 
17 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs cited by Lo, M.M., Doctors, 2002, p. 156. 
18 Ibid., p. 159. 
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perceived as placing a single society hospital in jeopardy. If the society’s only 
hospital ran into serious difficulties, for whatever reason, potential donors could 
have argued that, if the society’s missionaries were not overseeing the hospital 
then was the society still operating a medical mission? Home Boards could have 
raised the paternalistic question of “How will our fundraising public view our 
only hospital if it is managed by Chinese?” Thus, the move towards Chinese 
management and self-support could have been perceived as less attractive for 
societies supporting only one hospital.    
 Falling between extensive ad hoc development and single-development 
societies was planned, cellular, concentrated investment involving a small number 
of large hospitals.  For example, ACM operated five large urban based hospitals: 
two in conjunction with St. John’s University in Shanghai and three others in 
Anqing, Wuxi, and Wuchang.  During the war, the ACM operation had the 
advantage of having no outlying rural medical stations that had to be supplied or 
overseen, as was the case in Hubei, to distract from the main operation. Despite 
occupation, all four cities were able to maintain communications with each other 
and continue with their work. The ACM Bishops had always played a strong 
administrative role in hospital administration and, during the war, this continued 
as the mortar that linked the four hospitals. Such a tightly-organised investment 
also had the advantage over more geographically-extended medical missions, of 
being easier to administer. The ad hoc, development policy ran the risk of 
producing a disconnected, over-extended network, under a multi-layered 
administration responsible for extensive staff levels.  However, the ad hoc 
developers had the advantage of publicising themselves on a national scale, and in 
the case of the American Presbyterians, were able to cast American religious 
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influence and awareness of western scientific medicine over a greater area than 
any single or cellular development society could have hoped to do.19  Positively, 
from the missionary society perspective, an extended network of hospitals was 
impressive and radiated economic and physical commitment.  
EPM followed a policy of consolidation operating its five hospitals only in 
the southern areas of Fujian (3) and Guangdong (2). Such coastal concentration 
was rooted in the society’s early settlement in Chinese territory but to what extent 
this became confining in later years, a pattern from which there were neither the 
funds nor the will to break away from, it is difficult to assess. Certainly smaller 
societies were confined by economic and staffing issues which would have 
constrained any grand development plans however much they might have wished 
to expand.  Societies that arrived later in China enjoyed the advantage of being 
able to expand further inland not being ‘tied’ by any pioneer economic investment 
to the initial geographical confines of nineteenth century missionary development.  
 There were anomalies such as BMS which began work in China in 1874 
and later established a hospital in Xian (Sian), which in 1936 was the only 
Protestant mission operated hospital in Shaanxi province (Refer Appendix – Map 
2).  Being, in parts, the CCP base area, this region was problematic for missionary 
hospital development, and may have contributed to a reluctance to commit the 
required funds to establish and maintain a hospital in this area. Another anomaly 
was the Bethel Mission (BeM) which operated only one hospital and this was in 
the urban setting of Shanghai where there were many other hospitals and where 
                                                 
19 The American influence referred to here does not infer attempts by missionaries to forge a 
militaristic or cultural empire but rather to the opportunity to propagate the Gospel over a large 
area. 
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costs would have been high.20 However, societies with hospitals in Shanghai had 
the advantage of visitors passing through ‘in transit’ and staff were able to 
socialise with other missionaries and their professional peers. The CMA and NAC 
had their administrative offices in Shanghai providing convenient meeting places 
for medical professionals. Essentially, underlying the establishment and 
successful administration of the hospitals of all the medical mission stations, 
whatever expansion strategies they chose to implement, was the financial security 
and size of the society. 
 The location of mission hospitals, by province, in 1936, reflects their 
geographical distribution along lines corresponding to the early years of 
missionary influence (Refer Appendix – Map 2). Thus, the major concentrations 
were to be found in the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu and 
Shandong where 111 of the 246 hospitals were situated. The establishment of 
medical missions in the interior areas followed the natural and man-made 
transportation routes into Hubei, Henan, Hebei, Hunan and on into Sichuan 
providing a total of 84 hospitals for these provinces. As could be expected, the 
remoter, more geographically challenging provinces of Gansu, Yunnan, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Shanxi and Shaanxi, had considerably fewer medical missions totalling 
only 26 for the five provinces. Unexpectedly there is a relative paucity of 
hospitals in the more accessible Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangxi triangle of provinces 
which totalled only 23. Zhejiang’s small number of hospitals reflects its 
mountainous terrain which, compared with the lower landscape in Jiangsu, would 
have presented a considerable barrier to development.  Similarly, the more 
difficult terrain would also explain why Jiangxi had six hospitals.  But Anhui 
                                                 
20 This hospital was established in 1920 by Mary Stone and Ida Kahn, both Chinese women 
brought up by missionaries and educated in America. 
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appears to present something of an anomaly as, despite the Yangzi valley flowing 
through its central area, the province had only nine hospitals, all American.  
Manchuria supported two Protestant hospitals; the SDA Shenyang (Mukden) 
Sanatorium and CSM Hospital 
 Protestant medical missionary work amongst lepers appears to have been 
most strongly concentrated in Fujian and Guangdong provinces although Dr. 
James Maxwell (1873–1951) acknowledged that because leprosy workers 
combined to “hide their work under a bushel” accurate information was difficult 
to obtain.21  He made specific mention to the fact that due to this lack of publicity 
his paper listing leprosaria and leprosy clinics may have held “errors of 
statement”. 22   Maxwell also commented that, in similar fashion to hospital 
dispensaries, leprosy clinics were difficult to define, with some being attached to 
hospitals and some operating in rural districts. It appears that much work, 
including some operated by medical missionaries, was financed by The Mission 
to Lepers (International) and The Chinese Mission to Lepers.23  In summarising 
the leprosy situation Maxwell is disparaging about many of the leprosaria noting 
that medical treatment could be non-existent with consequently high mortality 
rates. Data from Boynton lists the following leprosaria:24  In Fujian three British 
(all CMS), and two American leper homes (CEZMS, WFMS), and in Guangdong 
two British (CMS, EPM) and two American (PN).  Leper homes were also 
situated in Shandong, under the supervision of Qilu University described by 
                                                 
21 Medical Adviser to The Mission to Lepers (International) and The Chinese Mission to Lepers.  
Maxwell, J., “Leprosaria and Organised Leprosy Clinics”, in CMJ, Vol., 49, September, 1935, pp. 
957–962, p. 962. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The Rotary Club also supported leprosy work. 
24 Data obtained by analysing mission stations information listed in Boynton, 1936 Handbook, pp. 
243–303.  For a list including Roman Catholic and private institutions refer to: Maxwell, 
Leprosaria, 1936. 
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Maxwell as the only ‘hospital’ for lepers (PN), in Zhejiang (CMS), Hebei (LMS),  
and Xiaogan in Hubei (LMS), described by Maxwell as being “excellently 
planned, well built and very well run”.25  This last leprosaria will feature in the 
Hubei chapters. 
 
(iv) Medical Missionary Professional Staff 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Matron Gladys Stephenson and Graduate Nurses at the  
MMS General Hospital  ( Pu’ai yiyuan ) Hankou, 193726  
 
In 1937 there were approximately 5,800 Protestant foreign missionary staff in 
China of whom 297 were doctors and 262 nurses, totalling 559 professionally 
qualified foreigners engaged in medical work. 27  By way of comparison the 
mission societies employed 515 professionally qualified Chinese doctors and 
1,161 Chinese nurses totalling 1,676 Chinese medical professionals employed in 
Protestant medical missions. Thus the ratio of foreign to Chinese doctors in 
missionary institutions in 1936 was 1:1.7 and of foreign to Chinese nurses 1:4.4. 
                                                 
25 Maxwell, “Leprosaria”, 1936, p. 960. 
26 Cram/Photograph/0842. 
27 The China Handbook 1937 lists total Protestant missionaries in China in 1935 as 5,816 
representing 18 denominations. China Year Book 1938, p. 453. Based upon data from the May 
1937 figures issued by the Council on Medical Missions Prayer Cycle of the CMA 1936–37. 
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Foreign   Chinese   Ratio 
Doctors 297 Doctors 515 1:1.7 
Nurses 262 Nurses 1161 1:4.4 
Total: 559 Total: 1676  
 
Table 3:  Medical Missionary Staff in all China 193628 
 
The dependence of medical missionary work upon Chinese nurses is noteworthy, 
especially when the 3,707 student nurses working alongside the qualified 
professionals are taken into account as supplementary support creating a ratio of 
1:42.8.29 Of interest here is not only that there were more Chinese than foreign, 
but how few there were, in total, underpinning Protestant medical missions in 
China. This provides us with an overview of how small the foreign medical 
missionary presence in China was in numerical terms on the eve of war compared 
with the estimated Chinese population of 450 to 480 million.30  The influence 
extended by these hospitals in their immediate catchment areas, however, far 
exceeded their statistical presence and data supporting this is provided in chapter 
four with reference to the hospitals in Wuhan.31  
 Within the Protestant missionary movement foreign medical professionals 
accounted for just over 10% of all mission society staff. Although this thesis is 
concerned with medical missionaries, it is recognised they did not function in 
isolation but as part of a wider missionary community that provided support in 
                                                 
28 Boynton, C.L. and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 1936, p. 188. Based upon data from the May 1937 
figures issued by the Council on Medical Missions Prayer Cycle of the CMA 1936–37. 
29 Ibid. 
30450 million: Yip, K.C., “Disease and the Fighting Men: Nationalist Anti-Epidemic Efforts in 
Wartime China, 1937–1945”, in  Barrett, D.P., Shyu, L.N. Shyu, L.N. (eds.), China in the Anti-
Japanese War, 1937–1945: Politics, Culture and Society, New York, Lang, 2001, p. 180. 480 
million: Ho, P.T., Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953, Harvard University 
Press/Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 86.  
31 Refer Table 6, p. 165. For example 44 government physicians working in 18 hospitals supported 
423 beds plus outpatients, whereas 42 Protestant physicians in only 5 hospitals supported 798 beds 
plus outpatients.   
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varying ways both administratively and practically. An unforeseen source of 
support staff came from German Jews who fled Nazi Germany and entered 
Shanghai during the war.  These refugees were required to register with the CMA 
and, by the autumn of 1940, over 100 had done so, with most being placed in 
positions away from the coastal areas and 12 being employed by mission 
hospitals.32   
 Other medical professionals worked in China. Independent foreign doctors 
travelled to China after the outbreak of war but did not associate themselves with 
medical missions. One of the most famous was the Canadian thoracic surgeon Dr. 
Norman Bethune (1890–1939) who worked with the CCP 8th Route Army and 
died of blood poisoning obtained whilst performing surgery. 33  Contemporary 
references to Bethune are scarce and he is regarded rather ambivalently by some: 
McClure wrote home that an ex-SPG nurse who had worked with Bethune 
thought well of him and McClure quotes her as saying “once he [Bethune] gets 
away from his alcoholic beverages he does a good job of work and is not a bit 
afraid of hardship”. 34   Bethune’s work for the CCP was celebrated in the 
establishment of The Bethune Hospital, with by 1943, an attached medical school, 
                                                 
32 “Yearly Review”, in International Review of  Missions, Vol., 29,  No. 29, January, 1940, p. 20. 
H. Oertel, a German Jewish doctor worked at the General Hospital in Hankou.  Dr. Hirschl was 
engaged by EPM in 1939 in Quanzhou.  PEC/FMC/Series 1/Box 14/file3.  
33 Before going to China Bethune was a member of the Canadian Communist Party and worked 
with the Eighth Route Army from March 1938 where as well as providing medical care he 
attempted to teach basic medicine. Shewmaker, K.E., American and Chinese Communists, 1927–
1945, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1971, p. 92.  Despite his reputation, Bethune falls 
outside the scope of this thesis as he was not a medical missionary.  As accounts of his work did 
not circulate freely until after the war years his influence on the wartime medical missionary 
experience was negligible although he became a hero to the CCP. In 1949 the Public Health 
Bureau chose the tenth anniversary of his death to hold a public hearing against the Union 
Hospital over a post-partum haemorrhage death. “Hankow Union Hospital Board of Directors 
Medical Superintendent’s Report”, December 1st, 1949, CWM/LMS CH2, Central China Reports. 
34 There is no further information concerning Miss. Hall from McClure other than she was a New 
Zealander, “too elevated to know anything about politics”, and was supported by a “left-wing 
group” from Hong Kong. Scott, M., McClure, 1979, p. 273. 
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at Shijiazhuang, on the Hebei–Shanxi border.35  Other independents who worked 
for the 8th Route Army were five doctors who, as part of an Indian medical 
mission, were sent to China in response to an appeal from Zhu De.  They arrived 
in Hankou in 1938 where they met Zhou Enlai and worked in the ex-Japanese 
concession in the 64th base hospital temporarily established there in 1938.  Later 
they served in Yanan, home to The International Peace Hospital, situated in caves 
on the edges of the town, and in mobile medical units with the 8th Route Army.36  
In contrast to the co-operation that was to develop during the war between 
different missionary denominations and nationalities, political differences were to 
prove more resistant to change. For, despite the common enemy, the Japanese, 
ideological differences remained, as exemplified by the Indian doctors referring 
amongst themselves to one ACM missionary as “Rasputin” because of his “close 
connection with the Chiang Couple”.37 
 
Change and Medical Missionary Experience  
The changes that were the most difficult to prepare for or predict were the 
momentous events completely outside medical missionary control such as the 
commencement of hostilities in July 1937 and Pearl Harbor in December 1941.  
The initial outbreak of war and the outbreak of the Pacific War brought new rules 
and regulations, triggered troop movements and bombing raids, destroyed 
communication lines, and so on. The change brought about by these events, in a 
domino effect, then set in motion further smaller changes such as the censoring of 
                                                 
35 China Defence League Report, “International Peace Hospitals”, in CMJ, Vol., 61, No. 2, April–
June, 1943, pp. 190–191. 
36 For an ideologically biased account of this Indian medical mission refer to Basu, B. K., Call of 
Yenan: Story of the Indian Medical Mission to China, 1938–43, All Indian Kotnis Memorial 
Publication Committee, 1986, reprint, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 2003. 
37 Ibid., p. 81. 
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mail and the necessity for travel passes, and as the war progressed it becomes 
impossible to separate cleanly which changes were a direct result of the war and 
which had no relation to the war.  There were changes over which medical 
missionaries had some degree of control even if they could not predict the 
consequences. For example that the chaos of war would seriously disrupt medical 
missionary work was predictable and could be planned for by stockpiling drugs 
where possible and this, along with changes in clinical practice, were relatively 
easy to plan for and incorporate. That refugees, and ultimately hospital staff, 
would move westwards was similarly a reasonable prediction but less foreseeable 
were the subjective, human changes that occurred during the war such as the co-
operation between denominations and the golden age of individual opportunity.  
The only way to label change that occurred solely as a result of the war would be 
to isolate change that would have happened if there had been no war and that is an 
impossible task. Thus we have to accept that the changes that occurred were as 
closely linked as the individual strands of a tightly woven mystic knot, each a 
visible strand in its own right yet impossible to unravel tidily.  Nonetheless that 
does not mean that wartime change cannot be analysed in a thematic way and the 
following six sub-sections represent such an attempt.   
 
(i) Immediate Effects of Hostilities 
An analysis of the immediate wartime effects upon medical missionary work 
indicates that the onset of hostilities resulted in instantaneous communication and 
transportation disruption with consequent economic problems in areas under 
occupation and attack. This disruption in turn impacted upon the movement of 
goods and medical supplies creating logistical problems for suppliers and 
purchasers. In addition to the traffic of goods, population movement became 
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chaotic as refugees fled and others became subject to the rules and regulations of 
occupation which impacted upon military, civilian and refugee movement and the 
transportation of the wounded.   
 Changes did not occur in isolation and ‘knock on’ effects were created. 
For example, ACM’s St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Shanghai expanded overnight, in 
August 1937, from 200 to 300 beds but its gas supply was interrupted. There were 
no facilities for sterilising, and staff had to fall back on electricity and liquid 
sterilisation.38  As a result of these changes, the hospital’s electricity bill doubled 
in a month. Previously, the maternity section had dealt with 120 to 130 women a 
month but in August 1937 this jumped to 342 as maternity hospitals in Shanghai 
were closed or reduced as staff evacuated  Cotton pads used in maternity care 
became scarce, which led to an increase in their price.39  St. Elizabeth’s services 
were further stretched by the refugee influx which naturally increased patient 
numbers. These changes occurred in tandem with the first resignations of the 
Chinese staff that began to move to the west. Thus, the outbreak of hostilities led 
to logistical problems at a time when the demand for services and goods within 
the hospital had more than doubled and the staff were fewer.  These developments 
were compounded by rising costs and shortages of basic medical supplies which 
in turn led to changes in clinical practice.         
  
 
 
                                                 
38 Anon, “St. Elizabeth’s Meets War Challenge” in Spirit of Missions, Vol., CIII, No. 3, March, 
1938, p. 105. 
39 Ibid., p. 107.Cellulose cotton in July 1938 was 68 cents a pound, by August it was $1.15, and 
sterilised brown paper was substituted which cut expenses in half. Nurse Emeline Bowne (1896–
1993) records a similar practice in Anqing where sterilised absorbent paper replaced gauze as an 
outer dressings cover. Bowne, E., to family, October 10th, 1937, ACM archive. 
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(ii) Communication and Travel 
Communications between China and the outside world, and within China itself, 
were disrupted and travel became slow, erratic and hazardous. A trip that before 
the war had taken three hours by road could take as long as five days by foot 
during the war.40 Missions in Free China were able to maintain communication 
with their home bases using cables and letters, although the latter could take three 
months or more to arrive. It was, however, still possible to complete and submit 
annual reports and returns that kept those at home belatedly in touch with the 
China field. Those in occupied China, particularly after Pearl Harbor, were 
completely cut off with no communication with the outside world. Landsborough, 
in the Free China area of Fujian, described the continued, albeit tenuous, contact 
with home base as “comforting”.41   
 Travel from, and within, Japanese occupied territory became subject to 
tiresome rules and regulations. Foreigners were effectively marooned within 
mission premises.  For example, in Tianjin the concession area around the LMS 
Mackenzie Memorial Hospital was cordoned off and passes required for exit and 
entry.  The result was that Chinese suppliers could no longer deliver food or 
goods, forcing missionaries to make time consuming trips outside the Concession 
to purchase supplies.  The hospital’s business manager had to make three separate 
visits to the Flour Exchange and then negotiate for four hours to buy 50 bags of 
flour which was a complete waste of a business manager’s time. 42 A further 
complication was that the undertaker lived in the Chinese city and as a result of 
the cordon his services became unavailable raised problems over burials which 
                                                 
40 Landsborough, D., in conversation, February 24th 2007, cited these journey times when 
describing two trips he made on foot between Quanzhou and Fuzhou.  
41 Ibid. 
42 LMS, Mackenzie Memorial Hospital: The War Emergency, 1937, CWML A 3/3, p.6. 
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were not only of a practical nature but also concerned issues of public health. A 
substitute undertaker was engaged but on one occasion a corpse was “arrested” by 
the city’s Auxiliary emergency Corps and held until proof of origin could be 
obtained from the hospital. 43 
 If movement for foreigners within the towns and cities was tiresome, it 
was even more complicated for those wishing to travel between cities in occupied 
China. No travel was possible without a pass and these were difficult to obtain.44 
A declaration had to be signed: 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p. 7. 
44 Bowne, E., to family, June 30th, 1940, ACM archive. 
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Fig. 2: Declaration Required for Travel by Medical Missionaries Between 
Anking and Shanghai under the  Japanese Occupation of Anking45 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Bowne, E., Inserted in file RG 270–9-5, ACM archive. 
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In addition, all baggage was carefully examined by the Japanese authorities: 
Before any foreigner leaves the city all his or her luggage has to be 
examined so as to avoid this being done at the city gate the Military 
Police have come to our houses to examine them there…  They go pretty 
much through everything and are interested in all our possessions.  A 
little thing like that doesn’t affect you at all after a while.46 
 
 As travelling became increasingly complicated and subject to more and 
more red tape, communication between dioceses had to be undertaken by cable, 
making their contents more public and less secure than in the past. In March 1938, 
the Japanese introduced mail censorship and all written communication became 
subject to scrutiny.47  The Anqing medical missionaries prepared cable codes that 
could be used to communicate with the Bishop of Hankou via the ACM cable 
address “Anchumiss”.  “BABY SICK” indicated “Situation threatening – may 
need help”, “BABY WORSE SEND SERUM”  translated as “Situation dangerous 
arrange for immediate evacuation”, “POST SUPPLIES” was “Steamers not 
stopping, evacuation if necessary would be impossible without help”.  Possible 
replies from the Bishop included “SERUM UNAVAILABLE DISPATCHING 
LATER” which meant “means of evacuation not immediately available, will 
arrange as soon as possible” or “SERUM BY EXPRESS POST ON (state day)” 
translated as “Launch leaving on day designated”.48 While there is no reference to 
the codes ever being used they provide a good example of a strategy laid in place 
by medical missionaries to overcome censorship.   
 
(iii) Relationships 
Medical missionaries without outside contact, such as that sporadically enjoyed 
by Landsborough, were particularly isolated. United Christian Missionary Society 
                                                 
46 Bowne, E., to family, March 23rd, 1941, ACM archive. 
47 North China Herald, March 9th, 1938. 
48 Bowne, E., Inserted in file RG 270-9-6, ACM archive. 
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(UCMS) Nurse Mushrush was described as the only foreigner in Nantung, Jiangsu, 
when it was occupied by the Japanese army on March 17th 1938.49  Mushrush had 
200 women refugees, including ill and wounded, under her sole administrative 
and clinical care during a period when the Japanese burned over 1,000 houses in 
the city in reprisal for the killing of some troops by city residents. Thus Mushrush 
was isolated from fellow missionaries while living in an unpredictable, dangerous 
environment. It is reasonable that under such circumstances medical missionaries, 
in both Free and occupied China, formed closer relationships with their Chinese 
colleagues.  The increased formation of these relationships was a wartime change 
that emphasised that the paternalistic attitudes of previous years were 
anachronistic. 
 Lewis Smythe (b.1901) a missionary sponsored by the Congregational  
Church and a Professor of Sociology, and his wife Margaret (b. 1901) who was a 
doctor were on their way to Lushan, a retreat known to missionaries as Kuling, for 
their summer vacation when hostilities broke out in 1937. Smythe returned to 
Nanjing immediately before the city fell and remained there during the occupation.  
His wife and two daughters evacuated initially to Hong Kong and later to the 
Philippines returning in 1940 to meet up with Smythe.  The family then travelled 
to Chengdu where they remained for six years. Smythe resumed his work with the 
evacuated University of Nanjing and his wife worked in a mission hospital where 
her speciality was Tuberculosis.  Describing her time in Chengdu, Margaret 
Smythe commented upon the change in her relationship with her Chinese 
Christian colleagues: 
 
                                                 
49 Anon, War Conditions in Nantung, Kiangsu, 1938, Conference of British Missionary Societies 
(CBMS) 368, File 1. 
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… we felt that our fellowship with our Chinese Christian co-workers 
who had come with us was closer there than it had been back home, 
because we were all sort of exiles together in a way… So it got to be 
really, quite a close-knit fellowship and we were closer to them than 
we’d been back home…  50 
 
The unstated implication here is that such a close-knit fellowship had previously 
been unusual between foreign medical missionaries and their Chinese Christian 
colleagues, or such new-found fellowship would have raised no comment. Shared 
wartime experience of hardship and evacuation, combined with closer proximity 
in living conditions, had created new bonds and understanding between foreigner 
and Chinese. Although there was some pre-war movement towards greater 
fellowship, particularly between the younger generation and their Chinese 
colleagues, wartime change during the war accelerated this trend. 
 However, some occasions witnessed tension between foreign medical 
missionaries and their Chinese colleagues such as that which arose between Dr. 
John Roberts (b. 1903), a medical missionary at St. Andrew’s Hospital in Wuxi 
(Wusih) from 1936 to 1940 and his Chinese hospital staff. A Japanese civilian 
was brought into the hospital with an ectopic pregnancy. He recommended she be 
sent to the Japanese hospital in Shanghai as an emergency case but, as it was a 
three-hour journey, he agreed to operate despite never having previously 
performed the operation.  
 So I had a little trouble with the staff.  But, of course, they said she was 
the enemy of the country.  And I said, “Well, we are going to do it 
anyway.”  So we operated on her.  …And, the next thing, I heard, was, 
that morning, the Japanese military were out in the office and wanted 
to know why we weren’t registered with the puppet government in 
Nanking. So the only thing I could tell them, “We don’t recognise the 
puppet government.” …and the thing that saved the whole thing was 
that the patient began to get better.  And when she got better she was a 
very appreciative patient.51 
                                                 
50 Smythe, M.G., Transcript of interview for China Missionaries Oral History Project, Henry 
Luce Foundation and Claremont Graduate School Oral History Collection, 1972, p. 43. 
51 Roberts, J., interview transcript, 1984, p. 14, Oral History Project, ACM archive. 
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 Roberts distinguished between a Japanese woman experiencing a medical 
emergency and the administrative demands of the occupying force; He was 
prepared to provide emergency medical service but baulked at co-operating 
politically by registering the hospital with the puppet government.  That he was 
not afraid to take the latter stance indicates, clearly, he was not easily intimidated 
by the Japanese. Whether he wanted the woman to go to the Japanese hospital in 
Shanghai because she was Japanese or because he had never operated on an 
ectopic pregnancy is unclear; but, he was prepared to overrule his Chinese staff’s 
opinions to treat a patient and he had the authority to do so.  Did Roberts, by his 
authority, place his colleagues in a position where they felt they were 
collaborating with the enemy?  It seems he did.  However, what would have been 
the position if the woman had died: would he and his staff have been liable to 
accusations of incompetence or even murder?  What if he had refused to operate?  
Would he have been supporting his Chinese colleagues’ sensibilities while 
breaking his Hippocratic Oath and ignoring the Christian ethos of service to 
others? Roberts’ actions illustrate how medical missionaries could use the power 
of their outsider position to involve their colleagues in potentially collaborative 
acts. This critical emergency illustrates several levels of power; Japanese 
authority over Roberts,  his authority over Chinese colleagues, the power of the 
medical emergency activating the doctor’s professional response and, perhaps, the 
power of fear forcing action to negate any possible repercussions should the 
woman have died. This episode provides a glimpse of some of the tensions 
experienced by both foreign and Chinese medical staff. 
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(iv) Chinese Staff Move West 
By the third week of August, 1937, the Chinese had blocked the Yangzi River at 
Zhenjiang (Chinkiang) in an effort to protect Nanjing, with the result that all 
through-traffic from Central China to Shanghai ceased. Fewer ships were 
navigating the rivers because of the danger to shipping, and because cargo 
tonnage had dropped. Restriction of movement coincided with the period when 
civilians began moving west. The first Chinese civilians to migrate westwards 
were those with resources who could afford to relocate via boat and rail. One 
consequence of this was that the mission hospitals lost the fee-paying patients 
they relied upon to balance their budgets.52  For some hospitals dependence upon 
local fees was great.  For example; local income covered 90% of the ACM 
General Hospital’s expenditure. 53   Loss of this income created economic 
instability just as the costs of running hospitals increased. Donations from the 
National government and relief agencies for refugee care went some way to offset 
the balance and make up the shortfall, but many hospitals soon found themselves 
with financial problems, especially when funds from mission bases also dried up.  
The first wave of refugees was followed by those who had fled on foot carrying 
their possessions with them. The further they travelled the poorer they became as 
their meagre resources became depleted or were stolen by thieves.54  Families ran 
the risk of being broken up, and by the time they reached Central China many 
were destitute.  
 Staffing shortages compounded the medical missionaries’ problems as 
Chinese hospital staff began resigning to journey west.  Many Chinese staff left 
                                                 
52 Spirit of Missions, Vol., C11, No. 10, October, 1937, p. 468. 
53 ACM, Bishop’s Column, District of Hankow: The Newsletter, Vol., XV111, Jan/Feb, 1938,  
p. 2. 
54 Extracts from “Letter from Changsha”, in China Information Service Bulletin, Issue 9, June 23rd, 
1938, New York, p. 27, CBMS 368, file 1. 
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earlier than they thought necessary, as reported by an inspector for a CMA report 
on relief work, but they reasoned they had to take advantage of transportation as it 
became available rather than risk being trapped in occupied territory.55  At the 
BMS Foster Hospital in Zhoucun, the majority of the male nursing students left 
soon after war broke out, and the hospital was forced to employ ward orderlies to 
replace them.56  The SDA year-end report for 1937 recorded a total medical staff 
of 360 but by December 1938 this had fallen to 200: a loss of eight doctors, 14 
graduate nurses and 138 trainee nurses.57 The greatest losses haemorrhaged from 
Shanghai, Hankou and Yancheng which respectively lost 87, 35 and 23 staff.  
However, the 1939 SDA year end report recorded a total rise of 41% in staff 
numbers to 282 with an increase of ten graduate nurses and 72 trainee nurses.58  
Thirty staff had been engaged in Chongqing, and there had been a substantial 
increase, 36, in the staff of the Shenyang Sanatorium.  This increase must to some 
extent reflect the re-engagement of some of those who evacuated in 1938 and, 
having arrived at their destination in the west, resumed employment although it 
does not explain the staff increase in Shenyang.   
 That many resumed work with SDA suggests they were not deserting 
SDA hospital mission work and neither is the impression given that the Christian 
message had not been strong enough to convince them to remain to provide 
service to others; they were evacuating for safety ahead of the advancing Japanese. 
However, these evacuees were arriving at a new destination just as the western 
                                                 
55 Brown, R.E., “A Report on Relief Work Inspection”, in The Chinese Medical Journal, Vol., 56, 
July, No. 1, 1939, pp. 95–98, p. 96. 
56 The positive side to this was that it accelerated the transition already begun of training female 
student nurses rather than male.  Foreword, Foster Hospital Report, Choutson, Shandong, 1940, 
BMS archive, [no page numbers in this report.]. 
57 SDA, “Medical Department, China Division, Summary”, in China Division Report, Vol., 8,  
No. 8, 1938, p .6, and Vol., 9, No. 8, 1939, p. 6. 
58 Ibid., Vol., 9, No. 8, 1939, p. 6. 
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provinces were experiencing a refugee influx and, it would have been convenient 
and prudent, to resume employment with SDA rather than to attempt to gain 
employment with a new mission society, so resumption of employment may 
indicate convenience rather than loyalty to the mission.  
 Trainee nurses continued to graduate during the war and may have been 
recorded as a trainee loss, so a recorded loss on paper could, in fact, reflect a more 
competent professional nurse. For example, Tatsienlu, in 1939, records a loss of 3 
trainee nurses and an increase of three graduate nurses which may document the 
same members of staff. Being year end figures, fluctuations within the year are 
not clear and some staff were drafted for war service by the Chinese authorities. 
Those least likely to move were the physicians who tended to remain fairly fixed, 
reflecting the fact that most of them were foreign although, again, where a station 
is recorded as having one doctor there is nothing to indicate whether it is the same 
doctor at the beginning and end of the year. Despite the limitations of the 
recorded data it is clear SDA staff were moving around the country away from the 
central theatre of war to what was perceived as the relative safety of the border 
areas.  The SDA year-end figures for 1941 and the rest of the war years, as a 
consequence of Pearl Harbor, were never produced, thus providing an example of 
wartime conditions forcing a change in mission society data publication.  
 This draining of staff westwards caused a reassessment of the relationship 
between medical missionaries and their Chinese colleagues. Attitudes varied with 
some missionaries seeing such leave-taking as desertion whereas others 
appreciated their Chinese staff would face difficulties from which they, as third-
party nationals, were exempt. Emeline Bowne expressed her thoughts to her 
family in December 1937: 
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We foreigners will be holding the fort – it is right for any Chinese 
colleagues to go as it would be impossible for them to be here should the 
Jap. come in.59 
 
 In the hospital at Weihui (Weihwei) Henan, to the dismay of the Canadian 
mission staff, all the Chinese doctors and 75% of the student and graduate nurses 
had left by the end of 1937:  
 The infection of fear spread and on one never-to-be-forgotten day twenty 
of our staff left. Within two weeks our staff was reduced to one Canadian 
doctor, two Canadian nurses and seven Chinese graduates and pupils.60   
   
For some, this sudden exodus was fuelled by a desire to work in the government 
hospitals where they could more obviously see their contribution aiding the 
Chinese war effort. 61   An added incentive was the higher salaries paid by 
government hospitals at a time when supplies were scarce and prices rising.62 By 
January 1940, 30 nurses had left St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Shanghai and were 
serving with the regular military forces.63  The foreign staff had to confront the 
fact that some of the Chinese staff they had thought loyal to the Christian mission, 
when faced with choosing between mission hospitals and mission wages, and 
government hospitals and government wage levels, chose the latter. Thus, some 
evacuees may, under the guise of patriotic duty, have chosen economic security 
over Christian service.  
 The westward movement of Chinese staff was not without some short 
term benefit.  Central provinces such as Hubei and Henan in the early stages of 
the war were able to make use, temporarily, of the large numbers of qualified 
Chinese medical staff that passed through their midst while fleeing the Eastern 
Provinces. We can only speculate whether the Chinese Christian staff would have 
felt more loyalty towards the mission hospitals if they had had more autonomy.  
Steps, which will be identified in the next chapter, were being taken towards 
                                                 
59 Bowne, E., to family, December 13th 1937, ACM archive. 
60 Cited by Grypma, S.J., “Healing Honan”, 2005, pp. 211–212. 
61 Ibid.  
62 De Jong, G.F. The Reformed Church in China, 1842–1951, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Eerdmans 
Pub. Co., 1992, p. 265. 
63 Spirit of Missions, Vol., CV, No. 8, August, 1940, p. 9. 
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devolution but still, in the mid 1930s, foreigners, particularly doctors, remained in 
positions of leadership over their Chinese staff.  It was to be the changes 
described in this and the following chapters that were to accelerate advancement 
towards Chinese medical control. 
 
(v) Medical Supplies and Goods 
In Shanghai, during the early months of the war, hospital supplies were 
augmented by donations from drug companies and businesses.  For example, in 
October 1937, Jardine Mathieson donated cotton wool, Burroughs Welcome 
chloroform, Allen Hanburys drugs and dressings, and Cathay Hotels towels. 64 In 
the same month, all medical supplies and surgical instruments became exempt 
from import duties. 65  Not all areas were on the receiving end of generous 
donations, and the staff of the MMS Blyth Hospital in Wenchow, Zhejiang 
province, during 1937, thought they would have to close the hospital due to the 
interruption of its medical supplies from Shanghai. The problem was resolved 
after Asiatic Petroleum and British cargo boats resumed operations and were able 
to transport supplies.66 
 The CMA acted as a coordinator for medical supply donations and began 
issuing consignments of goods in January 1938. 67   By September, the CMA 
Relief Fund had received $50,928.93 from donors as varied as the British Fund 
for Relief Work in China (CC$6,000) and the Joint Women’s Associations of 
Shanghai (CC$100).  Recipients included CC$21,000 for the American Red Cross 
Budget, CC$2,077.43 for wounded soldiers and emergency hospitals, and 
                                                 
64 North China Herald, October 13th, 1937, p. 64. 
65 Ibid., October 27th, 1937, p. 132. 
66 MMS Annual Report, Review of 1937, MMS 85. 
67 CMJ, Council on Medical Missions, Vol., 54, No. 5, November, 1938, p. 484. 
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CC$3,891.40 purchased gauze, ether, quinine and other goods. 68  The 
Association’s Medical Secretary reported 20 consignments of medical supplies 
had been despatched in July and, during November, 31 consignments sent to 25 
different cities.69 Recipients included not just Protestant but also Roman Catholic 
missions, the Red Swastika Society (a Buddhist relief organisation) and other 
Chinese charitable institutions.70   
 Quinine, in particular, was in short supply and Dr. J. L. Maxwell Secretary 
of the British Society to the IRCC, expressed grave concern.  Despite a million 
tablets of quinine having been sent by overseas Chinese from the South Seas, 
these had all been depleted and existing supplies in Central China were almost 
exhausted.71  The CMA responded and by November was able to report $3,000 
worth of quinine tablets had been issued.72  However, the service encountered 
logistical problems when, in December, it was announced the Director of the Post 
in Shanghai had issued a notice to the effect that from November 18th all parcels 
would be examined by Japanese censors and all medical supplies destined for 
Central China would be confiscated to prevent them reaching the Chinese 
government.73 
 In Free China, the Chinese government’s laboratories were unable to keep 
up with the demand for anti-smallpox vaccine and an urgent request was made to 
the Secretary General of the League of Nations. The League responded, and 
4,000,000 doses were ordered to be sent to French Indo-China in an attempt to 
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stave off an epidemic in China’s war areas.74  Fears of a smallpox epidemic were 
not without foundation as December 1938 saw 331 Chinese and 23 foreigner’s 
deaths in Shanghai, bringing the total number of deaths during the outbreak in the 
city to 1,100.75  
 The CMA vacated its premises in Shanghai in December 1938, and the 
CMM, under Dr. Brown, carried out an inspection of over 40 medical and relief 
organisations visiting 13 districts including the Red Cross Medical Headquarters 
at Chiyang, Fujian. In his summary of this tour, Brown reported the greatest 
problem for medical missionary work was disruption to transportation.  In all the 
areas visited, discussions were held with missions, foreign relief workers, 
provincial governors and their officials, National government members and relief 
workers. All reported their greatest need was to keep communication lines open 
expressing a desire to “keep the wheels turning”.76  Mission hospitals in particular 
were reported as being hampered by a lack of transportation for supplies and staff.  
Brown recommended coordination with the British Chinese Red Cross Medical 
Division, which had access to trucks. In July 1939, the CMA moved to emergency 
offices in Chongqing where despite being cut off from contact with medical 
missions in occupied China, it was well placed to aid Free China:  
Perhaps never before has the CMA been in such regular and intimate 
touch with hospitals.  Hospitals from all corners of the country are in 
constant correspondence reporting their special needs and problems.  For 
example the C.M.S. Hospital at Kunming and the Missionaries Memorial 
Hospital at Chaotung have written of their problems of high costs in 
Yunnan…77 
  
Every effort was made to relay supplies to hospitals. The Canton Hospital, 
(UCC/UB) through the CMJ, reported that when the river was closed, it would 
                                                 
74 CMJ, Vol., 55, No. 1, January, 1939, p. 90. 
75 Ibid. 
76CMJ, Vol., 56, No. 1, July, 1939, p. 96. 
77CMJ, Vol., 58, No. 3, September, 1940, p. 496. 
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have been impossible for the hospital to obtain necessary supplies of medicines 
without help from the U.S.S. gunboat Mindanao.78  
 Some hospitals were fortunate enough to have staff with foresight. 
Landsborough described how extra supplies ordered for Quanzhou by his 
predecessor had lasted throughout the war: 
 Certainly before she [Dr. Florence Read] left she was very cunning, very 
wise I think, for instance take ether and chloroform for general 
anaesthesia, there wasn’t any gas or anything.  There was chloroform and 
that was it.  But she made a big order, a great big order of big bottles of 
chloroform and ether, especially ether, about that high. [indicates with 
his hand approximately one metre from the ground]  A huge order of 
ether from Shanghai and these came down even before we arrived and 
they were stored where we lived a little bit further away from the 
hospital, they made a huge hole in the ground and built a storehouse with 
a concrete lid…and so these bottles lasted us right through the war.79 
  
After the war Landsborough and his colleague Tunnell published a paper 
describing an improvised technique they had developed during the war enabling 
them to perform 100 operations under endotracheal anaesthetia when “few 
hospitals in China can have had facilities for modern endotracheal anaesthesia”.80 
Although Reed’s foresight and Landsborough and Tunnell’s improvisational 
technique secured the hospital’s supplies of anaesthetics the sourcing of other 
drugs proved a problem for the hospital.  Despite remaining in Free China for the 
duration of the war the hospital was permanently on a war footing as the Japanese 
were only one day’s march away in Xiamen and tensions were fuelled by 
‘nuisance’ bombing raids. 
 Hospitals in Free China were supported by the FAU which transported 
supplies from West China under the leadership of McClure.  Fuzhou was Fujian’s 
                                                 
78CMJ, Vol., 59, No. 3, March, 1941, p. 294. 
79 Landsborough, D., in conversation, February 24th, 2007.  
80 Landsborough, D., Tunnell, N., “Simple Endotracheal Anaesthesia”, in CMJ, Vol., 65, Nos. 9 
and 10, (single edition) September/October, 1947, p. 367.  
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dispersal point and, although he never met any of its members personally, 
Landsborough regarded the FAU as:  
 … an absolute life-saving thing…Now take Fuzhou a big city where 
there were two big hospitals there. One was the American Methodist 
Hospital [Christian Union] and then the Church Missionary Society 
C.M.S. Hospital [Christ’s Hospital] in Fuzhou these two big hospitals 
there and the other mission hospitals dotted around. And medicines were 
not really made in the area, they depended upon being brought in and so 
that’s when the supplies had to come in from West China, they were not 
many but they came from West China and how could we get supplies 
from West China?  It was through the Friends’ Ambulance Unit.81 
 
The FAU, even though they operated within Free China, still had tedious 
logistical problems transporting the supplies. Within Fujian many of the roads had 
been destroyed to impede Japanese movement inland but this also obstructed the 
FAU.  Truck drivers had to be trained mechanics in order to make running repairs 
at the side of the road with one of the main problems along the Burma Road being 
access to water to cool the engines.82  
 Mission hospitals were also subject to the over-use of existing resources 
both material and human. The LCH in Shanghai reported that increased usage of 
its equipment would lead to earlier replacement than in the past.  In the first 
quarter of 1938, the LCH’s work had increased by 47%, compared with the 
corresponding period for 1937. Regarding the hospital’s human resources the 
problem was not finding people to work but of overwork by existing staff already 
exhausted.83   In August 1937, between 90 and 100 new wounded were arriving at 
the LCH each day, and even when services were stretched to breaking point, new 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 The Burma Road was built by the Chinese in 1937 connecting Lashio in Myanmar ( Burma) 
with Kunming. It was notoriously difficult to negotiate, partly because of the hair-pin bends, and 
supplies were transported along it into China during the war, particularly by the FAU using 
temperamental charcoal driven trucks.  For an account of the daily life of an FAU driver working 
this route see: Llewellyn, B., I Left My Roots in China, London, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953, pp. 
15–43. 
83 LMS, “Lester Chinese Hospital, Annual Report and Accounts 1937”, LMS Triple Jubilee 
Papers, CWML A.3/3 
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wounded were still being admitted.  The new wounded were Koreans and Chinese, 
who were brought in as suspected spies, or Japanese, after “being set on by the 
crowd”.84  These patients then had to be guarded until police protection arrived, 
which hindered and delayed staff even further.  Such overwork and stress was, 
however, only the beginning and by August 24th, the day after the accidental 
Chinese bombing of the Sincere Department Store, when it was reported that 150 
people had been killed and 450 wounded, the hospital staff’s previous experience 
was put to good use.  The work of the LCH following the bombing is described 
by the hospital’s chief surgeon and illustrates not only the way the hospital 
operated but also the type of injury medical missionaries and their staff had to 
contend with: 
I was really proud of the way our people went at it.  The experience of 
nine days before stood us in good stead. By 3.30 we had cleared up. 
Operations of course went on to much later. Our rooms in out-patients 
and emergency were cleared – floors washed – light cases sent off – 
about 10 medium cases transferred to other hospitals and about 40 left in 
our wards.  On trestle beds, floors etc.  By 4 p.m. even the courtyard had 
lost its blood stains, fresh stock of dressings &c were in the rooms and 
all ready for another burst which one prays may never come. Five have 
died overnight…  One man who was brought in dead was completely 
severed across the middle, but was held together by almost uninjured 
clothes.85 
 
 An unexpected side-effect of the transportation problem was that the 
arrival of military wounded from the front to all hospitals was often delayed, and 
many died of their wounds while in transit.  As a result, unusually for hospitals 
operating in a war zone, more medical than surgical cases were received. In 
Shanghai, and other large cities, the wounded had easier almost instant access to 
hospitals.  Consequently, wounds that would have been fatal for military wounded 
isolated on the front line could be treated promptly in the cities and lives saved.  
                                                 
84 Paterson, J.L.H., Confidential extract from correspondence, August 16th, 1937, CBMS Box 368, 
File 2. 
85 Ibid., August 24th, 1937, CBMS Box 368, File 2. 
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In the early months of the war the numbers treated could be high and in Shanghai 
the LCH dealt with 1,176 gunshot wounds during a two week period between 
August 13th and 31st 1937.86 
  
(vi) Enemy Action: Medical Missionaries and Mission Property 
Personal injury and damage to mission property were unavoidable consequences 
of enemy action.  Medical missionaries, as a collective group, appear to have 
escaped major injuries during the war, but damage to mission property was 
common-place. An account of a typical bombing raid resulting in damage to 
mission property was recounted by Dr. Ayers from Zhengzhou (Chengchow) in 
Hunan: 
Bombs started dropping all around, anti-aircraft guns and machine 
guns firing, people screaming, dogs howling etc.  Eighteen planes 
came over and dropped about eighty bombs, of which number 70 
percent were in the environs of the different missions and the 
remaining Lunghai Gardens and residential compound.  Eight 
bombs landed in the south compound, one in the hospital 
compound, twelve in the Catholic Mission Compounds, and many 
around the missions… At least nearly three thousand dollars worth 
of damage was done to our compounds…87 
 
 In addition to being damaged by bombing raids, hospitals and mission 
property were also occupied and, in some cases, looted as the Japanese advanced. 
The CMM made efforts to tabulate mission hospital losses. The initial CMJ report 
covered information received up to March 1938 and reported 14 hospitals had 
been occupied, damaged, looted or destroyed with an estimated loss of 
$400,000. 88  A second report published in March 1939 covered 34 mission 
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88 Wong, K.C., “Medical Secretary’s Interim Report for March 1938”, in CMJ, Vol., 53, No. 6, 
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hospitals and clinics with an estimated loss of between $1,000,000 to 
$1,5000,000.89   
 
 March 1938 March 1939 
Occupied Huchow  
      General Hospital                               
Soochow (Suzhou)  
      Soochow Hospital 
      Wilkinson Hospital 
Yanchow (Yangzhou) 
      Baptist Hospital 
                                  
 
Huchow 
      General Hospital 
Kashing (Jiaxing) 
      General Hospital 
Shanghai 
      General Hospital       
      Shanghai Sanitarium Clinic 
Soochow (Suzhou) 
       Soochow Hospital 
      Wilkinson Hospital 
Yangchow (Yangzhou) 
       Baptist Hospital 
 
Damaged Chouts’un (Zhoucun) 
      Foster Hospital 
Nanchang 
      Ida Kahn Women and Children                   
Hospital 
 
 
Paoting 
      Taylor Hodge Memorial Hospital 
Shanghai 
      Margaret Williamson Hospital       
      St. Luke’s Hospital 
Taiyuan (Daizhou) 
      Schofield Memorial Hospital 
 
       
 
 
Chenchow (Chenzhou) 
      General Hospital (Hua’ai) 
Chouts’un (Zhoucun) 
Foster Hospital 
Nanchang 
      Ida Kahn Women and Children   
Hospital 
Paoting 
      Taylor Hodge Memorial Hospital 
Shanghai 
      Margaret Williamson Hospital 
      St. Luke’s Hospital 
Taiyuan (Daizhou) 
      Schofield Memorial Hospital 
Tinghsien (Dingxian) 
      Leprosy Asylum 
Yencheng (Yancheng) 
      General Hospital 
                                                 
89Wong, K.C., “Medical Secretary’s Interim Report”, in CMJ., Vol., 55, No. 3, March, 1939,  
p. 295. There is a calculation discrepancy in the report.  It calculates 11 mission hospitals 
destroyed not 10, 8 occupied not 7 but tabulates the actual hospitals as set out in Table 6 above 
from which the writer has made her calculations. 
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Looted Wusih (Wuxi) 
      St. Andrew’s Hospital 
Changsha 
      Church Hospital 
 
Changsha  
      Church Hospital 
Haichow (Haizhou) 
      E. L. Graham Hospital 
Nanning 
      Seventh Day Adventist Sanitarium 
Wusih (Wuxi) 
      St. Andrew’s Hospital 
 
Destroyed Kiangyin 
      Christian Hospital 
Soochow (Suzhou) 
      Elizabeth Blake Hospital,  
 
Chiaotoutsen (Jiaotouzhen)  
       Seventh day Adventist Clinic 
Kiangyin 
      Christian Hospital 
Liuho (Liuhe) 
      Grace Hospital 
Nantung 
      Christian Hospital 
Shanghai 
      Bethel Hospital 
 Soochow (Suzhou) 
      Elizabeth Blake Hospital 
      Tooker Memorial Hospital 
Waichow 
      Seventh Day Adventist Hospital 
 
Wuchang 
      Seventh Day Adventist Clinic 
Wuchow (Wuzhou) 
      Stout Memorial Hospital  
 
Closed  Jukao (Rugao) 
      Mission Hospital 
Taichow (Taizhou) 
      Sarah Walkup Hospital 
Tinghsien (Dingxian) 
      Salvation Army Hospital 
Yencheng (Yancheng) 
      General Hospital 
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Table 4:  Council on Medical Mission Assessment of Loss to Mission 
Hospitals and Clinics, March 1938 and March 193990 
 An addendum to the 1939 list noted that since the information had been 
compiled most of the occupied hospitals had been returned, but many were 
damaged and equipment either missing or beyond use such as in the case of the 
ACM St. Luke’s Hospital, Shanghai, when, in January 1938, the operating theatre 
was open to the elements with one of its walls torn out. The CMM report noted:  
The entire change of conditions, the lack of financial resources, makes it 
now impossible to carry on the work as before. Future medical work may 
have to be greatly modified and built on a much simpler basis so as to 
cope with the present urgent needs.91   
 
Thus, institutionally, it was being recorded that adaptations had already had to be 
made as a result of wartime change and that the long term consequences of the 
situation would probably necessitate further modifications to working practices.  
Medical staff were having to cope with uncertain, often disastrous, wartime 
conditions that, in the short term, were not expected to improve.  
 
The Post-Pearl Harbor Period 
(i) Chinese Staff 
With the attack on Pearl Harbor medical missionaries’ Chinese colleagues lost  
 the privileges and protection they had received through their association with the 
foreign missionaries and some suffered greatly as a result. Early on December 8th 
1941, the Japanese arrived at the Kate Ford Whitman Hospital at Fenchow, 
Shanxi Province, and detained all the missionaries. The next day, the first wave of 
                                                 
90 Wong, K.C., “Medical Secretary’s Interim Report for March 1938”, in CMJ, Vol., 53, No. 6, 
June, 1938, p. 612. Wong, K.C., “Medical Secretary’s Interim Report”, in CMJ, Vol., 55, No. 3, 
March ,1939, p. 295. 
91Wong, K.C., “Medical Secretary’s Interim Report”, in CMJ, Vol., 55, No. 3, March ,1939, p. 
296. 
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Chinese Christian arrests began, including two Chinese nurses from the hospital 
and Pastor Wang Ching Wen, Principal of the Bible School, Chairman of the 
Hospital’s Board of Management, the Boys’ Primary School and the Middle 
School. The Rev. Harold Matthews, General Secretary of the mission, and Miss. 
Noreen, Hospital Superintendent, were also detained for five and three days 
respectively.92 
 The second wave of Chinese Christian arrests began on January 25th 1942, 
and included Dr. Wang, the hospital doctor, and several others from the hospital.  
Altogether, 41 Chinese Christian workers from the hospital and church were 
arrested, and 20 taken in for questioning.  All were beaten and tortured.  Those 
arrested in the second wave were tutored by those from the first wave and advised 
it was in their best interests to confess to being Communists.  They were coached 
to say they had only joined because they had been told to, had no knowledge of 
the party’s organisation and had done nothing. It was suggested that those who 
answered in this way would face the least trouble.   
 Later, it was mooted that the Japanese had been seeking such confessions 
to try and establish that the Executive Committee of the Fenchow Church was the 
Executive Committee of the Fenchow Branch of the Communist Party, with links 
to a Communist headquarters in Peiping.  Pastor Wang, who was questioned for 
the longest period and beaten the most severely, was asked; “What orders does the 
United States government give to this mission at Fenchow?”, “When the Chinese 
army retreated in 1938, where were the soldiers concealed who were left on the 
mission premises?” and “What is the connection between the Fenchow Church 
                                                 
92 Chao H.H., “The Clouds of Witnesses: A Record of Experiences of the Fenchow Christian 
Church, Shansi, China on and after December 8th, 1941”, 1944, translated by Alfred Heineger,  
China Missionaries Oral History Project, Henry Luce Foundation and Claremont Graduate 
School Oral History Collection, 1972.  
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and the Central Government in Chungking?” 93   Upon his release after being 
sentenced to two months imprisonment, Dr. Wang entered the hospital at Taiku, 
Shansi, as a patient.  
 This linking of Chinese Christians with the CCP and the United States 
government anticipated post-Pearl Harbor change in CCP missionary policy from 
one of aggression and animosity towards missionaries, to regarding them as a 
valuable conduit to China’s allies. As the National government was China’s 
diplomatic delegate, the CCP was distanced from official contact with China’s 
allies.  Tao Feiya suggests missionaries became valuable facilitators of an 
“International Relations Bridge”, between the CCP and China’s allies.94  
 On March 4th, 22 of the Fenchow prisoners were informed they were to be 
executed, given a final lecture in which they were told their suffering had been to 
change their pro-American hearts, and then, unexpectedly, released. Of the 22, six 
were ill and seven taken ill after release, and of these, two subsequently died.  
Among the other 19 prisoners, Dr. Wang was given a two-year prison sentence 
(later commuted to 9 months) making a total of just over a year of imprisonment. 
Another prisoner was executed.95  Thus, the protection the hospital’s Chinese 
medical workers had received, via association with third party nationals, had 
evaporated and the foreign missionaries were powerless to protect them.  
  After the war, Alfred Heineger (b. 1891), who had returned to oversee the 
rebuilding of the hospital found Dr. Wang had survived. Discovering that the 
Japanese had cremated their dead in the eastern part of the mission Heineger 
described the day of his return as “about as depressing a day as I have ever 
                                                 
93 Ibid., p, 8. 
94 Tao, Feiya 陶飞亚, Guoji guanxi de qiao liang  国际关系的桥粱, Kang zhan shiqi Zhonggong 
dui jidujiaohui de xin zhengce  抗战时期中共对基督教会的新政策 (New Communist Policies 
towards the Christian Church in the War of Resistance) in Wenshizhe, No. 5, 1995, pp. 10–15.  
95 Chao, H.H., “The Clouds”, 1972, p. 9. 
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experienced”. 96  In February 1946 Pastor Wang and Dr. Wang took part in a 
Conference on “The Rehabilitation of the ABCFM’s Congregational work in 
North China”.  Heineger made this comment: 
 Think what it means to be partners with men like these in the tasks of 
rebuilding in their NEW DAY for China! [Italics added]97 
 
The use of the word “partners” illustrates how Heininger regarded his relationship 
with his Chinese colleagues. Shared suffering and wartime experiences had 
occasioned this public expression of Heineger’s sense of partnership.  In 1925 an 
ABCFM report for Heineger’s mission at Teichow had expressed the hope that: 
 The future will justify our assurance as to Chinese leadership which is to 
replace the missionaries within a few years98   
 
While the Chinese devolution hoped for in 1925 had still not arrived there was a 
post-war recognition that shared experiences and partnership had replaced foreign 
missionary instruction.  
  
(ii) Mission Hospital Reports 
Information concerning mission hospitals in occupied China became harder to 
glean following Pearl Harbor, but repatriated medical missionaries were able to 
provide information.  The Gripsholm’s first voyage carrying repatriates from 
China arrived in New York on August 25th 1942 and carried 41 doctors and 30 
nurses from the Far East.99  Her second voyage ended in New York on December 
1st 1943, and transported 43 doctors, of whom 25 had been associated with 
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mission hospitals. 100  There were also 8 dentists and 41 missionary nurses from 
either occupied China or the Philippines and while on board ship medical 
missionaries held four meetings. 101  The first two covered internment camps; 
conditions, deficiency diseases and nutritional disturbances.  Observations from 
different locales were collated and it was hoped the findings would be published 
in full. Thus the war had provided medical missionaries with the opportunity for 
research and consequent professional development. 102  The third meeting was 
held to familiarise the returnees on recent developments in American medical 
practice and registration for war service.  The fourth meeting was specifically for 
missionary doctors and nurses to report on conditions within the hospitals and 
medical schools in occupied China, and to draw up post-war plans.  This pooling 
of knowledge went some way towards creating a partial report of medical 
missionary work in 1943, and helped clarify the situation in occupied China. The 
publication of this information in the CMJ provides a vignette of medical 
missionary thought. 
 80 hospitals were reported by name, and of these, 47 remained operational, 
with 37 reported as closed.  Of those remaining one was closed but the staff were 
carrying on elsewhere, and in two the Japanese had opened military hospitals with 
former staff carrying on elsewhere.103  One hospital building was destroyed, but 
had established itself at a new site while another was reported as being used as a 
Japanese civilian hospital with the Chinese staff carrying on elsewhere. Of 31 
                                                 
100 The second American repatriation ship, the Teia Maru, carried 1,624 passengers (1,564 
American and 60 Canadians) and rendezvous-ed with the Gripsholm on the West Coast of India 
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101 Ibid. 
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103CMJ, Vol., 61, No. 4, October/December, 1943, CMA, Washington, D.C., p. 359. There is a 
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hospitals reported as being under Chinese control, 19 were Christian, 4 civilian 
and 8 government-run  Of 24 under Japanese control, 19 were civilian and 5 
military.  The hospitals are not identified so it is impossible to place them 
geographically, but it is significant to note that despite closure, damage, and 
requisition, of the 31 hospitals reported upon as being under Chinese control, over 
half were being managed by Chinese Christians.  In a further 32 hospitals, 
similarly unidentified, it was reported former Chinese staff were retained in whole 
or in part.104  
 Following their discussions, the Gripsholm medical missionaries drew up 
six resolutions to aid rehabilitation of medical missionary work after the war. 
Chinese leadership was the second resolution to be tabled and significantly, 
emphasis was placed upon the ‘local’ as opposed to the ‘national’ or 
‘international.’ 
 Chinese Leadership: This should be given increasing emphasis in the 
control through local boards of directors and administrative positions, 
promoting local cooperation of the church and community in the matter 
of health, education, and financial support.  The place of the foreign 
doctors or nurses in the mission hospital should be determined by the 
special needs of the case and the approval of the older members of the 
Chinese staff. [Italics added.]105 
 
 There is a sea change in attitude here with the recommendation that 
Chinese staff approve the “place” of the foreign doctors and nurses and not, as 
previously in many areas, of Chinese staff being subservient to foreign staff.  
Continued cooperation with Chinese Health Organisations was supported, to aid 
preventive medicine in the fight against infectious diseases and public health. The 
final sentence of the resolution statement stresses the importance of a return to 
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China of medical missionaries who have empathy with the Chinese and their 
customs and reinforces the idea of returning to help the Chinese rather than lead 
them: 
 After the close of the war we believe there will be a period of active 
reconstruction and growth throughout China, and doctors and nurses who 
are familiar with people, the customs and the language of the country 
will be those best qualified to return and help the Chinese leaders in this 
work of rehabilitation.106 
 
 The argument the repatriates were taking back with them was one of 
support for Chinese medical personnel in China, rather than governance over 
them, but crucially they did not anticipate any necessity for a reduction in their 
own presence. By the end of the war, when some Chinese staff had proved they 
could manage mission hospitals effectively under difficult conditions and when 
the post-war call sounded for Chinese autonomy in mission hospitals, as will 
become clear, Mission Boards were forced to appreciate they could no longer 
defend an argument for continued western governance.  What also became 
difficult to defend was the foreign medical missionary presence itself. 
 
Medical Missionary Work in Free China 
Free China’s provinces were more provincial than the areas the majority of 
refugees had vacated, and the population was more self-sufficient, having always 
been removed from the main areas of modernising influence.107  The newcomers 
were not readily-accepted by the inhabitants who were suspicious of the new 
arrivals.  Distinctions were made between ‘people who had come down the river’ 
(xiajiangren下江人) and local people (bendi ren 本地人).108 Initially the xiajiang 
                                                 
106 Ibid., p. 362. 
107 Bowne, E., to family, March 22nd, 1942, ACM archive. 
108 Esherick, J.W. (ed.), Remaking the Chinese city: modernity and national identity, 1900–1950, 
Honolulu, University of Hawai’I Press, 2000, p. 174. 
 147 
ren arriving in Free China did not even unpack their belongings, thinking their 
westward exodus would prove to be only temporary.109  
 Outside supplies were unobtainable, and the population was forced to live 
entirely from the land. In Chengdu and Chongqing, the university medical schools 
and hospitals provided a modern western medical service, with up-to-date 
equipment and services. Austin describes the men’s hospital at the West China 
Union University as a “magnificent, multi-pavilioned, two-storeyed edifice…”110 
In the rural areas of Free China conditions were more primitive; there were few 
drug supplies, fuel was scarce and, as a result, working hours often limited to 
daylight.  Work in the rural areas of Free China was, however, less dangerous as 
they were spared the intensive bombing raids endured by the cities. In February 
1941, Bishop Craighill ordered the ACM staff to evacuate Anqing.111  Emeline 
Bowne journeyed to Wuhu and from there, disguised as a Chinese woman, 
travelled to Maolin in southern Anhui.  She began operating a small clinic, 
attending mostly to farmers’ legs and infected fingers and hands reflecting the 
area’s tea picking agricultural base.  A Chinese doctor, Dr. Wei visited weekly. 
There were few drug supplies, the rice situation was serious and Bowne 
contracted malaria.112  She established a record and ticket system for Nationalist 
soldiers who came and went “like will and the wisps” 113  requesting 
sulphanilamide for meningitis.114 How the sulphanilamide was obtained is unclear, 
although reference is made to a Mrs. Wu, who moved through Japanese and 
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Chinese lines.115  Currency regulations decreed missionaries were only allowed to 
draw ten percent of society and personal funds from the bank in Huangshan 
(Tunki), because the army could not access the funds it needed from the west to 
pay its troops. Thus missionary funds, personal and institutional, were, effectively, 
underwriting Nationalist soldiers’ wages. Funds that could be withdrawn were 
paid in high denomination bank notes of $50 and $100, which incurred a ten 
percent charge from local profiteers, although Bowne thought they were fortunate 
to be able to change them at all.  Soap became as “precious as gold” and they 
struck as few matches as possible.116 Despite medical and economic difficulties, 
personally and institutionally, Bowne was able to keep the clinic operational. 
 In August 1944, Bowne moved further westwards to Kunming where a 
pad of writing paper cost $500, a prophylactic toothbrush $1,000 and three yards 
of material $18,000.117  At Kunming Bowne described conditions as “primitive” 
and her work consisted of general nursing while operating a de-lousing campaign 
in a temple.118 Professionally she was fulfilled:  
This is just the sort of work I have been longing to do and Maolin was a 
fine preparation. It is like regular hospital nursing – practically no 
equipment and I concentrate on eyes.  The very sick as much as possible, 
scabies treatments, keeping hot water boiling on hand and generally 
trying to keep up with things… I am still trying to find some way to get a 
hospital number attached to every pt. [patient] so that we won’t lose 
them.  They are transferred with great rapidity from one tent to another 
or to the temple.119 
 
 While attempting to organise the hospital’s administration, Bowne also 
operated her own, unofficial, hospital accounting system with donations she 
received personally.  With these funds, she bought stoves and carried just enough 
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charcoal to the hospital for the day’s needs.  She also bought cooking utensils and 
“various other things”.120  
 In comparison to her nursing work in Anqing, where a Medical 
Superintendent oversaw secretarial and administrative work, in Free China, 
Bowne took charge and ran all sections; secretarial and economic and perhaps 
more importantly: in an emergency wartime situation.  As well as establishing and 
operating the de-lousing campaign she organised the collection of 6,000 catties of 
fuel for each general de-lousing. In July 1945, she contracted typhus despite 
having been inoculated.121  Her reward was a heightened sense of her professional 
worth because, in retrospective review of her wartime experiences in Free China, 
she commented that what she had really learned was that while people could have 
medicine and medical care, without nursing care things were impossible. 122 
Personally acknowledging the importance of her profession’s skills, Bowne was 
experiencing a golden age in her career, in spite of the personal privations she was 
experiencing.  
 When Hankou fell in October 1938, Dr. Herbert C. Liu and Dr. Samuel 
Pang, two Chinese Christian doctors working in a small SDA medical clinic, 
evacuated and established a medical centre in Chongqing.123  They left Hankou 
with no equipment or funds and managed to run the hospital as a self-supporting 
concern throughout the war.  At the 1945 SDA Mission Symposium Autumn 
Council in Grand Rapids, Michigan, their achievement was noted by one of the 
delegates: 
 I think I am safe in saying that, aside from some Ingathering funds 
appropriated that first year, and from a small donation of two thousand 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., May 25th , 1945. 
122 Bowne, E., Oral Transcript, 1985, Disc Two, p. 67. 
123 Both doctors had studied medicine at the SDA Loma Linda medical school in America. 
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pesos from an interested person in the Philippines, that institution 
[Chongqing Medical Centre] has developed and grown from its own 
income. 124 
 
The medical centre flourished from its opening in spring 1939, and by 1945 had 
evolved into an 85 bed hospital with a nursing school. 125  The founding and 
operating of this hospital highlights not only the competence of Chinese Christian 
missionary medical workers but also illustrates the opportunity given to them by 
the wartime conditions to demonstrate this competence.  In addition to day-to-day 
administration, they had to deal with the problems of running a hospital in a city 
that was regularly bombed during the day.   
 Adaptations to clinical practice had to be made: major surgical operations 
were undertaken with crude, out of date instruments, and sterilisation procedures 
were reliant upon pressure cookers.  Medicines were scarce and those that could 
be sourced were expensive. 126   The hospital operated permanently under 
‘bombing alert’, and medicines and supplies remained boxed up for easy 
transportation during raids.  Each staff member had a designated task and within 
20 minutes patients and equipment could be transferred to dug-outs in a hill 
behind the hospital.  Following bombing raids, a first-aid ambulance travelled to 
areas of the city where they could be of most use.127 In July 1941, the hospital 
received a direct hit that divided one sixty-foot building into two halves, leaving a 
25 foot crater in the centre open to the sky; the operating theatre was completely 
destroyed and operations transferred to the chapel where plaster had been forced 
                                                 
124 Longway, E.L., “A Note of Courage From China”, in The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, 
January 10th, 1946, SDA, RH 1946–02, p.17. Harvest Ingathering was an SDA annual event when 
a call was made for funds from church members. 
125 Liu, H., “Our Medical work in Free China”, in The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, March 
8th, 1945, SDA, RH1945–10, p. 14.  
126 SDA “China Division Symposium”, in The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, June 4th, 1941, 
SDA, RH1941/28, p. 152. 
127 Howard, M.D., “The Chungking Medical Center”, in The Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, 
Vol., 118, No. 58, December 11th, 1941, Washington DC, SDA,  RH1941 – 58,  p. 11. 
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off the walls. For makeshift protection from falling plaster and to catch the dust 
muslin was slung under the ceiling over the operating table.128  Due to the bomb 
damage the hospital needed to be rebuilt. Conditions were therefore extremely 
difficult and decisions had to be made on the spot under greater than normal 
pressure.  The Chinese Christian medical staff were able to administer and 
supervise the hospital professionally, and run it as a self-supporting venture 
raising the necessary funding as and where they could find it.  Without the war 
this opportunity would not have been available and the two doctors would 
probably have continued working in the small clinic in Hankou under foreign 
direction. 
 
Summary  
Although the changes that occurred as a result of the war brought difficulty and 
hardship, they also provided medical missionaries and their Chinese Christian 
colleagues with opportunity in both occupied and Free China.  These health 
professionals, who were trained to provide Christian medical care, devised 
strategies to cope with situations they never imagined they would have 
encountered when they signed up for medical missionary work.  Every moment of 
the war they had to be prepared to meet the challenge of the unexpected. The 
consequence of coping with these social, economic and occupational changes 
resulted in professional and personal development, and foreign staff reassessed 
their working and personal relationships with their Chinese Christian colleagues.  
 It was predictable that working in a war zone would lead to professional 
development as medical professionals treated war wounds and diseases with 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
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which they were unfamiliar in peacetime, and in numbers they had never 
previously encountered. The war provided medical professionals with the 
opportunity to gather clinical information for research purposes. It could be 
expected, that within the theatre of war, medical personnel would become 
inventive and improvise as goods and medical supplies became scarce and 
expensive. Less predictable was the successful way both medical missionaries and 
their Chinese colleagues embraced the administrative role that the war demanded 
of them. While those previously in authority had experience of the administration 
involved in running hospitals and dispensaries, there were those who found 
themselves alone or with depleted staff numbers with no such experience.  For 
most, but not all, new levels of professional and personal competence were 
achieved as they grappled with wartime change.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Pre-Occupation Hubei : The Protestant Medical Missionary Contribution 
 
     Now is the day of opportunity, if ever, for our medical missionary 
movement to function …1 
 
Dr. H.W. Miller, SDA, 1938. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Hubei was chosen as a regional study area for this thesis because it provides an 
opportunity to examine the wartime experiences of British, American and 
Scandinavian medical missionaries within a clearly defined administrative area. 
Wuhan was not occupied until October 1938 so it is possible to compare medical 
missionary pre-occupation, and occupied experience, within both urban and rural 
contexts.2  The rural districts, although constantly fought over, remained free for 
varying periods and as Hubei was never completely overrun, the contrasting 
experiences of occupied and free Hubei continued throughout the wartime period. 
An additional point sparking interest was that Hankou contained the world’s 
largest Methodist Missionary Hospital in the 1930s; the Methodist General 
                                                 
1 SDA,  “Medical Secretary’s Report”, in China Division Reporter, Vol., 8, No. 2, 1938, p. 10. 
2 Where relevant this thesis will refer to each individual city, or to the conurbation of Hankou, 
Wuchang and Hanyang as ‘Wuhan’.  
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Hospital, Hankou, or in Chinese the Hankou Hospital of Universal Love, (Pu’ai 
yiyuan 普愛醫 院), founded in 1864.3   
 
 
Fig. 3: Matron Gladys Stephenson at the entrance to the  
MMS General Hospital, (Pu’ai yiyuan), Hankou, 19374  
 
Medical Missions in Hubei 
In 1937 amongst 17 missionary societies operating in Hubei eight were actively 
involved in medical missionary work: LMS, MMS, ACM, CSFM, SMF, SDA, 
NLK, and CovMS.5  
                                                 
3 This hospital, also known as the MMS General hospital will be referred to as the Pu’ai in order 
to avoid confusion between it and the ACM Church General Hospital which will be referred to as 
the General Hospital.  
4 Cram/Photograph/4062. 
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Arrival 
in Hubei  
Mission Societies in Hubei  
 
Denom- 
ination 
1861 LMS       London Missionary Society* 
                倫敦會 
Anglican 
1862 WMMS  Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
                Society* 
                大英循道會 
Methodist 
1868 ACM       American Church Mission* 
                美國聖公會 
Anglican 
1878 CSFM     Church of Scotland Foreign Mission* 
                 蘇格蘭福音會 
Presbyterian 
1889 CIM        China Inland Mission 
                 內地會 
Inter-denom. 
1890 SMF        Swedish Missionary Society* 
                 行 道會 
SDA         Seventh Day Adventist* 
                 基督复临安息日會 
Lutheran 
Anglican 
1891 CovMS   Covenant Missionary Society *  
                北行道會 
Lutheran 
1893 CMA      Christian and Missionary Alliance 
                宣道會 
Other 
1894 NLK       Norwegian Lutheran Mission* 
                中國基督教潞的會 
LUM       Lutheran United Mission 
                豫鄂信義會 
Lutheran 
1911 YMCA    Young Men’s Christian Association 
                 男青年會 
Association6 
1912 Aug         Augustana Synod Mission 
                信義會 
Lutheran 
1912 FMS        Finnish Missionary Society 
                 湘西北信義會 
Lutheran 
1916 LBdM      Lutheran Board of Missions 
                 信義公里會 
Lutheran 
1934 Ex-LMS (retired)  Miss Coxon Anglican 
1935 YWCA    Young Women’s Christian Association 
                女青年會 
Association 
 
Table 5:  Dates of Arrival of Protestant Missionary Societies in Hubei 
Province *denotes  medical missionary work7 
                                                                                                                                     
5 CovMS, based in Chicago, worked in cooperation with other Swedish Missionary Societies.  
Both CovMS and SMF appear to have been referred to as Xingdao hui 行道會 , now The 
Evangelical Covenant Church.  
6 The YMCA and YWCA although categorised as ‘Associations’ by Boynton, they are not, strictly 
speaking, missionary societies.  Boynton, C.L. and C.D., 1936 Handbook, 1936, p.133.    
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 Hankou, where the National government temporarily established its 
wartime headquarters in November 1937, was an interior treaty port established in 
1858 as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin which opened China’s 
interior to missionary endeavour. 8   Following a period of relatively tentative 
‘colonisation’ by British and American societies beginning in 1861, there 
followed a flurry of activity between 1889 and 1894 bringing the number of 
mission societies operating in Hubei to ten.9  The foreign presence now included 
Swedish and Norwegian supported societies; SMF and NLK. The arrival of the 
YWCA in 1935 complemented the Protestant presence. 
 As they sought to establish themselves medical missions encountered 
financial insecurity, civil disturbance, and staffing problems. Dr. Porter Smith, the 
first WMMS doctor to arrive in Hankou in 1864, opened a dispensary eight days 
after he arrived that evolved into the Pu’ai. 10   Smith and his successor, Dr. 
Hardey, each managed only one term in the field before ill health forced them to 
return home. On both occasions the Pu’ai had to be closed, and following 
Hardey’s term the hospital was closed for a further period of two years.  
Additional closures followed bringing cessation of medical services and 
                                                                                                                                     
7 Data obtained by analysing mission station information listed in Boynton pp. 243–303 and 
society records. 
8 The British Concession was relinquished in 1927 and the Russian in 1925. By 1937 only the 
Japanese and French Concession remained as Germany was deprived of hers in 1917. For a 
comprehensive account of the Treaty of Tianjin see Fairbank, J. K., “The Creation of the Treaty 
System,” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol., 10, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 
249–252. 
9 This flourish of activity demonstrates the growing importance laid upon evangelisation of the 
world during the period of imperialist expansion during the last decades of the 19th Century.  It is 
illustrated by the success of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions founded in 
1886 which encouraged university students to volunteer for missionary work abroad. The SVM 
“Watchword” was “The evangelization of the world in this generation”. Hutchison, Errand, 1993, 
chapter 4, pp. 91–124. 
10 Hospital of Universal Love. Kang Zhijie, “Yizhi binghuan”, 2007, Kang’s references include 
WMMS Annual Reports and “Pu’ai Hospital Records”. 
 157 
consequent termination of evangelistic opportunity and financial loss. 11   The 
erection of the iron-works in Hanyang, and the city’s cotton mills in the 1890s, as 
part of the Qing government’s self-strengthening policy, finally brought much 
needed income. The workers at Hanyang, unaccustomed to operating machinery, 
were prone to industrial accidents, and the government negotiated a contract with 
WMMS for these industrial injuries to be brought to the Pu’ai as fee paying 
patients.12   
 Civil disturbances included rioting in Guangji (Wusueh) in 1892, when the 
WMMS’ women’s hospital had to be closed four times and in 1899 in Anlu, 
where Dr. Arthur Morley’s premises were attacked on three separate occasions. 13  
In 1900, as a result of the Boxer Rebellion, women and children were ordered, by 
the Consul, to retreat to the coast but the Pu’ai, while closed to its in-patients for 
almost a year, managed to keep the out-patient department functioning.14  The 
anti-Christian disturbances that affected all societies in the 1920s have already 
been referred to. 
 The financial insecurity of the mid 1930s is exemplified by ACM, where, 
with nearly $10,000 Mex cut from the 1934 appropriation budget, as a 
consequence of the depression, there was a call from the society to economise.15  
Over the winter of 1933–1934 heat had been discontinued in some wards of the 
General Hospital in Wuchang to save coal for the following winter, and 
discussions had taken place concerning a possible closure. Fees were to be 
                                                 
11 Tatchell, A., Medical Missions in China in Connection with the Wesleyan Methodist Church, 
London, Robert Culley, 1909, p. 121. 
12 Ibid., p. 124. 
13 A Methodist preacher and a British Customs officer were killed. WMMS, Report of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Association Society for the Year ending April 1892, London, WMMS, p. 85. 
Findlay, G.G., Holdsworth, W. W., The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 
Vol., V., London, The Epworth Press, 1924, p. 519. 
14 Tatchell, A., Medical Missions, 1909, p.157. 
15 Church General Hospital Report, District of  Hankow: The Newsletter, Vol., XIV, No. 2, 
February 1934, RG64 121–19, p. 8. 
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increased and charges introduced for X-rays and outside referrals.16  The funding 
situation became more and more critical and when the newly installed diesel 
engine, described as “like a child with a congenital disease” finally gave up 
leaving the X-ray machine out of action, the hospital was forced to rely on oil 
lamps.17   
 LMS, despite experiencing similar financial problems and civil 
disturbances to the other missions, played an important role in the establishment 
of a strong legacy of medical care and education in China.18 The key figures in 
Hubei were Drs. Thomas Gillison (1859–1937) and Percy McAll (1870–1937) 
spending 55 and 37 years respectively as medical missionaries in China.19  These 
two Scottish doctors founded a Hankou medical school in 1902 that become part 
of the Qilu University of Shantung in 1918. McAll was particularly celebrated for 
his work on the standardisation of medical terminology working until two years 
before his death at the University’s Medical Translation Department.20 
 The situation in Hubei in 1937, before war broke out, was superficially 
little different from previous decades with the three major mission societies 
supporting medical work in the province still facing financial and staffing 
problems in an environment not yet completely free from the potential threat of 
civil disturbance. However, the anti-Christian disturbances belonged to a different 
decade and the National government had been established for ten years, and was 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 ACM, “One Week at the Hankow Hospital”, in District of Hankow Newsletter, Vol., XV, No. 4, 
May, 1935, RG64 123–19, p. 9. 
18  John Mackenzie founded the first LMS modern medical school in Tianjin in the 1880s. Goodall, 
1954, p. 519. 
19 Gillison was first appointed to China in 1882.  His son, Keith, was a surgeon at the Union 
Hospital, Hankou, during the war.  
20McAll was the father of Kenneth McAll and father-in-law of Frances McAll interviewed by the 
author. He was first appointed to China in 1898. CMA, Obituary of Percy Lonsdale McAll, CMJ, 
Vol., 51, No. 5, May, 1937, pp. 693–4. 
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now looking to medical missionaries for support for its health policies.  Western 
medicine was gaining greater acceptance which could surely only lead to 
increasing patient numbers with associated increased funding. In this post anti-
Christian disturbances period medical missionaries can be excused for hoping and 
thinking that, perhaps, at long last, they were finally on the cusp of more settled 
times both financially and politically.  
 
Medical Ministry in Hubei in 1937 
(i)  Distribution of Medical Missions in the Hubei Field 
Map 1 shows that the positioning of Hubei’s medical missions was closely related 
to the physical geography of the province following the natural communication 
links created by the rivers and shunning the less populated mountainous areas to 
the west.   
 
 
Map 1: Protestant Medical Mission Stations in Hubei Province in 1937 
(ii) The Wuhan Cities  
 
Hankou  ● 
      Wuchang  ● 
 
  Guangji ● 
 Laohekou ● 
Xiangfan  ● 
 Suixian ● 
● Anlu 
●Xiaogan 
  Zhongxiang  ● 
 Zaoshi  
         ● 
 Yichang ● 
Shashi   
          ●   
Huangshi   ● 
 ● Huanggang 
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Map 2: British Consulate Map of Wuhan 193121  
  
MMS Pu’ai yiyuan    LMS/MMS Union Hospital  ACM Church General Hospital 
 
Wuhan, situated at the confluence of the Yangzi and Han rivers, was a city 
accustomed to new arrivals and transients and had a tradition of accepting, if not 
necessarily welcoming, strangers, which initially aided missionary work in 
                                                 
21 British Consulate Map of Wuhan National Archives, WO 106/5351 345134 
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Hankou. 22   When the National government transferred to Hankou, in January 
1938, the city adopted a new lease of life that triggered a blossoming of cultural 
activity.  MacKinnon has described how for the ten months that the government 
was based in Hankou artisans, writers and publishers blazed a trail to the city 
bringing with them something of the spirit of pre-war Shanghai. There was a 
“unity of spirit against the Japanese at Hankou” as Nationalists, Communists and 
rival Militarists participated in and attempted to manipulate and influence an 
explosion of the Chinese press.23  Within those ten months the number of journals 
published rose from thirty to over two hundred.24  One result of this sudden influx 
of journalists and foreign visitors25 was that an international spotlight was placed 
on Hankou that romantically likened its predicament to the ongoing 1938 siege of 
Madrid. This new atmosphere and some success by the Chinese army encouraged 
the optimistic view in the city that the Wuhan area could act as a barrier to the 
Japanese advance.26  
 In July 1937 when war broke out, prior to Hankou’s cultural blossoming, 
the mission societies were operating hospitals in several areas of the province.  
The LMS, as can be seen in Map 3, operated hospitals with foreign staff in 
Wuchang (2), Xiaogan and Zaoshi and cooperated with MMS in administering the 
Union Hospital, (Pu’ren xiehe yiyuan  溥仁協和 醫院), in Hankou.27   
                                                 
22 Rowe, R.T., Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796–1895, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1989, pp. 4 and 27. 
23 MacKinnon, S., “The Tragedy of Wuhan”, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol., 30, No. 4, October, 
1996, pp. 931–943, p. 935. 
24 Ibid., During this period the only English newspaper published in Hankou was the Central 
China Post published daily which described itself as the “Finest Advertising Medium in Central 
China”,  The China Yearbook, 1938, p.562 
25 For example: Smedley, Bethune, Capa, Auden and Isherwood.  
26 The Chinese victory at Taierzhuang in March–April 1938, MacKinnon, S., “The Tragedy”, 1996,   
p.  932 
27 The Union Hospital was founded in 1927. The LMS was contracted to put all its services at the 
hospital’s disposal.  The WMMS for five years from 1927 would provide $3,000 per annum and in 
the sixth year $2,500 reducing each subsequent year by $500 until the grant ceased. Staff were 
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Map 3: LMS Medical Missions in Hubei Province 1937  
 
 
 
Map 4: MMS Medical Missions in Hubei Province 1937  
                       
                                                                                                                                     
provided and maintained by both. MMS, “Hankow Hospital Union, Preliminary Statement and 
Constitution”, MMSL CH 259. 
Hankou  ● (Hankow) 
 ●Wuchang 
           (2) 
Zaoshi  (Tsaoshih) 
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MMS was operating hospitals with foreign medical staff in Hankou (the Pu’ai and 
the Union with LMS), Anlu,28 Huangshi (Shehuiyao), and with Chinese medical 
staff overseen by non-medical foreign staff in Suixian, Guangji and Zhongxiang. 
(Refer to map 4). MMS maintained a greater presence in the rural areas of the 
province than LMS and the Pu’ai was situated in the heart of Hankou’s Chinese 
area of the city at WuShenMiao enabling MMS to establish close ties with the 
Chinese population.  
 
 
 
Map 5: Pu’ai yiyuan at WuShenMiao in the Chinese City 29 
 
The Wuhan provincial government listed 51 city hospitals in 1937 but while all 
these institutions were officially classified as hospitals, 11 were established in 
1936 and appear to have been small out-patient clinics with only one doctor and 
                                                 
28 The Anlu referred to here is the present day Anlu which was previously known as Anluhsien, 
Anluxian or Teian.  To complicate matters further Zhongxiang , prior to the period of this study, 
was also referred to as Anlu.  Shihuiyao and neighbouring Tayeh are now Huangshi,  
29 Xin Wuhan Zhinan 新武汉指南 (New Wuhan Guidebook ), Wuhan Wenhua Chubanshe 
Bianyin, 1946 [Cram/Papers/617].    
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no beds. 30  Table 6 below illustrates that of the remaining 40 institutions five 
were Protestant mission hospitals, one the Roman Catholic Commemorative 
Hospital (Meishen yiyuan), seven were government administered hospitals, 24 
were private and one was a 100 bed Red Cross hospital established in 1933. The 
two Japanese hospitals were both Dōjinkai – Universal Benevolence Association 
tongren – hospitals established in 1902 and 1923.31   
 
 Number 
of 
hospitals 
Number 
of in-
patient 
beds 
Number of 
physicians 
Number of 
pharmacists 
Number 
of nurses 
Protestant 5 798 42 9 179 
Catholic 1 200 2 5 13 
Government 18 423 44 15 65 
Private 24 175 50 27 54 
Japanese  2 123 22 6 22 
Red Cross 1 100 2 1 16 
Total 51 1819 162 63 349 
 
Table 6: The Wuhan Hospitals in June 193732 
  
 As can be clearly seen from Table 6, the 5 Protestant mission hospitals, 
(only a tenth of the hospitals listed), provided a disproportionate amount of 
Wuhan’s medical services; almost half the in-patient beds (44%), half of the 
nurses (51%), a quarter of the doctors (26%), and 14% of the pharmacists. Among 
the private hospitals, the International Hospital (Wanguo yiyuan 萬國醫院 ) 
established in Hankou in 1917, catered for the foreign community of French, 
                                                 
30June 1937 data certified produced under the seal of the Hubei Provincial Government Secretariat 
reproduced in: Wuhan difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, (ed.), Wuhan shizhi, 1993, pp. 196–198.  
31 Ibid., p. 196.  
32 Ibid. 
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English, Americans and Germans. Other private hospitals were sponsored by 
industrial and financial concerns such as the Guangdong Bank, which established 
the first privately run hospital in Wuhan in 1912, and the Pinghan Railway 
Riverbank Hospital (Pinghan tielu jiangan yiyuan平漢鐵路江岸醫院) established 
in 1916.33 The first government maintained hospital, the Hankou City Hospital 
(Hankoushi yiyuan  漢口市醫院), had been established in June 1927 under the 
leadership of a Japanese trained doctor, Dr. Li. 34   This hospital was to be 
completely destroyed by Japanese bombing. 
 
 (iii) The Rural Stations 
Wuhan housed the province’s largest hospitals in 1937, the greatest number of 
mission offices, and the largest accumulation of medical missionary personnel, 
but there was much medical missionary activity in the rural areas. The CSFM, 
NLK, CovMS, and SMF operated medical missions exclusively in the rural areas. 
When these smaller societies arrived in Hubei they had to establish themselves 
away from the dominating sphere of the larger societies and they set up missions 
in the countryside to the west of the province.  A brief examination of the history 
of two of these mission stations highlights the legacy that 1930s medical 
missionaries inherited from their predecessors, and demonstrates some of the 
problems they experienced in the years leading up to the war, both as a result of 
their own making, and as a result of external forces.   
 CovMS founded a base at Xiangfan and set up a small infirmary and 
dispensary at Xiangyang in 1902 after many internal financial problems, partly 
                                                 
33 This hospital moved to Guiling prior to the Japanese occupation of Wuhan. Wuhan difangzhi 
bianzuan weiyuanhui, (ed.), Wuhan shizhi, 1993, p. 195. 
34 Now the Number Three Wuhan Hospital (第一三医). Wuhan difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 
(ed.), Wuhan shizhi, 1993, p. 194. 
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due to mismanagement by the home base treasurer, who had neglected the China 
field.35 Despite efforts to recruit medical staff they were never able to overcome 
adequately staffing problems, but in 1915 were able to open the CovMS Bethesda 
Union Hospital in Xiangyang.  The period 1912 to 1926 was the high point for 
Covenant missionary work and the foreign mission staff increased from 25 
missionaries in China in 1915 to 52 by 1925.36  The anti-Christian disturbances in 
1927 took their toll on personnel and, following the advice of their government, 
many returned to the United States to resign subsequently from mission service.  
These resignations coincided with a falling off of domestic donations and when in 
1933 six missionaries became available to serve in China after decades of being 
without staff there were insufficient funds to support them37 .  
 NLK entered the China field in 1892 and the society’s missionaries 
followed the route of the Han River to settle in Laohekou in 1894. 38   Incidents 
concerning NLK personnel reflect the dangers of living in rural areas where 
bandit and Communist activity undermined the political stability of the province.  
Dr. Tömmes Frøyland, was murdered by bandits in 1914 and in 1928 the 
Frøyland Memorial Hospital at Laohekou was opened in his memory.  Another 
NLK missionary, Knut Samset, met with apathy when he opened a dispensary at 
Neixiang in Henan and after six months, when no-one had consulted him for 
medical help, he moved to Lushan in 1907 to continue with missionary work.39   
In 1922 he settled in Laohekou becoming Superintendent over all NLK work in 
China in 1932.  His capture by Communists in 1936 while travelling to Wuhan, 
                                                 
35 Olsson, K. A., By One Spirit, Chicago, Covenant Press, 1962, p. 442–3. 
36 Adult church members numbered approximately 2,500. Olsson,  By One Spirit, 1962, p. 450. 
37 Ibid., p. 453. 
38 Now a district of Guanghua. 
39 Kjebekk, E., “Knut I Samset – Missionary and Martyr in 1937, A Norwegian Missionary Who 
Compiled a Chinese Hymn Book,” an unpublished paper made available by the author, 2007.  
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and his death under mysterious circumstances, caused much distress and alarm 
among missionary circles while reaffirming the missionary martyrdom legacy.40     
 
Chinese Christian Medical Staff 
Chinese medical staff in Hubei provided essential support for the western medical 
ministry. Who were these Chinese colleagues?  What did they experience working 
in medical missions?  Chinese sources, as noted earlier, in comparison to the 
volumes of western sources available to the researcher are sparse but we can catch 
glimpses of these people. 
 In 1919 Dr. H T. Chiang (1883–1962)41 the WMMS’s first Chinese doctor 
to be placed in sole charge of a hospital in China at Huangshi (Tayeh),  reflected 
the growing awareness of, and confidence in the professionalism of Chinese 
doctors. Chiang’s appointment coincided with a period of change for China’s 
medical personnel who were being trained both abroad and in China, and 
beginning to hold positions of authority in hospitals, medical schools, and 
colleges.  Following the training of nurses starting in Guangzhou, Hankou and 
Chongqing in 1900, and at Anqing and Nanjing in 1908, the Nursing Association 
of China (NAC) was founded in 1909, the same year that the first Chinese nurse, 
Miss. E. Mawfung Chung, graduated abroad.42  The NAC began producing the 
NAJ in English in 1918 and followed this with joint English and Chinese editions 
in 1920. 
                                                 
40 Ibid., Samset was travelling to Hankou to deliver the manuscript of a revised Lutheran hymn 
book containing 456 hymns when captured.  He wrote ransom demands but his whereabouts were 
never ascertained.  He apparently died from illness in February 1937 although it was suspected he 
was shot.  
41 Chiang, Huchen. Educated at a WMMS mission school, St. John’s University in Shanghai and 
Edinburgh University.  Chang, N.J., “Tension Within”, 1999, p. 428. 
42 Chung graduated from Guy’s Hospital, London and chose the name for the NAC. Wong, K.C., 
Wu, L. T., History of Chinese, 1932, p. 400. 
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 The Chinese-led National Medical Association of China (NMA) under the 
Presidency of Harvard graduate Dr. F. C. Yen was founded at a Conference of the 
China Medical Missionary Association (CMMA) in 1915.43 As a professional 
body the NMA required its regular members to be graduates of recognised 
medical schools and colleges approved by the Association and they had to be 
“acquainted” with at least one western language.44   The NMA and CMMA held 
joint conferences in 1917 and 1920 and amalgamated in 1932 to form the CMA 
the first eight Presidents of which were European and American trained 
physicians. 45   From the Boxer Rebellion to the founding of the National 
government in Nanjing in 1927 there was a recognition and acceptance by 
foreigners and Chinese alike of the growing professionalism of Chinese medical 
personnel. While this growing professionalism was initially supported and 
encouraged by the NAC and CMMA, both ostensibly foreign led institutions, the 
increase in membership of the NMA from 80 members at its first conference in 
1916 to “about 400” at the eighth conference in 1930 indicates that this desire for 
formal recognition of China’s medical personnel’s professionalism stemmed from 
the Chinese themselves.46     
 An expansion in medical missionary work from 1917 to 1936 coincided 
with growing Chinese medical staff demands for official recognition and greater 
                                                 
43 The CMMA, predominantly of foreign membership was founded, in 1886.  Balme, China and 
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autonomy. Kang argues that it was the impact of the May 4th Movement that led 
to the appointment of Chiang to a position of authority in 1919.47  However this 
does not take into account that already in May 1918 Chiang was in written 
negotiations with the WMMS executive for a higher salary, improved living 
conditions, and greater autonomy:  
 I would be empowered to have a free hand in the administration of the 
hospital in charge without undue interference from the Superintendent 
of the circuit.48   
 
Chiang also requested a six to twelve month furlough every seven years for post-
graduate work.  At a meeting of the Wuchang local committee, in August 1918, a 
unanimous decision was reached that Chiang be given full professional autonomy 
having the same status as his European colleagues, his salary was to be  increased, 
a furlough period agreed and other concessions met.49  Thus his appointment to 
Huangshi predates the May 4th Movement. 
 During the anti-Christian/anti-foreign boycott movement disturbances in 
1926 mission property in Wuhan was plastered with placards bearing slogans 
such as; “Down with Christianity – the forerunner of Imperialism”, and 
“Christianity is the enemy of Nationalism”.50  The missionaries in Huangshi were 
attacked and confined by the magistrate for their own safety before being 
evacuated to Hankou. 51  Again, Chiang took sole authority for the hospital. 
Similarly another Chinese doctor, Dr. Hwa, chose to remain at her post in Anlu to 
continue the hospital’s work.  By June 1927, as a consequence of the disturbances, 
all the rural country stations were evacuated by foreign staff, but work, where 
                                                 
47 Kang, “Yizhi binghuan”, 2007, p. 8. 
48 Chiang, H.C. to Hill, J.K., May 14th, 1918, WMMS Box 7, MF 310.    
49 Report of the Local Committee, October 24th, 1918, unsigned, WMMS, Box 7, MF 317. 
50 WMMS, The One Hundred and Thirteenth Report of the Wesley Methodist Missionary Society, 
London, WMS, 1927, p. 68. 
51 Ibid., p. 69. 
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possible, was maintained by the Chinese staff.52 Chiang’s work was singled out 
for praise: 
 After the departure of Dr. Pell Dr. Chiang continued the work and has 
won glorious opinion by his tact and ceaseless energy.  He has been 
ably seconded by Mr. Yü, the nursing superintendent, who is a sincere 
Christian and an efficient worker.53 
 
This was recognition at the highest level since it was unusual for any Chinese 
staff member of a mission hospital to be singled out in an Annual Report.   
 In 1928, the same year the National government established the Ministry 
of Health in an attempt to formalise and improve China’s medical service, the 
hospitals at Huangshi, Zhongxiang and Anlu were all under the charge of Chinese 
doctors.  Although it would appear that the promotion of these Chinese doctors to 
positions of authority indicated a handing over of responsibility from foreign to 
Chinese management, this was not as autonomous as it appears.  Rattenbury 
(1878–1962), the WMMS Chairman of Hupeh District, and his colleagues in 
Hankou during the anti-Christian disturbances, from the sanctuary of the 
Concession, were “kept busy corresponding with the Chinese workers at the 
country stations”.54   Thus, the society’s foreign missionaries although not in situ, 
remained directing operations from Hankou. Chiang thus set a precedent when he 
became the first Chinese WMMS doctor to be placed in a position of real 
authority within a hospital in China paving the way for later Chinese management. 
In 1932 he was appointed Superintendent of the Pu’ai. 
 Kang suggests the Pu’ai used Christianity to create a central axis for 
western medical education and evangelism and that its gradual entry into Chinese 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 70. 
53 WMMS, The One Hundred and Fourteenth Report of the Wesley Methodist Missionary Society, 
London, WMS, 1927, p. 99.  
54 WMMS, The One Hundred and Thirteenth Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
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society resulted in a rich interchange of Chinese and Western culture.55  Certainly 
being situated in the Chinese City area of Hankou granted the Pu’ai closer contact 
with the Chinese population and provided a central axis for education and 
evangelism but there does not appear to have been extensive cultural interchange 
when, for example, ward reports had to be written in English. Such proximity may, 
however, as will be referred to below, have worked towards lessening the strange 
foreignness of western medicine.  It is clear that the period from 1919 leading up 
to the war years was one where the Chinese medical community was beginning to 
assert itself and demand indigenous genuine autonomy but that there was still a 
long way to go.  
 
The Chinese Staff in 1937 
The use of English by Chinese staff was required by the Pu’ai and Union 
Hospitals. Zhang Fuying 张馥英，a nurse who worked at both hospitals， 
recalled her nursing reports at the end of each shift had to be completed in 
English to be corrected by Stephenson, the Matron and Nursing School Director.  
Zhang was born in Yichang in 1918 and joined the Union Hospital’s Nurses’ 
Training Course following a hospital recruitment visit in 1934.56  She began her 
training aged 16 and her family paid $100 for her to enter the course which she 
confirmed was a great deal of money at that time.  Wages were commensurate 
with the amount of years the students had studied; the first year’s monthly wage 
was $1 during which they cleaned doors and windows, cleared the rubbish bins 
and looked after the patient’s dirty things. The second year the monthly wage 
                                                 
55 Kang, Z., “Yizhi binghuan”, 2007, p. 10. 
56 Zhang Fuying, aged 89, was interviewed by the writer at her home in Hankou on November 7th, 
2007. 
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increased to $2 and the students began learning how to take temperatures, change 
bandages, allocate medicines and carry out simple jobs. Zhang described it as 
“waiting around and providing a service”. 57  The third year’s monthly salary 
brought another dollar increase and by the fourth year, when the students’ 
monthly salary was $4, they were in the highest level at the school. 58 Zhang 
began with general nursing at the Pu’ai for her first two years and then 
transferred to the Union Hospital to study midwifery where her main 
responsibility was to wash the women and babies after birth.  When she returned 
to the Pu’ai as a graduate, she became the administrator for the obstetrics 
department. She remembered having a holiday each year on Florence 
Nightingale’s birthday. All student nurses were expected to follow the Christian 
religion and were baptised. Besides attendance at Sunday prayers in the hospital 
wards, attendance at the 9 o’clock Church Service was compulsory.  Regarding 
the administration of the MMS, and communication with the Mission Board, 
Zhang had no experience of this and had no knowledge of the society’s intentions 
regarding Chinese Christian Church self support.  Despite being an administrator 
herself, it seems that Zhang’s responsibilities were solely within the confines of 
the hospital, and – as her position within the hospital suggests – she was not 
required, or encouraged, to have contact with the society’s home base executive 
and neither did she expect to. As a result, she had no influence on policy or 
management, although she commented she felt she was regarded as an equal and 
that the foreign doctors and nurses were good people.   
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 In 1938 the CSFM Yichang Mission Council set Chinese nurse’s salaries at between $20 and 
$28 per month. Acc 7548, B194, Ichang Minutes (there are no Minute numbers), 1938–45, CSM 
archive.  In 1940, a newly graduated nurse in a private Shanghai clinic received between $15 and 
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 Jin Peifa 金培发, an MMS nurse at Anlu who, like Zhang, began his 
training aged 16 was aware of an inequality of salary between himself and the 
foreign nurses.  He said this did not worry him and he did not think it wrong 
“because they had a higher level of knowledge”. 59   He did not know exactly 
what the foreign nurses were paid because their salaries came direct from the 
society, but he confirmed he knew they earned more than he did.  As a nursing 
student he was paid two or three ‘silver dollars’ a month which he regarded as 
enough for a single man’s living.  He also received one, and later, two yuan of 
paper money for life’s essentials such as toothpaste and soap.60  He commented 
that the western people he worked with were “very kind”.  He too was required to 
attend church services but, coming from a Christian background with Christian 
parents, this was natural to him. 
 Relations between the foreign medical missionaries and their Chinese 
staff appear on the whole, to have been amicable with disagreements being of a 
contractual and professional nature.  At the LMS Zaoshi hospital in 1938, where 
relationships were described by Nurse Haward as for the most part of the happiest, 
there had been a problem with Dr. T’ien who had requested a three month holiday 
five months before his Agreement specified and $100 holiday pay to which the 
Hospital Board thought he was not entitled.61  When Dr. T’ien learned there was 
no automatic renewal of his Agreement he backtracked and made what was 
described as “tantamount to an apology” but his contract was not renewed. 
Haward also reported that a nurse who had been with them for three years and 
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who would have been useful had had to leave for “repeated indiscretions” and a 
male nurse had had to be dismissed for “wilful neglect of a cholera patient”.62  
All this only compounded staffing problems as two other members of staff had 
left to take up posts in Sichuan because of the approaching Japanese and, in 
addition, a nurse had left to get married. 
 As the Japanese approached Wuhan, the staffing problems in the hospitals 
became more acute. The main problem was the continual turnover of Chinese 
staff.  Zhang and Jin both evacuated with their families and worked during the 
war in Chongqing. This was at a time when the number of patients was increasing 
and when staff were required more than ever. Chinese medical professionals from 
Dongbei (Manchuria) en route to Sichuan were employed by the Pu’ai but only 
remained for a short period. 63  Similarly refugee nurses passed through rural 
Hubei on their journey west, but as Dr. Garnick noted: 
The loss of the students is to a certain extent made up by refugee 
nurses of all sorts and sizes who come along from the east and north 
China – some of them are a great help but many are unreliable for they 
are just getting useful when they decide to go off again.64 
 It was not fear of death that made them leave since they remained calm 
during air-raids and were willing to die for their country but fear of falling into 
the hands of the Japanese, particularly those who had heard accounts of the fall of 
Shanghai and Nanjing.65 Hankou could no longer offer the safety of a British 
Concession and medical missionaries were therefore unable to protect their staff 
as they might have done previously. The staffing problems prior to the Japanese 
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occupation highlight how dependent the foreign missions were on their Chinese 
staff. Working in a mission hospital however carried neither the same patriotic 
reward as working in a government hospital nor the higher salaries. How many 
Chinese staff remained at their posts through loyalty, Christian conviction or 
through a lack of qualification for a governmental post is not apparent. 
 
Finances, Staffing and Government Registration 
As we learned earlier, in medical missionary circles in China three topics had long 
been under discussion when hostilities broke out in July 1937: financing, staffing, 
and government registration. As a result of falling donations at home linked to the 
depression, mission societies were suffering financially and this was affecting 
their overseas mission. MMS publications and reports publicly discussed an 
official period of retrenchment, and hospital budgets in Hubei, for 1936, had been 
trimmed by 15 per cent.66  Some missionary staff were donating money from their 
own salaries to prop up the society’s finances.67  Additionally there were staffing 
problems; Franklin, the Vice-Chairman of ACM’s National Council, following a 
visit to the “Orient” in 1936 stated that he regarded the society’s medical work as 
“abundantly justified” and noted that the hospitals made a “definite contribution” 
to the Church’s evangelism.68  It is pertinent to note first that he felt the need to 
justify the contribution of the society’s medical work at all, and secondly that he 
chose to measure the success of the hospital’s contribution through its evangelical 
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work.  He was thus reinforcing the time-favoured mission Society discourse that 
the primary function of a hospital was to spread The Word. Government 
registration of hospitals and nursing schools and missionary co-operation with 
government agencies69 were also being debated in the immediate pre-war period.  
Not all societies hesitated, and in 1937 approval was given by the LMS Mission 
Board and China Council to the Nursing School at Zaoshi to register with the 
government. There was an acknowledgement of the added expense involved in 
registration.70  It was against this discouraging background of discussions over 
finance, personnel and administration that hostilities erupted in July 1937. 
 
The Commencement of Hostilities 
Of all of those overseeing medical work in Wuhan it was ACM’s Bishop Alfred 
Gilman (1878–1964) who came closest to accurately predicting what might be 
expected: 
This war is likely to be prolonged and to spread beyond the areas now 
actually involved in the fighting.  The character of the conflict is likely 
to become more rather than less ruthless. Dangers to life and to Church 
work in the diocese are likely to increase.  Schools may be broken up, 
even hospitals may suffer, and it may become our part to urge non-
combatant Christians to flee to the country. …Conditions may remain 
relatively peaceful here for a few weeks or even months: but we must 
face the possibility that even the Wuhan cities may become a 
battlefield; that the Canton-Hankow Railway may be cut, and that great 
danger and privation may meet all those who remain in the limits of 
this Diocese.71 
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Despite Gilman’s uncannily accurate prediction of what was to come, few 
anticipated the duration of the war or the intensity of privation to be experienced 
by both foreigner and Chinese alike.  
 Just seven days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Gedye, the MMS 
Hubei Superintendent on furlough in Guling (Kuling), was under no illusion that 
the situation was serious. He instantly put into place security procedures regarding 
correspondence in China. 
 … the situation at the moment seems very grave indeed and would 
seem to indicate that we may be in for a proper show down... I feel I 
can’t afford to get cut off from the district just at this juncture…  I am 
sending this under separate cover, just in case any form of censorship 
is started, and am sending the duplicate via the Pacific just to make 
sure of its getting through. 72 
 
 Gedye saw parallels with the anti-Christian disturbances but drew comfort 
from the fact that the situation in 1937 was not anti-British based and, therefore, 
locally there was probably little to fear.  He anticipated Wuhan would attract 
bombing raids but thought the country areas would be freer from this.73 What he 
did not anticipate was that once occupied, Wuhan would be safer than the country 
districts, which would be subjected to air raids and artillery bombardment as the 
Japanese fought to gain an internal foothold in the province from where they 
could launch bombing raids on Chongqing. Gedye was at pains to stress to 
headquarters in London that he regarded support for the Society’s Chinese 
colleagues of the utmost importance. 
 My own feeling, up to the present [August 1937], has been that we 
should try to carry on our normal work and as far as possible the 
missionaries should stand alongside their Christian colleagues… I feel 
at all costs we must try and keep some kind of skeleton staff to support 
our Chinese colleagues.74  
 
                                                 
72 Gedye A.J., to Rattenbury, H., July 14th, 1937, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 428.  
73 Gedye, A J., to Rattenbury, H., August 18th, 1937, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 428 
74 Ibid. 
 178 
 Rattenbury, MMS’s London China Secretary since 1936 who had served 
in the field during the anti-Christian disturbances, was mindful of the society’s 
experiences during the 1920s and anxious that mistakes made then were not 
repeated.  
 I think you will agree that it would be better to maintain the working 
staff at a maximum rather than a minimum, and not to get into the 
depleted way into which we were forced in 1927.75  
 
 Gedye returned to Wuhan in September to find a shortage of supplies and 
doctors.  The supply shortage was not regarded as particularly alarming since the 
harvest that year had been a good one, which indicates there was no anticipation 
that the war might be prolonged, but the dearth of doctors was judged as a 
potential problem since medical staff were anticipating a heavy load of surgical 
work from the front line. Chiang, at the Pu’ai, was making efforts to employ a 
replacement doctor for Dr. Ralph Bolton who had recently left for furlough.  
Gedye was keen to reassure headquarters that Wuhan was beyond the reach of 
Japanese planes and that it would remain so unless the Japanese obtained a base 
further inland. However his thoughts proved erroneous:   
Whilst I was reading over this letter prior to signing it six Japanese 
bombers came over the top of the Tortoise Hill and let off their bombs 
– presumably they were after the arsenal.  The bombs seem to have 
fallen over a wide area and we got a shaking.76 
 As a consequence of being within Japanese bombing range it was deemed 
necessary to demarcate mission buildings. An order came from the local 
authorities that properties must be camouflaged and all white walls and red roofs 
had to be painted grey. 77  A large red cross was painted on the Pu’ai roof by its 
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Chinese staff and other buildings flew the Union Jack, the purchase of which 
added to missionary expenditure at a time when funds were already short.78  ACM 
established an “Emergency Supplies Construction” fund specifically for expenses 
relating to Japanese bombing.  They marked their property with American flags 
on the roof, on high flag poles and used smaller flags to demarcate the corner 
boundaries.79  Gedye was uneasy over so public a display of foreign ownership 
when MMS was allegedly attempting to promote a Chinese Christian Church but 
finally decided the “very special circumstances” warranted such a display.80 
 During the autumn of 1937 further air raids on Wuhan and the fall of 
Nanjing on December 13th brought the war more sharply into focus as it became 
clear there was a real threat that the Japanese would turn their attention to Central 
China.  This triggered a reassessment of the possible evacuation of missionaries. 
When most of the modern medical infrastructure in eastern China was under 
Japanese occupation, Hubei’s medical missionaries had an added incentive to  
remain at their posts.  An exception was the Institute of Hospital Technology 
(IHT) which relocated to the Canadian Mission Hospital at Chongqing prior to the 
occupation.81  However, this was an isolated evacuation undertaken to safeguard a 
specialist medical training establishment.82  Prior to October 1938 Hubei was one 
of the few Chinese provinces outside occupied China that could hold itself up as a 
bastion of modern medical service and such a responsible position was one 
unlikely to be casually relinquished. 
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 Yichang provides an example of how medical missionaries experienced 
the early stages of the war outside the Wuhan area. Situated in western Hubei, 
Yichang was at the highest navigable point for large steamers which endowed it 
with strategic importance.  In October 1937 the inhabitants were experiencing 
some inconvenience regarding communication and travel but anticipating greater 
disturbance to come. Unlike Wuhan, Yichang was beyond Japanese bombing 
range at that time, but the expectation was that this would change as the Japanese 
advanced along the Peipin-Hankow railway.  Following the Chinese retreat from 
Shanghai the most noticeable effect of the outbreak of war for Yichang was the 
breakdown of regular communications, not only between the town and all ports 
from there leading to Shanghai, but also between China and the outside world. 
 Another immediate effect of the outbreak of hostilities was that it became 
difficult to carry out financial transactions.  Rev. Forbes Tocher (1885–1973) of 
CSFM reported that negotiating Shanghai Bank cheques and obtaining ready cash 
for official and personal use had been difficult for some weeks, although things 
had improved.  Mail from home had been delayed and missionary salaries were 
three weeks overdue.83  Business in Yichang had slumped as shipping fell away 
and there had been small price rises but nothing alarming.  The hospitals were 
carrying on but had no way of replenishing dwindling supplies.  Provision had 
been made for 150 wounded to be handled by the Society’s two hospitals but 
despite there already being wounded in the hospitals farther east none had yet 
arrived in Yichang.84  Dr. T. Chalmers Borthwick, also CSFM, was put in charge 
as coordinator and administrator for all Yichang hospitals handling the wounded, 
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including military hospitals.85  Thus, early in the war, Borthwick was placed in a 
responsible administrative position illustrating not only the wider administrative 
burden falling upon medical missionaries, as a result of the war, but also the 
National government’s use of medical missionary expertise for the co-ordination 
and administration of its military hospitals.  
 In Laohekou, Drs. Gabriel Lende (1896–1979), Olaf Olsen 1893–1993 and 
H.T. Han were at the Frøyland Hospital when hostilities broke out.   
 
 
Fig 4: Dr. Olaf Olsen, Dr. Gabriel Lende, Dr. H.T. Han86 
 
This 65 bed hospital in 1937 treated 1,245 inpatients, 19,361 outpatients and 
performed 360 operations.87 They were far from the front with only a few war 
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wounded but trade had been paralysed and prices had risen with meal costs 
doubling.  To offset their financial problems they increased out-patients’ fees 
from 100 to 200 cash per visit.88  For the NLK mission stations to the west of the 
province the years 1937 to 1939 were experienced as calm years to be followed 
by two years of extensive bombing.89  
 Missionaries in Hubei had the arguable advantage of being in receipt of 
eye witness reports of conditions during and after the Japanese occupation of 
other Chinese cities.  An anonymous eye-witness, in March 1938, provided a 
detailed account of the difficult conditions in the city following occupation.  He 
explained he was writing specifically to enlighten other missionaries about what 
they might expect upon occupation: 
 These conditions are given impartially and objectively, not through any 
sense of bitterness but with the desire to show what missionaries in the 
interior may expect in connection with the possible occupation of their 
cities by the Japanese so that they may more intelligently prepare for 
eventualities both in the protection of foreign property which it is 
necessary that they occupy, and in the care of refugees.90 
 
Despite such well meant warnings it is unlikely the inhabitants of Hubei had any 
real conception of what they were about to experience under occupation. 
Correspondence between Gedye and Rattenbury reveals tensions between those in 
the field and those directing operations at home and although neither were 
medical missionaries, an examination of the tensions played out is relevant to 
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medical missionary work as a reflection of the workings of the institutions that 
directed them.  
 
Home Board Direction     
Gedye, MMS’ Hubei General Superintendent, was of the opinion that any 
decision concerning evacuation should be taken by individual missionaries 
following familial discussion.  He shared this opinion with Moss, the Consul-
General and cited this in a circular he sent to staff in the field which he quoted in 
a letter to Rattenbury, General Secretary for China: 
 The Consul-General’s position seems to be that each person should 
take responsibility for deciding for himself.  I feel that the present is 
very different from past occasions when we have had to face the 
possibility of evacuation, and so our approach to the situation may 
have to be somewhat modified.  In the past it has been customary to 
wait for orders from the Consul, or the General Superintendent but this 
time the Consul-General is rather putting it up to each individual to 
decide for himself.  It seems to me, from the point of view of the 
mission, we might take a similar stand. I do not want to shift any of my 
responsibility, but there is such a side [sic- wide?] difference between 
the cases of different members of our staff that each case  needs to be 
examined individually, and personal and other factors taken into 
account.91 
 
  Rattenbury disagreed replying if “ever there was a time to stand by, that 
time is now” illustrating his, and presumably the society’s policy, on 
evacuation.92  He then makes light of the dangers of remaining by remarking that 
there had been only one missionary death in the field in the previous six months, 
the implication being that, despite the hostilities, he/the Society did not consider it 
particularly dangerous for missionaries in the field.  Rattenbury then pointed out 
that because of his position, and links with other missionary societies, Gedye was 
in a better position than other individuals to take a risk, and that as General 
                                                 
91 Gedye, A.J., to Rattenbury, H., November 30th, 1937, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 430. 
92 Rattenbury, H., to Gedye, A.J., December 17th, 1937, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 430. 
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Superintendent of the District he had to take “emergency burdens”. 93   The 
implication here was that it was a risk to stay but Gedye’s role was to “say 
straight out what you feel should be done”.94  In other words Rattenbury felt 
Gedye should lead the missionaries and instruct them, not encourage them to 
make individual decisions. Finally, Rattenbury was perturbed by Gedye’s 
suggestion that missionaries in the past had responded to orders from the Consul-
General.  This may have been particularly galling to Rattenbury because, as he 
was the General Superintendent in Hubei during the 1920s, it appeared as if it 
implied he had regularly taken orders from the Consul-General. Certainly he was 
at pains to distance himself from such claims: 
 In my recollection the Consul never, except once, sent any orders to 
anybody whatsoever.  He did give advice and we always took his 
advice into consideration. The only order I remember was one received 
by an agitated Consul in 1927 telling me to come out of our compound 
or go to Shanghai.  I felt like telling him to go to blazes but actually for 
the district’s sake I pocketed my wrath and did as I was told.95 
 
 In this correspondence Rattenbury was attempting to push Gedye into a 
more forceful style of leadership. Rattenbury implied that were he still in the field 
he would have shown greater leadership and taken the risk of advising 
missionaries to remain in the field, however he was in London. As China 
Secretary, it was Rattenbury’s position to promote the society’s policy but to be 
fair he did finish by writing that whatever Gedye decided, he would have the full 
backing of headquarters.  An interesting facet of this correspondence is not only 
that it reveals tensions between home base and leadership on the ground but also 
demonstrates the level of discussion that took place behind the scenes concerning 
evacuation. 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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 The case of Rattenbury, as the representative of MMS policy, indicates 
that MMS policy towards its missionary staff in the field, at that time, showed a 
lack of understanding of the fact that times had changed, of a looking back to the 
past and of an institutional paternalism towards its staff whereby individual 
decision making was discouraged at all levels.  The Gedye–Rattenbury, or ‘in the 
field versus home administration’, tensions were mirrored almost six months later 
by correspondence between Bishop Gilman and Dr. John Wood in the ACM New 
York offices. 
 In contrast to the flowering of culture and military optimism that the 
Chinese and the city’s foreign visitors were enjoying, Hankou’s missionaries were 
more circumspect and made no mention of the new-found atmosphere in the city 
as described by others. Four months prior to the Japanese occupation Gilman 
reported to ACM in New York that while, as a result of successes of the Chinese 
air forces, their minds had been at peace until June 4th, the situation had changed 
following a rapid advance of the Japanese army and indiscriminate bombing of 
Hankou.96  Gilman also informed New York of his plans to “evacuate all women 
and children” at a cost of not less than US$5,000, and those not connected with 
property or refugees he proposed to evacuate to Guling. The Wuchang ACM 
General Hospital was, however, to remain a centre of operations.  The military 
situation deteriorated and in subsequent correspondence Gilman wrote that, 
following the proposed retirement of the Chinese forces from Henan and since the 
“terrific bombardment” of Canton, 97 the National government was proposing 
Wuhan be evacuated.98  From this we can surmise that by early June only five 
                                                 
96 Gilman A.A., to Wood, J., June 6th, 1938, Gilman Papers – RG 64 69–13, ACM archive. Gilman 
succeeded Roots in April 1938. 
97 June 6th, 1938. 
98 Gilman, A.A., to Wood, J., June 11th, 1938, Gilman Papers, RG 64 69–13, ACM archive. 
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months after its establishment in Hankou, the National government was publicly 
intimating it recognised Wuhan would fall to the Japanese.  So, despite the 
outward flowering of its façade, the city was inwardly bracing itself for 
occupation. 
 As preparations were made for the expected fall of the city there was 
disagreement between the remote Mission Board and those on the ground.  The 
question of caring for ACM’s Chinese staff demonstrates how differences of 
opinion and tensions arose. Wood’s response to Gilman’s proposal to “evacuate 
all women and children” is illuminating because of the cautious response it offers 
to what, in China, was considered a crisis. Wood, distanced from events and 
therefore removed from the emotions being experienced in China, replied from 
New York:  
 I am not sure just what you mean when you use the phrase “all women 
and children” when you speak of evacuation, it is impossible for the 
American Church to assume a large responsibility for people other 
than our own nationals. In the absence of further information I cannot 
go into any details.  We trust you to act conservatively. 99 
 
Gilman’s reply illustrates that those at home base and those in the field did not 
always agree:  
 Your letter of June 23rd shocked me terribly.  I have never been able to 
understand and do not know such a phrase as “it is impossible for the 
American Church to assume a large responsibility for people other 
than our own nationals.”  You have asked me to preach the Gospel to 
the Japanese who have just failed to kill me in order to show that the 
Church is international.  Surely we are out here as a Mission to make 
the Chinese people Christian.100 
 
Gilman, in tandem with many other missionaries in the field, was prepared to 
ignore instructions from his society executive and reimburse the cost of the 
evacuation (five years salary of an American missionary) from his own pocket 
                                                 
99 Wood, J., to Gilman, A.A., June 23rd, 1938, Gilman Papers, RG64 69–13, ACM archive. 
100 Gilman, A.A., to Wood, J., August 8th, 1938, Gilman Papers, RG 64 69–13, ACM archive. 
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rather than discriminate against the Chinese women and children under his 
care. 101  As the war progressed and medical missionaries and their Chinese 
colleagues had to make more and more decisions, without reference to 
headquarters, they were given the opportunity to express their autonomy and 
further examples will be presented below.  
 
Refugees and Wounded: Opportunity for Service  
Medical missionaries in Hubei, in the decades leading up to the war, had gained 
experience coordinating Red Cross relief, 102  alleviating the consequences of 
natural disaster (particularly flooding and refugee work),103 and managed staffing 
problems.104  They had experienced anti-western campaigns, attacks from bandits 
and Communists, and struggled with rising drug prices. This pre-war experience 
in giving service and providing relief laid the foundations for medical missionary 
strategy and activity in Hubei during the war and as will become apparent, some, 
particularly those working back home for the Home Boards who had authority 
over medical missionaries, were to look back to these years for guidance.  
 The hostilities created difficult situations and events of a much larger, 
more intensive scale than had been experienced previously and bombing raids that 
now targeted civilians brought fear to all. Vast numbers of refugees arrived in 
                                                 
101 There are no further references to “all the women and children” which suggests this topic was 
closed and that the evacuations took place. 
102 For an account of Central China Red Cross Society work 1911–1912 at the Pu’ai Hospital 
during the October 11th revolution period see:   MMS, Celebration of Eighty-five Years of Medical 
Work, May 17th 1864–May 17th, 1949, “Hospital of Universal Love” Methodist General Hospital, 
Hankow, Central China, MMSL CH 257. 
103 For a missionary account of medical relief work during the 1931 flood see “Trouble upon 
Trouble: A Year of Distress in China, The Story of 1931”, WMMS Annual Report, London, 1932, 
p. 52.   
104 For an example of staffing problems experienced by the WMMS as a result of the First World 
War when vacancies could not be filled from home and drugs and supplies became scarce  see: 
The One Hundred and Third Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, London, 
WMMS, 1917, p. 65. 
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Wuhan following the outbreak of hostilities and civilian casualties arrived in 
unpredictable waves as a result of military action and aerial bombardment. 
Although refugees and civilian casualties had been an integral part of medical 
missionary work in previous times, the sheer numbers they had to contend with 
after 1937 were unparalleled and at times must have been overwhelming  
 
 
(i) Refugee Relief in Wuhan 
As soon as hostilities broke out, the Chinese Christian leaders met and, on August 
9th, inaugurated the Wu-Yang-Han Relief Association of Chinese Christians.105  
As refugees began arriving in large numbers from Shanghai, a meeting was called 
between the Hupeh Christian Council Preparation Committee and the Wu-Yang-
Han Relief Association which resulted in an Emergency Relief Committee of 
Western Christian Churches.106  Inaugurated on December 11th 1937, and chaired 
by the ACM Bishop of Hankou,107 Logan Roots (1870–1945), with an Executive 
Committee meeting weekly, this relief group, composed completely of Christian 
Chinese members, was later coordinated with the IRCC.108 Roots reported: 
Our work for refugees began like that of most churches with 
individuals caring for friends or acquaintances or strangers who needed 
temporary assistance.  As numbers grew I appointed a small committee 
to act for the diocese. Then the Emergency Relief Committee of the 
Wuhan Christian Churches was formed by the Preparation Committee 
of the Hupeh Christian Council and finally the Red Cross Committee 
                                                 
105 Seven Missionaries, Christians in Action: A Record of Work in War-time China, London, 
Green and Co., Ltd., 1939, p. 63. MacKinnon has noted that reliable refugee numbers are “a major 
issue” for the historian and writes that total refugee population totals vary from three million to 
ninety million. He also notes that anecdotal evidence is abundant but statistical evidence “skimpy 
and conflicting”. MacKinnon S.R., Wuhan, 1938, War Refugees, and the Making of Modern China, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, pp. 45–47. 
106 Participants included ACM, CCC, LMS, MMS, SMF, LUM, CMA, the Bible Societies, YMCA 
and YWCA. 
107 Bishop Roots was succeeded by Bishop Gilman in Otober 18th, 1937. 
108 Not to be confused with the IRC the International Relief Committee a different relief 
organisation in China. 
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co-ordinated this work with that of the Roman Catholic War Relief, the 
Government and the Benevolent guilds: thus performing the same 
function for refugee work as for hospitals.  I was amazed to find the 
extent of the existing work for refugees and the readiness of 
government, benevolent guilds, Buddhist and Mohammedan 
individuals and groups, Roman Catholics and Protestant, to cooperate 
in the happy fellowship of the International Red Cross.109 [Italics added] 
 
 Roots suggests above not only that “happy fellowship”, was not the norm 
but confirms Wuhan was already home to a strong Chinese support system for 
refugees. Benevolent halls (shantang善堂) 110 had traditionally provided relief 
work among the Chinese in Hankou and a National Relief Committee (NRC) in 
July 1938 reported 57 relief shelters being operated by these Chinese self-help 
organisations. 111  Although numerous, they served only a few families or a 
maximum of 30 people. 112  Traditionally they had operated as relief agencies 
dispensing grain, operating fire fighting services and handing out winter clothing. 
In particular some dispensed free medical care. Benevolent Halls operated 
through a gift and subscription source of income from donors which provided the 
capital for their activities.113 Considering the city’s propensity for flood and fire a 
support system, such as that provided by the Benevolent Halls, could be expected, 
although Roots’ comments point to an aloofness of the Chinese relief bodies from 
the foreign. It would appear, from Roots’ perspective that the Chinese and the 
missionary relief bodies, over the years, had been operating as separate entities. 
New found co-operation was recognised at a National Christian Council for China 
meeting in February 1938 when a report on Church policy noted that the troubles 
had given “an impetus to co-operation and church unity” and “It had been an 
                                                 
109District of Hankow: The Newsletter, Vol., XV111, No. 1, January/February, 1938, p. 2, ACM 
archive. 
110 Rowe, R.T., Hankow: Conflict, 1989. Chapter three ‘Popular Welfare’ in particular traces the 
development of 19th century benevolent halls in Hankow, pp. 105–127. 
111 MacKinnon, “Refugee Flight”, 2001 p. 129. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Rowe, R.T., Hankow: Conflict, 1989, pp. 105–127 
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inspiration to see the Roman Catholics and Protestants working together”.114  This 
was not an isolated incident of Protestant and Catholic cooperation. Robjohns, in 
describing medical work following a serious air raid at Jingshan (Kingshan) wrote: 
 It is impossible to close this account without paying a very high tribute 
to the cooperation, friendship, and help of the Roman Catholic Mission 
in this district.  It was a revelation of how near we could draw together 
in the working out of Jesus’ message of love.115 
 
 Schools had been temporarily closed and were readily available for the 
temporary housing of refugees from a few days to months.  For some of the 
thousands of refugees who arrived in Wuhan tragedy awaited: 
 In recent weeks thousands have arrived from the province of Anhwei 
(Anhui), and the people of that province, resident in Hankow, have 
been feeding them in the Anhwei Provincial Guild Hall.  What cruel 
fate brought these poor people hundreds of miles in order to be crushed 
under the walls of the Provincial Guild by a bomb released to frighten 
the people of Hankow?116 
 
Executive Committee policy was to create several small camps in Wuhan and, in 
the spring of 1938, additional camps were opened at Zaoshi, Shayang, Honghu, 
Shashi and Yichang.  All were run under Christian auspices with some having 
salaried managers and a committee of refugees.   
 Chinese responsible for full time jobs in the refugee camps such as cooks, 
were paid a small wage but, mostly, the essential work was carried out by the 
refugees themselves.  Work was encouraged and the government funded practical 
industries such as sandal and towel making, and gauze manufacture for hospital 
use.  Under these schemes, refugees were taught to weave, provided with raw 
materials and portable looms and paid.  However, apart from the provision of 
footwear, this did not solve the immediate problem of clothing the refugees.  To 
                                                 
114 National Christian Council for China Meeting in Chinese Recorder, April 1938, p. 204. 
115 Robjohns, H.C., to Brown, T.C.，4th October, 1938, CWM CH/65, Central China Incoming 
and Outgoing Correspondence, 1928–1939, Robjohns file. 
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combat this material was purchased and cheap clothing produced by the local 
mills and refugees.117 
 The NRC July 1938 report, out of a total of 111 shelters operating in 
Wuhan, listed 18 local city-government relief shelters mostly situated in Wuchang 
housing over 20,000 people.118 15 shelters were operated by Christian Church 
organisations and three shelters in Hankou were operated by the IRCC for Central 
China serving approximately 700 in each. 119  The IRCC also coordinated all 
hospitals and helped them access reasonably priced drugs and medical supplies. 
The Hubei hospitals shared similar problems regarding supplies and equipment to 
hospitals in other areas, as previously referred to in chapter three. At Zaoshi, by 
September 1937, only two months after hostilities began drugs were already in 
short supply and prices rising. Quinine in particular was becoming prohibitively 
expensive.120   
   Serving on the IRCC for Central China was Dr. James L. Maxwell, 
Director of the IHT, secretary of the CMA’s CMM, and editor of the CMJ.  Also 
serving on the Committee were the Mayor of Hankou Dr. C. K. Wu, and the 
Consul-General with Madame Jiang Jieshi as Patron.  The IRCC for Central 
China was responsible for an area stretching 800 miles both north to south and 
east to west of Wuhan.  This involved nearly a hundred hospitals and dispensaries 
which in 1938 were mostly in fighting zones, although a few were in occupied 
territory.121  An example of the sort of problem the IRCC had to solve was how to 
reinstate vaccine supplies which had been obtained from Beijing but which, 
                                                 
117 7,543 yards of new cotton was purchased with £2,053 from the International Red Cross 
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because of the hostilities, were no longer available from that source. The sub-
committees of the Shanghai IRCC were located in Hankou, Guangzhou and 
Tianjin. The focusing of relief activity in the concession areas of Shanghai, a city 
that by October 1938 had already been occupied for a year by the Japanese, was 
not as strange as may first appear, as, despite being under Japanese control, the 
city does not seem to have been as cut off from the rest of China as much as might 
have been expected. Certainly for the administration of the relief groups Shanghai 
was well situated.122 Ronald Rees (1888–1975), on the staff at Lingnan University 
in the South China District and an MMS representative on the NCCC, March 
1938 wrote: 
 Shanghai is by no means a dead city…  It may be thought by many that 
this city is ceasing to become a centre for thought and work and activity 
that concerns China as a whole. No one place can serve all China with 
equal facility… many newspapers and offices of importance are 
here. …Shanghai has direct touch with North China and with the coast 
down south as far as Canton, no part of which is at present occupied 
territory… We are not so cut off from Central and West China as might 
seem to be the case because of the air mail service from Hong Kong 
which can normally get letters to Szechwan within a week… Hankow is 
of course more central geographically, but it is not in effective touch 
with North China, or with East China, or the Coast... I am just making 
the point that the national position of Shanghai for many purposes has 
been less interfered with than might be supposed.123 
 
 Medically, the mission hospitals took responsibility for the serious cases 
in the refugee camps and provided their services for free and the IRCC subsidies 
enabled mission hospitals to continue. In Hankou, the IRCC received $200,000 
from the National government for mission hospitals assisting wounded soldiers.124  
                                                 
122 The following relief organisations had their headquarters in Shanghai in March 1938: British 
Ambassador’s Committee, American Advisory Committee for the Red Cross Fund, China 
International Famine Relief Committee, National Christian Council War Relief Fund and the 
CMA.  Rees, R., “Life and Work in Shanghai – March 1938”, unpublished CBMS report, p. 4, 
CBMS Box 368, file 1. 
123 Rees, “Life and Work” 1938, p. 4. At this time the occupied areas of Shanghai were still under 
the administration of the Great Way Government Dadao zhengfu  大道政府，which was 
established on December 7th, 1937 under Japanese patronage. It was replaced on April 28th, 1938 
by the Shanghai Municipal Commission. 
124 Fitch, R.F., “Christian Church”, 1938, p. 128. 
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Initially, however, problems remained. By the time Wuhan had received its third 
air raid attack on October 24th, Dr. Chiang, at the Pu’ai, had been informed the 
government would pay twenty cents a day for every wounded soldier treated. 
From October 23rd, the IRCC would pay an additional subsidy per wounded 
soldier of forty cents per day.125  Chiang was of the opinion that while these sums 
would just about cover the hospital’s costs, no monies had been received for those 
tended following the first air raid, and similarly, no monies received for soldiers 
admitted during the early part of October.  It did not seem likely that monies 
would now be received retrospectively from the IRCC, or the government, and 
Gedye wrote to Rattenbury requesting additional funding from the Home 
Board. 126  The Pu’ai, despite funding from the National government and the 
opportunity for service its refugee and wounded work was presenting, was already 
under-funded and suffering along with other hospitals, because its fee-paying 
patients had fallen away preferring to use a hospital in what they perceived as a 
safer area.   
 The SDA Sanitarium, situated at East Lake outside Wuchang, opened in 
October 1937, with Dr. Harry W. Miller (1879–1974), the SDA’s China Medical 
Secretary, who had previously been at the Shanghai Sanitarium, at the helm.127 
The sanitarium’s work involved huge numbers of refugees.  To provide an 
indication of the numbers involved the sanitarium reported that in 1939 it had 
treated 71,000 out-patients. 128   An SDA doctor and two graduate nurses, in 
cooperation with the local authorities, gave almost 20,000 cholera injections over 
                                                 
125 In the 1937 General Hospital Report Jiang lists the subsidy as 50 cents per day from the IRC 
and 20 cents from the local authority which probably indicates an increase in the subsidy. 
126 Gedye, A.J., to Rattenbury, H., October 28th, 1937, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 430. 
127 For an account of his work for SDA refer:  SDA, Zhonghua sheng, 2002, pp. 790–794. 
128 May, S. B., “The Wuhan Sanitarium”, in CDR, Vol., 10, No. 16, 1940, p. 1. 
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a three-week period.129  As a result, during the 1938 summer outbreak, the camp 
experienced only two deaths, both of whom were refugees who had contracted 
cholera outside the camp and entered unnoticed and unrecorded.  Complementing 
the efficiency of this inoculation programme conditions within the SDA refugee 
camp were considerably better than for those crammed into the Safety Zone in 
Hankou – the conditions of which will be described below. The sanitarium had its 
own water system with provision for filtering and roof storage.  This provided an 
“abundant supply of clean, soft clear water, but also had good water pressure”.130  
One of the basic requisites for effective hygiene in the fight against cholera and 
other water-borne diseases was therefore already in situ before the occupation.  
 SDA medical work was not only founded upon healing but also placed 
much emphasis upon teaching the “principles of healthful living”, which included 
concentrating on the healing environment to include sunlight, diet, fresh air and 
rest which provided protection from epidemics. 131  The new sanitarium was 
situated in an environment more conducive than most for refugee work and was 
managed by medical missionaries whose mission society placed a strong 
emphasis upon hygiene and sanitation. This emphasis unintentionally 
complimented the hygiene (weisheng 卫生) movement of the 1920s and 30s, and 
earlier, that Rogaski has termed hygienic modernity.132  State policies linked the 
state of the nation with the health of its people and utilised public health measures 
and the New Life Movement to debunk the accepted foreign discourse of Chinese 
hygiene deficiencies and to embrace modernity.  The SDA similarly used its 
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policies of healthful living to pursue its own agenda not from any specific desire 
to bring secular modernity to the Chinese people but rather to present to the 
ordinary people of China a clean, Christian way of living.  While the Chinese 
state was concerned with modernising China and its citizens, the Japanese as part 
of their occupation policy were concerned with inoculation, fresh water supplies 
and epidemic control, the SDA’s objective was ultimately to propagate the Gospel.  
Situated outside the urban area the sanitarium had a physical advantage over the 
city camps and, psychologically, the staff and refugees were distanced from many 
of the minor irritations suffered by those living in and around Hankou.  
 SDA refugee relief work in the sanitarium provided an unprecedented 
opportunity to spread the society’s beliefs and provide Christian service and this 
opportunity to improve spiritual health and spread witness was embraced: 
They [the refugees] also presented a wonderful opportunity to the 
sanitarium workers for soul-winning effort.133 
 
Daily meetings were held, bible study groups formed and a full time evangelist 
appointed for refugee work. Sabbath day observance was insisted upon and 
because the refugees did not understand what to them was an alien practice they 
questioned it. This provided an excellent opportunity to bear witness by way of 
explanation. 134   When the Wuhan Sanitarium was opened it was envisaged as a 
base from which the Gospel would travel into western China. This linking of 
salvation and care of the sick has ancient roots; the word “salve” in Latin 
translating as “health” acknowledging a relationship between medical care and 
spiritual welfare. It is this connection that provides the foundation for Miller’s 
Medical Secretary Report which indicates that, for the SDA executive, there was 
                                                 
133  SDA, “Refugee Evangelistic Work at Wuhan, Hupeh”, in CDR, Vol., 9, No. 10, 1939, p. 5. 
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no Two-fold Call quandary: their medical ministry role was primarily to advance 
the Gospel message.  
 Now is the day of opportunity, if ever, for our medical missionary 
movement to function and for us to enlist it in every possible available 
resource, for in what lines of service can we better approach the human 
heart to influence it for Christ?... Every war the past fifty years has 
resulted in opportunity for the advance of this [the Gospel] message, 
and may we not look upon this as our day of opportunity to reap for the 
church?...We believe that the Wuhan Sanitarium can serve as a base of 
operation for these western fields where our greatest results in soul 
winning may be realised.135 
 
Within the SDA papers consulted there are no references to indicate whether the 
Sanitarium’s medical missionaries were individually required to evangelise while 
performing their professional duties, but it is clear that mission policy was most 
definitely to utilise medical work to propagate the Gospel. For the SDA executive 
the war offered a welcome opportunity to evangelise.  
  
(ii) Refugee Work in the Rural Areas  
Refugee work, particularly in the rural areas, gave medical missionaries the 
opportunity to prove their administrative skills without reference to the Home 
Board. Dr. Forbes Tocher, Secretary of the CSFM Mission in Yichang described 
refugee work as falling into three stages:  During the first stage in late 1937 and 
early 1938 refugees were arriving from Shanghai and North China.136  They were 
financially secure but lacked accommodation seeking transportation to Sichuan.  
Included among these early refugees were families, business and school groups 
who took up every available space in churches, mission schools, halls, and private 
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houses. 137   Middle or Lower River steamers were arriving in Yichang and 
unloading 2,000 passengers, but the Upper River transportation could transfer 
only 200 at a time.138  Missionary relief was primarily focused on housing these 
refugees and securing passages for them westwards.   
 The second stage of refugee relief work began in February 1938 with the 
arrival of those fleeing the fall of Nanjing and the seizure of Shandong.  These 
were destitute people who had been bombed out and forced to flee with few, if 
any, possessions in contrast to those who had chosen to flee. This second wave of 
refugees was in need of financial help as well as accommodation.  These refugees 
came from the Hankou refugee camps forwarded by the Hankow Christian 
Emergency Committee. The Ichang Church Union Committee, composed of 
CSFM, ACM and SMF missionaries, was asked to accept responsibility for the 
refugees.  Those arriving independently were instructed to request relief from the 
local magistrate, although local facilities were inferior to those offered by the 
missions.  This difference in the standard of relief between town and Church 
Union emphasised to refugees that they were under the care of Christian missions. 
Refugees were only allowed to remain under the Church Union’s care for a 
maximum of three months with most staying several weeks. Funding for the relief 
work came from the IRCC ($3,200), the Yichang Churches ($850), from other 
Yichang sources and friends in Scotland ($550).139 
 By August, the inflow of refugees had almost dried up, but local officials, 
on account of the air raids, were anxious for people to keep moving westwards 
with the threat of the impending fall of Wuhan the final third stage of Yichang’s 
refugee relief work began as more refugees arrived. By mid-October 1,500 
                                                 
137 Tocher, “Wartime Service”, 1938. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
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Christian refugees remained in Hankou, but Tocher was of the opinion that 
Yichang’s days as a place of refuge would soon be over and arrangements were 
made to set up places of refuge in country stations.140 
  At Zaoshi, LMS Nurse Ethel Haward (1888–1952) fulfilled her medical 
duties and at the same time established a towel making factory for refugees, while 
organising and directing cholera relief. Initially she wanted to establish a soap 
factory using locally grown peanuts in a scheme similar to one established by a Dr. 
Carver in the United States.141  Although he was contacted, he failed to provide 
the full information for making the soap.  Haward then interviewed people who 
she thought could help, including the Imperial Chemical Industries’ (ICI) 
Manager Dr. Dixon. The refugees embraced the scheme and among them were 
some responsible business men whom Haward thought could oversee the work 
once the correct method was ascertained. Soap was in short supply and since there 
was no other producer locally it was unlikely they would cultivate ill-will by 
competing with any established businesses. The ICI advisers proved to be too 
technical, wanting to utilise expensive machinery that would only employ a few 
people, which undermined the objective of providing useful employment for 
refugees, so the scheme was abandoned.142  Undeterred Haward was advised to 
make shoes, and after calling a meeting with the refugees they decided to 
manufacture towels. Suitable premises were found and Haward organised $200 
funding from the New Life Movement representative Major General Huang, and 
$300 from Miss. Coxon’s 143  Hankou Committee, with $100 being privately 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
141 Haward, M., to Brown, T.C., March 31st, 1938, CWM/LMS/64 Central China Incoming and 
Outgoing Correspondence 1928–1939, Haward file.  
142 Ibid., April 17th. 
143 Winifred Coxon (1871–1946) could be described as the Grande Dame of missionary work in 
Hankou.  Beginning with CIM in 1898 she joined LMS in 1907.  Principal of the Wuchang girls’ 
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subscribed. This provided seven looms, thread, bleaching powder, vats and small 
necessities.The towel factory proved to be very successful initially selling 100 
towels at $2.00 per dozen, although when a second batch of thread was ordered it 
was found that the price had risen “nearly a fourth” and was expected to rise 
again. 144  Material from the towel fund also financed raw material for straw 
sandals.  
 The building of the aerodrome at Zaoshi, involving 10,000 men, provided 
Haward with the opportunity to organise and oversee relief following a suspected 
cholera outbreak at the site.  The workers’ water supply was at a distance from 
their work and consequently the supply was inadequate. At Haward’s suggestion 
two nurses were appointed and a kitchen at a cost of $200 was set up to supply 
boiled water.145 The workers collected their water in kettles and four men from 
the refugee camp carried and boiled water for a small wage.  In the long term, 
despite the high cost of the fuel, this was beneficial to the hospital since no further 
cases developed.  The success of this public health work met with the approval of 
the civil governor of the district who was reportedly impressed by the work.146 
 From March to July 1938 Haward embraced the opportunity for service 
presented to her and investigated and oversaw the establishment of refugee 
employment, organised and set up a successful anti-cholera campaign and 
maintained her professional work at the hospital.  What is of particular note is she 
was operating independently in the field writing to home base to inform them of 
                                                                                                                                     
boarding school from 1919 until the anti-Christian disturbances she concentrated on women’s 
evangelism, and medical and educational administration.  Retiring in 1934 she continued as an 
independent missionary, was interned in 1942 and died in Hankou aged 73. Goodall, N., A History 
of the London Missionary Society: 1895–1945, Oxford University Press, London, 1954, p. 185 and 
Hope-Bell, E., Winifred Coxon of China, Livingstone Press, 1948. 
144 Haward, M., to Coxon, E., July 13th, 1938. CWM/LMS CH/64, Central China Incoming and 
Out Going Correspondence, 1928–1939, Haward file.  
145 Haward, M., “Ups and Downs”, Tsaoshih Report, July 7th, 1938. CWM/LMS CH/64, Central 
China Incoming and Out Going Correspondence, 1928–1939, Haward file.  
146 Ibid. 
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her work rather than receiving instruction or requesting authorisation. Haward 
was responding to local conditions in the field with a new found autonomy 
proving she could innovate, organise, administer, raise funds and instigate good 
will within the community.  Her own comment at that time was “one never knows 
what job will come next!”147  Medical missionaries were proving their worth both 
professionally and institutionally by providing an essential service for China when 
its own medical services were overwhelmed. The war was providing a window of 
opportunity for medical missionaries like Haward and Robjohns to participate in a 
golden age when their work was both needed and wanted.  
 
(iii)  Caring for the Wounded 
The wounded came from the battlefields to the north and east and had often spent 
days, or even weeks, on boats and trains. Military medical services were 
inadequate.  To cope with the wounded, the Pu’ai added two hundred beds to its 
capacity of which two-thirds were reserved for military wounded and the 
remainder for wounded civilians.148  The Chairman of the Hospital Board placed 
a godown, the No. 4 Warehouse of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, 
at the hospital’s disposal, which was used for 104 seriously wounded.149  This 
was an addition to an already substantial hospital which included six doctors,150 
four Chinese and two foreign, 12 qualified NAC nurses, 60 student nurses and 
eight student midwives (all Chinese) under Stephenson and Miriam Driver - 
Matron and Assistant Matron respectively. 151  There were also pharmacy and 
                                                 
147 Ibid., Haward, M., to unnamed correspondent, April 24th, 1938. 
148 Chiang, H.T., “Medical Superintendent’s Report”, in Methodist General Report, 1937, 
Stephenson Box 642, MF 1358. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., Hung, Chiang, Lee, Yuen, Bolton and Redhead. 
151 Ibid. 
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laboratory staff. The emergency godown hospital had one full-time and two-part 
time doctors, nine NAC nurses and five student nurses.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Patients at the No. 4 Godown, Hankou, 1937152  
 
 The hospitals co-ordinated relief and in October 1937, the Pu’ai  requested 
surgical help from the Union Hospital. Gillison had to identify the seriously 
wounded by candlelight because the electricity supply had failed. 153   With 
selected wounded transferred to the Union Hospital additional wounded from 
Hanyang were also being admitted there. The Chinese nurses, having already 
worked during the day returned and worked until around 3am being ready for 
                                                 
152 Cram/Photograph/ 1270. 
153 Gillison, Kathleen, to Dear Friends, October 13th, 1937, CWM/LMS CH/64, Central China 
Incoming and Outgoing Correspondence, 1928–1939, Kathleen Gillison file. 
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their next day shift.154  When 100 more wounded were admitted, the nurses gave 
up their beds and slept on bamboo benches. Some of these wounded soldiers had 
been “… lying for more than a month with very little treatment, some with limbs 
missing & many incapacitated for life”. 155  Clearly, and understandably, work 
with the wounded was exhausting and distressing.  
 In the rural areas communications grew ever worse and facilities more 
makeshift.  The bombing of Jingshan on August 29th, 1938, provides an example 
of medical missionary work in a rural area at this time. Despite being a small 
peaceful town, away from military action, an airport was being built on the town’s 
outskirts. The nearest hospital at Zaoshi was twenty miles away and the 
connecting track, despite being recorded as a motor road, had “not seen a car for 
over a year”.156  Robjohns, at Zaoshi, initially thought casualties would be few 
because having heard the bombs fall at 7am, he presumed the target had been the 
airport and therefore did not feel his services were likely to be needed.  At 3.30 
pm he received a message that between 500 and 700 had been wounded and killed 
and a request came through for help. 157  A charcoal truck was provided and 
Robjohns and five nurses arrived at Jingshan at around 6pm to find the town in 
ruins and the city deserted which surprised Robjohns as, after twelve hours, 
people usually returned to check on their belongings and family and to rescue 
those who had been buried alive. Robjohns described the difficult conditions 
under which the hospital staff worked:  
 There were no officials to help us get to work, there was no suitable 
building standing for use as a hospital, and it was getting dark so that 
there was not much time for exploring. We went back to the bus station 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid, 
156 Robjohns, H.C., to Brown, T.C., October 4th, 1938. CWM CH/65, Central China Incoming and 
Outgoing Correspondence, 1928–1939, Robjohns file. 
157 Ibid. 
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which was an old temple and prepared to change dressings there. 
There was difficulty in getting lights, and difficulty in getting water, 
and difficulty in getting the cases carried to us.  At last we were under 
way and with the light of one lamp and a few candles were able to start 
work. Water was boiling over a fire and we were able to give the 
patients a drink, and about 10 p.m. a neighbouring village prepared a 
meal for the nurses, it was their first since midday.  After the meal we 
went back to the wounded, changed the remainder of the dressings, 
gave everyone a drink all round, and then tried to sleep in the truck 
looking up at the reflection of the burning city in the sky.158 
 
 Robjohns decided rescue work was best left to others and that the most 
immediate need was to transport the severely wounded back to Zaoshi.  Using 
three trucks, approximately 100 patients were transferred over two days with the 
death of only one.159 This prompted Robjohns, on his next visit to Hankou, to 
solicit donations enabling him to purchase a truck so Zaoshi could function as a 
base hospital for neighbouring towns.160  This work among the Jingshan wounded 
demonstrates the primitive clinical conditions under which some medical 
missionaries worked under crisis and highlights how they adapted and organised 
medical care within a difficult environment as well as the hours they were 
required to be on duty. Further examples of work among the wounded will be 
included below. 
 
 
 
The Safety Zone 
In June 1938 preparations began for a Hankou Safety Zone.161  Heavy bombing 
was expected to precede the burning of the Chinese areas of the city.162  In the 
first raid on September 24th 1937, a bomb had fallen 100 yards from the Pu’ai as 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Gedye, A,J., to Rattenbury, H., June 24th, 1938, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 433. 
162 These expectations must, to some extent, have been fuelled by the occupation of Nanjing  
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Redhead was preparing to operate.  The operation continued despite the bombing 
raid but, by next morning, all the patients in the maternity ward had “fled in 
terror”.163  As a result of that incident the Pu’ai, at the beginning of the war, was 
regarded as extremely vulnerable by both foreigners and Chinese, and in August 
plans were made to move.164  In the long term, however, its position in the heart 
of the Chinese city was to prove advantageous. 
 From Chongqing the French Jesuit Father Jacquinot de Besange travelled 
to Hankou. He had been Vice President of the Shanghai Red Cross Committee 
and Chairman of the Supervisory Committee of the Nanjing Refugee Zone, 
providing him with considerable experience in negotiating with Japanese 
officialdom.  He had also played a major part in the setting up of the Shanghai 
Safety Zone as Chairman of the Committee on Refugees.    
 
                                                 
163 Yuen, H.M., Pu’ai Midwifery Report 1937, MMS, Stephenson Box 31, MF 1359. 
164 Gedye, A.J., to Rattenbury, H., August 8th, 1938, WMMS CH Box 9, MF 433. 
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Fig. 5: Father Jacquinot (far left) and Staff Members from the Pu’ai, 
October, 1938165  
 The proposed Safety Zone included the former Concession areas and in 
July the Italian, German, French, British and American Consulates asked the 
Japanese in Shanghai to sanction the Safety Zone arrangements. Although this 
was a satisfactory demarcation area for the Catholic Hospital in the French 
Concession, it left the Pu’ai isolated in the Chinese city.  From a later perspective, 
Zhu Yunguang, writing in 1964, described the Safety Zone as a hoax perpetrated 
by the “international spy, the French National Rao Jiaju” which caused many 
Chinese to lose everything when they had to move to a new Safety Zone, because 
                                                 
165 Cram/Photograph/ 1242. 
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later the Japanese designated the area a Japanese military zone.166   During this 
period, he claims, some people, whom he does not specify, used the 
circumstances to “fish in troubled waters” and make a fortune.167  The implication 
here appears to be that some people took the opportunity either to take advantage 
of the situation to make personal financial gain or perhaps that they collaborated.  
 Having heard detonations throughout the evening of October 25th and 
witnessed the fires in the city, the staff of the Pu’ai assessed the situation from the 
Bank of China roof.  The largest fire was centred on the Municipal Buildings 
close to the Union Hospital towards the Japanese Concession: “The whole sky 
was red”.168  They could see the city’s cotton mills had been torched and that fires 
were also blazing in Wuchang. Earlier a single strand of barbed wire designating 
the Safety Zone had been placed around an area that included the French 
Concession and the former British, German and Russian Concessions. Flags 
sporting a red cross encased by a blue circle were hung from barbed wire every 
fifteen yards and refugees were already in situ. The city waited for the Japanese to 
arrive. Despite the tension an attempt was made to retain some semblance of 
normality and five student nurses were inducted into their training with a capping 
service.169  As Redhead observed at the time: 
 It [the capping service] was a simple impressive service, but those seem 
ridiculous words to describe it in.  The contrast – cheerful sane hymns & 
nice normal people, & lighted candles & folk going on with their lives, & 
outside anarchy & goodness knew what was to come.170 
 
                                                 
166 Rao Jiajju 饶家驹 (饒家駒) refers to Jacquinot. Zhu Yunguang, 朱运广, “Wo zai Hubei”, 
1986, p. 832. 
167 Ibid.  
168 The Japanese evacuated their Concession in July 1937.  The Concession was then taken over 
by the Chinese who burnt and dynamited almost all of the buildings within it on the 25th October, 
the eve of occupation.  Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 25th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 5. 
169 A cap was awarded to student nurses to mark the end of their initial probationary period. 
170 Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 25th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 5.  
 207 
 Redhead documented the Japanese army’s entry into the city.  The fire she 
had recorded was the burning of the Japanese Concession area by the retreating 
Chinese military.  The destruction of this area was to have repercussions. 
 
Summary 
 The pre-occupation period proved to be one of preparation and expectation 
for Hubei’s medical missionaries. In the early months, following the outbreak of 
hostilities, those who looked to the past could detect similarities with earlier 
periods of medical missionary work. There were parallels with earlier Red Cross 
work, refugee relief, and care for wounded.  Working under the auspices of the 
IRCC refugee camps provided medical missionaries in Hubei with opportunities 
to develop their administrative skills while attending to refugees and training and 
occupying them in useful activities.  As the war progressed, it became apparent 
that the situation was markedly different from earlier times because there was the 
addition of an external factor; the Japanese.   
 This Japanese presence united the Chinese and foreigners as they worked 
towards a common cause, against a shared invader, which helped to subordinate 
anti-foreign “them and us” feelings that had marred earlier periods in Hubei’s 
medical missionary history. Foreigner and Chinese endured Japanese attacks 
together, experiencing fear, while witnessing the after effects of air raids and 
artillery bombardment. Thus, through shared experience, there developed a 
forging of new institutional relationships in the pre-occupation period.  This was a 
period of greater co-operation, not only between the Chinese and foreigners, but 
also between the missions themselves regardless of denomination as Protestants 
and Catholics pulled together. Also, a new found co-operation arose between the 
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foreign and Chinese relief agencies that in earlier times had operated side by side 
rather than as a co-operative unit.  
 Tensions between missionaries on the ground and their home base 
executive were played out in correspondence as communications remained open 
but unreliable.  Autonomy was thrust on medical missionaries after occupation 
and they were forced to make decisions with no reference to home base.  Reading 
the correspondence, both official and personal, it is clear no-one had any real 
perception of how long the war would last and so while this pre-occupation period 
can be described as a period of preparation administrators were not looking too 
far into the future. 
 Staffing problems regarding mission hospitals were not new, but whereas 
previously the problem had been one of attracting and retaining professionally 
qualified staff the new difficulty involved simultaneous resignations. Without 
government and relief agency subsidies medical missionary work would have 
been in crisis particularly as the war brought its own expenses; the camouflaging 
of buildings, the raising of flags and the increased cost of drugs and medical 
supplies combined with the cost of evacuating women and children via circuitous, 
expensive routes. 
 Wuhan had over a year to prepare for its Japanese occupation which in the 
end was a peaceful capitulation. The Chinese military withdrew leaving Wuhan 
undefended which undoubtedly saved many lives and enabled medical missionary 
work to continue more or less uninterrupted. However, in the country districts the 
province would continue to be fought over up to the spring of 1945.  
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Opportunity Under Japanese Occupation 
 
 
…there is something of a thrill in having a really worthwhile piece of 
work to do, and in having opportunities for initiative, such as we have 
had.  
Dr. Keith Gillison, Surgeon and Medical Superintendent, 
Union Hospital Hankou. 19401 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Hubei under the Japanese occupation provides the focus for this chapter and 
reflects upon the post-Pearl Harbor changes that moulded medical missionary 
experience. Medical missionaries woke to learn their third party national status 
had, overnight, become that of non-combatant enemy national. There was no 
longer any prospect of negotiating with the Japanese military from a neutral 
position of strength and they were isolated from all Home Board guidance and 
support. An examination of the practicalities of life under occupation, including 
the economic and administrative consequences, will support the argument that, 
despite new challenges, the post-Pearl Harbor period continued to be a golden age 
of opportunity for medical missionaries. 
                                                 
1 Gillison, K., 1940 Annual Report, CWM/LMS CH/2, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong Reports, 
Keith Gillison file, 1940–49. 
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In Hankou, within a month after the occupation, a Peace Maintenance 
Committee (PMC) (Zhian weichihui, 治安 维持會) was inaugurated to identify 
people who would be prepared to work with the Japanese. 2   This puppet 
government was chaired by Chu Guoqin (Chu Kuo-Chin), described in a British 
diplomatic report as the owner of a “large hotel-cum-brothel” in the Chinese city.3  
Similarly, the Rev. Harold Wickings (1901–1992), Superintendent of the Xiaogan 
Hospital, reported that the town’s puppet government consisted of “opium-addicts 
and sycophants” who had to refer every decision to their Japanese masters. 4  
Whatever their personal reservations or thoughts, medical missionaries had no 
choice but to interact and cooperate with these opium addicts, sycophants and 
brothel-keepers.  
   
Consequences of the Occupation 
The Japanese attempted to occupy the North China Plain, Canton and Wuhan 
confidently expecting Chinese morale to collapse along with the country’s 
defences. Chinese policy was to delay the Japanese advance in order to gain time.  
The destruction of the Yellow River dykes at Huayuankou on June 9th 1938, with 
great cost for the civilian population, gained the Chinese almost five months in 
which to move industry, government offices and schools westwards before the fall 
of Wuhan.  It also prevented the Japanese from linking their northern forces with 
those in the Yangzi valley which would have cut off the Chinese retreat.5   The 
                                                 
2  “Wuhan Preservation Association”, War Office Decypher: Acting British Consul General 
(Hankow), November 26th, 1938, WO208/253.  
3 Ibid. Brook noted that some at the “lower levels of the political heap” took the opportunity to 
enrol onto the PMC in Jiading. Brook, T., Collaboration, 2005, p. 77. 
4 Siaokan Annual Report 1939, CWM/LMS CH/3, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong Reports, Wickings 
file, 1939–48. 
5 Van de Ven, H.J., War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945, London, New York, Routledge, 
2003, p.226.   
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destruction of the dykes, however, pushed the Japanese forces southwards 
towards the Yangzi and Wuhan. The Chinese tactics, while only delaying the 
inevitable, facilitated a planned military withdrawal by the Chinese military.  
 Japanese troops entered north eastern Hankou on October 25th and the 
following day 26 vessels of the Japanese army arrived in the city.6  In her diary 
entry for the evening of October 26th, Redhead recorded that when the Japanese 
reached Hankou the city offered no resistance. 7   The three main hospitals 
relocated to avoid being isolated from patients and staff outside the designated 
Safety Zone. The Pu’ai moved from its site in the heart of the Chinese city to the 
Bank of China building in the ex-British Concession, the Union Hospital 
relocated to the Salt Bank and, from Wuchang, the General moved to the All 
Saints’ compound in the former German Concession in Hankou.  This left only 
the LMS Ren Chi Hospital in Wuchang, under the management of Dr. Yeh. As a 
result of the move, the General, Pu’ai, and Union Hospitals, were all located 
within the designated Safety Zone. This Zone included the French Concession 
Special Administrative District (SAD 1), and ran from the former British 
Concession (SAD 3) northwards to the northern-most boundary of the former 
Japanese Concession. The former Russian Concession was SAD 2.8   
 
                                                 
6 Woodhead, H.G.W. (ed.), China Year Book 1939, North China Daily News and Herald Ltd., 
Shanghai, 1940. 
7 Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 27th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p.4. 
8 Refer map 6. 
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Map 6: Hankou Concessions: British Consulate Map of Wuhan 19319 
 
                                                 
9 National Archives, WO 106/5351 345134 
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Fig. 7: The Pu’ai at the Bank of China Premises, October 193810 
 
 
 
Fig. 8:Pu’ai  Ward in the Bank of China Premises, October 193811 
  
                                                 
10 Cram/Photograph/ 1264 
11 Cram/Photograph/ 1271 
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 A Chinese eyewitness described conditions within the proposed Safety 
Zone as extremely crowded with people’s personal goods piled up ‘like 
mountains’ and whole streets and alleys filled with oceans of people.12  Rents, 
especially in the French Concession, soared: the monthly rent for a “small space” 
in the French Concession in October 1938 was CC$300 to CC$400 a month and 
properties had to be rented for at least three, or even six, months. 13   By 
comparison, the monthly salary of a Chinese doctor at the General was CC$261.14  
 However, when the Japanese entered Hankou to discover the Japanese 
Concession had been almost totally destroyed by the retreating Chinese forces, 
they re-designated the Safety Zone a Japanese military area and designated the 
Chinese area of the city the new Safety Zone. They also requisitioned the bank 
buildings into which the hospitals had so recently relocated. 
 Despite only being given forty-eight hours in which to return to the 
buildings they had just vacated, and the inconvenience caused, this was an 
advantageous move for the Pu’ai which returned it to its familiar location.15 The 
Union Hospital took up premises with the Pu’ai together with some Catholic 
priests and sisters.16  Thus despite initial chaos the eventual outcome proved to be 
beneficial, particularly for the Pu’ai.  Being situated in the centre of the Chinese 
area of the city, the hospital was to become a rallying point for Chinese Christians 
and later, was protected from the main thrust of American and Chinese bombing 
raids.  
                                                 
12 Zhu, Y., Wo Zai Hubei”, 1986, p. 832. 
13 Rebok, D.E. “From Hongkong to Ichang”, in CDR, Vol., 9, No. 1, 1939, p. 4, SDA archive. 
14 Church General Annual Accounts November 1938.  Dr. Tseng Huen Wu’s annual salary was 
CC$3,132.  RG 64 69–14, Gilman Papers, ACM archive. 
15 Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 30th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 18.   
16 Heady, J.J., (General Superintendent for Hubei late 1938–1940, Chairman of District 1946.) to 
‘Colleagues’, Copy letter, CBMS Box 368, File 5.   
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 As the war progressed, hospitals frequently moved premises and the 
Union Hospital returned to its original site near the race-course, despite its being 
inconveniently situated one and a half miles from the city centre. In 1939, to 
combat this inconvenience, the hospital opened a two-room town branch at the 
Lutheran Mission building later moving again, in July 1940, with the midwifery 
and district nursing departments, to create a Town Branch at the YMCA 
premises.17  This was a far superior site in one of Hankou’s major business areas 
giving the hospital access to Hankou’s wealthier patients.18  All these complicated 
relocations needed to be co-ordinated and administered by medical missionaries 
who were already overworked and under pressure. Gilman believed the war 
increased awareness of western medicine amongst the Chinese population in 
Wuhan, and it is conceivable that this constant relocation of hospital premises 
may have aided this, as hospitals moved to new districts. 19   When Chinese 
civilian wounded found themselves in mission hospitals they experienced western 
medicine at first hand for the first time which may have removed some of the fear 
and mystique. 
 The Japanese immediately requisitioned all rickshaws and coolies with the 
result that cheap and convenient transportation around the city disappeared 
overnight. Gilman resorted to using a Cathedral tea trolley to transport reserve 
supplies to the General Hospital.20 In Hankou, sentried barriers were erected to 
demarcate military and civilian areas cutting off direct access to many parts of the 
city thereby forcing residents to use circuitous indirect routes. Consuls issued 
identity cards to be shown on demand and Chinese Christians obtained 
                                                 
17 Chapman, H.O., Union Hospital Report 1941–45, p. 4.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Gilman, A.A., to Wood J., June 9th, 1939, RG64 69–13, Gilman Papers, ACM archive. 
20 Gilman, A.A., to Wood, J., November 23rd, 1938, Gilman Papers, RG 64 69–13, ACM archive. 
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documentation that certified Church membership which they hoped would offer 
protection enabling them to move around with greater ease although many still 
received ill-treatment.21  
 Hankou became a communications depot for mission stations within 
Hubei since it was easier, quicker, and safer, to travel in, and then out, of the city 
rather than to journey across country. Travel required passes for which 
comprehensive forms had to be completed and travellers were treated to “rigorous 
searching and rough treatment”.22  Cable communications remained open until 
Pearl Harbor but were prohibitively expensive and mail became subject to further 
censorship with magazines and newspapers sometimes being delayed for 
months.23  In December 1938 the CMJ reported that the previous month a notice 
had been issued by the Director of the Post in Shanghai that all medical supplies 
destined for the interior sent via the post office would be confiscated. The 
explanation was that it would prevent them being siphoned off by the National 
government.  All parcels would henceforth be examined by Japanese censors, and 
post offices in occupied areas refused all printed matter for Sichuan, Guangdong, 
Hunan and Hubei. 24  Every opportunity to send mail was seized upon by the 
foreign community.  
After communications had been secured attention was turned to economic 
matters and, in March 1940, a Finance Commission was set up for Hubei, Hunan 
and Kiangsi. 25  Underpinning the Japanese occupation infrastructure was a 
                                                 
21 Heady, J.J., to colleagues, December 14th, 1938, CBMS Box 368, File 5. Zhu Y., “Wo zai 
Hubei”, 1986, p. 832. In Zhoucun, Shandong, Christian identification took the form of a badge.  
Flowers, W.S., March 21st, 1938, CBMS, Box 368. file 2,  
22 Rowlands, H.E., End of, 1947, p. 57. 
23 Intelligence Report for Hankow: the six months ending March 31st, 1940. 
FO371/24657/F1524/25/10. 
24 CMJ, Vol., 54, No.6, December, 1938, p. 582. 
25 Hankow Political Reoprt: the  six months ending September 30th, 1940. 
FO371/24657/F1524/25/10. 
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Chinese workforce working solely for the invaders’ benefit similar to the corvée 
labour force described by Brook in Jiading.26  Redhead noted in her diary three 
weeks after Hankou’s occupation that the Japanese were “impressing” labour.27  A 
Special Service Dept (SSD) succeeded the PMC but was not responsible for 
missionaries who came under the control of the military police. Thus, foreign 
medical missionaries remained under military based control and supervision, 
whereas the Chinese, once the SGC had been established, passed from an initial 
period of military control and supervision to one of economic control with 
military support.   
 Areas immediately outside Japanese control were patrolled by Japanese 
“puppet” troops, bandits, Chinese irregulars and regulars, as well as the 
Communist guerrilla forces.28  To add to the difficulties of transporting goods, the 
allegiances of bandits and guerrillas varied according to who was occupying any 
given district at any given time.29  Salt and coal supplies rapidly became short as a 
result of Japanese monopolies.30 Japanese controls impacted on medical supplies 
and apparatus and, by April 1940, these were subject to a 3% military customs tax 
plus loading charge and a 0.3% commission charge for the Japanese Military 
Relief Supplies Association of Hankow.31 
   Within Hubei’s occupied areas medical supplies were subject to 
rigorous examination. The movement of valuable medical supplies from Wuhan 
to outlying areas proved problematic as there was always the fear that goods 
                                                 
26 Brook, T., Collaboration, 2005, p. 77. 
27 Redhead, M., Diary entry, Nov 17th, 1938, Cram Family Archive, Cram/Papers/69. 
28 Hankow, Political Report: the six months ending September 30th, 1940.  
FO371/24657/F1524/25/10 
29 Intelligence Report for Hankow: the six months ending March 31st, 1940, 
FO371/24657/F1524/25/10. 
30 Political Report: FO371/24657/F1524/25/10. 
31 Memorandum on Taxation in Hankow,  April27th, 1940.FO371/24701/F3615/2843/10 
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would be requisitioned en route to their destination. For example goods for 
Xiaogan, forty miles North West of Hankou, had to be escorted, by the senders, to 
a small boat station two and a half miles outside Hankou.  Along the way, passes 
had to be shown and the goods subjected to thorough searches which could 
include the insertion of swords or sticks into the packages causing damage to the 
contents.  After examination the goods had to be repacked by the roadside which 
apart from being tedious and taking time could also cause further damage.32 
  
Challenge and Opportunity in the City and the Country 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Medical staff of the MMS General Hospital (Pu’ai yiyuan), 1938. 
Back Row left to right:  Unknown, Dr. H. Oertel, Dr. R. Bolton, Unknown, 
Unknown. Front Row left to right:  Dr. M. Redhead, Dr. H. Chiang, 
Unknown33   
 
                                                 
32 Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 58. 
33 Cram/Photographs/0841 
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(i) Practical Problems 
The first practical problem medical missionaries faced in Hankou, following the 
occupation, was the failure of the city’s water supply.  Apart from the necessity of 
a clean, reliable supply, for clinical and personal cleanliness, a dependable supply 
for drinking was essential to prevent sickness as noted earlier with reference to 
the SDA Sanitarium. Retreating Chinese forces had been dissuaded from 
destroying the city’s waterworks but not before some machinery had suffered 
damage. Inadequate coal supplies impacted on the electrical supply so it was, 
initially, only available at night and, at one time, a complete stoppage was 
threatened.34   Deprivation of these utilities was not only clinically dangerous but 
impacted on the hospital staff’s workload. The day following the Japanese 
occupation, Dr. Herbert Oertel at the Pu’ai attempted to repair the hospital’s 
water pump:   
 Here’s a hospital of this size, neither light nor water.  Our two wells 
are dry nearly; we are a long way from the river.  But it became acute, 
& so they got a team of ten hospital servants & Dr. Oertel escorted 
them to the river & they brought water back…  Later Oertel took a 
pump to bits & mended it & now we’ve a bit more water.  The light 
problem is very difficult.  We have some oil lamps & candles, but it’s 
hopeless.35 
 
Unfortunately despite Oertel’s best efforts the problem remained ongoing. 
Undaunted, he continued to shoulder responsibility for the Pu’ai’s water supply: 
He [Dr. Oertel] was tired last night after his day of dealing with the 
water shortage.  And had to get up at five – there was no water in the 
hospital, but he didn't believe them that one pump was empty, & 
himself pumped so hard that he had to change his pyjamas because he 
sweat [sic] so much.  Then he put buckets & things under all the 
rainwater spouts.  So the patients had water to drink at breakfast.36 
 
 Utility supply problems persisted in Hankou and the Union Hospital was 
still operating with an inadequate electricity supply in 1940 despite requests 
                                                 
34 Heady, J.J., to ‘Colleagues’, December 14th, 1938, CBMS Box 368, File 5, p. 2. 
35 Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 27th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 11.   
36 Redhead, M., Diary entry, October 28th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 12.  
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“made periodically by us through every conceivable channel…”.37  An electricity 
generator was procured to operate the X-ray machine but this met with problems 
when petrol ran short.  Kerosene provided fuel for lighting, but after the price 
tripled, the hospital changed to vegetable oil and operated a type of “mediaeval 
rush-lamp”. 38  Kerosene normally $4–$5 per tin rose ten-fold to $40–$60. 39  
Similarly coal, which pre-war was $20–$30 a ton was $200–$400 or more by the 
end of 1940.40   
 Goods in Wuhan grew ever more expensive and 1940 saw a rapid increase 
in the cost of living that impacted upon medical missionary work raising food and 
staffing costs. First grade local rice, which before the war had sold for $7 per 
picul had quadrupled in price by May to $29, $40 in September, over $100 by the 
end of the year and $120 by March 1941 as a result of widespread drought in the 
Yangzi Valley.41   All these items were essential supplies and the Union Hospital 
found its monthly food bill at the end of 1940 had increased by $3,600 compared 
to earlier in the year.42  As a consequence hospital wages that year had to be 
increased several times.43  Currency negotiations also affected hospitals and their 
staff; the Japanese introduced the military yen which offered a poor exchange. 
Municipal taxes had to be paid in yen and goods purchased in public markets had 
to be paid for in yen.44  However, outside the sphere of Japanese influence CNC 
remained the only negotiable currency.  
                                                 
37 MMS, The Report of the Union Hospital, Hankow, for the Year 1940, MMSL CH262, p. 2. 
38 Ibid. p.1. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. Rice was considerably cheaper in Shanghai where the price was CC$72 a picul. 
FO371/24657/F1524/25/10, FO371/24657/F1530/25/10. 
42 MMS, The Report of the Union Hospital, Hankow, for the Year 1940, MMSL CH262, p. 2. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Davidson, J.W.O., Consul General, Hankow Political Report for the Six Months ending Sept. 
30th, 1940. FO371/24657/F1524/25/10. 
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 With medical supplies being unobtainable or prohibitively expensive, 
medical missionaries were compelled to rely upon their own resourcefulness and 
ingenuity.  Plaster of Paris was in great demand but unavailable locally and, 
knowing that ‘goo gypsum’ (gypsum fibrosum) was mined not far from Hankou 
the Union Hospital staff managed to secure supplies from which, after 
experimentation they were able to produce their own Plaster of Paris. 45  Similarly, 
they experimented with pharmaceuticals such as Tincture of Opium and Tincture 
of Orange. 46  Such experiments were no doubt undertaken from medical necessity 
rather than to supplement the local opium supply, otherwise details would not 
have been reported with such a sense of achievement in the Hospital’s Annual 
Report.  
 In keeping with the “all hands on deck” response, non-medicals were 
drafted in to ease the medical missionary workload.  Wickings worked as a 
dresser in the Xiaogan Hospital out-patients department for several months. He 
was also responsible for “changing the drainage system, overseeing repairs to 
buildings, designing an incinerator and doing a little teaching” as well as work 
connected with the leprosarium.47  He could do this because, in contrast to the 
medical missionaries’ workload, ministers’ workloads had decreased: their 
congregations had diminished, they could no longer travel freely into the 
surrounding countryside and street preaching had been banned by the Japanese.48   
 
 
 
                                                 
45 MMS, Union Hospital, Hankow, 1940, p. 2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Wickings, H.F., Siaokan Hospital Annual Report, 1939, p. 1, CWM/LMS CH/3, 1941–1950, 
China/Hong Kong Reports, Wickings file, 1939–1948. 
48 Ibid. 
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(ii) Administrative Business 
Dealing with the occupying force and responding to official communications 
absorbed much of a medical missionary’s time. Before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese 
could, technically, only make requests regarding mission property but still great 
tact was required.  For example, at the end of 1938, a request was made by 
Captain Goto, Second in Command of the Japanese Police for the Wuhan area, to 
rent the, at that time, closed Huangpei (Hwangpei) Hospital and school buildings 
for Japanese military officers’ use.  The buildings were “some of the most 
prominent and best built buildings in the city”.49  After a meeting that regretted 
the Mission’s “inability to accede to this request”50 the request was turned down. 
The letter advising Captain Goto of the Committee’s decision stressed the 
religious and political position from which they reached their decision: 
 … For thirty years these buildings have been used solely for Christian 
philanthropic work, and we hope a time may soon come when that 
work may be resumed after the population has returned.  In view of the 
nature of the work, and our position as neutrals, we have always in the 
past declined permission for the use of our Mission buildings by 
military or official bodies, and we cannot on principle do otherwise 
now.51 
 
The following month, Goto, flanked by his Commandant, re-visited the LMS 
offices to repeat the request. The Committee was anxious to avoid a Japanese 
forced entry into the buildings and Goto was informed the matter would be 
reconsidered by the District Committee.52  The rent would, no doubt, have been 
welcomed by the Committee but considering that the request involved a “grave 
                                                 
49 Central China District Committee Minutes, Minute No., C8109, December 12th, 1938, 
CWM/LMS CH/15 1941–50, Central China District Committee Minutes, 1933–50,  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., Minute No., C9002, January 23rd, 1938. 
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matter of principle”, the Committee adhered to its original decision and informed 
Goto they could not change their neutral status.53 
 Some Mission Boards were prepared to rent their vacant properties to the 
Japanese but, while the word collaboration is not specifically mentioned regarding 
the Huangpei Hospital buildings, Mission Boards were sensitive to this issue.  
BMS correspondence in March 1939 concerning a Japanese request to rent one of 
their vacant properties in Shanxi illustrates this: 
 We felt that we must ask for reasonable conditions. Although this may 
mean nothing to the Japanese at this time.  Looking ahead, however, to 
the time when the war is over, and our Church in Shansi is 
reconstituted, we feel that we may have to explain our action to 
responsible Chinese who may have suspected us of collaboration with 
the enemy.54 
 
BMS was realistic enough to appreciate the Japanese could seize their property at 
any moment but were conscious of the need to make some attempt to negotiate 
“reasonable conditions” to combat potential accusations of collaboration. 
  Fortunately, not all District Committee business was so stressful. A 
request to rent mission property came from Swedish missionaries for the 
temporary use of part of a house in the Wuchang compound.  This was happily 
agreed and an offer of rent refused in recognition of help they had given LMS 
members with the proviso usage would not exceed three months.55  This provided 
the Committee with the chance to show their appreciation for Swedish co-
operation and offer a practical expression of inter-denominational fellowship. 
  
 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Williamson, H.R. to Dixon, S.H., Edinburgh House, London, March 7th, 1941, CBMS 383,  
file 3. 
55 Central China District Committee Minutes, Minute No.C0050, March 4th, 1940, CWM/LMS  
CH/15. 1941–50, Central China District Committee Minutes, 1933–50. 
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(iii) Financial Matters 
By 1941 the Union Hospital had exhausted its reserve funds and was experiencing 
financial difficulty partly because the foreign firms that had supported it in 
previous years had been forced to close through lack of trade.  As the foreign 
firms pulled out their financial support vanished with them.56  Attempts were 
made at cost cutting and some routine examinations of urine and stool samples 
were reduced.57 Another reason for the hospital’s financial problems was that in 
the first half of 1941 they had closed two wards to make economies but running a 
215 bed hospital below capacity incurred a heavy monthly loss since the plant 
costs remained constant so the plan failed.58  In November one of the closed 
wards was reopened but the rising food costs for that year, plus the extra work 
with diminished staffing levels, meant it had to be closed again after six weeks.  
The general ward patients were subsidised by private patients’ fees but there were 
many who could pay nothing and these were partly supported by the IRCC of 
Central China and the hospital’s own Samaritan Fund. 59  The situation was 
becoming so severe that the Chinese staff’s food had to be “drastically 
rationed”.60 There is no specific reference to the foreign staff’s food except that, 
in general, the hospital staff’s food was of poor quality and low in nutritive value.  
Whether this refers only to food for the Chinese staff or to all the staff is unclear; 
however, it is apparent economies were being made.61 
 Chapman had successfully obtained donations from friends and relatives 
in Australia to be used at his discretion. To shield them from the Japanese the 
                                                 
56 Brown, T.C., to Box E.S. (Secretary of the Central China District Committee), April 16th, 1941.  
CWM/LMS CH/9, 1941–50, Central China District Correspondence. 
57 Chapman, Union Hospital Report 1941–45, p. 7. 
58 Ibid., p. 3. 
59 Ibid., p. 4. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Hospital Board and Finance Committee agreed the funds should not be placed in 
the usual Income and Expenditure Account but instead in an independent 
“Hospital Stores Account”.  Basic supplies were purchased in 1940 and 1941 and 
stored.62  The hospital later purchased supplies from this store at a higher price 
than their original purchase price but at a substantially lower price than the 
current street values. Thus, the hospital obtained its stores at a reasonable price 
and the Hospital Stores Account was to some extent re-capitalised.  Obtaining the 
stores was difficult and risks were run, particularly in the late summer of 1941 
when large stocks of rice had to be bought from Free China and smuggled in and 
stored.  This particular purchase was aided by a $30,000 loan from a Chinese 
friend that was repaid in the spring of 1942.63 In effect, the hospital was running 
its own retail business to shield funds and combat inflation.  To complicate 
matters the business had to be conducted out of sight of the Japanese.  This 
Hospital Stores Account illustrates medical missionary resourcefulness and 
adaptation to wartime change.  There appears to be no recorded precedent for 
such an account.  The decision to set up and operate the secret “Hospital Stores 
Account” was conceived and run entirely by medical missionaries working 
autonomously in the field responding to local events. Everything possible was 
being attempted to maintain the hospital’s medical service and this was an 
ingenious scheme that appears to have worked well under wartime restrictions.  
 Regrettably, the wealth of the stores proved too much of a temptation for 
some of the hospital’s staff and several were dismissed for pilfering.64  Their 
actions, while not condoned, were excused as a visible sign of the “general 
                                                 
62 Ibid., p. 9. Supplies included coal, firewood, gasoline, kerosene, paddy [rice], wheat, cooking oil, 
cotton wool, surgical gauze and drugs amongst other items. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p. 10. 
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deterioration in morale in Hankow” which was seen as a result of policies adopted 
by the Japanese.65  Chapman wrote: 
 Let those who have themselves stood firm while they watched their  
 own families starve cast the first stone at these erring ones.66 
 
The tone here is regret for the social breakdown of society with an appreciation of 
human weakness rather than an expression of anger directed at individual 
untrustworthiness. While it is likely that staff in secular institutions also exhibited 
untrustworthiness, in a Christian institution it must have been especially 
disappointing that staff members proved to be untrustworthy.  In all institutions it 
must have been frustrating that staff had to be dismissed when they were so badly 
needed. Accordingly, tactful management of hospital staff was another skill that 
had to be factored into the medical missionary workload. 
 In February 1941, the LMS Mission Hospital, on the evidence of its 1940 
Annual Accounts made a request for a grant of $2,000 from the Society’s China 
Council to keep it afloat until the situation could be reviewed in June.67  Despite 
an IRCC subsidy of 50 cents per day for eight free cases (a total of $400), this 
covered less than half the real cost of supporting them.  The hospital had already 
received an LMS Special Grant of $3,795 and two loans had been taken up locally.  
Medicine and food costs had doubled during 1940 and in February 1941 food 
costs had risen yet again, probably prompting the request.  It was impossible to 
make any kind of budget forecast.  The figures speak for themselves: 
 
                                                 
65 Ibid., p. 11. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Central China District Committee Executive Report, February 27th, 1941, attached to 
Correspondence, Brown, T.C, to Box E.S., (Secretary of the Central China District Committee), 
April 16th, 1941, CWM/LMS CH/9, 1941–50, Central China District Correspondence. 
 
 227 
Date Number of  
in-patients 
Cash 
Receipts 
Total 
Expenditure 
Expenditure on 
food items  
Jan –  Apr 313 $6,418.65 $6,564.38 $2,308.12 
May – Aug 402 $9,885.15 $7,468.97 $3,914.83 
Sep – Dec 358 $9,807.70 $15,459.74 $9,475.03 
 
Table 7: Cash Receipts and Expenditure for Xiaogan Hospital 194068 
 
Taking into account that cash in hand and a credit balance in the bank of 
$2,390.92 were already allocated to outstanding invoices, the situation was that 
“the upper limit has now been reached”. 69  From Table 7 it is apparent that 
expenditure on food items between September and December more than doubled 
compared to the previous four months while income remained the same.  Food 
expenditure between September and December when compared to the first four 
months of the year appears to have risen by over four times.  The May to August 
period may have included some self-sufficient horticulture which would have 
eased expenditure but there are no references to any such activity.  Through no 
obvious fault of its management, and despite grants and subsidies, the hospital 
was becoming increasingly insolvent. As to self-generated income the in-patient 
numbers appear relatively stable but no indication is given of out-patient services 
which could have been extensive.  From this distance it is impossible to pass any 
judgement on the Xiaogan Hospital’s viability as a provider of medical services, 
but it is plain that, without a rapid increase in income, the hospital would have 
been unable to provide any medical service at all. Nevertheless, the LMS’s China 
Council’s response to the request was measured, and it replied that, if funds did 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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become exhausted the Council would meet the request with “sympathetic 
consideration”.70   
 The Union and Xiaogan Mission Hospitals, as examples of economic 
difficulty, reveal that geographical position made little difference to a hospital’s 
financial situation.  City and country areas alike had their own financial problems 
and the staff working in these hospitals shared an inability to exercise control over 
external events.  In both cases it was external rather than internal forces that were 
the root cause of the hospitals’ financial problems.  
 
(iv) Rural Danger 
After Wuhan fell the country districts became increasingly isolated and 
uncertainty was fuelled by rumour. In Suixian, the Rev. Fred Cram (1903–1998), 
Hospital Superintendent, recorded these rumours in his diary:  
 … heard that Nanking had fallen…” “Heard that Kiukiang had 
fallen…” “Rumours that Hankow had fallen…” “Heard J.s were at Hai 
Ho,…” “still keep hearing all kinds of rumours: first that the Chinese 
are going to return and then that they are going to use all means to keep 
Suihsien, today we again heard the rumour that the Japanese say they 
are coming to Suihsien for the New Year.71  
 
Attempts to obtain accurate information were thwarted as those who made 
attempts to leave Suixian were turned back by Chinese soldiers or conditions on 
the road.72  Passes remained difficult to obtain and when they were issued by one 
district could be inspected in another district en route only to be declared 
invalid.73  
                                                 
70 Ibid., Brown, T.C., to Box E.S., July 11th, 1941.  
71Cram, F., Diary entries, December, 4th,  1937, July 12th, October 26th, November 4th, December 
29th 1938, Diaries 27/9/35–11/11/38, and 11/11/38–20/1/39, Cram/Papers/CFP/FC. 
72 Cram, F., Diary entry, November 4th, 1938, Diary 27/9/35–12/11/38, Cram /Papers/CFP/FC. 
73 Cram, F., Diary entry, October 18th, 1939, Diary 11/12/38–20/01/39, Cram /Papers/CFP/FC. 
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 The uncertainties fuelled by rumour were experienced within an 
environment continually threatening physical danger. In a period of just five days 
during November 1938 the Suixian missionaries endured a series of potentially 
life threatening situations:74  On November 11th the hospital dispensary and gate-
house were destroyed by Japanese bombs.  On the 14th, the staff fled into the 
countryside in fear of further aerial attack as Japanese planes carried out 
reconnaissance.  On the 15th Cram was woken at 1.30 am when cannon fire shook 
the mission house and later that day he and three companions were mistaken for 
Japanese spies by two Chinese soldiers but managed to identify themselves.75  
The threat of death or injury was ever present and, in addition, bandits and 
Chinese army deserters had to be contended with. 76  In March 1939, the mission 
station’s apolitical stance and safety were threatened when the Chinese began 
erecting gun replacements abutting the north wall of the mission compound. Cram 
wrote to the Chinese authorities to alert them to the inappropriateness of the 
location but the work continued.77    
 Normal routines became disorganised and, on one occasion, Cram was 
woken at 4 am as people washed their clothes by moonlight in order to be able to 
flee into the countryside during the day. 78  Within this unsettled environment 
refugees and wounded had to be cared for. In Wuhan, the occupation had brought 
a stability that was absent from the countryside.  The situation was at its worst in 
regions where neither Chinese nor Japanese were in control. The bombing of 
Suixian began in July 1938 and continued until the town was occupied on May 
                                                 
74 Cram, F., Diary Entries November 11th–15th, 1938, Diary 11/11/38–20/1/39, 
Cram/Papers/CFP/FC. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., December 31st, 1938. 
77 Cram, F., Diary entry, March 30th, 1939, Diary 20/1/39–25/11/40, Cram/Papers/CFP/FC. 
78 Ibid., April 8th, 1939.  
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14th 1939.  Over this ten month period during which time their isolation was 
compounded by rumour and fear, the hospital staff were caught up in protracted 
hostilities that included heavy artillery bombardment. 
 In early 1939, the CovMS Bethesda Hospital, further west at Xiangfan, 
was suffering in a similar way to Suixian with air raids on the 17th, 18th and 19th of 
March. 79  Situated five minutes walk outside the city gates, the hospital was 
regarded as safer than other places within the city.  It was therefore a shock when, 
despite American flags being spread out on the lawn, hoisted on flagpoles and 
painted conspicuously on the roof, four bombs were dropped on the hospital 
compound during the March 19th raid. The attack appeared to have been targeted 
deliberately at the hospital and was thought to have occurred because the Japanese 
suspected it of harbouring Chinese soldiers as in-patients.80   120 patients were in 
the hospital and, although at the time they all escaped injury, six people, outside 
the hospital, were killed and others injured. Within a day all the Chinese staff had 
fled and the hospital was almost empty.  This was a bitter blow as the previous 
year the hospital had had “the most successful year in its history, professionally, 
financially, and spiritually”.81  Matson, a senior CovMS official who was visiting 
at the time, stressed, in his report, the fear and terror these raids brought to the 
local people.  As with the inhabitants of Suixian, the population left at dawn for 
the countryside with the majority returning at six in the evening.  Individual 
medical missionary response to the bombing is not specifically stated but 
                                                 
79 Matson, P., On the Missionary Road, March 24th, 1939, CAHL 2/912a Box 2F8, Peter Matson 
Correspondence, CovMS. 
80 There was foundation to this suspicion as a letter written two days later to the American 
Embassy confirmed the hospital had treated wounded soldiers. Peter Matson to American 
Embassy, Chongking, March 21st, 1939, CAHL 2/912a Box 2F8, Peter Matson Correspondence, 
CovMS. 
81 Peter Matson, On the Missionary Road,1939, CAHL 2/912a Box 2F8, Peter Matson 
Correspondence, CovMS. 
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reference is made to the “whole institution” being gripped by terror and 
confusion. 82   Thus, medical missionaries within the country districts shared 
similar experiences living and working under the constant threat of attack.  
 
(v) Personal Challenge 
In addition to the confined, chaotic environment in which they found themselves, 
medical missionaries were separated from loved ones, overworked and 
surrounded by disruption and uncertainty.  Consequently they looked to their 
work for fulfilment and professional satisfaction. Redhead, nine days after the 
occupation, wrote: 
 There is a sense of groping along, & a muddlesome feeling in one’s 
mind.  And the ordinary pleasant & useful occupations in life like 
writing letters – going for walks & to the pictures are all stopped & 
really there isn’t a day’s work without out-patients; and we’re feeling 
the reaction from the days of expectancy & crisis which in retrospect 
seem so colourful.  Now prayer is not as easy as it was then:  one’s 
mind isn’t set in any particular direction. Inaction & uncertainty are 
almost the most difficult things to be up against I am sure…    
Teaching my midwifery nurse is a satisfying thing.  But I do so 
miss Fred, [her future husband living in Suixian] & writing to him & 
having his letters…83   
 
 On the day the above diary entry was made the hospital was visited by 
Japanese soldiers. Unexpected visits by the occupying forces also, no doubt, 
added to the daily tensions:  
 Four Js came this afternoon.  One polite & two silent & one very rude.  
Ralph [Bolton] led them & Oertel & I came behind & didn’t let them 
stray.  When one dashed into Dr. Chiang’s bedroom without knocking, 
Oertel & I protested & said he ought to knock at the door, & an older 
one of them told him.  The night-nurses bedroom doors I shut as they 
came along & luckily they didn’t argue when I told [them] they 
couldn’t go in because the nurses were asleep.84   
 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Redhead, M., Diary entry, November 3rd, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 21. 
84 Ibid., p. 22. 
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Such interaction with the Japanese, particularly when unannounced, had to be 
negotiated, despite medical missionary third party national status. The only post-
occupation advantage for the residents of Wuhan was the cessation of bombing 
raids. Medical missionary personal experiences and anxieties were no doubt 
similar to those experienced by thousands of others in Hankou at that time but, as 
medicals, their profession dictated they maintain an exterior of calm competence 
in the workplace.    
 Medical missionaries shared their patients’ distress. Although not inured 
to injuries sustained as a result of conflict they were accustomed to treating these 
injuries on a daily basis. Following the occupation, however, they were presented 
with a new type of injury: 
And rape – we have four women in who have been raped by Japanese 
soldiers.  All have V.D. of course – two of them are sisters, bonny 
lasses.  It’s a job to know what to do with them.  To cure them is well-
nigh hopeless.85  
 
Cases such as these, as Redhead noted, had a hopelessness that was tragic for both 
doctor and patient. Not least with its consequent venereal disease, rape, at that 
time, was a violation regarded as carrying a lifetime sentence and Redhead shared 
in the hopelessness of the girls’ situation being frustrated by her inability to 
occasion a cure.  
 Despite public displays of cooperation and fellowship, medical 
missionaries were not immune to the challenges and frustrations of working with 
others. On occasions tensions amongst staff spilled over and frustrations, hidden 
publicly, erupted privately within the work space. Redhead recorded: 
                                                 
85 Although 914 (Neosalvarsan ) was available for treating syphilis it was primarily used for 
treating relapsing fever and was not as effective as the post-war treatments of penicillin were to 
prove to be. Redhead, M., Diary entry, November 17th, 1938, Cram/Papers/69, p. 25. 
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 We got up early, & I got in a raging temper with Sister Gladys and her 
high-handed ways – in fact spoilt the whole day.86 
 
There were tensions too at the Union Hospital and Kathleen, the wife of Keith 
Gillison, was seconded to the hospital’s Diet Kitchen, despite not being a dietician, 
where her role was that of mediator: 
Quite a bit of my time during the last six months has been taken up 
with being a kind of buffer-state or 3rd party.  It is not surprising, in 
view of the conditions & strain of the last two or three years in 
Hankow, that at times personal relationships get strained. It was 
because of this kind of difficulty, that it seemed right to the ‘powers 
that be’ for me to go into the Diet Kitchen … I have quite enjoyed my 
six months there, many of our problems have cleared up, & it has been 
a grand opportunity to work alongside the staff in the course of their 
ordinary routine…87 
 
 Kathleen’s role was not solely that of the Medical Superintendent’s wife. 
She acted as mediator, helped with the hospital accounts and secretarial work and 
the running of a monthly child welfare clinic while supporting the Sunday School. 
She appears not to have regarded her various duties as burdensome in any way but 
rather seen herself as being given the opportunity for personal and professional 
development. It is apparent that the Japanese occupation fostered an “all hands on 
deck” response within the hospitals.   
  
(vi) Inter-denominational Cooperation 
The inter-denominational cooperation observed in the pre-occupation period 
developed further following occupation. Elsie Dexter, a nurse at the General 
recorded: 
The fine cooperation of the mission hospitals this year has been one of 
our greatest joys.88 
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To support her statement Dexter cited the Roman Catholic Hospital’s willingness 
to share its laboratory service for malaria testing. The Union Hospital’s midwifery 
service was also singled out by her as an example of welcome inter-
denominational cooperation. That such mutual aid is highlighted suggests it was 
unusual enough to warrant mention.  
 A combination of the air raids experienced in Wuchang alongside a 
determined effort by the National government to empty the city caused the 
population to shrink from an estimated 400,000 pre-war to 12,000 immediately 
prior to occupation.89  A scorched earth policy had been proposed but abandoned. 
Mission compounds were perceived as safe havens and the few people remaining 
had flocked to them.  These compounds in Wuchang included the ACM Boone 
Compound, the Roman Catholic Mission, the Swedish Mission, the LMS Ren Chi 
Hospital and Girls’ School.  The close proximity of these mission stations allowed 
free interaction between them, but one missionary stated that while previously 
living in the LMS compound he had had no notion who was living in the 
neighbouring Catholic mission or in what work they were engaged in. After the 
occupation, this changed and he experienced a much greater sense of inter-
denominational fellowship: 
 Racial and ecclesiastical differences were laid aside…Now I felt that in 
a real sense ‘the middle wall of partition’ was being broken down. 
Sometimes the leaders of different camps would meet for 
consultation.90 
   
 The Ren Chi was located in the centre of this cluster of compounds from 
which this new found fellowship emanated and remained the only hospital 
operating in Wuchang city after the occupation.91  The hospital was run by a 
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Chinese doctor, Dr. Yeh.92  Plans were made to transfer the hospital to Hankou 
but Yeh decided to stay when he heard members of the American and Swedish 
Missions had decided to remain. Yeh established clinics and sent weekly reports 
to the IRCC which supported the hospital’s work financially.93  Staff numbers 
were swelled by medical staff from the closed Huangpei hospital and by staff 
from two Swedish mission country dispensaries.  This Swedish connection, whose 
staff remained neutral during the war, proved to be of great value not just for their 
professional expertise but also for negotiations with the Japanese following Pearl 
Harbor. One Swedish member of staff, the Rev. G. Tonner, 94  slept at the 
gatehouse of the hospital for the first week following occupation and later within 
the hospital compound. 95   Medical missionary staff from different missions 
collaborated closely in order to maintain a continuance of medical service. 
Without this collaboration the hospital would almost certainly have been unable 
to function and all western medical care in the immediate city area would have 
ceased.  
 
Japanese Anti-British Policy in Operation 
At Xiaogan, the hospital had been under the direction of a Chinese manager, Dr. 
Chang, but, as the Japanese approached, he evacuated westwards.  Dr. Dorothy 
Entrican (b. 1900) replaced him aided by Nurse Jean Gillison.96  Later, they were 
joined by Dr. Muriel Garnick (b.1906) from the Union Hospital with Dr. Chen as 
                                                 
92 There is little about him in mission society records. 
 93Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 26. 
94 He is named in LMS Central China District Committee Minutes, 1941–50, Appendix Two,  
p. 31.  
95 Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 23. 
96 Keith Gillison’s sister. 
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Medical Superintendent.97 The Rev. Wickings, the only foreign male member of 
the hospital team, was reluctant to leave the women unattended in case they were 
visited by Japanese soldiers.  This proved to be a realistic fear as on one particular 
occasion Wickings was in a separate part of the compound when two drunken 
Japanese soldiers attempted to enter the ladies’ house and insulted one of the 
nurses. Wickings was forced to eject the men. 98   Japanese soldiers did not 
recognise women doctors or nurses as professionals holding authority.  To the 
Japanese they were women and, therefore, inferior and when they wished to 
question Entrican they used Wickings as an intermediary posing questions to him 
to relay to her.  For a professionally qualified articulate woman this was, no doubt, 
infuriating.99  
 Following the announcement of the “New Order for East Asia” in 
November 1938, which sought to deliver the Chinese from western influence, the 
first Japanese-organised anti-British demonstration in Xiaogan in 1939 came to 
nothing since the District Magistrate, or “chief puppet” as Wickings described 
him, had been an in-patient and was grateful for the hospital’s care.100 When an 
official arrived to instruct him to begin an anti-British campaign he had 
apparently explained there were only five British foreigners in Xiaogan who were 
harmless. The official however had insisted the campaign go ahead but, after he 
left, the Magistrate sent a message advising the hospital staff not to be concerned 
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as there would only be a demonstration and he would warn them, if necessary, of 
anything further. Ultimately nothing occurred.101 
 During 1939, the hospital was searched numerous times by the Japanese 
military and the medical missionaries questioned about their work, but not all 
visits appeared threatening. A Japanese Surgeon General visited on several 
occasions and, after appearing to find the work of the Hospital and the Leper 
colony impressive, asked for literature about Christian missions.  He later sent 
gifts of sugar and milk.102  A cynic would not be condemned for thinking that the 
Surgeon General’s visit was actually a fact finding mission for, in November 
1940, the Xiaogan hospital found itself in competition with a Japanese hospital 
that had been established next door. Similarly, during the anti-British 
demonstrations in Zhoucun in 1939, a politically motivated hospital sponsored by 
the Japanese army opened next door to the BMS Foster Hospital “offering 
completely free treatment”. 103  This suggests a deliberate policy by the Japanese 
to undermine mission hospitals. The establishment of a puppet hospital next door 
in Xiaogan was provocative, especially as its staff included some who had worked 
at the mission hospital, who took the opportunity to intimidate their former 
colleagues. One had been a charge nurse at the mission hospital and, after being 
discharged for dishonesty, had obtained a forged doctor’s certificate and risen to 
the position of “leading man” at the new hospital for which he received a 
substantial salary.104  
 The staff of the mission hospital, unlike those at the puppet government 
hospital, did not have government support and the situation became even more 
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difficult when attempts were made to entice the Chinese mission staff away with 
offers of higher salaries. In a tangible manifestation of the “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere” policy of August 1940 anti-British leaflets were distributed to 
mission staff in November 1941 cautioning them about the dangers of associating 
with the British. 105 Chen was summoned to appear before the Magistrate and 
threatened in an attempt to persuade him to resign. Japanese guards were placed at 
the entrance to the hospital and patients intimidated.  For protection Chen was 
sent to Hankou to provide an account of events while Wickings and Garnick 
visited the puppet government Advisory Bureau to complain about the leaflets.  
They were received by Goto, the same man who had approached LMS to enquire 
about renting the vacated hospital at Huangpei. He assured them the production of 
the leaflets would be enquired into and their distribution would cease. Wickings 
later learned that Goto had, in fact, spearheaded the attacks on the hospital.106  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
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Post-Pearl Harbor Hubei 
(i) The Occupied Areas 
 
 
Map 7: Central China under Japanese Occupation, December 1941107 
 
On December 8th 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese officers 
arrived at the Union Hospital, and the British staff were informed that they, and 
the other British residents of Hankou, were to attend a meeting with the Hankou 
Garrison Commander.  At this meeting it was announced that Japan was at war 
with Britain and that they were to be confined to their homes. 108  From that 
moment, life lost all spontaneity in the occupied areas of Hubei.  As one 
                                                 
107 USAFFE, Army Operations in China, December 1941–1943, [Japanese Monograph No. 71],  
p. 55. 
108 Chapman, H.O., Union Hospital Report 1941–45, 1946, p. 12. 
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missionary ruefully noted: “That was the beginning of our internment.”109  No-
one was allowed to travel within or beyond the city without first obtaining a pass 
for which they had to state the purpose of their movements and the person or 
place they intended to visit.   
 
 
 
Fig. 10: Rev. Cram’s Travel Pass110   
From Shanghai to England (for furlough), valid 1942.2.27–1942.3.15 
 
Passes were only valid for a short time and all meetings banned.  This meant the 
Hospital Boards could not meet and, at the Union Hospital Chapman was given 
full authority. 111  It was suggested he maintain close co-operation over the 
hospital’s administration with Dr. Liu, the Assistant Medical Superintendent, 
should he have to hand over.112  The official recording, by Chapman himself, of 
                                                 
109 Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 75. 
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112 Dr.Y.K. Liu, Assistant Medical Superintendent and Assistant Surgeon.  
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the need for this suggests such co-operation over the running of the hospital 
between the Superintendent and the Assistant Superintendent may not already 
have been the norm. 
 Homes and buildings were subjected to unannounced visits as the 
Japanese searched for weapons and radios.  At the end of January, 60 British 
missionaries were ordered to vacate their premises and move in with friends.113 
As most of their friends were also being evicted this proved awkward. Some 
moved in with Gilman and remained boarding with him for several months.  The 
Bishop amusingly reported their arrival to the ACM offices in New York with: 
“This week has been marked by the opening of our Anglo-Saxon Refugee 
Camp”.114   In the same week, the General Hospital buildings in Wuchang were 
officially sealed to protect them although, as noted above, the premises had been 
vacated just prior to the occupation.  The premises to which the General had 
transferred in Hankou were looted and goods removed including the X-ray plant 
and five pianos.  Other items were burned in a bonfire that lasted for several 
days. 115  Empty buildings were sealed throughout Wuhan which provided the 
Japanese with the opportunity to seal Churches after looting them and burning 
their books. Gilman had to make a special request for a Church to be opened for a 
Confirmation Service.116  
 The streets were plastered with intimidating anti-foreign posters and 
slogans congratulating the Chinese on their freedom. One poster depicted a 
Japanese soldier running his bayonet simultaneously through the bodies of 
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American and British men.117  At first, the Japanese turned their attentions to the 
foreign businesses, but by March 1942, they had begun to focus on the 
missions.118   
 At Xiaogan, matters came to a head on December 13th 1941 when hand 
grenades were thrown into the hospital’s women’s ward and patients had to be 
evacuated.  By 3pm the following afternoon all the patients had left and the 
hospital closed. The Japanese campaign to close the hospital was driven by the 
Japanese anti-British policy but it is impossible to know how much was 
specifically motivated by their religious policy. Wickings was aware of this 
religious policy in June 1942 and is one of the few missionaries to refer to it in his 
writings, but he does not make any link between it and the closing of the Xiaogan 
Hospital.119  His interpretation was that Japanese religious policy was a deliberate 
attempt to target the Chinese to force an inter-denominational union between 
Chinese Christians: 
 On the surface it may sound attractive but there is plenty of evidence to 
show that this is merely another Japan stunt to bring the Church into 
line with the New Order in East Asia, which simply means Japan all 
over.120 
  
 The closing of Xiaogan ended on a note of optimism for despite the 
hospital’s demise, Garnick attempted to muster a sense of achievement by 
assessing the success of the hospital’s work in terms of its witness, not its medical 
accomplishment:   
So, we ended the year with the hospital closed. But to none of us did it 
end with a sense of defeat.  The witness of the hospital will not have 
been in vain in Siaokan.121 
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 Were the medical missionaries at Xiaogan in a state of denial? Their 
hospital had been forcibly closed, their work curtailed and their lives and those of 
their patients threatened. Did the closing of the hospital impinge upon the 
Xiaogan medical missionaries golden age?  Although enduring hardship and 
difficulties that blighted their daily lives, they nonetheless experienced the 
opportunity to carry out their calling, and succeeded for a time in providing a 
professional medical service in a wartime environment. It was a time when they 
were most needed and the closing of the hospital, due to external forces and 
policies beyond their control did not reflect unfavourably upon their individual 
motivation.  This determination to feel no “sense of defeat” (or perhaps not to 
admit to it publicly) was characteristic of the missionary ability to remain 
optimistic in the face of disappointment. The missionary raison d’être would be 
questioned after the war years when all missionaries had to consider the efficiency 
of their earlier work in a realistic way rather than through an optimistic lens.  In 
the post-war years upon their return to Xiaogan these same medical missionaries 
looked forward to the future rather than back to this period of chaos, isolation and 
uncertainty.  Had this optimism shielded them from the realities of their situation 
or had they perhaps always known the reality but not faced up to it?  
 Similar problems were being faced in the urban areas. In Hankou, 
Japanese Army officers began making frequent visits to the Union Hospital, 
thereby raising the fear that the military was planning to requisition it, a fear that 
was realised when the Japanese Army Medical Service took it over. When 
attention turned to the Ren Chi, interference was warded off by inviting 
Wuchang’s Chinese Mayor to make a personal visit.122 
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 It had been presumed that the Municipal Administration would not want to 
close the Union hospital, although it was clear that the Japanese aim was to 
eradicate all foreign influence.  A suggestion was put to the Japanese that the 
British staff would apply for repatriation, except for Chapman, who would retire 
in seclusion within the mission compound.123  The Union would be taken over by 
the Japanese, but the Town Branch at the YWCA would be renamed the Ho Chi 
Hospital and be run completely by Chinese staff.124  The Municipal Government 
and the Japanese initially approved this plan.  Dr. Liu took charge of the Ho Chi 
and from the outset proved his competence:  
 [Dr. Liu] had shown unsuspected reserves of strength, proving equal to 
every demand that was made on him.  He took entire control of the 
new hospital under a Supervisory Committee appointed by the two 
local church bodies representing the Founders [LMS and MMS].  
Though threatened by both Japanese and Chinese racketeers, he stood 
firm… Dr. Liu then dealt decisively with certain shady financial 
practices that he found among the staff, thereby losing one or two who 
had previously been considered indispensable, he was determined at all 
costs to start his new institution with a clean sheet.  He was faced with 
the internal staff troubles that always arise when a Chinese member of 
a hospital staff takes over supreme authority from a European head; 
and he met them with that mixture of patience, tact, compromise and 
firmness of which so many Chinese are past masters. 125 
 
 Japanese orders for foreigners to vacate Hubei were issued in April 1942 
and medical missionaries from the rural areas assembled in Hankou. 126  At 
Xiaogan, after the hospital’s closure, the foreign staff had moved in with the 
Wickings family where they were “free and yet interned” and, no longer in receipt 
of salaries, they had been forced to dismiss the servants to economise.127  The 
Xiaogan staff were joined in Hankou by missionaries from Zaoshi and members 
of the Yichang Scottish Mission. 
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 In July, the authorities announced all “enemy nationals” were to be 
transferred to Shanghai and Chapman was included amongst them, his hopes of 
waiting the war out in seclusion in Hankou thwarted. 128   The Swiss Consul 
accepted an inventory and the hospital keys were handed over.  The closing of the 
Union Hospital was to affect patients suffering from chronic illnesses requiring 
long-term care, but there was particular concern for the city’s lepers.129 Following 
the occupation, they had been the first patients to appear at the hospital for 
treatment and had continued to attend throughout the occupation period.  Without 
treatment, the remission of their disease would cease and they would revert to 
being infectious.130  While this concern was no doubt heartfelt, the description of 
the lepers is revealing because of the paternalistic way Chapman, a senior 
generation medical missionary, referred to them in 1945 after the war as children:  
 Some of them have attended regularly for four or five years; and in the 
long weary-up hill fight against their disease, while they have learned 
like children to trust and obey their doctors, the latter in turn have 
learned to love them for their patience, courage and gratitude.131 
 
While there has traditionally always been an element of hierarchy in the doctor–
patient relationship found in medical care, this description suggests the 
paternalistic attitude characteristic of earlier missionaries. This attitude regarding 
Chinese lepers as children who had to be taught is somewhat reminiscent of 
nineteenth century, and later, thoughts that indigenous people needed parental 
guidance. There was to be no place for any residual paternalistic attitudes in the 
mission hospitals of post-war China as will be shown when examining the 
Chinese rejection of their supposed dependence, together with the post-war 
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claiming of their autonomy within mission hospitals, as will be examined in detail 
in chapter seven.  
  On August 12th 1942, Dr. Liu heard officially that the Japanese had 
decided to seize the Ho Chi Hospital and that it would be run by the Municipal 
Government.  The Municipality’s Principal Medical Officer informed him there 
would be no change in staff but salaries would be increased two or three fold.132  
Two days later, with the news that the Ho Chi Hospital was, after all, being taken 
over by the Japanese, the remaining evacuees left Hankou for Shanghai with 
hopes that they would be repatriated.  It was not until after the majority had been 
interned and following their return in the autumn of 1945, that they were able to 
obtain any news of the staff and medical work they were leaving behind. 
 
(ii)  The Un-occupied Areas  
The CovMS Bethesda Hospital at Xiangfan maintained operations until it too 
finally fell to the Japanese for one month in March 1945 during the Ichigo 
Campaign.133  After Pearl Harbor the hospital was forced to focus upon the West 
and North for its supplies to counter-act the effects of the Japanese boycott on 
goods destined for the unoccupied areas of the province. Supplies were able to 
pass through from the American Red Cross in Chongqing, and from the North by 
lorry. Overseas supplies were arriving, but conditions remained chaotic and 
delivery services painfully slow; the hospital received a consignment of bandages 
from America which had “been on the road” for three years. 134  As with the 
hospitals in occupied areas, it proved impossible to prepare any realistic budgets. 
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 247 
For example: the Xiangfan hospital’s economic problems were compounded by 
new refugees fleeing the 1941–2 Henan famine while conditions in western Hubei 
were described as “near famine” following two successive years of crop failure.135  
In the surrounding countryside the social order was deteriorating and the hospital 
had to admit casualties from the lootings and shootings that were taking place.136  
It was therefore impossible to accurately predict future admissions or equipment 
needs. 
 Despite these conditions, Xiangfan hospital maintained its Nursing School 
and remained in contact with the NAC in Chongqing and its nursing students 
were able to sit their examinations.137  Student and qualified nurses were engaged 
from hospitals that had closed in the occupied areas: 
 Miss. Chang, who was loaned to us by the Laohokow [Laohekou] 
Hospital for a year, returned to her work there early in the year.  Miss. 
Pao a refugee nurse from Suihsien [Suixian] Hospital which was 
closed by the Japanese took over Miss. Chang’s duties here…  Mr. 
Sung and Miss. Wang left us early in the year to join a New Life 
movement Medical Unit and are now in Chungking.138 
 
This information demonstrates precisely how nurses relocated, not just 
geographically but also between mission societies. Miss. Chang transferred from 
NLK at Laohekou to CovMS at Xiangfan and back again.  Miss. Pao transferred 
from the MMS hospital at Suixian to CovMS at Xiangfan. The overall impression 
is of a perpetual movement westwards.  
 The NLK mission at Laohekou was the westernmost medical mission in 
Hubei and experienced the war in four distinct periods; from 1937 to 1939 a 
period of calm was followed by a period of intensive bombing which lasted until 
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1941.  From 1941–1944 another period of calm was followed by renewed 
bombing until the end of the war.139   Laohekou was not occupied until April 4th 
1945 and the occupation lasted only nine days. Over the Christmas period the 
missionaries had been advised by the American and Norwegian Ambassadors to 
evacuate as the Japanese were predicted to arrive in February.140  There was much 
discussion concerning what course of action should be taken and a few left but 
Alik Berg (1904–1948), a doctor at the Frøyland Memorial Hospital, remained 
with Drs Lende and Olsen. 141  The mission at Laohekou became an “orphan 
mission” when, on April 9th 1940, Norway was occupied by Germany.142  The 
Nazis took control of the Norwegian Missionary Society (NMS) the foremost 
missionary society in Norway, which was connected to the National Church.  It 
was larger and had closer ties to the Norwegian Government than NLK which 
managed to evade extensive Nazi control. Thus, unlike other missionary societies 
in Free China, NLK had neither financial nor administrative support from its 
Home Board.143   All policy decisions therefore became the responsibility of those 
in the field. Following the fall of Wuhan the threat of occupation had hovered 
over Laohekou but having avoided it for so long, the medical missionaries found 
it difficult to believe the Japanese might actually arrive, even though the airport at 
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Laohekou made it an obvious military target and the Japanese were pushing 
forward as part of the Ichigo Campaign. 
 During discussions Lende suggested closing the hospital and selling the 
medicine and equipment before handing the buildings over to the Americans. 
Olsen argued that conditions could soon change for the better and, if so, how 
would they function without medical equipment? Berg withdrew from the 
discussions because he was not Norwegian nor an enrolled member of the mission, 
and despite being on secondment to the society he felt it inappropriate to proffer 
an opinion. Fielding an attempt to persuade him otherwise, Berg held his ground 
and refused to change his mind. It was eventually decided they should sell 
everything and, on January 12th, a sale of goods was held at which the items sold 
well, because the prices were low. After the sale, Lende left Laohekou and 
authorised Berg to dispose of the remaining equipment and medicines.144  This 
Berg managed to do apart from some IRCC items which he donated to the 
Chinese Hospital.  As the Japanese Army advanced, Berg managed to escape on 
March 17th while other hospital staff members retreated with the American troops 
from Laohekou to Baihe (Paiho). Eventually, the NLK missionaries made their 
way to Kunming and thence to India but the Bergs could not leave because their 
passports were Finnish making them enemy aliens. With the hindsight of knowing 
the Japanese occupied Laohekou for only nine days, the disposal of all the 
hospital supplies and equipment was later perceived as a mistake, and Berg, 
despite refusing to provide any input at the time, later accused Lende of having 
made an incorrect decision.145  However, no-one could have known how short the 
occupation would prove to be, and this incident reiterates how major policy 
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decisions, which would normally have been taken by the home base after much 
executive discussion, became the province of medical missionaries alone in the 
field.  
 
Summary     
The key point of this chapter is that medical missionaries in all areas of Hubei, 
occupied and free, urban and rural, were powerless against external forces; but in 
particular after the reinforcement of Japan’s Greater East-Asia campaign they all 
experienced the consequences of Japanese policy and the daily anxiety of living 
within the theatre of war. Medical missionaries were distinct from other 
missionary groups because they were custodians of drugs, specialist medical 
equipment and solidly built secure hospital buildings, all of which were of value 
to the Japanese.  In their role as third party nationals medical missionaries stood 
between the occupiers and these valuable items.  Although some stability returned 
to Wuhan, the rural areas remained unsettled territory and problems were 
compounded by the famine in Henan and uncertain conditions in the countryside. 
Medical missionaries under occupation in Hubei adapted to an unfamiliar hostile 
regime and coped with uncertainty in their lives and workplace while carrying out 
demanding professional duties. Autonomy on the ground came as the occupation 
disconnected medical missionaries from their home bases, or, in NLK’s case, 
within the free area, as a result of its orphan mission status through events at 
home. 
 The crisis of occupation awakened reserves of practical resourcefulness 
and financial acumen as medical missionaries reacted to logistical difficulties, 
public utility breakdowns and inflation.  A wartime spirit of fellowship developed 
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and an “all hands on deck” response arose to counter the crisis.  It is noticeable 
that this inter-denominational co-operation, particularly between Protestant and 
Catholic, was presented at the time as being unusual and worthy of comment. 
Despite being forced to operate within a framework of Japanese policies 
deliberately constructed to undermine their work, medical missionaries remained 
optimistic, and were able to demonstrate the benefits of western scientific 
medicine to a wider group of patients than had previously been possible.  
Internment was to provide medical missionaries from occupied China with a new 
group of patients, but these patients, their fellow internees, were already familiar 
with western medicine. 
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Chapter Six   
 
 
Internment: Coming Into Their Own  
 
 
 What I’m saying is that the missionaries came into their own because 
they serviced the camps. 
 
Dr. Frances McAll, 2007.1 
 
Introduction 
Internment within the Japanese civil assembly camps changed all internees’ daily 
lives dramatically because not only were they incarcerated against their will in an 
unfamiliar closed environment, but their lives lost purpose. People who had held 
responsible managerial positions within foreign businesses, or local government, 
found themselves stripped of their occupation and social position, so that their 
sense of identity and social worth were threatened and they found themselves 
living cheek by jowl with people with whom, professionally and socially, they 
had previously had nothing in common and with whom they did not necessarily 
wish to be associated. As one lady commented: 
  In Shanghai I choose my friends whom I invite and whom I go to see and 
get on happily.  Here [Longhua] I have discovered that there are those who 
do not like me.2   
 
                                                 
1 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st 2007. 
2 Cited by Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 94. 
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 Within the camps, occupational status was reversed.  Practical skills such 
as plumbing and carpentry were more highly valued than managerial skills and 
people who could continue using existing specialist professional or practical skills 
found the transition easier than others. Medical missionaries, as specialists, were 
fortunate to fit into the practical skills category and their lives retained a familiar 
usefulness and practical purpose.3  This is not to suggest that their experiences 
were any better or worse than their fellow internees; but they entered the camps as 
medical missionaries and continued in that role, avoiding any loss of self-identity, 
professional worth or social standing.  In addition, their religious beliefs helped 
them: psychologists have pointed to the importance of religious or ideological 
commitment as an aid to coping with captivity.4 
 The Japanese provided only a custodial managerial role and the camps 
were ostensibly self-governing.  With very little medical provision within the 
camps other than that provided by the internees themselves, medical professionals 
played a vital role in maintaining internee health.  This chapter aims to explore 
and document this role and will argue that medical missionaries in the camps 
worked under physical, psychological and environmental hardship. Although 
medical work within the camps has been previously described, little recognition 
has been paid specifically to the medical missionary camp experience or their 
contribution.5  Medical missionaries were well prepared, from their experiences 
under occupation, to deal with problems such as a lack of appropriate medical 
                                                 
3 “The missionaries found it a lot easier”, McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st 2007. 
4 Hunter, E.J., “The Psychological Effects of being a Prisoner of War”, in Wilson, J.P., et al, (eds.), 
Human Adaptation to Extreme Stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam, Plenum Publishing 
Corporation, 1988, pp. 157–70,  pp. 167–8.  Cohen, E.A., Human Behaviour in the Concentration 
Camp: a Medical and Psychological Study, London, Free Association Books, 1988, p. 148. 
5  For example in Memorandum on the Protection of the American British and Netherlands 
Interests in Occupied China August 9th 1943 it is recorded: “within each camp there are a number 
of qualified British and American medical practitioners who are doing their utmost  to maintain a 
satisfactory state of health”. That many of these were missionaries is not mentioned. FO 916/1035, 
p. 8.   
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equipment and scarcity of drugs but, under internment, additional factors came 
into play which made their work more challenging. Together with the other 
internees, individual medical missionaries had to cope with boredom, failing 
health as a result of poor nutrition and a loss of privacy but specifically some also 
had to cope with opposition, prejudice, mistrust from their fellow internees, 
increased professional isolation and the gradual awareness that their professional 
skills were falling away. These difficulties needed to be overcome while 
incarcerated for an unknown period.  Nonetheless, these negative aspects were 
balanced by positive factors such as the personal and professional fulfilment of 
being able to provide an essential service for the internee community. As in their 
work outside the camps, there was also a personal satisfaction in knowing they 
were needed – even if this initially went un-recognised by some fellow internees. 
Professionally, they could display resourcefulness, and observe and record illness 
and the effects of nutritional deficiency for research purposes. Despite the 
opposition and mistrust there were examples of on-going non-missionary support 
for medical missionary work and, importantly, medical missionaries experienced 
spiritual fulfilment from “being chosen by God” for this special service.   
 Medical missionaries were not alone in providing medical services, but 
were perceived as being motivated by different forces in comparison to non-
missionaries simply because they were missionaries. Perceived by others, they 
were “religious professionals” and their prudish reputation, finely honed over one 
hundred years, travelled before them. To some they were “those bloody young 
missionaries”6 who were expected to preach aggressively ad nauseum and, as will 
be shown, the fact that some medical missionaries were young proved an added 
                                                 
6 McAll, F., and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 37. 
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irritation.  Among the other medical personnel there were, doubtless, many who 
were also Christians and similarly motivated by a desire to be of service; however, 
religion was not their whole life, they were not religious professionals, did not 
wear their faith as publicly as the missionaries and were not “labelled” 
missionaries.  Medical missionaries were viewed both as medical personnel and 
missionaries which resulted in their being perceived both positively and 
negatively. Eventually, however, even those who were initially anti-missionary 
acknowledged that the efforts of “those bloody young missionaries” went a long 
way to preventing what could have been private and public health disasters within 
the camps. 
 
 The Civilian Internment Camps  
Medical Internees 
After the second and final repatriation ship for North Americans, the Teia Maru, 
left Shanghai on September 18th, 1943, 41 missionary doctors and 39 missionary 
nurses remained interned in China comprising 68% and 34% respectively of all 
interned doctors and nurses.7  A fifth of these doctors and all the nurses were 
women.8  The nationality with the greatest representation was British with LMS 
providing just over half (22) of the doctors and more than a quarter (10), of the 
nurses. These non-repatriated medical missionary doctors and nurses provide the 
focus for this chapter as we examine their internment experience and contribution.  
 Not all civilians were taken to Shanghai prior to internment but the camps 
in which medical missionaries were interned in the Shanghai area were Ash, 
Zhabei (Chapei), Great Western Road (Columbia Country Club), Haiphong Road, 
                                                 
7 The Teia Maru was previously the French liner Aramis. Leck, G., Captives, 2006, p. 299.  
8 Data obtained from camp rolls listed in Leck, Captives, 2006, pp. 521–719. 
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Lincoln Avenue, Longhua (Lunghwa), Pudong (Pootung), and Yu Yuen Road.9  
There were also three camps at Yangzhou (Yangchow) approximately 100 miles 
north of Shanghai named respectively Yangzhou ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’.  The three 
Yangzhou camps opened in March 1943 with Yangzhou ‘A’ and Yangzhou ‘B’ 
closing in September 1943 and their internees being spread among the other 
camps to fill the spaces vacated by repatriated North Americans. Yangzhou ‘C’ 
continued to function until the end of the war. Two other civil internment camps 
housing medical missionaries were at Weixian (Weihsien) in Shandong and 
Guangzhou.  These camps were civil camps and, apart from Haiphong Road 
which will be discussed in the following section, were run by the Japanese 
Consular authorities, not by the military police or the army. Conditions varied 
according to the Camp Commandant’s attitude. Internees were expected to 
provide day to day medical care while the Japanese provided food supplies.  
Unlike POW camps where military rank determined status, there was no inbuilt 
hierarchy universally recognised by the internees.  Gilkey (1919–2004) a Weixian 
internee and missionary teacher documented his own experiences and the 
relationships he observed between internees. He described how, in the early days, 
power struggles erupted as men jockeyed themselves into positions on camp 
committees to find, as he described it, an “authoritative voice” that others would 
respect.10  Medical missionaries found themselves voted onto these committees. 
                                                 
9 Lincoln Avenue only opened in June 18th 1944 when those who had been originally deemed too 
ill to enter the camps had their exemption revoked.  
10 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 26. Gilkey read Philosophy at Harvard and was 
teaching English in Beijing when he was interned.  He received a liberal Protestant upbringing 
which his internment experience caused him to question and after the war he wrote extensively on 
theology. Refer: Pasewark, K.A., Pool, J.B. (eds.), The Theology of Langdon B. Gilkey: Systematic 
and Critical Studies, Macon, Mercer University Press, 1999. 
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 Camps varied in size from Yangzhou ‘B’, one of the smaller housing 
approximately 352 internees, to Longhua housing approximately 1,700.11  Two 
main problems stand out as a leitmotiv threading through official and personal 
accounts recounting the internment experience: monotonous food and a lack of 
privacy.  Of all the discomforts experienced such as fear, separation from loved 
ones, an inability to pursue interests and hobbies and such like, these two facets of 
internment camp life stand out. Gillison, interned in Yangzhou ‘C’, while noting 
there was always food, even if it was not appetising, and that they were not 
physically maltreated wrote:  
 The chief trials as far as we were concerned were I think lack of 
privacy, (In a room where 20 people could hear all you said all day 
etc.), lack of money or means of obtaining even the necessities such as 
soap, buckets, brooms etc., and lack of milk sugar, fruit etc., for the 
children together with the monotony of endless watery vegetable stews 
and of four walls out of which one could not penetrate.12 
 
Inadequate nutrition and a poor environment in turn affected physical health and, 
although references to medical matters do not figure as prominently in 
recollections as the tedious diet and loss of privacy, the threat of ill health was 
ever-present.  
 A Swiss Consular report of a July 1943 inspection reported: “The lack in 
variety of the food supplies is keenly felt”. The standard diet in all camps 
appeared to be: 
 Breakfast: – Tea (without sugar) and bread, latter of satisfactory 
quality and sufficient quantity. 
 Lunch: - Meat stew, mostly pork with Chinese vegetables of the season. 
 Dinner: - Much the same as lunch.13 
 
                                                 
11 Inspection des Campes d’internement de Yangchow, Tables des Matières (suite) 5-6 et 7 Juillet, 
1943, p. 25. Longhua,  FO916/1035. Red Cross Report on Lunghwa, August 8th, 1943, CO 
980/127 
12 Gillison, K., to Brown T.C., from S.S. “Arawa” nearing Hong Kong November 8th, 1945, 
CWM/LMS CH/11, 1941–50, Central China, Gillison, K.H., file, 1941–50. 
13  Memorandum on the Protection of the American, British and Netherlands Interests in Occupied 
China, August 9th 1983, FO 916/1035, p. 5. 
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The problem was of supply rather than finance, and as time passed the food 
situation deteriorated.  The medical repatriates on the second Gripsholm voyage 
called a meeting to discuss nutrition within the camps and it was agreed that large 
numbers of internees were always hungry: “The internees are starving and will 
continue to starve”.14  Fatigue and lassitude amongst internees was attributed to 
mental attitude and underfeeding.  Charts were produced that showed that the 
Japanese provided food in each camp to the value of 1,900 calories per person per 
day which was supplemented by Red Cross parcels when available to bring the 
average daily calorie level up to between 2,300 and 2,500.  There was, however, a 
considerable problem in making the food palatable enough for consumption.15  In 
July 1944 the Pudong camp Medical Officer, Dr. Keith Graham, pointed out to 
the Camp Commandant that the health of the internees had deteriorated to such an 
extent that it had become difficult to find able-bodied men to carry out chores. 
With his letter he included a monthly analysis of the internees’ daily calorific 
intake.16  Including food parcels and items purchased from the camp food store, 
the daily calorific value had been calculated at 2,566 in October 1943 from which 
it fell to 2,246 by March 1944, and just 1,754 in January 1945.   Nothing changed 
as a result of the letter and Graham’s attempt at negotiating with the Japanese 
authorities came to nothing.17 
 In her diary, Stephenson recorded that by February 1945 the daily meals in 
Longhua had been reduced to plain boiled water rice for breakfast and dinner, 
with one small meal a day of stew and rice and some bread. Fortnightly, internees 
                                                 
14 Confidential - Extract from the summary of The Second Voyage of the Exchange Ship 
Gripsholm, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, undated,  FO 916/1035,  
p. 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cliff, N.H., Prisoners, 1945, p. 139 
17 Cliff, N.H., Prisoners, 1945, p. 139 
 259 
were allowed three ounces of sugar.18  Such a diet was totally inadequate and 
reduced Stephenson’s ability to work. At first, she had been able to work “hard” 
but, by February 1945 after almost two years of internment she was only able to 
go on duty every other day, and still needed to see to her own personal chores and 
stand in line to collect her food.19  So, although medical missionaries had ready-
made positions within the camps and were able to maintain their professional 
status, their work became increasingly physically demanding as time passed and 
had to be carried out by ageing bodies weakened by poor nutrition.  At the time of 
her internment Stephenson was not a young woman (being in her middle fifties) 
and, by July 1945, was the only nurse on night duty with responsibility for 20 
patients with just one aide to assist her. The physical strain of holding down such 
a demanding job with no quiet place to sleep during the day meant she was only 
able to work for one week at a time, needing another week to recover. 20  In 
Yangzhou ‘C’, the camp committee minutes for July 1944 recorded that the 
female hospital staff were only working between 18 and 22 hours a week. 21 
Unlike others, medical staff would have found it difficult to exchange their camp 
jobs as others were able to do, because of the professional skills they possessed.  
This is not to suggest they would, necessarily, have wanted to exchange places 
with those who had lighter, or non-specialist duties, but to recognise that such an 
option was not, realistically, open to them.  
 Some camps operated their own shops, and internees were provided with 
‘Comfort Money’ supplied by the Red Cross with which they could purchase 
goods to supplement their meagre rations. Very little food came ‘over the wall’ 
                                                 
18  Stephenson, G., to “My Dear Ones,”  February 24th, entries from February 24th  to August 28th 
1945, Stephenson Box, MMS 642/643 
19 Ibid., February 24th . 
20 Ibid., July 29th. 
21 Yangchow ‘C’ Camp Minutes, July 6th, 1944, FO916/1036 
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and Chinese caught in the act of trading were severely punished. The frequency of 
Red Cross parcels varied among the camps.  Stephenson’s 1944 Christmas parcel, 
besides the usual items such as powdered milk, sugar, jam, flour, peanut butter, 
soap and toilet paper, had also contained a small Christmas pudding, some 
biscuits, walnuts, raisins and six chocolates. Stephenson eked out the contents of 
this parcel for four months.22 
 The chosen camp sites were inappropriate.  Pudong was described by the 
Swiss Consul as “some old and discarded factory godowns in a most unenviable 
industrial environment”. 23   While this description suggests an inappropriate 
setting for an internment camp, the reality was worse because the godowns had 
been used for storing coal and were impregnated with coal dust; surroundings 
which were hardly suitable for human habitation, particularly for small children, 
the elderly and asthmatics.24 Van Velden suggests overcrowding was the result of 
a deliberate Japanese policy to facilitate ease of monitoring.25  The Swiss Consul 
recommended halving the number of internees to allow “a decent minimum 
standard of living space” and noted that civilians in the camps received not even 
the standard military troop quartering of 60 square feet per man.26 
 In Longhua, Stephenson was billeted in a room where everything had to 
be done in the presence of 50 other women and, with only 18 inches between beds, 
she could feel her neighbour’s breath upon her face at night.27  The protection of 
                                                 
22 Ibid, February 24th. 
23 Memorandum on the Protection of the American, British and Netherlands Interests in Occupied 
China, August 9th 1943, FO 916/1035, p. 4. 
24 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 47. 
25 Van Velden, D., De Japanese Internerinskampen, Voor Burgers Gedurende de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. The Japanese Civil Internment Camps During the Second World War, (English 
Summary,) Faneker, Wever, 1985, pp. 511–518, p. 514. 
26 Memorandum, 1943, FO 916/1035, p. 4. 
27 Stephenson, G., to “My Dear Ones,” February 24th, entries from February 24th to August 28th 
1945, Stephenson Box, MMS 642/643.  A similar distance between beds was reported for the San 
Tomas Internment Camp in Manila.  Norman, E.M., Eifried, S., “How Did they all Survive? An 
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personal space in all the camps assumed proportions unimaginable outside and, in 
Weixian, where the space between beds was similarly 18 inches, chalk marks 
were placed on the floor to prevent internees surreptitiously moving their bed and 
possessions inch by inch into their neighbour’s space.28  There were also episodes 
of aural invasion of privacy and missionaries were castigated for the noise levels 
of their hymns and prayers.29 The loss of privacy related not just to the inability to 
hold private conversations or loss of space but also to private matters: 
 To take the most earthy kind of example,: the not unrare need to use a 
chamber pot at night within eighteen inches of your next neighbor [sic] 
and within nine feet of at least six other men, or women, was by no 
means easy either on the perpetrator or on those who lay there 
listening.30 
 
 Families were allowed to room together, but this did not, necessarily, 
provide them with extra space.  When the three McAlls were transferred from 
Yangzhou ‘B’ to Pudong camp they had to share a room measuring nine by 
thirteen feet with Dr. Godfrey Gale, his wife and daughter.31  This equates to 59 
sq. ft. per family, one sq. ft. less than the standard troop quartering. Their 
daughters’ cots were arranged down the centre of the room in an attempt to 
provide a small amount of privacy and they faced the embarrassment of who 
should be first to undress.  Although such embarrassments were awkward at the 
beginning, “Three years later we never gave it a second thought”.32   
  
                                                                                                                                     
Analysis of American Nurses’ Experiences in Japanese Prisoner of War Camps”, in Nursing 
History Review, Vol., 3, 1995, pp. 105–123, p. 115. Gladys Ross, ACM nurse and business 
manager, from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Shanghai, evacuated only to be interned in Manila. Ross, 
G., “Escape from Internment”, in Forth, No. 9, October, 1945, p. 12. 
28 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 19.   
29 Ibid, p. 18. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gale, G., “Pacific War 1941–45: From an Internee’s Point of View”, p. 24, CWM/LMS CH/49, 
1941–50, Central China, Gale file. 
32 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 37. 
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 What would have seemed a fantastic deprivation to a man comfortable, 
well fed, and serene in an easy chair at home, had by the end of a few 
short months become just “life” for us.33 
 
One saving grace was that, in general, unlike Japanese POW camps, internees 
were fairly well treated by the Japanese who, apart from ensuring no-one escaped, 
did not punish indiscriminately. There was, however, always an undercurrent of 
uncertainty and fear and Norman Cliff, a teenage internee in Weixian, recounted 
one occasion when he became in real fear for his life. 
I was helping to dump some ashes out of camp… I spoke a bit of 
Japanese to the guard.  “Is the war finished yet?” He graciously said 
“Not yet finished.”  Then he made a gesture to the effect that he would 
shoot us and fall on his sword and so this created a situation of fear and 
looking forward.  A sort of love/hate for the end of the war.34 
 
So, although there was always an element of fear and uncertainty, the internees 
could expect to remain unmolested for so long as they adhered to Japanese 
regulations, and once the camps were up and running conditions appear to have 
remained stable. 
 
The Medical Missionary Contribution to Camp Life  
(i)   Haiphong Road – The Lone Practitioner  
The first foreign nationals to be rounded up in Shanghai were interned in the 
Haiphong Road Camp on November 5th, 1942.35. These men, approximately 350, 
were classified as political internees and consisted of journalists, sailors and 
prominent business people. 36   Due to the supposedly political nature of its 
internees this camp was administered by the kempeitai, while all other civilian 
internment camps in China were administered by the Japanese Consular 
                                                 
33 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 48. 
34Cliff N., in conversation, March 1st, 2007.   
35 For a definitive account of the daily life in Haiphong Road and later in Fengtai see: Collar, H., 
Captive in Shanghai: A Story of Internment in World War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1990. 
36 Leck, G., Captives, 2006, p. 449. 
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authorities.37  As in other civilian camps, there was no physical work requirement 
but the internees were separated from their families.38  35 of the men originally 
rounded up were immediately detained in the Bridge House jail.39  One practising 
missionary doctor, one retired missionary doctor and one non-missionary surgeon 
were among the internees in the camp; Dr. Stephen Sturton ( b.1896 ) of the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS), Dr. Lewis Hylbert of the American Baptist 
Mission (ABM), and Dr. Thomas Dunn.40  Sturton qualified as a physician at St. 
Bartholomew’s Hospital in London in 1920, and arrived in China in 1921.  
During the war he acted as Red Cross Secretary in Hangzhou and apart from a 
year’s furlough, ending May 1940, he remained in China receiving an OBE for 
his work with wounded Chinese soldiers in Hangzhou. It is unclear whether this 
work resulted in his being classified as a political prisoner but he wrote that, when 
arrested, the Japanese attempted to prove a connection between himself and the 
British government.41 Two practising doctors within a camp of approximately 350 
men would have been adequate for the remaining years of the war had such a ratio 
been maintained, but crucially, the surgeon and the retired missionary doctor were 
American and were repatriated in September 1943 on the Teia Maru leaving the 
camp under Sturton, as “the only medical man in the camp” with one qualified 
                                                 
37 FO 916/1035. 
38 Confidential - Extract from the summary of  The Second Voyage of the Exchange Ship 
Gripsholm, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, undated, FO 916/1035,  
p. 1. 
39 Bridge House, a large block of residential housing, became an infamous Japanese jail during the 
war years in Shanghai.  Conditions within it, and the treatment of Chinese and foreign prisoners 
by the kempeitai, were harsh. 
40 Thomas Dunn had practised privately in Shanghai. Lewis Hylbert was retired. Recorded by 
Leck as aged 59 and 69 respectively upon release in 1945, p. 557. 
41 Sturton, S.D., From Mission Hospital to Concentration Camp, London and Edinburgh, Marshal, 
Morgan and Scott, 1948, p. 100. After the war one of his publications was a short report on the 
oedema he observed when he and fellow internees were transferred from Haiphong Road to 
Fengtai which he attributed to the conditions en route and internee polydeficiency. Sturton, S.D., 
“Deck Ankles” and “Travellers’ Oedema” in BMJ, April 13th, 1946, p. 589. 
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nurse. 42  The responsibility for administering day to day medical care therefore 
fell squarely upon Sturton’s shoulders.  
 It was obviously necessary for Sturton to enlist competent help and 
support once he found himself in sole charge and he appears to have assembled, 
and overseen, a system that was capable of dispensing efficient medical care.  An 
American Navy Chief Pharmacist’s Mate with some hospital theatre experience 
was placed in charge of dressings.  A graduate research chemist from Cambridge 
University, who had worked in Shanghai as a textile thread mill manager, 
oversaw the pathological work. A Dutch business-man ran the administrative side 
and, to give an indication of the amount of medical work undertaken within the 
camp, over 60,000 records of treatment were kept from November 1942 until June 
1945.43  The number of treatments indicates the importance of the provision of 
medical care. Nonetheless, the only medical supplies provided by the Japanese 
were cholera and anti-dysentery injections, and smallpox vaccines. 44  Some 
supplies were received from the Red Cross and the IRCC.45 
 As from September 1943, Sturton held the final responsibility for all 
treatments, the fact that the camp’s medical facilities were able to provide this 
number of treatments must reflect his competence. While overseeing and guiding 
his non-medical colleagues, Sturton was aided by two veterinary surgeons who 
“were a great help to us” and assisted with X-ray and clinic work besides 
providing nutritional expertise.46  Sturton’s trust in their competence can be seen 
                                                 
42 Sturton, S.D., From Mission, 1948, p. 108. 
43Ibid., p. 109. In June 1945 the Japanese authorities closed the camp and moved the men to 
Fengtai, four and a half miles from Beijing. 
44 Collar, H., Captive, 1990, p. 83. 
45 Ibid., p. 125. 
46 Sturton, S.D.,  From Mission, 1948, p. 110 
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from the way he relates how he was happy to be taken under the care of one of the 
veterinary surgeons when he himself suffered from pericarditis in 1944.47   
 Within the camp a First Aid Corps was established to train nursing staff 
for the hospital and to be on ‘stand-by’ during air raids and emergencies.48  This 
Corps was so successful that, after the war, the St. John’s Ambulance Association 
recognised the training and awarded certification to those who had undergone 
tuition.  Sturton wrote he had little to complain about concerning the Japanese 
Medical Officers that periodically visited the camp, but the Camp Commandant, 
Lt. Honda, was obstructive as he claimed some medical knowledge, which 
Sturton disparagingly wrote “he did not possess”. 49   As a result, Honda 
occasionally prevented men from receiving specialised treatment at the Police 
Hospital outside the camp despite its having been recommended by both Sturton 
and a Japanese Medical Officer.    
 Internees that had been held for interrogation and tortured in Bridge House, 
sometimes for several months, were released to Haiphong Road. They had been 
instructed by the Japanese not to relate their experience but the internee camp 
officials recognised that in the relief of being freed, they needed to unburden 
themselves, so their routine upon arrival was “barber, bath, a light meal, plenty of 
hot drinks, and then to bed in our camp hospital”.50  Besides needing medical care 
after their period of imprisonment, it was important that these men were sheltered 
from camp informers.  This meant isolating them in the hospital, allowing only 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p.109. 
49 Lt. Honda’s “pre-war vocation was the export of cheap Japanese pottery and toys”, Collar, H., 
Captive, 1990, p. 83. 
50 Ibid., p. 91. The treatment of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), also known as shell shock 
and concentration-camp syndrome, recognises the importance of encouraging survivors to talk 
about their experiences.  “De-briefing assists in the ‘re-entry’ process back into the community or 
workplace”. Stewart, W., An A-Z of Counselling Theory and Practice, Nelson Thomas, 2005,  
pp. 355–360.  
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trusted people to converse with them and placing them in the wider camp 
community only when they had been judged stable enough not to “talk 
unwisely”.51  A few internees had been threatened or broken under the strain of 
being in Bridge House and had agreed to act as spies upon their fellow internees. 
It was thought that most of the informers were well known, but it was not possible 
to be absolutely certain.52  Clearly medical care consisted of overseeing the health 
of the internees’ physical bodies and of nurturing their mental health while 
providing a watchful protective service at a time when they were arguably 
disorientated and at their most vulnerable. Not all who entered Haiphong Road 
following incarceration in Bridge House survived.   
 Sturton’s medical work within Haiphong Road furnishes an example of 
the type of professional, organisational and administrative responsibility that was 
shouldered by a sole medical missionary within a camp.  In highlighting Sturton’s 
situation there is no implied suggestion that he worked harder, or fared better, 
than a non-missionary doctor would have done in the same situation; the intention 
is to provide an example of one particular medical missionary’s experience as a 
sole professional and illustrate the cooperation and support some medical 
missionaries received from non-professionals within the camps.  Such support 
was, however, not universal and there were tensions when medical missionaries 
met with antagonism and obstruction. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Collar, H., Captive, 1990, p. 91. 
52 Ibid. 
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(ii) Yangzhou ‘B’ - Suspicion, Mistrust and Criticism53 
The Yangzhou ‘B’ camp, housing 138 men and 194 women, was operative from 
March until September 1943. 54  It was then closed and its internees spread 
throughout the Shanghai camps. Of the 352 internees 75 were aged under 18.55 
During the Swiss Consular inspectoral visit in July 1943 a confidential report was 
smuggled by Kenneth McAll into the Consul’s briefcase while the Japanese 
commandant received a telephone call. 56 Within this report the camp medical 
officers, McAll and Godfrey Gale (1913–1986) emphasised the unsanitary 
conditions of the water supply and sewage management.  Also singled out for 
comment were the poor communications, and interruptions to food and fuel 
supplies.  They pointed out there were 93 people in the camp aged over 50, many 
of whom would be unable to stand such a primitive way of life under winter 
conditions.57 The report’s contents were noted in the Consul’s report.58  During 
the same visit, a request for drugs originally submitted to the Japanese on April 5th 
was handed to the Consul with the observation that there had been no response 
from the Japanese.  A second list dated June 30th had been submitted to meet with 
a similar lack of response. A serious problem was the shortage of anti-tetanus 
drugs and they had almost no anti-diphtheria drugs.   Thus, medical officer’s work 
was hampered by practical problems as a result of the paucity of drugs, the living 
conditions within the camps and the Japanese indifference to combating these 
                                                 
53 Frances McAll as the mothers’ representative on a women’s committee:  “I soon found out I had 
dived into yet another bog of suspicion, mistrust and criticism which left me completely 
bewildered having never met anything like it before”.  McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 38.  
54 Inspection des Camps d’Internement de Yanchow. Tables des Matières (suite) 5-6 et 7 Juillet, 
1943, FO 916/1035 
55 Ibid. 
56 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 42.  
57 Medical Officers’ Statement dated 3rd July, 1943. (Smuggled to Swiss Consular Representative 
upon his visit July 3rd, 1943), FO 916/1035, P. 29. 
58 Inspection des Camps d’Internement de Yanchow. Tables des Matières (suite) 5-6 et 7 Juillet, 
1943, FO 916/1035, p. 23. 
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problems. To add to these practical problems there were inter-relationship 
problems between groups and individuals fuelled by missionary/merchant 
tensions. 
 Compared to Haiphong Road, Yangzhou ‘B’ enjoyed a wealth of medical 
missionary personnel.  In addition to Drs. McAll and Gale, there was a third 
qualified doctor: McAll’s wife Frances.  These three LMS doctors were supported 
by 8 qualified missionary nurses, one an experienced Matron, and two non-
missionary nurses.  It would be understandable if the assumption were made that 
the internees of Yangzhou ‘B’ were thankful to have such a strong medical 
presence, but this was not the case.  There appear to have been two main 
problems: first the doctors were missionaries and, second, their youth suggested 
inexperience, which potentially implied incompetence.  In retrospect, Frances 
McAll graciously attributed their fellow internee’s resentment towards medical 
missionaries as being due to the internees’ sudden loss of freedom, comfort and 
independence:  
 …and they found themselves not only in our case being looked after by 
very young people, because we were all in our twenties only but 
missionaries because they weren’t necessarily Christians themselves,  
or Church-going people.  So they resented the situation so badly. And I 
think that was quite reasonable really.59 
 
 Animosity towards missionaries in general is similarly documented by 
Gilkey who suggested attitudes towards missionaries within Weixian were 
influenced by whether or not people were sympathetic towards what the 
missionaries were “devoted to spreading”.60  Where there was no sympathy for 
his or her role, the missionary was regarded as “arrogant, fanatical, imperialistic, 
                                                 
59 France McAll in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
60 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 177. 
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and futile; and the missionary himself hypocritical and foolish”.61   But Gilkey 
noted that missionaries who were primarily devoted to spreading ideas in which 
people believed, such as modern medicine, technology and education, tended to 
have their human faults overlooked.  He also noted that, in the Far East, what he 
described as a “chasm of distrust and contempt” between missionaries and 
merchants had arisen.62  The merchants’ opinion being that missionaries were 
“loveless, sexless, viceless, disapproving and hypocritical fanatic[s]” whereas 
missionaries regarded merchants as “hard, immoral, addicted to drink, interested 
only in mulcting wealth from the poor Chinese”.63 While such descriptions are 
grossly caricaturistic and negatively biased, there were divisions between 
missionaries and their fellow internees and, despite their positive contribution to 
the general welfare of the camp, the medical missionaries in Yangzhou ‘B’ were 
not immune from such attitudes from their fellow internees. 
 The doctors had only been in camp for a few days when an elderly man 
died of pneumonia and, the same day, a patient’s gastric ulcer haemorrhaged 
while another man went temporarily insane and threatened to run rampage with a 
knife.64  The doctors at Yangzhou ‘B’ ran into “unexpected hostility” soon after 
they began medical work. 65  Most of the internees had been used to private 
medicine and were disconcerted to find themselves being compelled to turn to the 
medical missionaries. Frances McAll confirmed friction between merchants and 
missionaries in Yangzhou ‘B’:  
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 179. Merchant/missionary tensions are well described in Bickers, R., “Changing 
British”, 1992, p. 98. 
63 Ibid., pp. 179–80 
64 Gale, G., “Pacific War 1941–45, p. 17. 
65 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 37. 
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 Missionaries had never ranked high in the business world’s estimation.  
They found it hard to believe we could possibly know what we were 
doing and their security was seriously undermined.66 
 
 Kenneth McAll oversaw the camp’s public health and, as an accomplished 
artist, provided a series of cartoons as health information aids.67  Retrospectively, 
this was recognised as an error. The intention was to use posters to educate and 
heighten public awareness of likely health concerns through humour.  The posters 
covered practical advice on personal hygiene, nutritional care and the importance 
of mosquito nets.  This was useful, practical information that one would expect to 
be welcomed by the internees as part of a campaign to secure good health for all.  
The response to the posters is described as “almost a riot”.68 This violent response 
was interpreted by the doctors as a revolt against them “throwing their weight 
around” when people were deprived of their freedom.  The backlash to being 
“told” what to do went so far as an inedible stew being served up on one occasion 
because the vegetables had not been washed.  When this happened, the doctors, 
not the cooks were blamed for having “had the audacity to tell them [the cooks] 
how to do their jobs”.69  This animosity was compounded a few days later by the 
nursing Matron suggesting the infant daughters of the McAlls and Gales be 
allowed some of the food reserved for the sick.  This suggestion was decried by 
some internees who chose only to see the doctors’ children receiving “preferential 
treatment”, ignoring the fact that the girls were both under two years of age and as 
vulnerable infants arguably entitled to extra rations.70  The McAlls considered 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p. 38. 
70 Ibid. 
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they were under suspicion from their fellow internees of accepting food for 
themselves as well as for their children.71 
 The situation improved when a 16 year old boy developed acute 
appendicitis72 and the only medical equipment consisted of one pair of surgical 
gloves, two pairs of artery forceps, one scalpel and a “very small bottle of 
chloroform”.73  This proved to be a turning point in the camp’s support for the 
young missionary doctors and the whole camp was motivated to help provide 
equipment. A carpenter fashioned an operating table, the operation was 
undertaken, the boy survived and greater confidence among the internees 
established. 
  The young medical missionaries in Yangzhou ‘B’ had had to earn 
acceptance of their missionary background and secure confidence in their 
professional skills from their fellow internees.  Shared hardship had not brought 
automatic acceptance or solidarity. This distrust was surely ill-founded and based 
upon prejudice and ignorance.  This applies particularly in the case of Kenneth 
McAll who had spent some time in Xiaochang practising general medicine 
obtaining just the skills among his Chinese patients that were to be important 
within the camps such as the treatment of diseases caused by poor hygiene and 
inadequate nutrition.74 A Matron from Yangzhou ‘C confirmed the usefulness of 
mission hospital experience: 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p. 38. 
72 During the war in China there was a noticeable increase in appendicitis.  This was noted by the 
Gripsholm repatriates in Weixian camp, CMJ, Vol., 61, No. 4, October-December, 1943, p. 356. 
Conversely in the Dutch internment camps in Indonesia during the Second World War 
appendicitis was practically unknown, suggesting a link with a low fibre diet causing a high 
incidence of appendicitis. Black, J., “Acute Appendicitis in Japanese Soldiers in Burma: Support 
for the Fibre Theory”, in Gut, 2002, 50, p. 297 
73 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 39. 
74 Leck also makes the observation that previous medical missionary experience “while working 
[in the countryside] and improvising under difficult and sometimes primitive conditions” left them 
well equipped for interment camp duties. Leck, Captives, 2006, p. 187. 
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 One’s work and experience in a mission hospital proved invaluable in 
the necessary initiative, economy and improvisations of a camp 
hospital where so little could be procured.75 
 
 Frances McAll, newly qualified, was completely up to date as well as also 
having worked for a short time at Xiaochang.  At Qilu University she had been 
the only doctor who knew how to operate an electrocardiographic machine.76  
Gale was an Ear, Nose and Throat specialist who had also been attached to Qilu 
and so, between them, the knowledge possessed by these three young doctors was 
probably far wider and of more relevance to internees in a civilian internment 
camp than the knowledge and experience of many private Shanghai doctors not 
recently qualified. Nursing support included an experienced Matron and Jean 
Gillison who had experience from the rural hospital in Xiaogan.   
 Animosity emanated not only from groups but also from individuals:  
 There was this one woman made life very difficult she really had 
something against me I think she was jealous.  She was older, I was 
just a kid.  It was very hard for them to submit.77 
 
 This resentment came to a head when Frances McAll was involved, as a 
member of a women’s committee, in discussing whether application should be 
made to the Japanese for a goat to obtain fresh milk.  The discussion considered 
whether it would be allowed and whether it was reasonable from a public health 
point of view.  McAll, as an alternative, suggested they ask for soya beans: 
McAll – And I made the rash suggestion of asking for soya beans and 
we could make milk from soya beans, which we did at Xiaochang.  
There was an absolute riot amongst these women and this particular 
woman she just…[voice trails off] 
Chatterton – Why? 
McAll – Well I was more or less kicked out of the committee. 
Chatterton – What was her objection? 
                                                 
75 Wheal, E.S.A., “Organising a Hospital”, in Through Toil and Tribulation: Missionary 
Experiences in China During the War of 1937–45: Told by Missionaries, London, Carey Press, 
1947, pp. 61–65, p. 64. 
76 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
77 Ibid. 
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McAll – The soya bean was the food of the very low of the low, you 
know.  I think it was a class thing. 
Chatterton – She wasn’t going to eat animal food? 
McAll – No, she wasn’t going to eat soya bean.  Because, you know, 
could have had milk made from soya bean instead of from a proper 
animal.78 
 
McAll’s attempt to offer a solution using her practical experience of treating 
inadequate nutrition in Xiaochang, and her superior medical knowledge was 
blocked by ageism and class.79  From the group’s perspective, a young woman 
who thought she knew it all was telling her elders and betters what to do and 
threatening social standards. Given such motivational differences, youth and 
enthusiasm colliding with age and treaty port social values, it is unsurprising that 
tensions erupted between medical missionaries and some of their fellow 
internees.80 
 
  
Viktor Frankl (1905–1997) described three stages of reaction to admission to a 
concentration camp; the shock of admission followed by a phase of relative 
apathy when the internee becomes entrenched in camp routine, and a third phase 
concerning the psychology after release and liberation.81  Internee lethargy was 
reported by a Gripsholm repatriate to have also been present in a Japanese 
internment camp in the Philippines: 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Guy, R.M.A.D., Yeh, K.S.M.D., “Soybean ‘Milk’ as a Food for Young Infants”, in CMJ, 
Vol., 54, No. 1, July, 1938, pp. 1–30. 
80 Within the camps attempts were made to cling to social mores and in Longhua “practically 
everyone in camp has afternoon tea, the parties are quite the thing”. Copy letter from Mrs. Trivett 
repatriate in Toronto to Mrs. Tocher (wife of Ichang minister in Longhua) December 12th, 1943.  
FO 916/1035. 
81 Victor Frankl , a psychiatrist and prisoner in Auschwitz and other concentration camps, argued 
there was always hope and that life held a potential meaning under any situation, even the worst 
kind. Frankl, V. E., Man’s Search for Meaning, Boston, Beacon Press, 5th edition, 2006, p. 8. 
Cohen, a Dutch doctor interned in Ebensee Concentration Camp, described three stages of 
experience within camps: reaction, adaptation and resignation.  Cohen, Human Behaviour, 1988, p. 
115. 
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 One should not fail to mention the mental retardation that accompanies 
confinement.  Immediately following the bombings and in the early 
days of internment occasional hysteria was seen, but after many 
months lethargy and mental deterioration affected a moderate number 
of persons.82  
 
The “shock of admission” may partly explain the Yangzhou ‘B’ internees’ 
reaction to the medical missionaries: 
An abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation is normal 
behaviour…The reaction of a man to his admission to a concentration 
camp also represents an abnormal state of mind, but judged objectively 
it is a normal and, as will be shown later, typical reaction to the given 
circumstances.83  
 
Although Frankl’s analysis of behaviour applied to his own experiences within 
concentration camps where conditions were much harsher than in the internment 
camps referred to here, the examples given above would seem to indicate that the 
McAll’s fellow internees experienced a “shock of admission”. As in the 
concentration camps, the internees did not, upon entry, know how they would be 
treated, how long they would be held and whether they would survive. (Had the 
war lasted much longer, conditions would certainly have deteriorated rapidly and 
many would not have survived.) The “shock of admission” was reinforced by a 
loss of self-esteem that the medical missionaries did not experience because they 
retained a purpose in life. As one missionary expressed it: 
 People used to say to us sometimes “You know, this life is easier for you 
missionaries.” In many ways it was easier.  For Geoff and myself it was 
easier because we had migrated so often since 1938 that we had learnt to 
make a home anywhere.  It was many people’s first experience of not 
living in their own homes with the things they treasured around them… 
It was nothing new to us to rely on our own resources for filling up our 
leisure hours.”84 
 
                                                 
82 Whitacre, F.E., “American Civilians in a Japanese Internment Camp”, in Journal of The 
American Medical Association, March 4th 1944, pp. 652–63, p. 653.  
83 Frankl, V.E., Man’s Search, 2006, p. 20.   
84 Milledge, M., March 1946, CWM/LMS CH/4, 1951–50, Personal and Odds, Missionaries’ 
Experience in Internment. 
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For those who had lost their pre-internment way of life in Shanghai, the 
medical missionaries’ rapid acclimatisation to internment life must have 
been galling. 
  
 
(iii) Yangzhou ‘C’ – The “British” Practice 
Yangzhou ‘C’ opened in March 1943 and remained open for the duration of the 
war. Of the 625 internees most were British, including some Canadians, 
Australians, and New Zealanders, plus 38 Belgians and a few Americans and 88 
children aged under 14.85  Because all the medical staff were British the camp 
was not affected by repatriation since only North Americans were repatriated after 
the commencement of internment.  There were three missionary doctors, 
including Bolton from the Pu’ai, and Gillison from the Union Hospital, who acted 
as Medical Officers for the camp with Mary Gell, an SPG doctor from Jinan. 
Owen Beynon (1894–1977), a radiographer and pharmacist from the LCH was 
also interned. Robert Symons, the 28 year old son of the manager of the Union 
Brewery in Shanghai, was the only non-missionary doctor. There were eight 
nurses including a Matron and two non-missionary nurses. Apart from Symons 
and two missionary nurses in their thirties, the medical personnel were all in their 
forties and fifties, so, from the internee perspective, the camp had a plethora of 
medical experience to draw upon.86    
                                                 
85 Inspection des Camps, 1943, p. 33, FO 916/1035. This Swiss Consul inspection report states 
that in July 1943, 4 months after the camp had opened, all the internees were British apart from 
three Americans.  Leck states that during its operation 637 internees passed through Yangzhou ‘C’. 
Leck, G., Captives, 2002, p. 507.   
86 Camp data obtained from the nominal rolls, Leck, G., Captives, 2002, pp. 521–719. 
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 The internees referred to themselves ironically as “campers” and 
maintained detailed minutes of camp committee meetings.87 A British atmosphere 
was perpetuated through the use of place names such as Knightsbridge and Pall 
Mall for camp thoroughfares.88 Formal elections were held for camp office and, in 
January 1944, Gillison polled the majority of votes for election to the first camp 
committee and became the liaison officer of the camp’s Medical and Public 
Health Sub-Committee.89  This Sub-Committee oversaw general health concerns 
within the camp and also operated a medical policing scheme over individual 
internee’s health and reported to the Main Committee.  An official minute records: 
 Dr. Gillison reported that Mr Rudland had so far failed to report for the 
daily taking of his temperature as arranged for with a view to 
ascertaining whether his health precludes him from doing work as a 
kitchen stoker.90 
 
Regrettably, there is no record of how Rudland felt about his failure to attend for a 
health check being recorded for posterity in the camp committee minutes. 
Presumably such a ‘naming and shaming’ technique was regarded as a necessary 
support procedure to maintain both the health of the individuals concerned and to 
protect standards of internee health. This public policing appears to have been 
accepted by the internees, and contrasts with McAll’s attempts to maintain health 
within Yangzhou ‘B’ using humour. Three possible factors operating in 
Yangzhou ‘C’ may have facilitated the public policing of individual internees’ 
health and avoided the “riots” that occurred at Yangzhou ‘B’. Firstly the very 
existence of an official Medical and Public Health Sub-Committee as a result of a 
formal election gave the Sub-Committee a legitimacy McAll lacked in Yangzhou 
                                                 
87 Minutes of the Meeting of the Camp Committee held at the Camp Stores, 28th February, 1944. 
FO 916/1034 
88 Leck, G., Captives, 2002, p. 507.    
89 Minutes of the First meeting of the Camp Committee held in the Church on Thursday 24th 
January 1944.  FO 916/1033.  
90 The Minutes of a Meeting of the Camp Committee held in the Church on Thursday 3rd February 
1944. FO 916/1034. 
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‘B’. Secondly, Gillison was a fifty-year old experienced doctor who would 
command more respect than McAll. Thirdly, by the time the Medical and Public 
Health Sub-Committee was established, Yangzhou ‘C’ had been in operation for 
ten months and,  by then, it must have become more recognised than when the 
camps were first opened that maintenance of high standards of public health were 
essential.  Therefore, there would have been greater compliance with, and less 
antagonism towards, medical personnel’s attempts to maintain high standards of 
health. 
 The Medical and Public Health Sub-Committee served as a platform for 
ethical debate as well as overseeing the camp’s health.  One dilemma concerned a 
Chinese lavatory woman employed by the Japanese for sanitary work.91  After she 
had been working in the camp for over 14 months, she consulted Bolton 
whereupon it transpired she needed an operation to remove a tumour which would 
prove fatal if left untreated. Bolton had offered her treatment, but had failed to 
consult his colleagues before the Japanese had given their permission, thus the 
situation had progressed to a stage where it would have been difficult to withdraw 
and a Sub-Committee meeting was held to discuss the problem.  Beynon protested 
strongly that an operation would entail using the camp’s limited medical 
supplies. 92  These had been obtained from the British Residents’ Association 
(BRA) and the IRCC specifically for internees’ needs. Beynon may have felt a 
special responsibility towards the camp’s supplies since he had been instrumental 
in secretly outfitting the camps with drugs prior to internment working with 
British agents, the IRCC and the Swiss Consulate, and with his wife had carried 
                                                 
91 The Minutes of a Meeting of the Medical and Public Health Sub-Committee held on May 5th 
1944. “Medical Help for Lavatory Woman”, FO 916/1036.  
92 Ibid. Beynon had worked in the LCH continuously from 1921 until internment.   
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bags for four miles through torrential rain.93 He would not have condoned any 
wastefulness concerning the camp’s medical supplies.  More importantly than the 
misuse of the camp’s drug supplies, Beynon also feared the repercussions should 
the operation prove fatal.  He drew attention to his own “many years of 
experience of hospital work” and requested this important aspect should not be 
overlooked.94  
 Gillison disagreed with Beynon’s assessment of the risk of fatality stating 
he regarded it a simple procedure that he had left to his assistant Chinese surgeon 
to perform on previous occasions. He also argued that, in his opinion, the Sub-
Committee’s responsibilities extended to providing medical aid for those working 
in the camp compound irrespective of colour and race and that the medical 
supplies necessary to carry out the operation did not amount to a great deal. The 
majority of the Sub-Committee agreed with Gillison, and as the matter had 
already progressed so far, it was decided that to withdraw the offer of treatment 
would provoke severe criticism.95 However, it was mooted that there should be a 
definite ruling for future occasions. It was assumed the risk of death was covered 
since the Japanese had given their approval. A further point considered was that, 
if they refused to operate, the result could have been to cause ill feeling to the 
extent that the internees could be forced to undertake her unpleasant duties 
themselves. Thus, although the decision to operate was reached following 
professional ethical and clinical discussion, an element of self-interest was 
apparent.  It is tempting to suggest this incident indicates an element of friction 
between the Shanghai pharmacist irritated at not having been consulted 
                                                 
93 Beynon, O.G.R., to the LMS Directors, April 22nd, 1948, CWM/LMS CH/10, 1941–50, Central 
China Correspondence, Beynon file, 1939–49. 
94  “Medical Help for Lavatory Woman”, FO 916/1036.  
95 Ibid. 
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concerning something dear to his heart and the two Hankou doctors acting in 
collusion. There is no evidence to support this; but what is apparent is that, 
despite incarceration, the doctors attempted to maintain professional standards by 
entering into formal, minuted ethical discussion. 
 
(iv) Weixian – An “International” Practice  
In March 1943 Weixian camp in Shandong, approximately 100 miles North of 
Qingdao, received internees from Beijing, Tianjin and Qingdao and by September 
1st 1943, it housed 1,700 internees of whom 600 men and 589 women were 
British (1,189), and 270 were children.96  The latter were mostly pupils from the 
CIM Chefoo School who had been interned briefly in the Presbyterian Mission 
compound at Temple Hill before relocation to Weixian.97  The remaining 511 
internees were American, Russian, Belgian, Cuban, Greek, Dutch, Norwegian, 
and Indian. After September 3rd, 1943, the camp received a number of Italians 
making it truly international.98 This was mirrored in the medical personnel who, 
prior to repatriation, included Britons, Americans, Norwegians, Italians, a South 
African and a New Zealander. Their make up included 10 missionary doctors and 
seven missionary nurses with other personnel, according to the nominal rolls 
compiled by Leck, comprising 12 doctors, 20 nurses and a dentist. Through 
repatriation, the camp lost nine doctors, and five nurses leaving a total medical 
establishment of 36, including four missionary doctors and six nurses, and among 
the non-missionaries were nine doctors, 16 nurses and the dentist.  The 
approximate ratio of internees per medical professional rose from 34 to 47.  As 
                                                 
96 Included in the British total were 20 Canadians. 
97 Report on Conditions in Weihsien attached to correspondence from Halifax to Right Hon. 
Anthony Eden, British Embassy Washington D.C., Reference number 1076, December 21st, 1943, 
CO 980/126. 
98Date of surrender of Italian armed forces to allies.  
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part of a group of 500 Belgian, Dutch, and American Roman Catholics 35 nurses 
were originally assigned to the camp but the whole group was transferred to 
Beijing during August and September 1943.99  The nurses’ contribution to the 
camp outside their Roman Catholic brethren appears to have been minimal.  
 In this camp, medical missionaries were in the minority among the 
medical personnel because ranks were swelled by staff from the Peking Union 
Medical College (PUMC) and industry. A consular report noted medical 
provision was inadequate: 
 All medical and dental care of the camp is in the hands of the internees 
well supplied with qualified doctors and nurses. The Japanese have 
supplied virtually no medical supplies or equipment.  Barely enough 
surgical instruments to open an abscess… A hand pump for spraying 
disinfectant without disinfectant.100 
 
This report also described how all water had to be lifted by hand, electric light 
was rationed and the only heating came from small cast-iron Japanese-type stoves.  
Although food was provided, the Japanese storekeeper held produce back until it 
had rotted.  All these irritations served to weaken internee health which was 
described in December 1943 as “surprisingly good, but signs of a deficient diet 
were beginning to appear”.101  Internees requiring serious medical care could be 
sent outside for treatment, but such treatment was undertaken only when deemed 
absolutely essential.  A surgeon’s wife sent out of camp for a hysterectomy was 
returned after a month before her treatment had finished. She was forced to return 
to camp by train in a third class compartment with no medical staff in attendance. 
The journey took 18 hours.102 
                                                 
99 Camp data obtained from the nominal rolls, Leck, G., Captives, 2002, pp. 521–719. 
100 Report on Conditions in Weihsien attached to correspondence from Halifax to Right Hon. 
Anthony Eden, British Embassy Washington DC, reference number 1076, December 21st, 1943, 
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 The hospital at Weixian had 12 female and 12 male beds plus five 
paediatric and two obstetric beds.103  Such provision was totally inadequate for 
the care of chronic cases such as Tuberculosis or cardiac patients and was also 
deemed to prove inadequate during an epidemic. 104  Outpatient numbers serve as 
an indication of the level of work undertaken at Weixian during the early months. 
During May 1943 the following work was undertaken: 
 Medical, Surgical and Ophthalmological Clinics  1,439 
 Dental Clinic          394 
 Inoculations against Diphtheria         38 
 Typhoid Inoculations            39 
                               Total out-patients:    1,910. 
 Operations: 
 Major operations             2 
 Minor operations           12 
 Deliveries              2 
 Reductions of fractures under anaesthesia          2 
                                                                                 Total operations:     18 
 
A further 193 patients were visited by doctors during 698 home visits. The 
hospital, with no running water or central heating, had a total of 27 admissions 
with the total of in-patients 8 and 18 at the end of April and May respectively.105  
538 prescriptions were dispensed during May excluding drugs used by in-patients.   
 Norman Cliff, as a teenager in Weixian, could not remember the medical 
practitioners’ professionalism being questioned: 
 I didn’t hear anything about the ability of the doctors being questioned.  
We had some very well known doctors there who held high positions 
in their missionary society or in a mining Association.106 
                                                 
103 Report on Weihsien Internment Camp, May 1943, FO 916/1036. For comparison Pudong Camp 
with a population of 1,100, had eight hospital beds. McAll, The Moon, 1987, p. 49. 
104 Report on Weihsien Internment Camp, May 1943, FO 916/1036.  
105 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 57. 
106 Kaolan Mining Association. Cliff, N., in conversation, March 8th, 2007. 
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Cliff also confirmed that medical personnel received no different treatment from 
the Japanese than any other internee, but did remember that the Japanese made 
use of the hospital facilities on one occasion when a Japanese officer’s wife 
delivered a baby and was looked after “by one of our doctors”. 107  This was 
unusual enough to provoke comment and, as far as the writer is aware, there are 
no other references to the Japanese using internment camp medical facilities; 
therefore the occasion probably reflected medical emergency.  
   
 Medical Missionary Consequences of Internment  
Some comments on medical missionary experience surfaced via the Gripsholm 
returnees. Gillison is described as “was on Hospital staff.  All looked well and 
happy”. 108  Bolton is described as “On Hospital staff and member of Camp 
Committee. Dr. B. has taken part in the camp entertainment”. These messages 
were not always positive as Mary Milne, from Ash Camp, who had worked for 
the SMC Health Department prior to internment, is less happily described as “a 
nurse on the medical staff – she is very thin and nervous, should be repatriated”. 
Robjohns, also from Ash Camp, “is a senior medical officer and has given great 
satisfaction”.109  These tantalising snippets received months out of date said very 
little, but provided confirmation to families and Home Boards that individuals 
were alive. 
 
 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 This information was attached to a British Civilian Internees List attached to correspondence 
from the British Embassy, Washington D.C. to the Prisoners of War Department, Foreign Office, 
London, FO 916/1045 
109 Ibid.  
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(i) Professional Experience 
In their clinical practice medical missionaries, as previously, needed to be 
resourceful and meet challenges inventively.  When Gale, an ENT surgeon, was 
presented with having to treat an acute case of mastoiditis he managed to perform 
the necessary operation with carpenters’ tools and some pieces from a Meccano 
set.110  While this operation and that of the appendectomy referred to earlier, were 
successful, there were patients who could not be saved by any doctor or nurse’s 
resourcefulness.  Frances McAll commented that patients were lost that need not 
have been; especially drug dependent patients such as diabetics whose insulin 
supplies became exhausted.111  The loss of such ‘saveable’ patients must have 
caused great distress to all but particularly so to those who had the professional 
skill to save them, had they only had access to medical supplies.  In some cases, 
the condition was just too complicated to offer any hope of success, such as the 
brain tumour suffered by the Olympic athlete Eric Liddel, who died in Weixian in 
February 1945.112   
 There were also tragic accidents, which medical missionaries could not 
treat, such as when a young boy, also in Weixian, as a result of a dare reached up 
and touched a sagging electric wire during roll call only to be immediately  
electrocuted.113  Gale records one attempted suicide by an internee who fell in 
love with a Roman Catholic priest.114   He also records that medical staff were 
asked to perform abortions in Pudong camp, but, while recognising “the abnormal 
conditions of camp life offered extenuating circumstances”, refused. 115  They 
                                                 
110 Meccano was a child’s construction set. 
111 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
112 Cliff, N., Courtyard, 1977, p. 82. 
113 Ibid., p. 94. 
114 Gale, G., “Pacific War 1941–45”, p. 19. 
115 Ibid., p. 29. 
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were, however aware that illegal abortions were being performed although Gale 
does not record by whom, but he notes that one girl in another camp died as a 
result of an abortion.116  Unsurprisingly, this information does not appear in the 
society’s edited version of Gale’s internment account and neither do his 
comments regarding the illegitimate births that occurred, which he described as 
causing “difficult problems” after the war and, despite some “bigoted opposition 
from a certain section of the camp” the medical staff attempted to give them a 
“good start in life”.117 
 Despite being interned, medical missionaries worked to increase their 
professional knowledge and almost immediately began keeping records within the 
camps. This was an activity of positive value that did not require complicated 
equipment. During the July 1943 Swiss Consul’s inspection of the Yangzhou 
camps the LMS medical officer Dr. Geoffrey Milledge (1904-1997), of Yangzhou 
‘A’, like McAll, managed to smuggle a medical report to the Consul without the 
Camp Commandant’s knowledge. 118  It provided details of polydeficiency119 and 
demonstrates that nutrition and weight were closely monitored by the camp 
doctors who compiled research data. The importance for this thesis is that the 
research, detailing treatments, consultation numbers, and post internment weight 
loss, were of significance and were being recorded by medical missionaries. This 
work provided data of its own merit that, when linked with similar data from 
other camps, could be used for further research such as the long term effects of 
                                                 
116 Ibid. For edited version see: CWM/LMS CH/49, 1941–50, Central China Correspondence, file 
53.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Inspection des Camps, 1943, p. 23, FO 916/1035.  Similar research was carried out at Stanley 
Camp: Sydenham, A., “Amenorrhoea at Stanley Camp, Hong Kong, During Internment” in BMJ, 
No. 4465, August 3rd, 1946, p. 159. [Due to emotional shock and undernourishment.] 
119 Polydeficiency was a multi-vitamin deficiency that lowered resistance to disease not a disease 
in itself. 
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polydeficiency.  It is not the intention here to analyse this research other than to 
note that the camp doctor made the important point that the weights of the 
children were “far from satisfactory” since they should have been continuously 
gaining weight as a consequence of natural growth when many had gained no 
weight at all. When this camp closed in September, 1943, and the internees were 
dispersed throughout the other camps, it became impossible to follow this data 
through to the end of the war but the fact that it is available at all is due to medical 
missionary initiative and maintenance of pre-internment professional standards.  
 Despite these attempts to maintain standards both in their clinical and 
research work and the recording of successful operations carried out under 
difficult situations, it eventually proved impossible for medical missionaries to 
maintain their pre-internment professional skills.  Despite having experienced 
problems with a lack of medical supplies and equipment prior to internment, they 
had always retained access to their professional papers. Within the camps they 
had no access to libraries or professional journals. One of the Yangzhou ‘C’ camp 
requests to the IRCC was for: 
a good operative surgery such as ‘Carson’ as we have none and a book 
on skin diseases such as ‘Walker’s Dermatology’.120  
 
There is no indication whether these books were supplied but the request for them 
reveals a dearth of basic medical texts within the camp.  There were also fewer 
practical resources within the camps, with which to be resourceful than had been 
the case in the war years prior to internment. The chief medical officer of Pudong, 
Graham, recorded retrospectively: 
 This period of restricted activity under direct Japanese control gave 
rise to many problems with the medical care of a thousand persons of 
very diverse types… From the professional point of view: there have 
been so many advances in the past ten years (I left England in June 
1937) that a furlough will be all too short a time in which to bring 
myself up to date…These last few years in China [while interned] have 
                                                 
120 Inspection des Camps, 1943, p. 33. FO 916/1035.  
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all tended to lower one’s standard…there have been such long periods 
of inactivity as well as lack of communications with the outside 
world.121 [Italics added.] 
 
The reference to one’s standards having been lowered appears to be a personal 
acknowledgement of a reduction of professional standards within the camp.  This 
must have been the case, because no matter how stringently attempts were made 
to sustain standards, it was impossible to maintain pre-internment levels under 
camp conditions.  The loss of diabetic patients is indicative of this. Graham was 
also aware of lost years of professional study and a distancing from the medical 
grapevine that disseminated new advances by word of mouth, conference and 
publication.  Within the camps the principal, perhaps only, opportunity for 
professional development was the opportunity to observe and record data of 
clinical significance and the treatment of illnesses associated with internment; 
particularly the results of vitamin deficiency and overcrowding.  However, despite 
these opportunities unique to internment, in some cases medical missionaries’ 
professional skills went unpractised, which over a period of two and a half years 
threatened to be a significant problem. This was a loss forced upon medical 
missionaries by external events, not a consequence of any lack of effort or 
motivation on their part. 
  
(ii) Personal Experience 
 Physically medical missionaries paid a high price for their camp service 
 from weight loss to serious illness. Kenneth McAll’s weight dropped from 12 
stone to eight and Frances’ to six stone. 122  As a consequence of internment 
                                                 
121 Graham, K.I., LMS report, January 1947, CWM/LMS CH/2 1941–50, China/Hong Kong 
Reports, Graham file, p. 2. 
122 76Kg, 50.8Kg, and 38.1Kg. Weight upon release may not reflect lowest weight as a result of 
food supplies dropped by the US air Force prior to repatriation. Morgan, H.J. et al, Health  of 
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McAll’s ribs were to crack easily in the months following internment while 
Frances was treated for severe anaemia and the McAll and Gale daughters who 
were just four years old at the end of the war, had survived “remarkably well” – 
probably because they had qualified for the special diet.123  Gale spent the years 
following his release in hospital with tuberculosis.124  In Haiphong Road, Sturton, 
suffered from pericarditis and upon his release Paterson, aged 61, described 
himself as “still quite feeble”.125 There was personal tragedy amongst the deaths 
that occurred in the camps. Robjohns’ wife died in March 1944 in Ash camp of 
septicaemia and heart failure, aged only 36.126  Huizenga died of peritoneal cancer 
in Chabei Camp aged 64 in July 1945.127 
 Gilkey observed that the missionaries’ unique contribution to camp life in 
Weixian was their willingness to help others in special need.128  Other internees 
restricted their aid to family and friends, but missionaries were prepared to help 
those they did not know.  The Lincoln Avenue Camp was opened in June 1944, 
when all those who had been too ill, elderly or infirm to enter internment 
originally had their exemption withdrawn. Drs. Borthwick (CSFM), Garnick 
(LMS), and J. Paterson (1884–1952) (LMS), with Nurses Fletcher (CIM), Gedye 
(MMS) A. Smith (LMS) and Wilson (CSM) together with four non–missionary 
nurses and one doctor volunteered to move into Lincoln Avenue Camp to provide 
                                                                                                                                     
Repatriated Prisoners of War from the Far East, in  JAMA, Vol., 130, No. 15, pp. 995–999, p. 
995.  
123 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 87. 
124 Ibid.  Individuals’ medical records held by missionary societies for this period are not yet in the 
public domain. 
125 Paterson, J.L H. Previously senior physician at the LCH, to unknown addressee, September 13th, 
1945. CWM/LMS CH/13, 1941–50, Central China Correspondence, Paterson file, 1948–50. 
126 Robjohns, H.C., Letter from Foreign Office of Under Secretary of State April 25th, 1944.  
CWM CH/13, 1941–50, Central China Correspondence, Robjohns file, 1940–48 
127 Selles, K.D., “Many Points”, 2005, p. 297.  Huizenga’s obituary records “Malnutrition and 
overwork eventually caused his health to break down and he died of cirrhosis of the liver”. CMJ, 
Vol., 65, No. 1/2, January/February, 1947, p. V. 
128 Gilkey, L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 189. 
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a medical service. Six of the medical missionaries came from Longhua and, 
although this meant less medical care in that camp, the needs of the elderly people 
were judged to be paramount. Despite promises that Lincoln Avenue would be 
appropriately equipped for over 300 elderly people, conditions upon arrival were 
found to be filthy with no tools for cleaning.129 
 Besides helping people physically, medical missionaries were also called 
upon to provide a counselling service.  In Pudong the only places available in the 
whole camp for private conversations were the small consulting room cubicles 
where people could unburden themselves. Some problems had long term roots, 
and although the doctors could offer only limited practical help in these cases they 
were able to listen. 130  Van Velden noted that, among those interned, were 
psychopaths and people with serious psychoses and neuroses, but that new cases 
of neuroses rarely occurred and that neurotics “to a large extent got rid of their 
complaints” but, during the last months of the war polydeficiency began causing 
serious psychoses.131  This counselling work may have played a part in Kenneth 
McAll’s decision to qualify as a Consultant Psychiatrist after the war.   
 Being forced to turn down people’s requests for aid was an additional 
psychological strain on medical missionary’s lives.  Within the camps, drugs and 
special foods such as eggs, and dried milk, represented wealth and the medical 
staff were the gatekeepers to this wealth, which led to attempts at bribery.  One 
woman approached Frances McAll and attempted to bribe her with a small tin of 
coffee in exchange for some cascala tablets.132  “We didn’t possess any, I don’t 
                                                 
129 Leck, G.  Captives of Empire, 2002, p. 457. 
130 McAll, F. and R.K., The Moon, 1987, p. 57.  
131 Van Velden,,D., De Japanese Internerinskampen, 1985, p. 516.  
132 Cascala was a laxative.   
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think she believed me”.133  For a medical missionary this was doubly frustrating: 
being unable to help professionally and being thought of as a dishonest Christian.  
Gilkey wrote that, on the whole, missionaries were more honest and co-operative 
than any comparable secular group but they could be as lazy as anyone else and 
just as unwilling to give up any space for those who had less.134  So, although 
their honesty appears to have been of a high standard, missionaries were just as 
affected psychologically by incarceration as their secular brothers.  However, 
despite having to share in the burdens of other people’s problems and coping with 
slurs on their character, medical missionaries had their advantage over many other 
internees because they had, as Frances McAll put it, a “focal point” in their work.  
 …we were lucky it [their medical work] gave us a focal point. Kept us 
busy and gave us plenty to do.135 
 
As noted earlier, having a purpose in the camp not dissimilar to that held outside 
gave medical missionaries an advantage.  Another advantage was their faith. 
 
(iii) The Spiritual Experience   
Internment provided an opportunity for medical missionaries to be of service and 
to be seen to be of service.  After the war Robjohns wrote: 
We are deeply thankful to God for his care of our people, not just that 
they have escaped the serious physical consequences which we feared, 
but that they kept their courage and faith so high right through the 
trying days of internment and made such a magnificent witness to His 
faith in the service that they did. 136 [Italics added]. 
 
While acknowledging how missionaries maintained their faith in the camps, 
Robjohns thanks God for caring for “our people”. This is extraordinary when we 
                                                 
133 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
134 Gilkey,  L.B., Shantung Compound, 1966, p. 169. 
135 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
136 Robjohns, C. to Robjohns C, [father?] December 12th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/13, 1941–50, 
Central China Correspondence, Robjohns file, 1940–48. 
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take into account his wife’s death, aged only 36, since it was a very real “serious 
physical consequence” of internment. As a medical missionary himself, Robjohns 
was instrumental in helping people to escape these “serious physical 
consequences”, but he gives thanks to God regarding his own work as visible 
witness to his Christian faith.  His work was God’s work, not his own, and 
therefore his wife’s death would appear to have been regarded as part of God’s 
work. Waiting for internment, people were gathered in the Shanghai American 
Country Club, later the Great Western Road Camp, which functioned as a pre-
internment assembly camp. The McAlls heard that places had been booked on the 
British repatriation ship the Kamakura Maru for the repatriation of the 300 
missionaries billeted there.137 The British government had requested engineers, of 
which there were plenty in Shanghai, and doctors, nurses and teachers.  Most 
missionaries fitted into the last three categories but when the list was posted, they 
found that only three missionaries had been allocated passage.  Places had been 
taken by others “who had no right to go”, such as people associated with 
administrative services in Shanghai.138  After the war, Lady Mountbatten boarded 
the McAll’s ship in Hong Kong and told them that the “government had been so 
disgusted with what they got that they’d refused to send another ship”. 139   No 
second ship was sent for the British and the missionaries were interned; but, in 
retrospect, Frances McAll regarded this as God’s will.    
 But we realised pretty quickly that we were far better equipped to 
[stay.]  I mean we had the children so that was a bit worrying which of 
course other people did too… What I’m saying is that missionaries 
came into their own because they serviced the camps… 140 
 
                                                 
137 The Kamakura Maru left Shanghai on August 17th, 1942 for Mozambique carrying 908 British 
repatriates. Cliff, N., Prisoners, 1998, p. 117. 
138 McAll, F., in conversation, March 1st, 2007. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
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The disappointment at not being repatriated was reclassified as a representation of 
God’s will that medical missionary work would sustain those in the camps. 
 McAll - So far as our medical missionary work went I saw that as part 
of God’s, what he was doing, what he was up to.”  
 Chatterton - It was almost like he’d kept you back perhaps?   
 McAll - Well in a way exactly, I mean I had this thought which I quote 
in the book I think which has meant a lot to me over the years, you 
know, this is the nature of life get on and live it.  It didn’t matter to 
God whether we were looking after Chinese or Americans or British, it 
didn’t matter I think they were people.141 
 
 In his thoughts on camp life, Robjohns attributed missionary service to 
God’s will and to being instrumental within the camps in having changed others’ 
views of missionaries: 
Outsiders in China have a different idea of what missionaries are to 
what many of them had before the days of internment.142 
 
All the medical missionaries within the internment camps appear to have proved 
themselves competent professionals even if some, such as the McAlls and Gales, 
had to prove their merit to others over time. The changing view of missionaries of 
all kinds within the camps was remarked upon by an LMS teacher: 
… it has been a valuable lesson in cooperation with all sorts and types 
of people, a consciousness of the power of prayer, a necessity for 
complete dependence on God. One thing which has intrigued us as a 
group of missionaries has been the reaction of the ordinary man to 
having to live with the b--------- mishes, and it has been enlightening 
for both sides.  We have had opportunities that we would never have in 
normal circumstances, and I think they have come to see we are not so 
revolting as they at first thought – and said.143  
 
Similarly, Rowlands, who led the Thanksgiving Service for the end of the war in 
Longhua, recorded: 
The relation of missionaries and the non-missionary community took a 
new turn.  At first we had much prejudice and criticism to overcome, 
but later this attitude changed on the part of most to one of kind 
                                                 
141 Ibid. Book reference is to: McAll F., and R.K., The Moon, 1987. 
142 Robjohns, C. to Robjohns C., December 12th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/13, 1941–50, Central 
China Correspondence, Robjohns file, 1940–48 
143 James, E.R., from Yangzhou Camp to Brown T.C., September 12th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/12, 
1941–50, Central China Correspondence, James file, 1945. 
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appreciation… The experience of being interned together will not have 
been in vain if it leads to closer co-operation in serving China.144 
 
Gillison not only surmised his relationship with his Chinese colleagues in Hankou 
had deepened as a result of his “time of suffering” under internment but also his 
relationship with non-missionaries:  
… and the experience has taught us many things about the art of living 
and gave us contacts with our non-missionary fellow Britishers which 
we should otherwise never have had and which will undoubtedly be of 
value in the years to come.145 
  
At the end of the war, medical missionaries made an effort to regard their time 
spent in internment as a positive experience despite the physical and 
psychological difficulties they had faced.  As Gillison wrote: “But enough of the 
gloomy side – I feel that the time was definitely not wasted...”146 Unfortunately, 
for the Gillison family there was an unexpected consequence of the war and their 
internment years for when the Gillisons finally met their daughter, after a six year 
separation, she told them she no longer believed in God.147  For a missionary 
family this must have been a devastating consequence of the separation caused by 
the war and a high price to pay for their service in the camps. 
 There are conflicting reports concerning the relationships missionaries had 
amongst themselves.  There is a general consensus that relationships between the 
Roman Catholics and Protestants were co-operative in the camps. What is less 
clear is the relationship between the liberals and the conservatives. Cliff 
remembered the shock of moving from Temple Hill to Weixian where he met 
liberals and Roman Catholics for the first time and was surprised to find them 
                                                 
144 Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 95. 
145 Gillison, K., to Brown, T.C., November 8th, 1945. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Gillison K., to Brown, T.C., September 2nd, 1948.  CWM/LMS CH/11, 1941–50, Central China 
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“very nice and Godly people”.148  He had been “brought up that Catholicism was 
a very bad thing, they would chase you across the world rather than lose you” and 
in Temple Hill all the missionaries had been conservative fundamentalists. 149  
Cliff commented that, within Weixian the liberals and the fundamentalists argued 
continually and, in an election for the Weixian Christian Fellowship, it was 
thought that the fundamentalists had “pulled strings” to place themselves in key 
positions causing consternation amongst the liberals when the results were 
announced.150 The friction between the liberals and fundamentalists in Weixian 
was also noted by Gilkey:  
 Among the Protestant missionaries, diversity of opinion was so 
prevalent that at first it seemed embarrassing when compared to the 
clear unity enjoyed by our Catholic friends.  The fundamentalists and 
the liberals among us could work together, to be sure, when it came to 
services in the church and other common activities.  But still their 
frequent bitter disagreements were painfully obvious and damaging.151 
 
When asked whether there was similar inter-denominational friction in the camps 
of which she had been a part Frances McAll replied: 
 No, there was nothing like that. … in [Pudong] there was a great 
mixture of [missionaries], but they all worked together very well as a 
team.  So we had evangelicals and an Anglican Bishop and we had 
Methodists and Baptists.  There was one Baptist and one Methodist 
who were the most popular.152 
 
 This raises the question of whether inter-denominational tensions were 
absent in Yangzhou ‘B’ and Pudong or whether Frances McAll was unaware of 
them? Considering that liberals and fundamentalists had a long history of 
ideological friction, it seems unlikely they buried their differences in these camps 
– particularly when they had time for discussion.  Why should the Protestants in 
Weixian have been any different theologically from those in other camps? What 
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seems more likely is that Frances McAll was too busy with her medical work and 
her small daughter to notice. She would not have had the time to attend 
theological lectures or enter into religious discussion. Certainly, this writer has 
come across no mention of liberal and conservative/fundamentalist tension in the 
letters, diaries or reports of medical missionaries relating to internment. This 
failure to notice, if it be that, seems characteristic of the medical missionary’s 
ethos of getting the job done and leaving the theological arguments to others.  It is 
therefore through others’ eyes rather than those of medical missionaries’ that this 
friction is reported. This is not to say that all camps were the same; but, the liberal, 
conservative/fundamentalist argument was so much a part of Protestant 
theological discussion that, for it to raise its head only in Weixian, seems, to this 
writer, unlikely. 
 
Summary 
Enduring the same physical and psychological deprivations as their fellow 
internees, medical missionaries had the advantage of maintaining their 
professional status upon entry into the camps and of having a sense of purpose.  
Motivated by their professional skill to provide a medical service and their desire 
to be of service to God, and their fellow internees, they found it easier to adapt to 
camp life than many others.  As people constantly required clinical and surgical 
treatment or psychological counselling, the demands made on medical 
missionaries’ time were extensive but this gave them the advantage of always 
being busy. Other missionaries had time for theological discussion but medical 
missionaries’ days were full. Initially, this was an asset that staved off the apathy 
displayed by many internees and highlighted by Frankl as being part of the second 
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phase of camp life, but eventually, because of physical weakness caused by poor 
diet, the demands imposed on medical missionaries became arduous. How long 
they could have continued if the war had not ended in August 1945 it is 
impossible to predict, but declining health and weight loss as a result of poor diet 
affected all and medical missionaries were no exception. When hopes of 
repatriation died, medical missionaries attempted to make the best of their 
situation by regarding their incarceration as God’s will. 
 Within the camps, some medical missionaries unexpectedly had to combat 
prejudice and, although united in predicament, there was initially no solidarity 
between these medical missionaries and their fellow internees. This expressed 
itself in missionary/merchant tensions that were eventually recognised by some as 
having broken down so that, by the end of the war, there was greater respect from 
each side towards the other even if only grudging acknowledged. Medical 
missionaries held positions of status within the camps as Medical Officers on 
camp committees and managed to smuggle information to visiting officials under 
the noses of the Japanese.  They did their best to maintain their professional 
standards and carried out useful research recording weights and patient numbers 
within the camps but were unable, over a period of over two years, to maintain all 
their practical skills. Separation from specialist tools and equipment and a 
distancing from the medical grapevine and their professional journals meant that, 
when they finally left the camps, they were aware their skills had suffered as a 
result of their isolation. Despite their own failing physical strength and the paucity 
of medical equipment, facilities and drugs, medical missionary efforts within the 
camps managed, on the whole, to avoid serious epidemics and standards of health 
remained reasonably satisfactory considering the difficult environment. The 
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resourcefulness and initiative observed under occupation continued in the camps 
and, although there was personal sacrifice and physical discomfort, the 
opportunity for professional service to others was embraced.   
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Chapter Seven  
 
The Post-war Aftermath 
 
Let us Arise and Build 
Nehemiah 2:18 
 
 
Introduction 
Retrospectively we can appreciate that the golden age of medical missionary 
wartime service in China ended abruptly with the Japanese surrender on August 
15th 1945.1 Although medical missionaries welcomed the longed for peace, the 
Japanese surrender signalled their redundancy; their new found freedom brought a 
discharge from service with its consequent loss of status as they no longer had to 
shoulder the responsibility of internee medical care. Unable to return immediately 
to their posts medical missionaries entered a vacuum of service.  Tired and war-
weary, with many entitled to overdue furlough, they anticipated reunions with 
their families at home.  Incarceration had provided time for contemplation and 
some exited the camps demanding change.  The few who felt they could muster 
the strength, and who had the opportunity, to return to their mission compounds 
and hospitals were apprehensive about what awaited them in the fields they had 
                                                 
1 The official surrender was signed on September 2nd, 1945. 
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vacated over two years earlier. They had no doubts they were needed, but were 
they wanted?  Would they be welcomed or turned away?   
  The post-war period can be divided into three distinct phases; the 
immediate post-war phase; the return and re-establishment phase; and the re-
adaptation phase. In Shanghai the three phases were almost concurrent as a result 
of ease of access for inspection of hospitals and proximity of staff and supplies. 
This chapter will examine each of these three phases and document post-war 
change from the foreign medical missionary perspective with a primary focus on 
Hubei. 
 
Immediate Post-War Phase     
Cocooned within the camps medical missionaries had been incommunicado with 
the outside world for over two years.2   In recognition of the deprivations they had 
endured, it was universal Mission Board policy that internees be repatriated 
immediately. The few that expressed a wish to return to their missions were 
compelled to undertake arduous journeys and travel restrictions remained in 
operation.  Additionally, insufficient accurate information was to hand: what was 
post-war mission policy in the field? Were their mission hospitals still standing? 
 Almost a month after their surrender, the Japanese occupation forces were, 
described by Baxter, the China Field Secretary, as “still in the saddle” since no 
alternative administrative assembly had emerged to take control.3  The British 
Consul, Alwyne Ogden (1881–1981), arrived in Shanghai from Kunming on 
                                                 
2 Astonishingly a radio was maintained by some internees in Longhua throughout the internment 
period unbeknown to the other internees. Stephenson, G., Diary, August 12th, Stephenson Box, 
MMS 642/643, MF 1393. 
3 Baxter, A., to Brown, T.C., September 11th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/8, 1941–50, China/Hong 
Kong Correspondence, Baxter file, 1942–45. 
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September 7th, but officials there remained mainly American. 4   Management 
voids occurred in the mission fields resulting in the loss of hospital equipment.5 
The war had ended so unexpectedly that the tentative plans Home Boards and 
local missions had made, in anticipation of the cessation of hostilities, were 
thrown into disarray. Instead of embarking upon relief and rehabilitation with 
advance notice, or region by region as territory was won back or ceded, suddenly 
all China needed relief and rehabilitation simultaneously.  In particular, there had 
been no opportunity to muster staff to take the places of those being repatriated. 
Medical missionaries from some societies were locked into their home 
government’s war service contracts, as was the case with some CSM medical 
missionaries:   
 Explanations as to why we didn’t have a number of people recruited, 
trained and ready to go out, are summed up in four words - war and 
Ministry of Labour.  I won’t go into the trials and tribulations of trying 
to extricate Nursing Sisters from Government clutches during a very 
terrible war, suffice it to say it could not be done, except for specific 
posts about which we had to supply masses of information such as 
could not possibly be available as far as Ichang was concerned…  I 
must ask you to suspend your judgement upon this (and we) until you 
get home and learn something of what our difficulties here have been.6 
 
While explaining why medical missionaries were not immediately available to 
travel to China at the war’s end the above quotation demonstrates that in 
Edinburgh there was a belief that those in China had a lack of empathy 
concerning the situation at home. This was a significant post-war change; 
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routinely medical missionaries had regarded their home bases as lacking empathy 
with those in foreign fields. 
 As medical missionaries waited in the camps, the international and 
national relief organisations such as the FAU, United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Chinese National Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) moved swiftly to draw up agreements 
with mission societies prior to entering liberated areas.7  On January 21st, 1945, 
the CNRRA was established by order of the National government to provide 
emergency relief to liberated areas.  Supplies of CC$945,196,000 were requested 
from UNNRA which also provided 1,600 specialists and advisors.8  Commencing 
immediately after the Japanese surrender, UNRRA contributed a total of 300,000 
tons of food, clothing and other supplies to China until 1947. 9  These relief 
agencies re-established and sustained medical work in the field as the CNRRA 
Regional Supply List for the Pu’ai indicates:. 
                                                 
7 UNNRA was an international organisation of 47 member governments to provide relief for 
liberated countries in Europe and East Asia.  Establishing its general headquarters in Washington 
DC on November 9th, 1943, regional offices were opened in London, Shanghai, Sydney and Cairo.  
Relief consisted of food, clothing, fuel, medical, household and agricultural supplies, machinery, 
transportation and public utility provision.  In addition, welfare, medical and technical assistance 
were provided and a repatriation service.  10,000 personnel were recruited to provide assistance to 
countries that requested aid. Byler, J. N., “UNNRA The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration”, in Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopaedia Online, 1959, 
http://www.gameo.org/encyclopaedia/contents/U577.html  February 2nd, 2009. 
8 Pannabecker, S.F., “Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA)”, in 
Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopaedia Online, 1953. Price, F.W., China, Twilight or Dawn? 
New York, Friendship Press Inc., 1948, p. 65. 
http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia /contents/chinese_nation_relief_and_rehabilitation, February 
2nd 2009. 
9 Chassin, L.M., The Communist Conquest of China:  A History of the Civil War, 1945–1949, 
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 96. 
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Fig. 11: CNRRA Hupeh Regional Supplies for Pu’ai August 194610 
 
 Two problems complicated the lives of all internees outside the camps: 
accommodation and personal finance. With the Japanese still in situ in Shanghai 
accommodation was at a premium and many found it more convenient to remain 
within the camps rather than attempt to rent accommodation outside.  A dearth of 
ready cash also played a part in their decision to remain within the camps.  The 
Chinese government made a gift of CC$500,000 dollars per internee but, in 
Shanghai, with the minimum rickshaw fare set at $10,000, a small egg costing 
between $2 and $3,000, and a simple meal between $40,000 and $100,000, this 
                                                 
10 Hubei Provincial Archives, LS18-5-113 
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was inadequate to maintain an independent existence outside the camps.11  The 
Swiss Consulate understandably refused to advance money to internees for 
general living expenses while they were entitled to receive relief within the 
camps.12  Therefore, it made sound financial sense for internees to remain living 
within the confines of the camps during the immediate post-war period.  US air 
force provisions, dropped by air in the weeks following liberation, eased 
conditions within the camps and internees were free to move about.  Nurse 
Stickland writing in mid-September from Weixian declared: 
 It may seem strange to admit it, but on the whole I have been 
extremely happy here – this is a delightful compound. – I have been 
doing my own type of work i.e. nursing and through Guide and Ranger 
work I have found many new interests and many delightful friends.13 
 
The internment experience, for some therefore, proved to be a positive experience 
and remaining within the confines of the camps under post-war conditions may 
not have been too great an ordeal following the war’s end.  Remaining within the 
security of the camps also provided an acclimatisation period. 
 Following the euphoria of liberation, the security of the camps had to be 
exchanged for a world that had changed considerably and remained in turmoil.  
Problems that had been placed on one side now moved centre-stage, yet 
insufficient information remained to hand. Internees experienced the third stage of 
incarceration, as described by Frankl, whereby the sudden unexpected release 
from a sentence, the length of which had never been specified, did not bring the 
                                                 
11 Baxter, A., to Brown, T.C., September 11th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/8, 1941–50, China/Hong 
Kong Correspondence, Baxter file, 1945–1950.  The exchange rate of the Chinese to the American 
dollar went from 2,020 in January 1946 to 6,500 by December. Chassin, L.M., Communist 
Conquest, 1965, p. 96. 
12 Paterson, J.L.H., to unnamed recipient, September 13th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/13, 1941–50, 
Central China Correspondence, Paterson file, 1948–50. 
13 Stickland, G.M., to Brown T.C., September 19th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/19, 1941–50, Central 
China Correspondence, Stickland file.  Stickland was ex-Mackenzie Memorial Hospital, Tianjin.   
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complete happiness it had promised.14  Disillusionment that things were not as 
had been expected and bitterness over lost years were common responses to 
freedom. Medical missionaries experienced this phase, but not immediately. They 
appear to have suppressed their response only to give public expression in later 
years.15 Certainly, there was no sudden return to the comfortable familiarity of the 
lives they had led before the war, although there is no material to suggest they 
expected such a return.   
 An illustration of medical missionary disillusionment was Beynon, who 
was unable to resume his position at the LCH after the war. 16  (The hospital’s 
revised staffing policy will be considered in greater detail below.) Writing to the 
LMS Directors in 1948 he drew attention to the fact that he and his wife had a 
sense of “doing our bit” in helping to stock the internment camps with drugs.17   
Beynon had been dragged from his bed to face interrogation by the Japanese, an 
incident of which he and his family had lived in constant fear of re-occurrence. 
On his return to Britain, Beynon regarded himself as an: 
 odd man out with the humiliation of the realization that whatever one’s 
past has been or the extent of one’s contribution that the recognition is 
nil.18 
 
Three years after the war’s end Beynon remained without work in his home 
country and his disillusionment is clear.19   
 Disillusionment was not reserved for those who returned home; it was also 
experienced by those who remained in China. In January 1947, 18 months after 
                                                 
14 Frankl, V.E., Man’s Search, 2006, p. 90. 
15 Such delayed reaction is symptomatic of PTSD and concentration-camp syndrome. 
16 Beynon’s entry in th Annotated Register of LMS Missionaries, 1796–1923 records “Owing to 
changed policy of LCH, his service terminated June 1948”. 
17 Beynon, O.G.R., to The Directors, LMS, April 22nd, 1948, CWM/LMS CH/10, 1941–50,Central 
China Correspondence,  Beynon file, 1939–49. 
18 Ibid., Beynon’s work in securing medical supplies for the camps was recognised in Goodall, N., 
History of, 1954, p. 193. 
19 Beynon eventually found a position in India. 
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his release from internment, Graham experienced war weariness and questioned 
his professional skill:  
 As the time for my first furlough approaches I realise that there is a 
certain weariness which has been slowly overtaking me.  Is it the result 
of the war and the long continued abnormal conditions, or is it an after-
effect of internment?  One’s feeling in Tsanghsien [Cangzhou] is that 
one is still interned, without gaining all the benefits of fellowship with 
new friends which one had in camp. One most definitely feels the need 
of mental and spiritual renewing… From the professional point of view: 
there have been so many advances in the past ten years (I left England 
in 1937) that a furlough will be too short a time in which to bring 
myself up to date…  20 
 
Graham’s morale was low. Isolated in Cangzhou he was deprived of fellowship 
and had been requested to forego an overdue furlough. He was conscious that his 
professional skills needed updating and he was overseeing a hospital he was not 
even sure should have been re-opened. In discussion concerning the re-opening of 
the hospital he had questioned where the staff necessary to manage the hospital 
would be obtained and, as he had predicted, staffing did indeed prove 
problematic.21  No doctor was eager to take responsibility for the hospital while 
conditions remained unsettled and wartime disruption to medical colleges and 
nursing schools had added to the problems of engaging Chinese staff.  These 
staffing problems, augmented by financial difficulties and a flood that had caused 
the collapse of 700 feet of the mission compound’s wall had undermined 
Graham’s work and his morale. 22  War-weary and lacking fellowship he 
recognised a similar “war-weariness” of the Chinese people and wrote that “the 
moral laxity and selfishness noticed after every war is very apparent”. 23  
Altogether it seems to have been a demoralising appointment for Graham and a 
further example of medical missionary post-war disillusionment. All this was a 
                                                 
20 Graham, K.I., 1946 Tientsin and Tsinghsien Annual Report, January, 1947, CWM/LMS CH/2, 
1941–50, China/Hong Kong Reports, Graham file. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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long way from being the Chief Medical Officer of Putong Camp where his days 
had had meaning, where he had enjoyed fellowship and, even if he questioned 
whether he possessed the latest knowledge, he had been confident he was giving 
of his best.    
 Gillison, convinced that time in the internment camps had not been wasted, 
experienced grief over lost years with his children and this was the main reason 
given for his letter of resignation to the Board in 1949. Gillison had experience of 
the parent/child separation factor involved in missionary work having been the 
child of missionary parents.24  The Gillisons had left their children for over six 
years in their previous term in the field and felt they could not leave their children 
again for a similar period of time.25  Reference has already been made to his 
daughter’s loss of faith.  In a more explanatory letter written soon after his letter 
of resignation, Gillison set out why he was so opposed to the long separation of 
parent and child; it deterred suitable candidates, it caused missionaries to resign at 
the peak of their usefulness and it created antipathy in missionary children who 
otherwise might have followed their parents into a missionary career. 26  
Separation had been most acutely experienced during internment and, when 
released, the Gillisons officially requested that furlough policy for missionaries 
with families be revised. The Gillisons were not alone in their thoughts as noted 
by Baxter the Secretary of the LMS China Council in Shanghai: 
 A considerable number of people now returning, have raised with me 
the question of a shorter term of service for their next term, partly in 
                                                 
24 Keith Gillison served 23 years as a medical missionary in China and his father 55 years. For an 
account of the Gillison family’s work in China see: Gillison, and Frampton, The Cross, 1988. 
25 Gillison, K.H., to Orchard, R.K., February 2nd, 1949, CWM/LMS CH/11, 1941–50, Central 
China, Correspondence, Gillison K.H. file, 1941–1950.  Resignation accepted in Resolution of the 
Directors, Minute B9137, November 1949, CWM/LMS CH/11, 1941–50, Central China 
Correspondence, Gillison, K.H., file, 1941–50.  
26 Gillison K.H., to Orchard, R.K., February 15th, 1949, CWM/LMS CH/11, 1941–50, Central 
China, Gillison K.H., file. One ‘mish kid’ is cited by Austin as saying: “We were sacrificed on the 
altar of our parents’ missionary career”. Austin, A.J., Saving China, 1986, p. 332.  
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view of family circumstances and partly in view of extended periods of 
service in their last term.27 
 
Times changed and medical missionaries themselves had changed. They were no 
longer willing to fall in line with the society’s rules regarding terms of service but 
were willing to speak out and make their reservations public. They had, as 
Beynon remarked, “done their bit” and wanted support. Gillison returned to 
Hankou in 1947 and his wife joined him the following year. They remained until 
granted exit papers in June 1950.28    
 
Change and Medical Missionary Work  
It is unlikely medical missionaries fully appreciated quite the enormity of the 
post-war changes at the time.  Baxter reported to London that: 
 Our China friends as well as others remind us that the past in mission 
work is gone and that the Chinese Government will have to lay down 
its new conditions for mission work of all kinds.  Till that is done we 
don’t know where we are.29 
 
The extent of the changed conditions was less of a revelation to those in Free 
China, and at home, than for internees isolated from the papers and reports that 
had circulated regarding post-war missionary policy which, as we shall see, 
predicted the post-war period would be a time of change. The International 
Mission Council (IMC) 30  in 1944 suggested there would be a post-war 
                                                 
27 Baxter, A., to Orchard, R.K., “Shortened Terms of Service”, CWM/LMS CH/8, 1941–50, 
China/Hong Kong Correspondence, Baxter file, April/June, 1947. 
28 Gillison, and Frampton, The Cross, 1988, p. 179. 
29 Baxter, A., to Brown, T.C., September 11th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/8, 1941–50, China/Hong 
Kong Correspondence, Baxter file. 
30 The International Missionary Council directed and coordinated the operations of the World 
Christian Mission organising independent conferences and councils although it did not have the 
authority to issue directives and its decisions were not mandatory.  Decker, J.W., “The Post-war 
Programme of the International Missionary Council”, in IRM, October, 1944, Vol., 33, No. 132, 
pp. 433–442, p. 433. Decker had been a missionary in China with the American Baptist Foreign 
Mission becoming Secretary of the International Missionary Council in 1943. 
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opportunity for experimentation. 31  Old assumptions should be discarded and 
questions asked whether there should be a replica of the old-structure, a new 
philosophy based on the old order or new principles and a new philosophy.32  The 
old assumptions, such as missionaries believing they could do a better job than 
allowing indigenous Christians to manage for themselves, and that the western 
style of Church and Church programme suited Asia and Africa, had been passed 
down by missionaries to their indigenous colleagues.  These concepts had no 
place in the post-war and post-colonial world.33  
 Searle Bates (1897–1978), a former member of the University of 
Nanjing’s history department, also with the IMC, noted that a characteristic 
cultural nationalist response to the crisis of war was an assertion of native culture. 
Western dominance had disintegrated and would never return to its former 
position. Post-war, there would be no return to pre-war society, but an adjustment 
to a post-war society. 34  Latourette acknowledged an “augmented nationalism 
proudly conscious of the record of resistance in Japan” and heralded the post-war 
period as one of great opportunity for Christianity; an opportunity to “begin afresh 
unhampered by the mistakes of the past”.35  The IMC’s post-war principal policy 
objectives were to strengthen ecumenical relations within the Christian Church 
and to promote and co-ordinate post-war planning and rehabilitation. 36 
Representatives of younger Churches would be invited to the west to “prepare” 
western attitudes to the changed conditions. It was recognised there could be no 
                                                 
31 Davis, J.M., “Principles of Missions in a New Age”, in IRM, Vol., 32, No. 125, July, 1943, pp. 
264–278, p. 271 
32 Ibid., p. 264. 
33 Ibid, p. 265. 
34 Bates, M.S., “The Far East and Missionary Planning”, in IRM, Vol., 32, No. 128, October, 1943, 
pp. 369–376. 
35 Latourette, K., “Pre-war Christian groups in Asia in Post-war Planning”, in IRM,Vol., 33, No. 
130, April, 1944, pp. 138–146, p. 144. 
36 Decker, J.W., “The Post-war Programme of the International Missionary Council” in IRM,  Vol., 
33, No. 132, October, 1944, pp. 433–442, p. 436.  
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blueprint for the post-war period and that it would be crucial action was taken 
neither too early nor too late. Too early, and the physical effects of the war would 
impede progress, too late, and mission planning would be following in the wake 
of a country’s political, economic, and social post-war reconstruction.37  Decker 
also highlighted an important point; wartime psychology would condition 
attitudes and thinking clouding objectivity and vision.38  These cries for change 
stemmed partly from the Mission Boards’ own desire to put the past behind them 
but, perhaps more forcibly, in response to a strengthened indigenous nationalism 
that no longer respected the west as offering a superior example.  In China, the 
call for change was reinforced by the abrogation of the treaty system in 1943 and, 
as Ling has argued, many missionaries thought this would wipe away the unequal 
treaty stigma that missionary work had carried in the past.39  These thoughts were, 
however, to prove delusionary. As well as having wartime psychology, the 
released interned medical missionaries had the added burden of camp psychology.  
Cocooned within the camps they had been isolated from the missionary journals 
that could have alerted them to the type of post-war changes to which they would 
be expected to adapt.  Similarly, they were unable to attend, or read reports of,  
the May 1943 CMA Conference at Chongqing when Director General Dr. P.Z. 
King urged co-operation and asked Christian doctors to welcome newly appointed 
government health officers and work with them to solve mission hospital  
problems. 40  This spirit of co-operation was echoed by Mission Board 
representatives. 41 Interned medical missionaries were side-lined from this shift 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 439. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ling, O.K., Changing Role, 1999, p. 59.  
40 Outerbridge, T.S., “A Future for Christian Medical Services in China”, in IRM, Vol., 33, No. 
132, October 1944, pp. 415–425, p. 420. The Hunan Health Administration held a conference for 
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towards greater Chinese post-war leadership.  This is not to suggest they had not 
discussed their post-war expectations among themselves, but that they had been 
isolated from the public debate within mission circles.   
 Medical missionaries who had been interned had also been isolated from 
discussion within their own professional field. A British Red Cross and Order of 
St. John report from Changsha published in July 1943 stated: 
It seems definite that in the China of the future, Mission Hospitals will 
be expected to function within the framework of the Government 
Health Administration Services, of which they will have to form a part.  
A reliable spokesman of the National Health Administration in 
addressing the Council on Medical Missions, announced “Mission 
Hospitals should serve as a unit, part and parcel of the government 
Health Scheme.42  
 
The report’s unidentified author also comments:  
 In fitting into this National Health programme and I do not think there 
will be any place for the Mission Hospital outside of it – the first 
essential will be registration with the government.  (a) for the hospital 
(b) for the medical staff (c) for the nursing staff (d) for the Nursing 
School, (e) probably registration for all those engaged in the ancillary 
services.43 
 
The report recommended Mission Boards should start meeting together and be 
prepared to pool their resources, form a central agency for drugs and present a 
united medical front.   
 One of the first post-war papers to address the missionary role in China, to 
which the ex-internee medical missionaries would have had access, was written 
by Frank Balchin (b. 1913), an LMS missionary on furlough in Britain in October, 
1945.  This argued that missionary work had reached the third of a possible four 
stages: the pioneer and organisational stages of missionary work had passed and 
the co-operative stage reached, but the “trend for Church development” stage 
                                                                                                                                     
mission doctors to discuss future plans, which was seen as a “valuable” opportunity to network. 
CMJ, Vol., 62, No. 3, July-September, 1944, p. 302. 
41Ibid., p. 421.  
42 CSM, British Red Cross and Order of St. John, China, Hospital Unit Changsha, July 30th, 1943, 
Acc 7548 B 181 General 1940–5, CSM archive. 
43 Ibid.  
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remained unattainable.44  Balchin recognised there was still some way to go to 
reach devolution. He predicted the immediate post-war years would be consumed 
with the practicalities of resuming work and that the situation would stabilise 
itself around 1949.  He suggested Jiang Jieshi’s invitation for missionary support 
and a request from the NHA for medical assistance were positive indicators for 
the medical ministry and predicted a bright future for medical work in China.  
Medical missionaries were coming out of internment to positive predictions for 
their future.45  
 While reports and recommendations were circulating in Free China and 
abroad, Chinese staff within the occupied areas were gaining experience in 
managing hospitals without the foreign missionary presence and financial support. 
Although standards dropped as a result of negligent Japanese supervision, a 
shortage of drugs and equipment, and inadequate funding, this was a period when 
the Chinese gained confidence in their medical skills and management abilities. 
Given the necessary drugs, equipment, and funding the Chinese had no reason to 
believe that, post-war, they could not continue to manage without foreign 
intervention.  In some hospitals, the new stance came into force immediately; in 
others the change was more gradual. 
 After the Japanese surrender the LCH in Shanghai immediately put into 
effect new conditions for the staffing of the hospital giving priority to Chinese 
employees, with repercussions that will be discussed below.  Such a development 
had been foreseen by Baxter in 1942 who predicted that leaving the Chinese to 
carry on alone would bring change and that “the Chinese will have a good deal to 
                                                 
44 Balchin, F., “The Place of the Missionary in the Chinese Church”, in IRM, Vol., 34, No. 136, 
October, 1945, pp. 369–376. 
45 Ibid. 
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say as to the people they want to return after the war…”.46   It would “not be the 
case of resuming work anywhere” and post-war expectation should be that little of 
the physical fabric and equipment would survive. 47  Baxter’s comments proved to 
be prophetic as an examination of some of the hospitals in occupied China during 
the Return and Re-establishment phase will indicate.  
 
Return and Re-establishment Phase 
It is impossible within the confines of this thesis to recount the post-war condition 
of all the mission hospitals in occupied and Free China, however the following 
examples, primarily from Hubei, will serve to provide specific examples that 
permit both general and specific observations to be made.  
 
(i) FAU Relief and Rehabilitation: Union Hospital, Hankou.  
The buildings at the original Union Hospital site were reported as being in a “fair 
condition” although the chapel had been completely destroyed by bombing.48  
The Town Branch (the Ho Chi) at the YMCA building had continued under 
Chinese direction until it, together with the Catholic Mission Hospital and the 
International Hospital, was completely destroyed by incendiary bombing on 
December 18th, 1942.49  Wickings was the first LMS representative to return to 
Wuhan where he discovered former LMS Chinese staff and congregations had 
heard that all missionaries were pulling out of Wuhan and returning home.50 With 
no support, either financial or otherwise, following the missionary internment in 
                                                 
46 Baxter A., to Brown, TC.., July 27th, 1942, CWM/LMS CH/50, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong., 
Anglo-Japanese War Situation Correspondence, 1941–44 file.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Gillison, K.H, “The Future of the Hankow Union Hospital and the Re-building of Central 
China’s Medical Missionary Enterprise”,  November 5th, 1945, p.1, CWM/LMS CH/41, 1941–50, 
China/Hong Kong, Future of Hankow Union. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Wickings, H.F., Epilogue in Rowlands, E., End of, 1947, p. 98. 
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April 1942, and having had to find other means by which to support themselves, 
this news had been met with dismay. The arrival of Wickings, therefore, provided 
a much needed assurance to Wuhan’s Chinese Christians that they had not been 
abandoned.51 Wickings was followed in November by Gillison who reported that 
700 Japanese patients were still occupying the Union Hospital which had been 
converted into a Japanese infectious diseases hospital.52   
 The Union Hospital provides an insight into the FAU’s relief and 
rehabilitation work. In October, an agreement was drawn up between the FAU 
and a Shanghai Committee of the Union Hospital Board including Drs. Chapman, 
Bolton, and Gillison, Nurse Jean Gillison, the Revs. Wickings, Gedye, Griffiths, 
and Rees.53 Under the agreement, and the same month that it was drawn up, an 
FAU medical team under the direction of McClure re-opened part of the Union 
hospital with a skeleton staff to maintain 40 beds.54  The FAU medical team, 
acting as “a spearhead”, in a similar but more secular version of the medical 
missionary wedge tradition, worked “in connection with the NHA”.55  An out-
patient’s department was opened at the hospital on December 11th.56   
 The agreement allowed the FAU to negotiate day to day matters directly 
with the Union Hospital’s Board in Hankou – effectively by-passing LMS and 
MMS home base executives. This recognised the need in the field to eliminate 
relaying minor incidental details to London for comment or authorisation, and 
ensured decisions could be made on the spot with the minimum of delay.  Details 
                                                 
51 White, J. F., Annual Report, 1945/46, p. 2, CWM/LMS CH/3, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong 
Correspondence, White file, 1939–48 
52 Gillison, K.H, “The Future”, 1945. 
53 Ibid., Griffiths A.F., to Cocker Brown, T., October 11th, 1945. 
54 Gillison, K.H, “The Future”, 1945. 
55 Heady, J.J., to Secretaries of L.M.S. London, November 11th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/41, 1941–
50, China/Hong Kong, Union Hospital Hankow Correspondence 1937–45. 
56 Craig Stuart, C., to Brown, T.C., correspondence, December 12th, 1945, CWM/LMS CH/11, 
1941–1950, Central China Correspondence, Craig file, 1940–50. 
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continued to be relayed to London and consent requested for major decisions such 
as the signing of the agreement itself, but minor proceedings were to be settled 
locally. The agreement proposed an FAU medical team for a maximum of six 
months of at least two doctors and four supporting personnel.57 The hospital’s 
Board of Directors were to be responsible for all repairs and restoration 
refurbishment for which funds would be provided by UNNRA, CNRRA and other 
relief agencies. The FAU, which provided its staff free of charge, was responsible 
for obtaining all disposable medical supplies and as much free non-disposable 
equipment as was possible.  Standard hospital equipment supplied by FAU from 
their stock would be paid for at cost when the FAU withdrew, and all other 
hospital equipment would be purchased by Rev. Heady, the Acting Hospital 
Superintendent, in consultation with the FAU team leader. 58  Thus, the FAU 
provided the medical needs of the hospital; the staff, the equipment and the 
supplies, and the Hospital Board accepted responsibility for the hospital’s fabric. 
The FAU maintained control of the externally funded relief aspects of the 
hospital’s reopening while providing a foundation for future rehabilitation and 
development.  That the agreement was drawn up with such concord and so rapidly 
following the end of the war indicates the high level of post-war co-operation 
between LMS, MMS and the relief agencies. Such an arrangement was very much 
to LMS and MMS’s advantage since it provided them with much needed 
breathing space. The societies believed the local population needed a highly 
visible public expression of commitment and the reopening of the hospital, even 
partially, within two months of the end of the war, would make a positive public 
statement.  The FAU agreement brought medical mission relief to the city, while 
                                                 
57 Bell, C.W., F.A.U. (China Committee) Chairman to Chairman Board of Directors, October 1st, 
1945, CWM/LMS CH/41, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong, Union Hospital Hankow Correspondence. 
58 Ibid. 
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providing mission societies with the extra time they needed to formulate future 
policy, repatriate their staff, and enlist and send out replacements. Edward 
Cundall the hospital’s Superintendent when it was founded in 1927, who had 
served 44 years in China before retirement in 1940, was sent back by the MMS as 
a ‘bridge’ missionary. Crucially, the hospital had no income until it was 
operational which was an added incentive driving forward its re-opening.    
 
(ii) Under Chinese Management in Wuhan: Pu’ai, Ren Chi, and Ho Chi 
Hospitals 
 The Pu’ai, in the heart of the Chinese area of the city, was the only 
mission hospital in Hankou that continued, more or less undisturbed, from the 
missionaries’ enforced departure to their return. Despite Hankou being 
systematically bombed by the Americans and Chinese from the Japanese 
Concession to the mouth of the Han River, the hospital, under the Medical 
Superintendentship of Chiang, escaped serious damage by virtue of its 
geographical position. It served as a focal point for Chinese Christians throughout 
wartime Hankou and was likened by one writer to the role played by monasteries 
in conserving the Christian tradition through the Dark Ages.59  Chiang’s role was 
acknowledged: 
 Dr. Chiang has done a wonderful piece of work in keeping the 
Hospital going all the time, without any help or control by the Japanese 
or puppets.  The equipment needs replenishing but the whole thing is a 
going concern.  More than this, it has served as a nucleus for our 
workers here and a general encouragement to all.60 
 
                                                 
59 Anon, General Report for Hupeh District, 1945. Rattenbury attributes to Stephenson, MMS Box 
1294, Hupeh Chairman’s Correspondence, 1945/1949.  
60 Heady, J.J. to Rattenbury, H.B., October 27th, 1945, MMS Box 1294, Hupeh Chairman’s 
Correspondence, 1945/1949.  
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As a result of the December 18th 1942 air raids, the Pu’ai became the only 
hospital in Hankou with facilities to treat civilian casualties.  Chiang described 
these assaults as daylight “carpet bombing” on the ex-German, ex-Japanese and 
French Concession areas, which had led to an exodus of people with Hankou 
becoming a “dead city.”61  He commented: 
 We never dreamt of leaving our patients in the lurch.  Our stay 
affected our neighbours.  They also remained behind with us.62 
 
Such an example can only have supported the Pu’ai’s role as a rallying point in 
Hankou . Chiang also wrote:  
 My heart is full of joy and gratitude to God for the privilege of 
bearing the heavy burden of the Methodist General Hospital 
[Pu’ai].63 
 
With the arrival of peace, Chiang was aware that: 
 Peace has come at last. The old order is bound to yield.  The new order 
is in the making, new wine to be put in new skins, For this reason and 
for family reasons I beg leave to retire from mission service at the end 
of 1946.64 
 
 Chiang was 63 years old in 1945 and, after having had the responsibility 
of keeping the hospital open throughout the war, his request would appear a 
reasonable one, but Rattenbury replied that it was “just unthinkable” and 
suggested Chiang take a holiday before making any serious decision.65  Chiang 
did not retire and visited England at the Board’s expense in 1948.66  Dr. Teng 
Pang, at the MMS Zhongxiang Hospital, had also worked throughout the war 
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although he had been imprisoned for seven and a half months by the Japanese. 
After seven years of war during four and a half of which he operated single-
handedly he, like Chiang, was feeling the strain: 
 I myself am feeling the nervous strain too when the longstanding 
tension is over.  I have had no holiday for the past nine years so I feel 
that I must have [a] holiday to refresh myself both physically and 
mentally…67 
 
 Why did the Japanese not requisition the Pu’ai?  Having requisitioned the 
Union Hospital as a military hospital and handed the Ho Chi to the puppet 
government it is arguable that the Japanese recognised the need for an 
independent civilian hospital, but this seems doubtful. The answer seems more 
likely to lie in the fact that Oertel, an Axis national, had not been interned and 
remained in Hankou on the hospital staff, which may have protected the hospital 
from Japanese interference. It was with “great relief” that the news reached 
Longhua camp that Oertel was still incumbent in his position at the hospital.68   
Conversely official reports concentrate very much on the influence and hard work 
of Chiang as the leading force in the continuation of the hospital’s services.69  
From the mission’s perspective it may have been politically astute not to draw 
attention to the fact that their hospital had been protected by a German national, 
even though he was a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, when feelings towards 
Germans in post-war Britain were still raw.  The Ren Chi in Wuchang had also 
continued operating for the duration of the war, similarly with aid from neutral 
citizens; in this case Swedish missionaries.  By way of contrast with post-war 
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reportage of the Pu’ai, the support that the Ren Chi received from neighbouring 
Swedish missionaries received far greater mention and this may be explained by 
the Swedes being neutrals and, therefore, regarded in post-war Britain with less 
acrimony than Germans. 
 Even with neutral support, not all Chinese-run hospitals had been 
successful in missionary eyes. The missionary who took responsibility for the Ren 
Chi immediately after the war raised concerns with the LMS executive in 
December 1945 that the standard of medical practice at the hospital was causing 
concerns and, as a result, it was bringing the mission into disrepute.70  Also the 
Swedish Mission no longer felt it could recommend patients for treatment at the 
hospital.  There appeared to be some financial irregularities with Dr. Yeh being 
able to obtain “vast sums of money for this and that purpose” at a time when other 
medical institutions were experiencing grave economic problems.71  It is unclear 
whether there was a suspicion of collaboration with the puppet government or 
financial embezzlement; but that Yeh was able to raise these sums was regarded 
as suspicious. The recommendation was to take either the hospital in hand to raise 
standards or close it down. 72   Despite having managed to keep the hospital 
running throughout the war, Yeh found himself under suspicion as a result of his 
business acumen. Again, the question must be asked whether the returning 
medical missionaries had empathy; did they have any real understanding of the 
conditions Yeh had worked under during the final years of the war?  
 The Ho Chi Hospital, created from the Union Hospital’s town branch and 
staffed by Ex-Union Hospital Chinese staff had been handed over by the Japanese 
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military to the puppet government in the final years of the war for municipal 
administration.  Dr. Liu remained at the helm until early in 1944 when he was 
transferred to another hospital and his assistant Dr. Wang took charge.73   The Ho 
Chi had, however, continued successfully under Chinese leadership, with no 
neutral aid for over two years after the foreigners had been interned. Chapman, in 
his 1940–1945 report, referred proudly to the Ho Chi’s continuation under 
Chinese leadership as a “witness to the faith that was in it”.74  He also commented 
that the hospital staff had endured the Japanese occupation and the “taunts of its 
friends in Free China”.75  This was a reference to accusations of collaboration 
from those returning from Free China directed at those who had remained in 
occupied China.  
 After the war, the Chinese who had evacuated to the West returned and 
tensions arose between them and their fellow countrymen who had remained 
working in the missions in occupied China, and all others who had stayed and 
were accused of collaboration.  The latter were described by MMS as ‘loyalists’ 
for having remained with the mission and the returning evacuees were described 
as ‘patriots’ for having followed their leaders to the West.76  The patriots despised 
the loyalists, regarding them as having collaborated with the Japanese, and this ill 
feeling was intensified when returnees discovered positions they had hoped to 
take up upon their return were already filled by ‘puppet upstart’ loyalists.  
Conversely, where returning patriots were placed in positions of authority over 
loyalists, similar ill-feeling was fuelled. This “bitter conflict”, as it was described 
by one missionary  was initially thought to be fuelled by three factors; the 
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confusion in the handover period of post-war China, the delay, regarding 
Shanghai, in removing Japanese from their posts, and the National government’s 
apparent decision not to punish collaborators.77   
 
(iii) Post-war Transfer of Power 
In Xiaogan, it transpired that, after the Japanese took control when the foreigners 
were interned, some of the Chinese Church members and hospital staff took 
advantage of the situation to remove fixtures and floorboards to repair their own 
homes.  When the missionaries returned there was not one item of equipment 
remaining. 78  While the Japanese carried out some repairs, the materials used 
were worn and of an inferior quality when compared with the original materials. 
The arrangements that had been made for the Japanese to support the hospital 
financially had, perhaps predictably, been neglected. Disappointment was 
expressed that the Chinese Church members had not only done little to protect the 
hospital but, in particular, had failed to shield the leprosarium. 79  When the 
medical missionaries withdrew from Xiaogan in 1942 they left behind 66 lepers 
but, by the Autumn of 1945, there were only 19 still living and they were reported 
to have “undergone great privations”. 80   The 1942 Hankou city government 
hygiene resolutions record that some lepers were transferred from Hankou to 
                                                 
77 Anon, General Report for Hupeh District, 1945, 1945/1949.  For Nationalist government’s 
stance regarding Chinese collaborators see Pepper, S., Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 
1945–1949, New York and Oxford, Rowman and Litlefield, 1999, pp. 9–16. 
78 Wickings, H.F., to Brown, T.C., December 12th 1945, CWM/LMS CH/14, 1941–50, Central 
China Correspondence, Wickings file, 1940–50. 
79 Sparkes, C.I.,  Annual Report for Siaokan,1947, CWM/LMS CH/3, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong 
Reports,  Sparkes file, 1947–49. 
80 1947 Report on The Leper Colony at Siaokan, Central China, CWM/LMS CH/9, 1941–50, 
China/Hong Kong Correspondence file 1947–48. Communists closed the hospital in 1949. 
 320 
Xiaogan, therefore the death rate was, in fact, higher than these numbers 
suggest.81  
 When medical missionaries returned to Xiaogan the houses in the mission 
compound remained occupied by the Xiaogan Government Middle School and 
negotiations by Nurse Sparkes to regain possession proved ineffectual. 
Individuals were helpful but local administrative bodies such as the Chinese 
Church group would not cooperate. When the British Consular Authorities 
suggested a representative Chinese be found to register a protest Sparkes felt she 
had “lost face badly over it”.82  This incident illustrates a post-war power shift in 
negotiation; previously, the foreigner had been acknowledged as filling the key 
negotiating role in mission affairs, but, post-war, the Chinese had moved into this 
position.  In tandem with this power shift, Chinese staff began to receive greater 
public recognition from missionary societies for their work; Dr. Ch’iu’s support in 
the rehabilitation of the hospital was praised fulsomely by Dr. Entrican in her 
1948 Annual Report: 
 It was a real uplift to me to see how much had been done to revive the 
work and to rehabilitate the buildings.  This is due in great measure to 
Dr. Ch’iu – to whom we owe more than we can repay for the way in 
which he tackled the business of making fit for use, first one building 
and then another…83 
 
In February 1946, under the care of Dr. Ch’iu and as a result of relief and gifts 
from UNRRA, CNRRA, BRC and British Aid to China, the Xiaogan hospital 
reopened to out-patients although it was unable to accept in-patients until 1948.84 
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 The point to note regarding these three hospitals is not whether the former 
Chinese staff of the mission hospitals were regarded by the medical missionaries 
as having ‘held the fort’ efficiently during their absence but that the Chinese 
perceived themselves as competent and capable of sustaining managerial and 
administrative roles in hospital management.  
  
(iv) Summary of War Damage and Medical Missionary Response   
The physical damage to missionary hospitals in occupied China came as a result 
of Japanese aerial assault and physical occupation, and Chinese and American 
bombing raids.  However, unlike the Japanese raids, the latter were regarded as a 
necessary evil by the Chinese. One Chinese pastor, when asked whether he 
harboured any resentment over the American bombing raids, commented: 
 American planes, your planes brought hope to our hearts.  
Without them there would have been no end to tyranny, no real 
peace again.85 
 
While citing this quotation this writer acknowledges that the editor of the ACM 
newsletter Forth in 1946 was unlikely to publish any articles featuring Chinese 
citizens condemning American bombing raids in China during the war.  However, 
there is no reason to doubt that bombing motivated by liberation must have been 
easier to accommodate psychologically than bombing motivated by a desire to 
conquer. 
 In comparison with many other areas the Wuhan hospitals escaped with 
minimal physical damage. Those who returned to the Mackenzie Memorial 
Hospital in Tianjin in October 1945 were shocked by the sight of the buildings 
and the smell.  There was dismay that everything the society had worked for over 
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the years had been reduced to such disarray, and disappointment that the staff had 
been unable to maintain former standards of cleanliness and care.86 One visitor 
reported that the hospital was in ruins, there was two feet of foul water in the 
basement, the nurses had been badly trained under the Japanese, there were no 
sterile dressings and the servants had removed a considerable amount of hospital 
equipment. 87   
 Smaller scale physical damage to hospitals was generally the result of 
action by the Japanese as they adapted buildings to suit their own purposes.  For 
example, the removal of the compound wall at St. James Hospital in Anqing to 
provide building material for eight underground shelters was an operation on such 
a scale that it required military supervision of a large labour force in full public 
view.88 The pilfering of medical supplies, hospital equipment, drugs and building 
material, such as floorboards, is consistently recorded in missionary records as a 
Chinese rather than a Japanese operation.89 For example the author of the CovMS 
Bethesda Hospital Annual Report for 1945 wrote: 
 My considered opinion from all evidence that I have been able to gather, 
is that our hospital lost more equipment at the hands of the Chinese army 
and Chinese civilian looters than that which was lost to the Japanese.90  
   
The Japanese, as occupiers, were expected to seize and requisition items from 
hospitals and such actions were therefore probably unworthy of any particular 
comment but when a Chinese, particularly a trusted former hospital staff member, 
was documented as having removed drugs and equipment it was a betrayal of 
trust. In the theatre of war, it was an act that undermined medical missionary 
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efforts to aid the country of the people who were stealing from them.  It would not 
be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that such pilfering whether of small or 
large quantities, was tantamount to sabotaging the Chinese war effort particularly 
if it was suspected the materials were being passed on for Japanese use. 91   
 There is a case to answer that the returning medical missionaries lacked a 
real appreciation of the daily experiences of their Chinese colleagues under 
Japanese rule.  While they were interned, their Chinese staff had lost all mission 
society support, (apart from isolated cases where neutrals remained), and the 
removal of some floorboards or the pilfering of drugs may have provided an 
essential means of support for desperate people.  Likewise, some Chinese staff 
were refused permission from the Japanese to resign their hospital positions.92  
Consequently, the loyalties they had towards the foreign mission staff could 
conceivably have been laid aside, so that staff, had they paused to consider it, 
perceived themselves as diverting goods from the Japanese rather than stealing 
from the missions. Without Chinese accounts of their experiences Chinese 
motives must remain a matter for speculation and the medical missionary post-
war policy of looking forward did not encourage retrospective examination of 
Chinese motivation under Japanese rule.  Norman Cliff reported that, when he 
spoke to Chinese Christians upon his release from Weixian, they had told him 
women chi kule “我們吃苦了”, “We have eaten bitterness”, acknowledging their 
wartime experiences had been difficult. 93  By the time most medical missionaries 
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returned to the field, the time had passed for recrimination and to look back would 
have been regarded as adopting a retrograde retrospective attitude towards their 
mission work. 
 Damage to hospital buildings and loss of equipment and materials was, for 
the most part, redeemable enough to encourage re-building, given recourse to 
funding. The medical missionary response to the damage to their hospitals and 
compounds, following the initial shock and disappointment of those who returned 
to the field in the remaining months of 1945, was to re-build wherever possible.  
This response was very much in keeping with medical missionary optimism. Only 
in areas where the damage had been total, such as at Xiaochang, did they 
withdraw completely, and there, the decision was influenced by Communist 
activity in the area.   
  
Medical Missionary Post-war Reconstruction Policies 
During the Return and Rehabilitation phase a standardisation of logistics, an 
amalgamation of resources, greater support for medical missionaries new to the 
field, and the promotion of more extensive medical education for the Chinese 
were the four main foundations upon which the post-war policies proposed by 
medical missionaries rested.   
 McClure, who had worked with the IRC in Honan in 1941 as well as with 
the FAU, proposed a practical policy for obtaining mission hospital supplies.94  
His vision was the establishment of a “United Missions Purchasing Agency” that 
could function much as the IRC had in wartime.  Operating from Chongqing, the 
IRC had acted as a distributing organisation managing a medical supply 
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warehouse for mission hospitals. McClure was also well acquainted with 
transporting supplies along the Burma Road having driven it himself twelve times 
by early 1942.95  The experienced personnel and procedures necessary to run such 
a post-war centralised purchasing and supply agency were already in place. Most 
of the information, including the paperwork needed to operate such a system, was 
on file.  Standardisation of drugs and uniform procedures would facilitate bulk 
purchasing of supplies and equipment and, as much electrical equipment had been 
destroyed during the war, the perfect opportunity had arrived to standardise 
electricity supplies within mission hospitals. Previously different generating 
machines and voltages had necessitated obtaining machinery from a myriad of 
companies but, with standardisation, not only would equipment be 
interchangeable but specific personnel could be trained to maintain equipment and 
operate on a peripatetic basis. This was a similar idea to that mooted in the 1943 
BRC and St. John report but McClure was promoting the Purchasing Agency 
using the benefit of his own experience, which had been gained well before 1943. 
McClure was a surgeon, and a competent mechanic with the ability to strip and 
rebuild engines and vehicle bodies of all kinds and he had been responsible for 
establishing and running the FAU’s China Convoy trucks.96  He was alert to the 
inconvenience of not having interchangeable parts and equipment. Adding 
support to McClure’s proposal was the IRC’s experience of placing personnel in 
mission hospitals, an activity that could be continued for both foreign and Chinese 
staff. McClure promoted the Purchasing Agency as practical and one that would 
save “thousands of dollars each year if it can be put into practice”.97  His proposal 
demonstrates how medical missionary wartime experience influenced medical 
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missionary post-war policy recommendation. However, despite the financial sense 
and practicality of McClure’s proposal, he was unsuccessful in establishing it on a 
nationwide scale but there are indications that he was successful on a small scale 
in Wuhan. 
 While the Union Hospital was receiving FAU relief under McClure’s 
direction, an ambitious policy was under discussion between the MMS and LMS 
in London.  This was based on a scheme proposed by Gillison to amalgamate the 
medical establishments in Wuhan and create a Central China Christian Medical 
Union (CCCMU).98  A Wuhan Christian Hospital Union would consist of the 
Christian hospitals in Wuhan, the IHT, a United School of Nursing and a new 
United School of Midwifery. Within the Christian Hospital Union, the Union 
Hospital would aspire to achieve official recognition as a teaching hospital from 
both the government and Church medical schools. The other three hospitals, the 
Pu’ai, the ACM Church General and the Ren Chi would aim to develop 
specialisations to avoid duplication of services.   In a scheme very similar to that 
proposed by McClure and possibly influenced by him, a Central Business 
Provincial Depot would standardise the purchasing of drugs and equipment.  The 
aim was to amalgamate and coordinate the work of the existing missions in 
Central China “with a view to using their total resources as effectively as 
possible”.99 The scheme was approved in London in June 1946.100  The emphasis 
on raising the Union Hospital to government registered teaching status, the 
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expansion and registration of the existing nursing school and the establishment 
and registration of a new midwifery school confirm the prominence the training of 
Chinese staff was to be given in cooperation with government institutions. 
Paradoxically, this emphasis on cooperation was to lead to a call from one senior 
generation missionary, William Rowlands (1886–1971), in January 1946, for a 
reduced emphasis on educational and medical work on the understanding that 
these were now the concern of the Chinese government, not the mission. 
Rowlands suggested the Mission should place an “ever increasing emphasis on 
evangelism…”101  This was the antithesis of the outcome medical missionaries 
had envisaged for the post-war period and relegated their work to that of an 
auxiliary role that reduced it to little more than the wedge tactic of earlier years.  
Such a stance suggests that for some, like Rowlands, despite wartime change, 
there had been no evolution of the medical missionary role from that of its 
original wedge tactic.  
 The McAlls were medical missionaries who felt strongly enough about the 
need for policy changes to prepare a policy document and present it to LMS 
within a year of the war’s end. 102  Their experiences, during peace and war, 
played a fundamental part in the formulation of their post-war mission policy and 
it appears their internment experience strengthened their concern for the lack of 
basic hygiene practised by the rural Chinese.  They believed mission work in a 
small country station placed too great a responsibility upon the shoulders of 
young inexperienced missionaries and petitioned for greater support for foreign 
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missionaries in country stations.103  This appears to have been a personal cri de 
coeur from Kenneth McAll who, for his first field appointment, had been placed 
in sole charge of the Xiaochang hospital when newly qualified with only 
intermediate Chinese language skills at his command at a time when the country 
was at war and there was considerable Eighth Army activity in the Xiaochang 
area. 104 McAll’s opinion was that having responsibility for the hospital accounts, 
the ordering of supplies, the staff, building alterations and the secretarial work all 
contributed to encroach on the time available for patient care culminating in a 
lowering of medical standards. No mention was made of any evangelical 
responsibility. Such a work-load may have been acceptable in times of crisis such 
as during war, but, as a general peacetime policy, was unacceptable. In the 
McAlls’ opinion, their hospital was at its best when training Chinese nurses and 
they proposed the adoption of a post-war policy of medical education along lines 
similar to the CCCMU. They proposed medical education should be provided in 
large cities and universities rather than small country stations. Mobile units should 
be used to penetrate the country areas providing new missionaries with the 
opportunity to be a part of the mobile units where they could be supported and 
introduced gradually into countryside conditions. 105  Concentrating on medical 
education would not only create more medical practitioners and nurses for the 
country itself but provide a bigger staffing pool from which to support medical 
missionary work.  Being the son of Percy McAll, the previously mentioned 
translator of English medical text books into Chinese, it could be expected that 
McAll would take a pro-educational stance in proposing mission board policy but 
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by 1946 he was speaking from his own experience so cannot be considered to be 
parroting a deceased father’s mantra.   
 Public health concerns which had proved to be of such importance within 
the internment camps continued to be of concern to the McAlls.  Having had first 
hand experience of living under conditions where any lapse in personal or public 
hygiene was likely to lead to serious disease must have reinforced their already 
strong opinions on the importance of strict hygiene. They had experienced the 
fear of disease both as medical professionals and as parents of a young child 
without free access to medical supplies.  In support of their policy proposal, the 
McAlls noted that, while the Chinese had respect for some aspects of western 
medicine such as surgery and the use of quinine “They [the Chinese] still show 
almost no knowledge of the elementary principles of public health”.106 Medical 
service in rural stations was described by the McAlls as “inadequate” making 
“little impression on the general health and outlook of even the local 
population”.107   Their proposal for mobile units to emanate from urban areas 
would support new missionaries in the field and allow a wider geographical area 
and population to be served in contrast to the rural hospital’s static catchment area.  
Using mobile units, a higher proportion of the population could be reached 
providing greater opportunities to improve the rural population’s general health 
through treatment and education. 
 The McAlls resigned from LMS the same year they presented their 
proposal, but their resignation does not appear in any way related to its 
submission although there is no evidence that LMS adopted any reforms 
specifically as a result of the McAll’s proposals.  A counter-argument against the 
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main thrust of their proposal for medical missionaries in the rural field could be 
that they had first-hand experience of only one country station, Xiaochang, and 
therefore their experience was limited. Kenneth McAll’s field and wartime 
experience contrasts sharply with that of Farquhar Macrae who gained exactly the 
experience and support that McAll thought were so necessary for a young medical 
missionary in the field, but there had had to be a war to provide him with the 
opportunity to gain that experience. Macrae, a young CSFM missionary, was 
appointed to the Yichang Mission in 1943, but unable to reach it.108  Continually 
being forced to evacuate he was without direction from the Edinburgh offices. 
Cables sent with instructions arrived after he had moved on and were out of date 
when he received them or failed to reach him at all. Macrae spent the last two 
years of the war travelling around Free China obtaining positions in Changsha, at 
the MMS hospital in Shaoyang, and at Kweiyang before arriving in Kunming just 
as the Japanese Ichigo Campaign came into full effect. He was flown out of 
Kunming by the RAF to India before working his passage home as a ship’s 
surgeon to return to China after the work to Ichang.109   
 The medical missionary proposals outlined above were all concerned with 
promoting the continuation of medical missionary work and its institutions.      
These proposals were strongly motivated by a desire to aid China’s people, but it 
cannot be denied that they remained missionary-led and aspired to rebuild and 
strengthen missionary work. For example the proposed mobile units had a dual 
purpose as aids to training missionary doctors fresh to the foreign field, and were 
not presented as being solely of benefit to the Chinese. Thus the changes brought 
by the war were not, outside Shanghai, immediately perceived. It was recognised 
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that hospitals and medical schools post-war would need to cooperate with the 
NHA and the Ministry of Education, but it was not obvious that the balance of 
power had shifted towards Chinese leadership when these proposals were put 
forward.  Had missionary doctors and nurses been motivated solely by utilising 
their skills to provide medical aid for the Chinese people, they could have sought 
employment independently in any hospital in China, private, government, or 
Communist.  However, even if they chose not to evangelise publically, they 
remained committed Christians and, by their lifestyle, aimed to provide a 
Christian example. The idea of working as medical professionals outside the 
protective structure of a missionary umbrella under the Christian ethos was 
challenging if not unthinkable and there was an element of self-perpetuation and 
survival in medical missionaries’ post-war policy recommendations. It was, 
therefore, with some trepidation that the medical missionaries and their Home 
Boards registered the post-war clarion call for Chinese leadership that emanated 
first from Shanghai. 
 
The Re-adaptation Phase 
The repercussions of the war affecting the medical missionaries’ relationship with 
their Chinese colleagues were most keenly experienced during the re-adaptation 
phase. This period could have been expected to last for several years and 
culminate in a period of growth and expansion for missions but it was severely 
hampered by the civil war.  The post-war movement away from foreign control 
and leadership to Chinese administration created tensions between foreign and 
Chinese staff. Medical missionaries and mission society executives were 
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compelled to adapt their attitudes and work practices to accommodate post-war 
change. The LMS Lester Chinese Hospital in Shanghai is a case in point. 
(i) The Lester Chinese Hospital110  
The LCH was one of the first missionary hospitals in occupied China to be 
revisited by its former staff after the war. The hospital’s fabric had escaped 
serious damage and it had continued with Chinese management under Japanese 
supervision.111  The hospital had been looted and there had been a lowering of 
medical standards under the Japanese.112 Whether the two were connected in that 
a lack of equipment and medicines affected clinical practice is not clear, but, at 
the end of the war, conditions in the hospital were reported as sub-standard: 
 Hospital - very ragged and dirty.  No sheets, no blankets etc. left.  
Patients largely fed by relatives bringing in food and sleeping all round 
the ward floors.  Instruments – very few left.  Drugs – only a few Jap 
drugs in the place – patients told to buy their own.  No charity patients 
– all must pay and pay heavily.113 
 
 Work at the LCH was initially supported by aid from the BRC and 
UNRRA and a caretaker Superintendent, Dr. P.T. Chen, was installed by the 
Health Bureau. 114  By December 1944, LMS was engaged in registering the 
hospital with the government, which would permit it to be handed back to the 
control of the Trustees. 115  Registration necessitated the naming of a 
Superintendent which LMS hoped would be Paterson, the previous Medical 
Superintendent and chief surgeon.  However, there was an awareness that his 
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appointment could prove problematic as it was thought Chen might wish to 
continue permanently and Griffiths, the Acting Secretary of LMS and BMS in 
Shanghai in 1945, was anxious not to “get off on the wrong foot with the 
authorities”.116  Griffiths thought it necessary to check with London: 
  I take it that we have no objection to the appointment of a Chinese 
superintendent if he is the right man for the job. The Christian purpose 
of the Hospital is the main LMS concern, though the position is 
complicated with the Trustees as a third party.117  
 
 LMS had no objections to a Chinese Superintendent provided he was 
“suitable” and a “professing Christian” with suitability no doubt, being defined by 
the society. 118 The Committee’s first choice was Dr. C.C. Chiew [Ch’iu?] as 
although Chen was regarded as suitable, he was not a professing Christian.  This 
latter point was perceived as a “big drawback to his suggested appointment”.119  
With Chen, as Acting Superintendent, the Christian ethos of the LCH was already 
perceived as slipping away from mission society control. 
 By March 1946, Griffiths was drawing up a new draft constitution for the 
LCH and was confident that Chen, as Acting Superintendent, was “really doing 
his best”.120  Nonetheless, there were tensions between LMS and what Griffiths 
described as “the new regime”; but he remained anxious not to upset negotiations 
with the Bureau of Health to the point of recommending glossing over details. 
Griffiths was attempting to protect what he and LMS regarded as the hospital’s 
raison d’être; the continuance of a Christian medical contribution, although it was 
now accepted that Chen was likely to remain in the post of Superintendent. LMS 
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hoped their Dr. Cater, originally appointed to Shanghai in 1932, would be able to 
return as Chief Medical Officer. Griffiths tellingly remarked: “If that is done there 
is little doubt that Cater would be in very effective control”. 121 The implication 
being this would have been a satisfactory resolution.  However, Griffiths had 
over-estimated LMS’ foreign staff’s adaptability and under-estimated Chen’s 
ability and ambition. 
 In July, Cater refused to return as Chief Medical Officer.  He had heard 
from a friend and colleague visiting England that the hospital was being run like a 
government institution and that Chen had placed many of his relatives in key 
positions in the Hospital’s business department. This he regarded as “most 
disquieting”.122 He was also unimpressed that Chen had not replied to his last two 
letters. Cater summed up the position as he saw it: 
 Let us face the situation squarely.  The British Trustees have now no 
power and no money.  The Hospital Committee has been organised by 
Dr. P.T. Chen and will certainly back him 100%.  In the internal 
administration his relatives and appointees occupy practically all key 
positions. His position is therefore quite unassailable – he has gathered 
all the reins of power into his own hands.  If I return to Shanghai I shall 
have to be a “Yes man” to him even if there are things going on in the 
Hospital of which I entirely disapprove.  My information suggests that 
there are such “goings on”.123 
 
Clearly, Cater was neither prepared to work under the leadership of Chen nor to 
work in a subservient position within the hospital and he confirmed this with 
further comment: 
 I am not prepared to work in an institution where I have no legitimate 
voice in affairs of [indecipherable due to hole punch], nor do I feel that 
the Mission should cooperate in an institution on such terms without 
realising the grave danger that they may have their good name 
compromised. I know that you realise that the situation in the Lester is 
not purely of post-war origin but has its roots in the Historic past.124 
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What appears to have gone unrecognised by Cater is that the position he would 
have been placed in, had he returned to the LCH, was equivalent to that of many 
Chinese doctors working in pre-war mission hospitals; working in an institution 
where they had no legitimate voice in affairs. Thus, the tables had been turned; 
Cater had been ousted and was unprepared, or unable, to adapt to work under the 
new regime.  His thoughts also concerned the Christian status of the hospital and 
he voiced his unease: 
 When we had a powerful body of British trustees, an active Committee 
predominantly British, a nursing staff of up to a dozen, there was no 
doubt in many of our minds as to whether the institution deserved the 
name “Christian”.  The prospect now – with powerless trustees, a 
committee far from 100% Christian, and one or two missionaries with 
no voice in Hospital policy, against a background of complete political 
and economic chaos – to say the least the prospect is not a very hopeful 
one… 
 I believe he [P.T.Chen] wants to maintain the Hospital’s relationship 
with the Society because it means for the Hospital useful personnel at 
no cost, & is a most useful source of funds and supplies…125  
 
Although there was, no doubt, genuine concern that the hospital was losing its 
Christian ethos, it would be reasonable to suggest there may have been an element 
of professional rivalry or jealousy in Cater’s attitude.  Nonetheless, his concerns 
for the Christian ethos of the hospital were not unfounded. By November 1946, a 
new LCH Board of Directors consisting mainly of Chinese had been appointed 
and Chen’s position as Superintendent made permanent.  Notice had been given 
to terminate the hospital’s Agreement with LMS in 1948. Chen had made it clear 
he did not wish the return of Dr. Harmon or Beynon, but he did request the 
appointment of two new doctors and two nurses at the society’s expense.126  Chen 
was sweeping with a new broom to discard former foreign staff but eager to 
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engage new and, perhaps more malleable, staff if the society would pay. The 
impression given is that Chen was flexing his muscles indicating to the society 
that staffing decisions were his prerogative not theirs.  The society refused to 
finance new staff until the financial situation had improved and it was furnished 
with further information regarding the new Agreement.127   
 Chen quickly raised salaries and wages explaining this eliminated any 
need for hospital staff to misappropriate funds or supplies.  He also dismissed 
people found guilty of minor financial offences to indicate further that 
malpractice would not be tolerated.  His actions met with a mixed reaction from 
LMS observers: 
 The impression one gets is that he [Chen] is quite sincere in saying all 
this, but at the same time reports come to us from other quarters that 
the doctors as distinct from employees, are making huge sums of 
money by charging personal fees in addition to the fees officially 
charged by the Hospital.  Indeed we have been told that Chen himself 
is the biggest transgressor in this regard.128 
 
While Chen’s personal financial matters, and those of his colleagues, raised 
comment he was not without financial acumen; as a result of monies received 
from a special campaign for the hospital he had bought gold bars that were 
reported in January 1947 to have doubled in value.129  He was also planning to 
make LMS staff flats into private wards for wealthy patients and was requesting 
the LMS staff move out. What is apparent is that by January 1947 Chen was 
managing the hospital successfully, but not in a way that was commensurate with 
how an LMS mission hospital had previously operated. From the Chinese 
perspective, this was, undoubtedly, perceived as a step forward but from the 
mission society perspective threatened to sideline the hospital’s Christian ethos. 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 
128 Baxter, A., to Orchard, R.K., June 16th, 1947. CWM/LMS CH/8, 1941–50, China/Hong Kong 
Correspondence, Baxter file, April/June 1947. 
129 Ibid. 
 337 
 By July 1947, it was felt that a crisis had been reached and foreign staff 
were refusing to work in the hospital.  One medical missionary, Dr. A.E. Towers, 
who had been on the staff from 1921 until 1938 expressed the view that:  
 
 Changes in the organisation of the Hospital have prevented her 
rejoining its staff and she has settled down to a ministry of healing and 
spiritual service in this country [UK.].130 
 
Bryson refused to take a position at the LCH even though it was pointed out to 
him that his decision might have been an important factor in the society’s future 
connection with the hospital. He considered teaching in one or two main centres 
to be the way forward for medical missionary work in China.131  The Society was 
forced to consider seriously whether it would be better to withdraw from the 
hospital: 
To reduce the extent of our LMS co-operation with the Hospital to the 
work of one or two Chinese evangelists creates a difficult situation and 
raised the question as to whether we should simply withdraw as a 
Mission and arrange for religious work to be carried on under the 
Chinese Church.132 
 
 The transition from mission-led to Chinese-led management is well 
demonstrated by events at the LCH. While it was immediately recognised that 
change had occurred, not all medical missionaries were able to accept the changes, 
especially those who had returned home immediately after the war.  The major 
problem was the foreign staff’s feelings that, by returning to a Chinese-led 
hospital, they were being demoted and deprived of a voice in the day to day 
running of what they regarded as ‘their’ institution. This was not what they were 
used to and, particularly for those who had experienced absolute responsibility 
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during the war years, was a difficult adaptation to embrace. These medical 
missionaries felt unable to work under Chinese leadership and were unable to 
adapt to the Chinese way of doing things. These attitudes were most deeply 
ingrained in those who had worked at LCH before the war.  Later reports were 
more favourable: 
 Dr. Chen has proved himself a very able administrator… When in 
Shanghai I have continued to visit the Lester Hospital.  Dr. Chen has 
been glad to discuss various matters with me from time to time and he 
has very kindly offered our missionaries out-patient facilities at the 
hospital.  In spite of the appalling inflation Dr. Chen had the courage 
and vision to proceed with a building scheme.  He secured some 
financial assistance from the China Relief Mission and additional 
buildings were put up in the hospital thereby increasing the bed 
capacity from 300 in 1947 to 400 in November 1948.133 
 
These differences of opinion regarding Chen’s competence fall into two camps; 
those who were in Shanghai to observe him at first hand and those in Britain 
reliant upon second-hand reporting. Individuals reporting back to medical 
missionaries in Britain, such as former colleagues and friends, may have thought 
it astute to report Chen was incompetent, thinking it was what those at home 
wanted to hear. Few wish to learn their successors are more capable than they 
were. Those on the ground, in Shanghai, who could observe what was happening 
first hand, appear less dismissive of Chen’s efforts.  
 
(ii) Other Areas 
There are notable differences between the hospitals in Shanghai and those in other 
areas.  In Shanghai the mission hospitals at the end of the war were viable 
essentially only requiring re-stocking with drugs, equipment and staff. The post-
war phases had run concurrently in the city since inspection had been 
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straightforward and re-establishment was able to commence immediately while 
the Japanese were still in situ. By the time LMS had realised what had happened, 
the LCH had begun anew and been placed firmly under the leadership of a 
Chinese Acting Superintendent who was not a professing Christian.  The Ministry 
of Health had moved quickly to ensure re-establishment in Shanghai did not mean 
repetition of foreign Christian administration. In areas that were geographically 
removed from Shanghai conditions were more chaotic and hospitals required 
rebuilding as well as re-stocking. These areas experienced distinct Immediate 
post-war and Re-establishment phases which provided missions with the 
opportunity to re-establish themselves. Events moved faster in Shanghai than in 
other areas possibly because Shanghai was a showcase for the Ministry of Health 
and easily accessed by relief agencies.  Further, conditions in Shanghai had been 
less disturbed than other areas due to its early fall, the length of occupation and 
the international attention it received. 
 Not all Chinese in positions of authority were regarded as being able to 
effectively shoulder their responsibilities. At the Tianjin Mackenzie Memorial 
Hospital the foreign Assistant Matron, Miss. A.G. Smith reported that the Chinese 
Matron was over-burdened.134  The Matron’s relationship with both the Chinese 
and the foreign staff was poor and it was felt she was “insecure in her own 
position”.135  There were irregularities in the use of supplies and supplemental 
payments to staff, no-one was being trained and the most capable Chinese were 
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leaving as they found it impossible to work with the Chinese Matron. 136   
Additionally, the Matron was an aunt of one of the hospital doctors and the whole 
hospital was “very much a family concern”.137  Smith recognised the post-war 
power shift and thought only the Chinese themselves could deal with the situation 
effectively. She also noted that to complete government registration and deal with 
governmental issues the hospital needed a Chinese representative. Smith argued 
that increased administrative competence necessitated greater Chinese 
participation.  Her appraisal of the situation indicated she was neither against 
Chinese leadership nor mourning any loss of foreign leadership but, rather, 
lamenting a loss of administrative competence within the hospital. 
 In March 1948 Smith tendered her resignation citing her inability to work 
under the Chinese Matron, with the latter’s temperament being instrumental in her 
inability to continue.  She felt she could have “been able to fit into the scheme of 
things” had the Matron been of a different temperament before explaining that 
some of the misunderstandings had occurred as a result of language difficulties 
during long discussions. 138   To some extent, this negates her claim that the 
Matron’s temperament was completely at fault, since language difficulties were 
likely to have arisen between herself and other native Chinese speakers in long 
discussions.  Smith perceived her problems as:  
 I have not been able to get a real grip on things this time. All medical 
and surgical treatments have gone apace so much in the past few years 
and we folks who were interned seem to be back numbers.  I did no 
refresher course while I was home.  It might have been easier here with 
the help and counsel of a foreign doctor.139 
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 Smith was undermined by a difficult relationship with the Chinese Matron, 
her isolation from foreign medical companionship and her feelings of being out of 
touch professionally. Although she expresses no misgivings about Chinese 
leadership and management in principle, the fundamental impression is that after 
20 years medical missionary service in China, she was just unable to adapt. It may 
have been that her frustrations stemmed from the feeling that she could have done 
a better job than the Chinese Matron, although she does not suggest this in the 
material available. To her credit, she had attempted to re-adjust but was unable to 
do so, thwarted, as she perceived it, by a Chinese Matron’s temperament. Smith’s 
resignation was accepted by the Society and, by September 1948, she was 
working in a convalescent home in Handcross, Sussex.140 
 In Wuhan, efforts were made to filter out staff that Mission Boards 
thought would be unable to work co-operatively with Chinese staff.  In 1940 it 
had been proposed that a Miss. Dey, who had previously worked at LCH, would 
be “eminently fitted for the Union Hospital staff…” 141  and in 1943 it was 
suggested that Dey be invited to work at the Union Hospital.  When some of her 
former colleagues from the LCH heard of the suggested appointment the Board 
was forced to reconsider: 
 …a good deal of evidence was put forward to show that while Miss. 
Dey is an excellent lady in many ways and undoubtedly well-meaning, 
she does not seem to get on well with the Chinese staff.142  
 
Chapman, the Union Hospital Medical Superintendent became concerned and 
called a meeting with the District Committee Executive to discuss the matter. Dey, 
who in 1940 was working in West China, was expecting to move to Central China 
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but it was decided that Baxter should notify her that the Hankou position was not 
definite and that no assumption should be made by her that such a position would 
be possible.143 In January 1946 when it became apparent that the Board in London 
was, once again, on the point of proposing Dey as a replacement nurse for 
Hankou, those at the Union Hospital met this proposal with dismay. 
 
 All that we have heard since coming out of internment camp 
merely confirms the impression that Miss. Dey is unsuited for work in 
any hospital in China. Surely it would be better to stop her now, even if 
it means disappointment and difficulty, than that the poor woman 
should fall down over her work here on the field and a mess be made 
of a promising situation.144 
 
Wickings eventually recommended that Dey be stopped from working anywhere 
in China and the China Committee authorised an appointment to Papua, New 
Guinea.145  The main reason behind LMS’ decision not to reappoint Dey to the 
China field appears to stem solely from her attitude towards the Chinese which 
was regarded as cause for concern during the war period but had become 
untenable in 1946. 
 Dey was not alone: other missionaries were deemed unsuitable for post-
war service in China because of their relationship with the Chinese.  In the case of 
Rev. and Mrs. Busby it was the Chinese who protested at their return. It appears 
to have been Busby’s personality that affected the Chinese staff and the younger 
missionaries and he was regarded as being a “bit awkward” by members of other 
missions.146   
 I think we may have passed over these things so far as they affect 
missionaries only but we felt the Chinese point of view decisive. They 
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evidently feel he [Busby] does not trust them and is heavy-handed in 
his general attitude.  All this and the fact that we are making something 
of a new beginning in the North made us take the action we did 
take…147  
 
The Busbys’ devotion to mission work, after 26 years of service, an adopted 
Chinese daughter and a Chinese ward, was not in question; a sea change had 
occurred.  In this reversal Chinese opinions were now taking precedence over 
appointments in the field. Despite close connections with the Mackenzie 
Memorial Hospital they were not medical missionaries but their post-war 
experience provides an example of how Mission Board policy changed in the post 
–war years.  
 As well as changed attitudes regarding appointing medical staff, there was 
a greater awareness of how to communicate with the Chinese in the post-war 
period. Orchard, at the Mission House in London, drafted a reply to a letter 
received from Chinese members of the Hupeh-Hunan Synod of the Church of 
Christ in China in Hankou.148  The letter was signed by the secretary T’ao Chen 
T’ing. Orchard forwarded his draft reply to Wickings for his observations. 
Wickings pointed out that though the letter was appropriate for a secretary writing 
to a British Church body, the situation was more complicated regarding China. 
Were the letter addressed to the original sender, Mr. T’ao, he would lose face 
because he would be unable to translate it.  It would be more diplomatic to 
address the letter to the whole Synod where somebody would translate it, 
eradicating any danger of loss of face.  Orchard’s original letter began:  
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Dear Friends,  
The Directors of This Society have received with very great interest and appreciation the 
letter of greeting you sent by Mr. Wickings…149 
 
After Wickings had edited the letter, it began: 
 Dear Friends, 
 In the Spring of 1942 there were discussions in Hankow between 
doctors and nurses (Chinese and British Missionaries together) of the 
Methodist Church …150 
 
The edited transcript had been stripped of its official jargon and replaced 
with simpler wording which made it much more accessible than Orchard’s 
original draft. Orchard, upon receiving Wickings’ edited draft, accepted the 
revised version was more appropriate and gratefully accepted the changes to his 
official jargon which he recognised as “officialise”.151  Both were anxious to show 
greater understanding and courtesy indicating a new awareness by the Home 
Board of the value of communicating in a manner that would be well received by 
the Chinese. This new method of communication recognised the importance of 
communicating effectively as well as avoiding giving offence.  For medical 
missionaries the re-adaptation phase, which lasted for several years, was a period 
of acknowledging and adapting to changes large and small and marked the 
beginning of the final retreat. Decisions had to be reached about practical matters 
such as future employment, housing and working practices in a changed world 
while intangible issues such as attitude and disillusionment had to be confrontefd 
and dealt with.  
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Summary 
The Japanese surrender sounded the death knell for the medical missionary 
golden age although it was not recognised as such at the time.  Although some 
Chinese had managed to keep mission hospitals in the occupied areas functioning, 
not enough were successful to be able to describe them as having kept the medical 
missionary lamp burning brightly. In areas where there was success there was 
sometimes support from foreign neutrals. Despite the damage to hospitals and 
lack of immediate supplies there was no serious suggestion that medical 
missionary work in China should be abandoned; too much had been invested 
financially, professionally and personally.  As a result of FAU, UNNRA CNRRA, 
and BRC aid it was possible to begin re-opening and re-building almost 
immediately.  Mission society post-war policy placed a noticeable emphasis on 
providing medical education for the Chinese and immediately it was clear that 
Chinese leadership was going to play a much larger role than it had done 
previously.  This was anticipated by those who had been able to keep up with 
mission society and Chinese government reports concerning plans for the post-
war period, but the discussion and information within these reports was denied to 
those who had been interned. The development of Chinese leadership could not 
be accommodated by all medical missionaries and some, despite attempting to 
adapt, were unable to work in institutions headed by Chinese. The older 
generation of medical missionaries who championed the evangelistic side of 
medical missionary work, if they searched their hearts, would have found 
lingering vestiges of paternalism that encouraged them to keep hold of the guiding 
reins.  
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 With the benefit of their wartime experience medical missionaries 
voluntarily offered their thoughts on post-war policies to their Mission Boards.  
These policies aimed to rectify some of the mistakes, as they saw it, in medical 
missionary training, to consolidate mission hospital logistical services, and to 
create more efficient urban units that did not duplicate specialities.  There was a 
questioning of mission society family and furlough policy, an indication that 
medical missionaries had used part of their time as internees and in Free China to 
reflect upon their working conditions and the logistics of the medical mission in 
China. 
 During the three post-war periods all sides exhibited a lack of empathy.  A 
lack of empathy was shown by medical missionaries towards Chinese Christians 
in occupied China who had worked under Japanese rule.  Secondly there was a 
lack of empathy from medical missionaries towards the Chinese working in 
leadership positions after the war, and thirdly there was a lack of empathy from 
medical missionaries for those working at home base. During the war all sides had 
worked together to defeat the enemy but with that aim removed the sanctions that 
had operated to discourage criticism evaporated.  There was no great public 
outpouring of criticism; the lack of empathy appears as a lack of understanding; 
an inability of people to place themselves in each other’s circumstances, and an 
inability to admit that others may have experienced difficulties too.   
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Conclusion 
 
The War-Time Golden Age of Professional, Personal and Religious 
Challenge and Opportunity 
 
Protestant medical missionaries encountered many difficulties during the war but 
we can now appreciate that for many this provided an eight year period of 
professional, personal and religious challenge and opportunity. Medical 
missionaries’ professional skills became the major focus of their daily lives and 
they gained personal satisfaction in meeting their calling by utilising these skills 
to good effect as service in God’s name. Medical missionaries proved themselves 
capable administrators not only of large institutions but also of small, temporary 
refugee units, mobile clinics and internment camp hospitals, dispensing 
psychological support as well as medical care. During the course of their work 
they had to confront uncomfortable wartime issues; acting as gatekeepers to 
valuable medical supplies, debating medical ethics in internment camps, and 
negotiating with the authorities, both friendly and hostile.  However, the war also 
provided an opportunity to adapt medical practices, and to research and document 
wartime diseases and injury enabling medical missionaries to add to the corpus of 
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medical knowledge. For the Chinese it was also a period of individual opportunity 
during which they were able to take control of their own affairs, display their 
efficiency and reflect national sentiment. 
 The selection of Hubei for detailed regional study has proved worthwhile 
particularly because medical missionary experience within the province was so 
varied.  Hubei was never totally occupied by the Japanese at any one time and it 
was therefore possible to make comparisons between occupied and free, and urban 
and rural areas.  The fall of Wuhan highlighted provincial difference as post-
occupation life in the urban areas became relatively peaceful whereas in the rural 
areas territory was being militarily disputed right up to the spring of 1945.  Pearl 
Harbor further accentuated the differences between Free and occupied China for 
Hubei’s third party nationals, as did the experience of internment.  With regard to 
individual missionaries it was possible to compare the experience of different 
nationalities and again, to note similarity and difference as the war progressed. The 
choice of Hubei is perhaps shown to have been most successful in that the province, 
over the wartime period, provided a microcosm of medical missionary experience 
in all China.  Thus, in answer to the question posed in the introduction of chapter 
three: “Was medical missionary experience in Hubei during the war representative 
of medical missionary experience in China as a whole?” – a cautious answer can be 
given in the affirmative.   
 Medical missionaries reassessed their relationships with others in the China 
missionary field. They experienced a flowering of fellowship with foreigners from 
other missions and religious denominations, although some also encountered 
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confrontations with internees in the camps.1  Shared hardship did not always forge 
solidarity. Medical missionaries reassessed their relationships with their Chinese 
Christian colleagues and some experienced a greater affinity with them.  This was 
particularly noticeable following Pearl Harbor when foreigners experienced the 
occupation as enemies of the Japanese in a similar way to the Chinese although 
some foreign personnel still harboured vestiges of paternalism. The Mission Boards, 
anxious to maintain their stake in medical work in China, post-war, were prepared 
to rethink their modus operandi but some individuals either could not or would not 
adapt.  Ingrained attitudes finely honed over many years could not be changed 
overnight even by those sympathetic to the new regime who simply did not want to 
hand over.   
 In both Free, and occupied China, medical missionaries showed 
resourcefulness and ingenuity in tackling practical problems such as repairing 
bomb damage, reconnecting utility supplies and organising refugee workshops. 
There were, however, individual concerns that had to be addressed such as the 
medical missionary role and pacifism, and decisions had to be made concerning 
situations that others might interpret as collaborative.  
 The golden age of religious opportunity, during the war, presented itself to 
many medical missionaries as the opportunity for individuals to carry out, and be 
seen to carry out, their personal calling, rather than a more general institutional 
opportunity to spread the Gospel throughout China. Medical missionaries  were 
able to demonstrate their personal raison d’être of service to the Chinese and their 
                                                 
1 As an example of continuing cooperation and fellowship, in January 1949, the Norwegian and 
Swedish missions had lent nurses to the Ren Chi hospital and regarding the building of the new 
Catholic Mission its nurses were “keen to participate in any cooperative plans”. Operating 
instruments had also been lent by the Catholic hospital to an LMS doctor for a difficult midwifery 
case. “Annual Report of The Ren Chi School of Midwifery and Mothercraft, January 1949”, 
CWM/LMS CH/2, 1941–1950, China/Hong Kong Reports, Gillison, J.B., file, 1940–49. 
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fellowmen in God’s name secure in the knowledge they were, or felt they were, at 
last, wanted and needed. This new found recognition could, however, even 
without Communist rule, only ever have proved transient because, as the National 
government’s NHA policies evolved and more Chinese medical personnel 
graduated; foreign medical missionaries would no longer have been so 
desperately needed and consequently, no longer wanted.  During, and, 
immediately after the war, more Chinese personnel moved into positions of 
authority in China’s hospitals reinforcing what had been under way before the war 
so that as the war ended, the medical missionary golden age was already ebbing 
away. The results of the changes that propelled Chinese personnel into these 
genuine positions of authority were to prove too firmly embedded for there to be 
any post-war extension of the golden age. Medical missionaries felt they were no 
longer wanted, although in the immediate aftermath of the war, as with the 
Japanese administration, China still needed them. Decker, ABFM missionary in 
China and Secretary of the International Missionary Council, summed up the 
situation succinctly in 1946:  
 The day of the missionary who directed the work of Chinese colleagues 
draws toward the evening, if indeed the sun has not already set.2   
 
While missionaries openly acknowledged that the war had brought, and 
accelerated change, there could, at the time, be no realisation that a golden age 
had occurred for they, unlike us, were unaware of what was to follow.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Decker. ,  J. W., “Christian Movement in China,” in  Far Eastern Survey, Vol., 15, No. 4, 
February 27th, 1946, p. 61.  
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Change and the Medical Missionary Role 
During the war the healing of the body took priority over the pro-active 
evangelistic side of medical missionary work which became subordinated under 
pressure of work. The sheer weight of their work load, and the additional 
administrative responsibilities they had to shoulder, sapped medical missionary 
health and energy overwhelming their demanding schedules effectively distancing 
them from any substantially pro-active evangelical role. For the junior generation 
of medical missionaries, who chose to spread God’s Word through lifestyle 
example rather than via direct preaching, the loss of pro-active evangelical 
opportunity was of little significance. The prioritising of their professional 
responsibilities not only served to reinforce upon them the value of their 
professional role but also their perception that the Two-fold Call was a legacy 
they had no desire, nor need, to inherit. Their work with refugees, wounded, and 
the sick remained the public expression of their Christianity.  
 Medical missionaries were aware of the issues of the day being debated by 
other missionaries such as the liberal/conservative argument and the movement 
towards a Chinese stand-alone Christian Church through attainment of the Three 
Selfs.  However, the junior medical missionaries appear to have let these issues 
pass them by, preferring to spend their time concentrating on their professional 
duties rather than participating in theological or political debate. What, at the 
beginning of the war, had been the personal stance of the junior generation of 
medical missionaries regarding their medical missionary role became, in the post-
war era, a pressing topic for mission board and conservative consideration.  As a 
result of the war a significant questioning of the role of the western medical 
missionary in China developed between missionaries themselves, their Mission 
Board executives and Chinese commentators. Should the practice of medicine be 
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publically acknowledged and accepted by all as the true focus of the medical 
missionary role? 
 For the conservative medical missionaries who prioritised the saving of 
souls over the healing of the body in propagating the Gospel, the anticipated 
opportunity to evangelise, promised by the outbreak of war, had proved over-
optimistic. The archives are silent on any sizeable increase in conversion rates for 
the wartime period. The prioritising of medical missionary professional skills, the 
increase in administrative responsibility, the transience of the refugee population 
and the general disruption created by the war, all conspired to undermine what 
initially had appeared to offer a promising evangelical opportunity.  Consequently, 
conservative medical missionaries, many of whom were from the senior 
generation with a lifetime of experience in China, had more cause to reconsider 
their post-war role in China and greater difficulty in adapting to the changed 
situation in Chinese hospitals than their younger, more liberally minded 
colleagues.  Any hopes that the pressures of the war that prioritised the medical 
over the evangelical would disappear, and the situation reverse itself, soon 
evaporated as the Chinese put voice and action to their new found autonomy.  
Post-war, it was immediately apparent that foreign medical missionaries had to 
adapt and adapt quickly; there was no longer any discretion in the matter. 
 That the main focus of the post-war medical missionary role would be 
professional rather than pro-actively evangelical was publically acknowledged by 
the CBMS.  A letter in the BMJ from the CBMS’ Medical Advisory Board calling 
for recruits for medical missionary work in China, in November 1946, confirms 
mission boards accepted their perception of the focus of medical missionary work 
had changed. Over two lengthy paragraphs, the professional opportunities offered 
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by service in China are stressed: a wealth of clinical material, the opportunity to 
follow a wide choice of types of practice, hospitals that compared structurally 
with those at home staffed by competent well trained personnel, the opportunity 
to teach and to integrate with local government schemes. 3   The Christian 
characteristics of a medical missionary career in China are only briefly touched 
upon at the end of the letter in one brief paragraph:  
 To the medical worker who has the vision to show through his profession 
his evangelical faith, who would speak to men and women through the 
medium of the healing art, his Master’s words of Eternal Life, there is 
open to-day a door of unbelievable opportunity. [Italics added].4 
 
While acknowledging the evangelical opportunity that medical missionary work 
offered, this appeal is written to attract professional medical personnel and 
emphasises strongly the advantages for individual professional development.  The 
request is for men and women who will “show” their Christian beliefs “through” 
their profession which suggests evangelising through professional and lifestyle 
example. The opportunity offered is first and foremost a professional position, not 
a religious one; the request is for medical professionals, not “men of true piety” as 
had been the call in earlier days.5  Wartime changes had altered the focus of the 
medical missionary role, and its relevance in China was being challenged as the 
result of an increasingly efficient government health policy and increased Chinese 
autonomy.  What had not been obvious during the war but was to become so in 
post-war China was that during the war the Chinese had wanted, and needed, 
medical missionaries’ medical skills, not Christianity, which reinforces the 
argument that the golden age was an individual not an institutional experience. 
 
                                                 
3 Bolton, R., et al, “Recruits for Medical Missionary Work”, in BMJ, November 2nd, 1946, p. 669. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The Lancet, Vol., 2, July 1st, 1837, p. 520. 
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Other Changes and Further Research   
As an institution, the Protestant medical ministry suffered much financial loss as 
hospitals and equipment were damaged, destroyed or looted. The difficulty of 
obtaining medical supplies and drugs, together with inflation, all added to the 
problems of keeping hospitals and clinics functioning under wartime conditions. 
Although the mission executive had always been geographically distant, the 
problems of communication and, in occupied China, the total loss of contact post-
Pearl Harbor, made it impossible for those at home to have any real concept of 
what was happening on the ground. Despite the increased fellowship between 
denominations there was a lack of empathy on all sides arising from, and 
aggravated by, geographical distance. Mission Board executives, medical 
missionaries on the ground, the National government, the Chinese in the west, and 
the Chinese in occupied China all failed to come to terms with the others’ 
difficulties. New tensions were therefore added to what had always been a 
strained bureaucratic-professional relationship between mission executives in 
Europe and North America, and those in China. As the Chinese were released 
from any remnants of medical missionary paternalistic direction following the 
internment of foreigners, so medical missionaries in occupied China were 
released from any paternalistic direction from their mission executive. Chinese 
and foreign medical personnel working in mission hospitals both acquired a new 
found autonomy that reinforced post-war change; the Chinese acquired 
confidence in their ability to provide a medical service free from foreign 
supervision, and foreign medical missionaries gained the confidence to question 
Mission Board direction and policy. Japanese religious policy, that sought to 
destroy Chinese ties with western missionaries, further bolstered Chinese 
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confidence in their ability to run their own affairs and supported progression 
towards a stand alone Chinese Christian Church divorced from western leadership. 
Thus for Chinese Christian medical personnel in occupied areas two influences 
were at work; the withdrawal of the foreign presence and Japanese religious 
policy and therefore the realisation that they could administer their own hospitals 
was doubly reinforced.  A Chinese perspective on this aspect would be 
illuminating. 
 The different nationalities appear to have experienced the war in similar 
ways within the geographical regions of wartime China, although far more North 
Americans than other nationalities were repatriated from the internment camps 
since they were able to negotiate exchanges with Japanese interned in America. 
Nationality was, however, relevant in one respect in that those who were Axis 
nationals or neutrals, such as the German national Dr. Oertel in Hankou, or the 
Swedish missionaries in Wuchang, were exempt from internment.  It is apparent 
that these individuals made a significant contribution to medical missionary work 
in the occupied areas while other medical missionaries were interned. Within the 
material studied for this thesis their contribution has been gleaned more from 
passing reference rather than from any full account of their work and further 
research regarding their contribution to medical missionary work during the war 
would certainly add to our knowledge of medical missionary experience.  
Similarly, as noted by others, there is a lacuna regarding medical missionary work 
and leprosy.6 Although this thesis has included some references to work among 
lepers in China there is scope for further scholarly research regarding this subject 
during the war years and other periods. 
                                                 
6 Tiedemann, R.G., “The Development of Medical Missions in China: Controversies and 
Historiographical Considerations”, unpublished paper presented at “Shenti, linghun”, Shandong 
University, 2008, p. 252. 
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 There are important questions relating to medical missionary work that 
have not been addressed in any depth by this thesis such as whether medical 
missionaries saw themselves, at the time, of supporting western imperialism 
during the war, and to what extent medical missionary work was associated with 
the Chinese Christian Church and its intended progression towards self-support.  
These questions have not been addressed here because, apart from lack of space 
for adequate discussion, while they have fostered much missiological debate, they 
are peripheral to the focus of this thesis. Similarly UNRRA documentation 
identifies links between Health Department Directors, County Magistrates and the 
Pu’ai yiyuan and deeper examination of this documentation and that held in 
Chinese government and UN archives would explain these links and add to our 
understanding of how medical institutions were integrated into post-war NHA and 
relief programmes. 7  Future research regarding these questions, concentrating on 
the war and post-war periods, would be beneficial and work towards filling this 
lacuna.   
 In the years following the war events spiralled out of control as the CCP 
branded missionary cooperation with the National government, commented upon 
within this thesis, as irrefutable proof of political activity. Medical missionaries in 
particular were vulnerable because they, and their institutions, were highly visible 
and their influence was deemed widespread since they came into contact with so 
many people during the course of their work. The CCP singled out medical 
hospitals and church schools as material symbols of aggressive western 
imperialism.  Material on medical missionary experience covering this period in 
medical missionary history is available for future study and analysis, although 
                                                 
7 Six Month Summary of Monthly forms received from the Pu’ai yiyuan Regarding Relief Work, 
December 31st 1946 – Authorised by the Health Department Director Lu Junxin, Hubei Provincial 
Archives, LS18-5-113 
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much has not yet been placed in the public domain to guard against potential 
embarrassment or distress to Chinese Christians and their relatives in China 
today.8 
 All the foreign medical missionaries in China were to a greater or lesser 
extent isolated from their fellow mission society members and their home bases, 
whether in occupied or Free China, and as the war dragged on more and more 
months passed with no news from their families at home.  The experiences of 
those in Free and occupied China differed, but whether liberal or conservative, 
foreign or Chinese, junior or senior generation, many rose to the challenge 
experiencing the war as a period of professional and personal development 
providing them with an opportunity to display their competence and reaffirm their 
raison d’être of service to others. 
 In October 2007 the mission buildings of the Pu’ai and the residential 
compound, although much dilapidated, remained in evidence providing 
accommodation for Hankou families as evidenced by the photographs below.  The 
buildings were, however, scheduled for immediate demolition to be replaced by 
high level flats similar to those already overshadowing the compound. One of the 
last surviving nurses to have worked at the Pu’ai under foreign leadership during 
the war, Zhang Fuying, aged 90, in October 2007 remained close by living in 
rooms with windows overlooking on one side the now fully cemented mission 
compound courtyard and on the other the Number 4 Hankou City Hospital and 
remnants of the old Pu’ai Yiyuan buildings. Thus, while growing ever more 
fragile with each passing year vestiges of wartime medical missionary work, both 
                                                 
8 Conversation with the MMS archivist, Lance Martin, at SOAS, October 2009. 
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human and structural, had survived, despite unbelievable upheaval, to bear 
witness in twenty-first century China.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12: MMS Mission Compound Wu ShenMiao, Hankou, October, 2007 9 
 
 
                                                 
9 Photograph taken by John Cram, October 2007. 
Home of Zhang Fuying, 
October 2007, nurse at 
the General Hospital - 
(Pu’ai Yiyuan) during 
and following the war 
years.  
 High-rise 
development in 
progress. 
Gladys Stephenson’s 
rooms; Matron and 
Director of Nursing at 
MMS General 
Hospital 1933-1951. 
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Fig. 13: Staff Quarters, MMS Mission Compound, Wu ShenMiao, Hankou, 
October, 2007 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
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Appendix I - Establishment of Protestant Missions in Hubei  
 
Date Society Place 
1861 LMS Hankou* 
Hanyang 
1862 WMMS Hankou* 
1867 LMS 
WMMS 
Wuchang* 
Hanyang 
1868 ACM Hankou  
Wuchang* 
1873 WMMS Guangji (Wuxue)* 
1878 CSFM Yichang (Ichang)* 
1880 LMS 
WMMS 
Xiaogan (Siaokan)* 
Anlu* 
1883 WMMS Hanyang 
1886 ACM Yichang (Ichang) 
1889 CIM 
WMMS 
Hankou 
Huangshi (Tayeh)* 
1890 SMF 
SDA 
Wuchang 
Wuchang* 
1891 CovMS 
 
WMMS 
Hankou 
Xiangfen (Fancheng) 
Zhongxiang (Chungsiang)* 
1893 CMA Wuchang 
1894 LUM 
NLK 
SMF 
Xiangfen (Fancheng) 
Guanghua (Laohekou)* 
Yichang 
1895 CIM Yichang 
1896 LUM 
SMF 
Taipingtien(Dian) 
Shashi (Shasi)* 
1897 WMMS Suizhou (Suichow) 
1898 LMS Hwangpei 
1899 LMS 
NLK 
Zaoshi (Tsaoshih)* 
Kinhsien 
1900 ACM 
CovMS 
Shashi 
Xiangyang (Siangyang)* 
1901 NLK 
SMF 
Yunyang 
Huangzhou (Hwangchow)* 
1902 LBM Zaoyang (Tsaoyang) 
1903 SDA Hankou 
1904 NLK Shiwakai 
1905 CovMS 
SMF 
Nanchang 
Macheng (Masheng) 
1907 CovMS Jingmen (Kingmen) 
1908 CMA 
CovMS 
Hankou 
Jiangling (Kingchow) 
1909 SMF 
 
Kienli   
Jiangling (Kingchow) 
1911 YMCA Hankou 
1912 Aug 
FMS 
NLK 
Shekou (Shekow) 
Shekou (Shekow) 
Fengxian (Fenghsien) 
1913 YMCA Wuchang 
1916 LBdM Hankou 
1917 LBdM  Suizhou (Suichow) 
1922 CovMS Yichang 
1935 YWCA Hankou 
  (* denotes an eventual medical mission) 
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Appendix II   
 
Protestant Missionary Societies Supporting  Hospitals  
and Medical Services in China in 19371 
 
 
Supporting   Name of Society           Acronym 
Country       
 
US   American Baptist Foreign Mission Society    ABFMS 
  Mei jinli hui  美浸禮會 
US   American Board of Commissioners for Foreign  ABCFM 
   Missions  Gongli hui    公理會 
US    American Church Mission      ACM/PEC 
  Meiguo shenggong hui  美國聖公會 
US    American Friends Mission     AFO 
  Guige hui   貴格會 
US    American Lutheran Mission of Shandong    ALM 
  Zhonghua xinyihui 中華信義會 
US    American Presbyterian Mission South   PS 
  Chang lao hui 長老會(美南) 
US    American Presbyterian Mission North    PN 
  Changlao hui-mei bei  長老會(美北) 
US   Augustana Synod Mission (Dispensary only) Aug 
  Xinyi hui   信義會 
GB   Baptist Missionary Society      BMS/EBM 
  Daying jinxin hui  大英浸信會 
US   Bethel Mission      BeM 
  Boteli hui  伯特利會 
GB  Bible Churchmen’s Missionary Society    BCMS 
  Shengjing chaihui  聖經差會 
US   Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist   MEFB/ 
  Episcopal Church Mei yi mei hui  美以美會  MEC 
GB    Church of England Zenana Mission    CEZMA/ 
  Zhonghua shenggong hui   中華聖公會  CEZMS 
US   China Free Methodist Mission     FMA 
  Xunli hui 循理會 
INT’L  China Inland Mission     CIM 
  Neidi hui    內地會 
US   Christian Reformed Church Mission    CRC 
  Guizheng jidu jiaohui  歸正基督教會 
                                                 
1 Compiled using: (1) Individual mission society archives, (2) Boynton C.L., Boynton C.D., 1936 Handbook 
of the Christian Movement in China Under Protestant Auspices, The National Christian Council of China, 
Shanghai, Kwang Hsueh Publishing House, 1936, (3) Ricci 21st Century Roundtable Database on the History 
of Christianity in China, http://ricci.rt.usfca.edu. Consulted various dates 2006–2009. (4) For some mission 
society Chinese names: Stauffer, M.T. (ed.) The Christian Occupation of China, Christian Continuation 
Committee, Special Committee on Survey and Occupation, 1922, reprint San Francisco, Chinese Materials 
Center, Inc., 1979,  
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GB    Church Missionary Society     CMS 
  Daying jiaohui  大英教會,   
  Yinghang jiaohui  英行教會 
US   Church of the Brethren Mission     CBM 
  You’ai hui 友愛會  
US   Church of the Nazarene      CN 
GB    Church of Scotland Mission      CSFM 
  Sugelan fuyin hui  蘇格蘭福音會 
US  Covenant Missionary Society     CovMS 
  Xingdao hui   行道會 
US/GB  Cheloo (Qilu) University    CU 
  Qilu daxue   齐鲁大学 
GB  English Presbyterian Mission    EPM/PEC 
  Daying zhanglao hui 大英長老會 
US   Evangelical Church Mission     EC 
  Shengdao hui 聖道會 
FIN  Finnish Missionary Society      FMS 
  Xiang xibei xinyi hui  湘西北信義會 
GB   Friends Mission – Quakers      FSC 
  Gongyi hui公誼會 Gongxin hui  公信會 
US    Kuling (Guling) American School     KAM 
  Guling mei xuexiao 牯嶺美 
GB    London Missionary Society     LMS 
  Lundun hui  論敦會 
US    Lutheran Board of Missions      LUM 
  Yu’e xinyi hui   豫鄂信義會 
US   Mennonite General Conference Mission    MGC 
  Meiguo qingjie hui  美國清潔會 
US   Methodist Episcopal Church South     MES/ 
  Jianli hui監理會     MECS 
GB   Methodist Missionary Society    MMS 
  Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
NZ   New Zealand Presbyterian Mission    PCNZ 
  Xinxi lan zhanglao hui 新西蘭長老會 
NOR    Norwegian Lutheran Mission     NLK 
  Zhonghua jidujiao lude hui  中國基督教潞德會 
NOR    Norwegian Missionary Society      NMS 
  Nuo xinyi hui 挪信義會 
GER    Ostasien – Mission      AEPM/OAM 
  Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsverein  
  Tongshan hui, deguo 同善會,德國 
US    Palmetto Presbyterian Mission     PPM 
US   Reformed Church in America     RCA 
  Meigui guizheng jiao hui 美國歸正教會 
US   Reformed Church in the United States    RCUS 
  Damei fuchu hui  大美復初會 
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US   Reformed Presbyterian Mission     RPC 
  Meiguo yuelao hui  美國約老會 
GER    Rhenish Missionary Society      RM/RMG 
  Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft 
  Lixian hui, Deguo 禮賢會, 德國  
INT’L   Salvation Army       SA 
  Jiushi hui  救世會 
US    Seventh-Day Advent Mission     SDA 
  Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
US    Seventh Day Baptist Missionary Society    SDB 
  Anxinri jinli hui  安息日浸禮會 
GB   Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in   SPG 
  Foreign Parts  
  Daying anligan hui  大英安立甘會 
US    Southern Baptist Mission     SBC 
  Jinxin hui   浸信會 
SWE   Swedish Missionary Society     SMF 
  Xingdao hui  行道會 
US    Swedish American Mission     SEFC 
  Rui mei hui瑞美會 
US  United Brerthren in Christ    UB 
  Jidujiao xieji hui  基督教協基會 
US   United Christian Missionary Society    UCMS 
  Jidu hui   基督會 
CAN   United Church of Canada      UCC 
  Jianada lianhe hui  加拿大聯合會 
US    Women’s Foreign Missionary Society of the  WFMS 
                        Methodist Episcopal Church       
  Meiyi mei hui (nü bu) 美以美會（女部） 
US   Women’s Christian Medical College  (Educational) WC 
US    Yale Foreign Missionary Society   (Educational) YM 
  Yali daxue  雅禮大學 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 382 
Appendix III  Mission Hospitals by Province1 
 
Anhui (Anhwei )Province    
 
 
Country Mission Society Location Hospital Name 
US  ACM — American Church 
Mission/(Protestant Episcopal Church) 
Meiguo shenggong hui  美國聖公會 
Anglican Episcopalian 
 
Anqing 
(Anking) 
St. James Hospital 
US MEFB/MEC — Methodist Episcopal 
Church 
Mei yi mei hui  美以美會 
Methodist  
 
Wuhu True Light Branch 
Hospital 
 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
Changlao hui-mei bei  長老會美北 
Presbyterian 
 
Huaiyuan 
(Hwaiyuen) 
 
 
Shouzhou 
(Showchow) 
 
Xuzhou 
(Nanhsu-chow) 
 
 
1. Hope Hospital 
2. Craigin Memorial 
Hospital 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Goodwill Hospital 
US  SBC — Southern Baptist Convention 
Jinxin hui   浸信會 
Baptist 
 
Boxian 
(Pochow) 
Women’s Hosp. 
US UCSM — United  Christian Mission 
Society 
Jiduhui   基督會 
Protestant 
 
Hefei 
(Luchowfu) 
Christian Hospital 
US MEFB/WFMS — Joint  
 
Wuhu General Hospital 
 
 
Fujian (Fukien) Province 
 
Country Mission Society Location Hospital Name 
US ABCFM — American Board of 
commissioners for Foreign Missions 
Gongli hui    公理會 
Congregational 
 
Changle 
(Diongloh) 
 
Ingtai 
 
Pagoda 
Anchorage. 
 
Christian Hospital 
 
 
Whitney Hospital 
 
Pagoda Hospital 
 
GB CEZMA/CEXMS — Church of England 
Zenana Mission 
Zhonghua shenggong hui   中華聖公會 
Donggau 
(Dongkau) 
 
Loyuan 
Women’s Hospital 
 
 
Christian Doctrine 
                                                 
1 Compiled using: (1) Individual mission society archives, (2) Boynton C.L., Boynton C.D., 1936 Handbook 
of the Christian Movement in China Under Protestant Auspices, The National Christian Council of China, 
Shanghai, Kwang Hsueh Publishing House, 1936, (3) Ricci 21st Century Roundtable Database on the History 
of Christianity in China, http://ricci.rt.usfca.edu. Consulted various dates 2006–2009. (4) For some mission 
society Chinese names: Stauffer, M.T. (ed.) The Christian Occupation of China, Christian Continuation 
Committee, Special Committee on Survey and Occupation, 1922, reprint San Francisco, Chinese Materials 
Center, Inc., 1979,  
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Anglican 
 
 
 
Ningde 
(Ningteh) 
 
 
Hospital 
 
Women’s Hospital 
 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
 
Daying jiaohui      大英教會 
Yinghang jiaohui  英行教會 
Anglican 
 
Fuzhou  
(Foochow)  
 
Funing  
 
 
Kaosanshih 
 
Kienow 
(Kien’ow) 
 
 
Ningde 
(Ningteh)  
 
Putian  
(Putien) 
 
Christ’s Hospital 
 
 
Men’s Hospital 
Women’s Hospital 
 
Po’ai Hospital 
 
Men’s Hospital 
Women’s Hospital 
 
 
Women’s Hospital 
 
 
St. Luke’s Hospital 
GB EPM — English Presbyterian Mission 
Daying zhang lao hui 大英長老會 
Presbyterian 
Yongjun 
(Yungchun)  
 
Zhangpu 
(Changpu)  
 
Quanzhou 
(Chuanchow) 
 
Christian Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
GB LMS — London Missionary Society 
Lundun hui  論敦會 
Congregational 
 
Huian 
(Hweian) 
 
General Hospital 
US  MEFB/MEC — Methodist  Episcopal 
Church 
Meiyi mei hui 美以美會 
Methodist 
Yanping 
(Yenping)  
 
Gutian 
(Kutien) 
 
Aiden Speare Hospital 
 
 
Wiley General Hospital 
 
US PN — American  Presbyterian Mission 
North 
Changlao hui (mei bei) 長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Xingtai 
(Shunteh) 
Hugh O’Neill Hospital 
US  RCA — Reformed Church in 
America/Reformed Dutch Church 
Meigui guizheng jiao hui 美國歸正教會 
Reform 
Xiaoqi 
(Siokhe) 
 
Xiamen 
(Amoy) 
 
Tongan 
(Tungan) 
 
Neerbosch Hospital 
 
 
Hope and Wilhemina 
Hospital 
 
Eliza H. Blauvelt  
Memorial Hospital 
 
 
US WFMS — Womens’ Foreign Missionary 
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
Meiyi mei hui (nű bu) 美以美會（女部） 
Methodist 
Futsing  
 
 
Sienyu 
(Sienyu) 
 
Mintsing  
 
Lucy F. Harrison Hosp. 
 
 
Mary Eliza Nast  
Hospital 
 
Nathan Sites Memorial 
Hospital 
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Yanping 
(Yenping) 
 
Bingtang 
(Haitang) 
 
 
Emma Fuller Hospital 
 
 
Christian Hospital 
 
US/ GB Joint — RCA, LMS 
Reform/Congregational 
 
Zhuangzhou 
(Changchow)  
 
Union Hospital 
US Joint — WFMS WFMS, MEFB, ABCFM 
Methodist 
Congregational 
 
Fuzhou  
(Foochow)  
Christian Union 
Hospital (Willis F. 
Pearce Memorial & 
Kate C. Woodhull) 
 
 
Gansu (Kansu) Province 
 
 
Country Mission Society Location Hospital Name 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui    內地會 
Inter-denominational 
Lanzhou 
(Kaolan) 
 
Pingliang 
 
Borden Memorial  
Hospital. 
 
Mission Hospital 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Adventist  
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日 
Adventist 
 
Lanzhou 
(Kaolan) 
General Hospital 
 
 
Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province 
 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
US ABFMS — American Baptist Foreign 
Mission Society American Baptist Mission 
Northern Baptists 
Mei jinli hui  美浸禮會 
Baptist 
Kityang 
 
 
Chaoyang 
 
Shantou 
(Swatow) 
 
Bixby Memorial  
Hospital 
 
General Hospital 
 
Thresher Memorial 
Hospital 
 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
Daying jiao hui      大英教會 
Yinghang jiao hui  英行教會 
Anglican 
 
Pakhoi 
(Beihai) 
General Hospital 
GB EPM — English Presbyterian Mission 
Daying zhang lao hui  大英長老會 
Presbyterian 
Swabue 
(Shanwei) 
 
Wujingfu 
(Wukingfu) 
 
Shantou 
(Swatow) 
 
General Hosp. 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
(temp closed)  
 
GB MMS — Methodist Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
Methodist 
 
Shiuchow 
 
Foshan 
(Fatshan) 
  
 
General Hospital 
 
Mission Hospital 
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NZ 
 
PCNZ — Presbyterian Church of New 
Zealand Foreign Mission 
Xinxi lan zhanglao hui 新西蘭長老會 
Reformed Presbyterian 
 
Longchuan 
(Kongchuan 
 - via Canton) 
 
 
Po’wai Hospital 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North 
Presbyterian Church in the United States 
Board of Foreign Missions 
Changlao hui (mei bei)  長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Lianzhou 
(Linchow) 
 
 
 
Yangjiang 
(Yeungkong) 
 
 
Guangzhou 
(Canton) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haikow 
(Kiungchow) 
 
Nodoa 
 
Kachek  
 
 
1.Van Norden Hospital 
 
2.Brooks Memorial 
Hospital 
 
Forman Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
Hackett Memorial 
Hospital 
(Tertiary Education) 
1. David Gregg 
Hospital 
2. David Graham 
Hospital 
 
Hoihow Hospital 
 
 
Mary Henry Hospital 
 
Christ’s Hospital 
GER RM/RMG — Rhenish Missionary Society 
Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft 
Lixian hui Deguo  禮賢會, 德國 
 
Dongguan 
(Tungkun) 
 
Mission Hospital 
US  RPC — Reformed Presbyterian Mission 
Meiguo yuelao hui 美國約老會 
Reformed Presbyterian 
Luoding 
(Loting) 
 
Takhing 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
US SBC — Southern Baptist Mission 
Jinxin hui    浸信會 
 
Tungshan Leung Kwong Hospital 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Adventist 
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
Guangzhou 
(Canton) 
 
Huizhou 
(Waichow) 
 
Canton Sanitarium 
 
 
Sui On Hospital 
US SEFC — Swedish American Mission 
Rui mei hui瑞美會 
Evangelical 
 
Guangzhou 
(Canton) 
 
Todd Hospital 
CANADA UCC — United Church of Canada 
Jianada lianhe hui  加拿大聯合會 
Protestant Union 
Jiangmen 
(Kongmoon) 
 
 
1. Men’s Hospital 
 
2. Marion Barclay 
Hospital 
 
CANADA
/US 
Joint — UCC/UB Guangzhou 
(Canton) 
 
Canton Hospital 
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Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
GB BCMS — Bible Churchmen’s Missionary 
Society 
Shengjing chai hui聖經差會 
Anglican 
 
Nanning 
 
Emmanuel Hospital 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   內地會 
Interdenominational 
 
Linfen Wilson Memorial 
Hospital 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
Daying jiao hui       大英教會 
Yinghang jiao hui   英行教會 
Anglican 
 
Guilin 
(Kweilin) 
 
Way of Life Hospital 
US SBC — Southern Baptist Mission 
Southern Baptist Convention 
Jinxin hui    浸信會 
 
Wuzhou 
(Wuchow) 
 
Guilin 
(Kweilin) 
 
Stout Memorial 
Hospital 
 
Baptist Hospital 
 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Adventists 
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
Adventist 
Nanning  
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Guizhou (Kweichow) Province 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Interdenominational 
 
Anshun Gospel Hospital 
US EC — Evangelical Church Mission 
Shengdao hui 聖道會 
Evangelist 
 
Tungjen General Hospital 
 
 
Hebei  (Hopeh) Province 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
US ABCFM — American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
Gongli hui    公理會 
Congregational 
 
Tongxian 
(Tunghsien) 
 
Lu Ho Hospital 
US CN— Church of Nazarene   
Protestant    
Tamingfu Bresee Memorial 
Hospital 
 
GB LMS — London Missionary Society 
Lundun hui   伦敦會 
Congregational 
(Xiaochang) 
Siaochang 
 
Cangzhou 
(Tsangchow) 
 
Tianjin 
General Hospital 
 
 
Roberts 
Memorial Hospital 
 
Mackenzie Memorial 
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(Tientsin) 
 
Hospital 
US MEFB/MEC — Board of Foreign Missions 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church   
 Meiyi mei hui   美以美會 
Methodist 
 
Changli 
 
Beijing 
(Peiping) 
General Hospital 
 
Hopkins Memorial 
Hospital 
 
US MGC — Mennonite General Conference 
Mission 
Meiguo qingjie hui  美國清潔會 
Mennonite 
 
(Kaizhou) 
Kaichow 
 
General Hospital 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North/Presbyterian Church in the United 
States 
Board of Foreign Missions 
Changlao hui (mei bei)  長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Beijing 
(Peiping) 
 
Paoting 
 
Douw General Hospital 
 
 
Taylor Hodge Memorial 
Hospital 
INTN’L SA — Salvation Army 
Jiushi hui  救世會 
Dingxian 
(Tinghsien) 
 
 
Jen Min Hospital 
US   SDA — Seventh Day Adventist  
  Jidu fulin anxiri hui   基督複臨 安息日會 
  Adventist 
 
Zhangjiakou 
(Kalgon) 
 
North China  
Sanatorium. 
 
GB  SPG — Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts. 
Daying anligan hui  大英安立甘會 
Anglican 
 
Hokienfu 
 
Chichou 
(Chichow) 
 
Yungtsing 
 
Datong 
(Tatung) 
St. Andrew’s Hospital 
 
St. Barnabas’ Hospital 
 
 
St. Stephen’s Hosp. 
 
Moss Memorial 
Hospital 
 
US WFMS — Womens’ Foreign Missionary 
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
Meiyi mei hui (nü bu)  美以美會（女部） 
Methodist 
Tianjin 
(Tientsin) 
 
(Beijing) 
Peiping 
 
 
Isabella Fisher Hospital 
 
 
Sleeper Davis Hospital 
 
 
Henan (Honan) Province 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
US Aug — Augustana Synod Mission 
Xinyi hui   信義會 
Lutheran 
 
Luoyang 
(Loyang) 
Augustana Mission 
Hospital 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
 
Kaifeng 
(Kaifeng) 
 
Qixian 
(Kihsien) 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Hospital 
US FMA — China Free Methodist Mission 
Xunli hui  循理會 
Methodist 
 
Kaifeng 
(Kaifeng) 
Grinnel Hospital 
US LUM — Lutheran United Mission Lutheran Huangchuan Luther Hospital 
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Board of Missions 
Yu’e xinyi hui   豫鄂信義會 
Lutheran 
 
(Kwangchow) 
 
Xinyang 
(Sinyang) 
 
 
Honan Union Hospital 
 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Adventist  
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
Adventist 
 
Yencheng Sanitarium 
CANADA UCC — United Church of Canada 
Jianada lianhe hui  加拿大聯合會 
Protestant Union 
 
(Zhangde) 
Changteho 
 
Taokou 
(Taok’ow) 
 
Weihui 
(Weihwei) 
 
Huaqing 
(Hwaiking) 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Menzies Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
Hubei (Hopeh) Province 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
US ACM — American Church Mission 
Protestant Episcopal Church 
Meiguo shenggong hui  美國聖公會  
Anglican 
 
Wuchang Church General 
Hospital 
US CovMS — Covenant Missionary Society 
Swedish Evangelical Mission Covenant  
Xingdao hui   行道會 
Lutheran 
 
Xiangfan 
(Siangyang) 
 
Bethesda Hospital 
GB CSFM — Church of Scotland Mission 
Sugelan fuyin hui  蘇格蘭福音會 
Presbyterian  
 
Ichang  
(Yichang) 
 
1. Buchanan Memorial 
Hospital 
2. Rankine Memorial 
Hospital 
 
GB LMS — London Missionary Society 
Lundun hui   伦敦會 
Congregational 
Zaoshi 
(Taoshih) 
 
Wuchang 
 
 
Xiaogan 
(Siaokan) 
Taoshih Hospital 
 
 
1. Men’s Hospital 
2. Women’s Hospital 
 
Mission Hospital 
 
 
GB MMS — Methodist Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
Methodist 
 
Zhongxiang 
(Chungsiang) 
 
Hankou 
(Hankow) 
 
Wuxue/ Guangji 
(Wusueh) 
 
Anluhsien/Teian 
(Anlu) 
 
Huangshi 
(Shihuiyao) 
Hill Memorial Hospital 
 
 
Methodist General 
Hospital (Pu’ai) 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
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Suixian 
(Suihsien) 
 
 
Suihsien Hospital 
NOR NLK — Norwegian Lutheran Mission 
Zhonghua jidujiao lude hui   
中國基督教潞德會 
Lutheran 
 
Laohekou Dr. Frøyland Memorial 
Hospital 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Adventist 
Jidu fulin anxiri hui   
Adventist基督複臨 安息日會 
 
Wuchang Sanatarium 
SWEDEN SMF — Swedish Missionary Society 
Xingdao hui  行道會 
Lutheran 
Shashi 
(Shasi) 
 
Hwanggang 
(Huanggang) 
 
Polikliniken Hospital 
 
 
Hwangchow Hospital 
JOINT MMS/LMS — Joint Union Hospital 
 
Hankou 
(Hankow) 
 
Union Hospital 
 
 
Hunan (Hunan) Province 
 
 
Country Mission Society 
 
Location Hospital Name 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
Hongjiang 
(Hungkiang) 
 
Changsha 
 
Ai-hien Hospital 
 
 
Hudson Taylor Hospital 
 
FINLAND FMS — Finnish Missionary Society 
Xiang xibei xinyi hui  湘西北信義會 
Lutheran 
 
Jinshi 
(Tsingshih) 
 
Mission Hospital 
GB MMS — Methodist Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
Methodist 
 
 
Shaoyang 
 
Yongzhou 
(Yungchow) 
 
Methodist Hospital 
 
Mission Hospital 
NORWAY NMS — Norwegian Missionary Society 
Nuo xinyi hui 挪信義會 
Lutheran 
Yiyang  
(Yiyang) 
 
Xinhua 
(Sinhwa) 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Lutheran Hospital 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North 
Changlao hui (mei bei) 長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Changde 
(Changteh) 
 
Xiangtan 
(Siangtan) 
 
Chengzhou 
(Chengchow) 
 
Hengzhou 
(Hengchow) 
 
Taoyuan 
1. Hospital 
2. Hospital 
 
Nathanial Tooker 
Hospital Hui Ching 
 
Hui’ai Hospital 
 
 
Ren Chi Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
US RCUS — Reformed Church in the United Yuezhou Hoy Memorial Hospital 
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States 
Damei fuchu hui  大美復初會 
Reform 
(Yochow) 
 
Chengzhou 
(Chengchow) 
 
 
 
 
Chengchow Hospital 
 
US YM — Yale Foreign Missionary 
Society/Yale in China. 
Yali daxue  雅禮大學 
Tertiary Education 
 
Changsha Hsiang Ya Medical 
College: Hunan Yale 
Hospital 
 
 
Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province 
 
Country Mission Society  Location      
                   
Hospital Name 
US ACM/PEC—American Church 
Mission/Protestant Episcopal Church 
Meiguo shenggong hui美國聖公會 
Anglican 
Tertiary Education 
Wuxi 
(Wusih) 
 
Shanghai 
 
 
 
St. Andrew’s Hospital 
 
 
St. John’s University: 
1. St. Elizabeth’s 
Hospital 
2. St. Luke’s Hospital 
 
US  AFO — American Friends Mission 
Guige hui   貴格會 
Quaker 
 
Luho Peace Hospital 
US BeM — Bethel Mission 
Boteli hui  伯特利會 
Protestant 
 
 
Shanghai Bethel Hospital 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui 内地會 
Anglican 
 
Shanghai Mission Hospital 
US CRC — Christian Reform Church Mission 
Guizheng jidu jiaohui  歸正基督教會 
Reform 
 
Rugao 
(Jukao) 
 
Mission Hospital 
GB LMS — London Missionary Society 
Lundun hui   伦敦會 
Congregational 
Shanghai 
 
 
 
 
Lester Chinese Hospital 
US MES/MECS — Methodist  Episcopal 
Church South 
Jianli hui  監理會 
Methodist 
 
Changzhou 
(Changchow) 
 
Suzhou 
(Soochow) 
 
Stephenson Memorial 
Hospital 
 
Soochow Hospital  
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North 
Changlao hui (mei bei)長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
 
Kiangyin 
(Kiangyin) 
 
Suzhou 
(Soochow) 
 
Christian Hospital 
 
 
Tooker Memorial 
Hospital 
US PPM — Palmetto  Presbyterian Mission 
Presbyterian 
 
Suzhou 
(Soochow)  
 
Wilkinson Hospital 
US PS — American Presbyterian South 
Changlao hui (mei nan) 長老會(美南) 
Suzhou 
(Soochow) 
 
Elizabeth Blake 
Hospital 
 
 391 
Presbyterian 
 
Suqian 
(Sutsien)  
 
Qingjianpu 
(Tsingkianpu) 
 
Yancheng 
(Yencheng) 
 
Chinkiang 
 
 
Haizhou 
(Haichow) 
 
Taizhou 
(Taichow) 
 
Tongshan 
(Süchow) 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
Goldsby King  
Memorial Hospital 
 
Ellen Lavine Graham 
Hospital 
 
Sarah Walkup Hospital 
 
 
1. M. I. Rogers Hospital 
 
2. Christian Hospital 
 
US RCA — Reformed Church in 
America/Reformed Dutch Church 
Meiguo guizheng jiao hui  美國歸正教會 
Reform 
 
Tongan 
 
Elizabeth H. Blauvelt  
Memorial Hospital 
US SBC — Southern Baptist Mission 
Jinxin hui  浸信會  
Baptist 
 
Yangzhou 
(Yangchow) 
Baptist Hospital 
US SDA — Seventh-Day Advent Mission 
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
Adventist 
 
Shanghai Shanghai Sanitarium 
US SDB—Baptist Seventh-Day Missionary 
Society 
Anxinri jinlihui  安息日浸禮會 
Baptist 
 
Liuho 
(Liuhe) 
Grace Hospital 
US UCMS — United Christian Missionary 
Society   
Jidu hui  基督會 jidu jiaohui 基督教會 
Protestant ( Disciples of Christ) 
 
 
Nantong 
(Nantung) 
Christian Hospital 
US Joint — MEFB/MEC, UCMS 
Tertiary Education 
 
 
Nanjing 
(Nanking) 
University of Nanking:  
Union Hosp. 
US Joint — MES/WC 
Tertiary Education  
Shanghai Women’s Christian 
Medical College:  
Margaret Williamson 
Hospital 
 
 
 
Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province 
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                       
Hospital Name 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui  內地會  
Inter-denominational 
 
Poyang Mission Hospital 
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US KAM — Kuling (Guling) American School 
Guling mei xuexiao 牯嶺美學校 
 
Guling 
(Kuling) 
Kuling Medical Mission 
Hospital 
 
US MEFB/MEC — Board of Foreign Missions 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church    
Meiyi mei hui 美以美會 
Methodist 
Jiujiang 
(Kiukiang) 
 
Nanchang 
 
 
Water of Life Hospital 
 
 
Ensign  
Memorial Hospital 
US WFMS — Womens’ Foreign Missionary 
Society of Methodist Episcopal Church 
Meiyi mei hui (nü bu)  
美以美會（女部） 
Methodist 
 
Jiujiang 
(Kiukiang) 
 
Nanchang 
 
 
Danforth  
Memorial Hospital 
 
Ida Kahn Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
Manchuguo 
 
Country Mission Society Location 
 
Hospital Name 
GB CSFM — Church of Scotland Mission 
Sugelan fuyin hui  蘇格蘭福音會 
Presbyterian 
 
Shenyang 
(Mukden) 
Hospital 
US SDA — Seventh Day Adventist  
Jidu fulin anxiri hui 基督複臨 安息日會  
Adventist 
Shenyang 
(Mukden) 
Shenyang Sanatorium 
 
 
 
Shaanxi (Shensi) Province 
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                   
Hospital Name 
GB BMS/EBM — Baptist Missionary Society 
Daying jinxin hui  大英浸信會 
Baptist 
 
Xian 
(Sianfu/(Changan) 
Jenkins Robertson 
Hospital 
 
 
Shandong  (Shantung) Province 
  
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                       
Hospital Name 
US  ABCFM — American Board of 
Commissions for Foreign Missions 
Gongli hui    公理會 
Congregational 
 
Lintsing 
 
 
Dezhou 
(Tehchow) 
 
Lintsing  
Memorial Hospital 
 
Williams Porter 
Hospital 
 
GER AEPM/OAM — Ostasien  Mission 
Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer 
Missionsverein 
Tongshan hui, deguo 同善會,德國 
Reformed Presbyterian 
Qingdao 
(Tsingtao) 
 
Jining 
(Tsining) 
 
Dr. Wunsch’s Hospital 
 
 
Tung Shang Hospital 
US ALM — Anglican Lutheran Mission of 
Shandong 
Zhonghua xinyihui 中華信義會 
Lutheran 
 
Qingdao 
(Tsingtao) 
 
 
General Hospital 
 393 
GB BMS/EBM — Baptist Missionary 
Society/English Baptist Mission 
Daying jinxin hui  大英浸信會 
Baptist 
Zhoucun 
(Chowtsun) 
 
Qingzhou 
(Tsingchoufu) 
 
 
Foster Hospital 
 
 
Kuang Te Hospital 
 
 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
 
Yantai 
(Chefoo) 
Mission Hospital 
JOINT CU — Cheloo (Qilu) 
Qilu daxue   齐鲁大学 
Tertiary Education  
 
Jinan 
(Tsinan) 
 
Cheeloo University/ 
Shantung Christian 
University: University 
Hospital 
 
US MEFB/MEC — Board of Foreign Missions 
of the Methodist Episcopal 
Meiyi meihui  美以美會 
Methodist 
 
Taian Po Chi Hospital 
GB MMS — Methodist Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
Methodist 
 
Chukiatsai 
 
Wuting 
Laoling Hospital 
 
Ru Chi Hospital 
 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North/Presbyterian Church in the United 
States 
Board of Foreign Missions 
Changlao hui (mei bei)  長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Yantai 
(Chefoo) 
 
Ichowufu 
 
 
Weixian 
(Weihsien) 
 
Tengxian 
(Tengshien) 
 
Jining 
(Tsining) 
 
 
Jinan 
(Tsinan) 
 
Yihsien 
 
Temple Hill Hospital 
 
 
Floyd White General 
Hospital 
 
Shadyside Hospital 
 
 
North China Hospital 
 
 
Bachmann-Hunter  
Memorial Hospital 
 
 
Louisa Y. Boyd 
Women’s Hospital 
 
Raymond Memorial 
Hospital 
 
US SBC — Southern Baptist Mission/Southern 
Baptists 
Jinxin hui    浸信會 
Baptist 
Laichow 
 
 
 
Pingdu 
(Pingtu) 
 
Huangxian 
(Hwanghsien) 
 
Mayfield Tyzzer  
Kathleen Mallory  
Hospital 
 
Oxner-Alexander 
Hospital 
 
Warren Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
GB SPG — Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts 
Daying anligan hui  大英安立甘會 
Anglican 
 
Pingyin 
 
 
Yanzhou 
(Yenchow) 
 
St. Agatha’s Hospital 
 
 
St. Luke’s Hospital 
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Shanxi (Shansi) Province 
 
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                        
Hospital Name 
US ABCFM — American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
Gongli hui    公理會 
Congregational 
 
Fenyang 
(Fenchow) 
 
 
 
Taiku 
(Taiku) 
 
 
1. Harwood Memorial 
Hospital 
2. Kate Ford Memorial 
Hospital 
 
1. Taiku Hospital 
2. Branch Hospital 
 
GB BMS/EBM — Baptist Missionary Society 
Daying jinxin hui  大英浸信會 
Baptist 
 
 
Daizhou 
(Taiyuanfu) 
 
Arthington Memorial 
Hospital 
 
Schofield Memorial 
Hospital 
 
US CBM — Church of the Brethren Mission 
You’ai hui 友愛會  
 
 
Pingding 
(Pingtingchow) 
 
Liaozhou 
(Liaochow) 
 
 
Brethren Hospital 
 
 
Brethren Hospital 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
 
Changzhi 
(Changchih) 
 
Linfen 
 
Wilmay Memorial 
Hospital 
 
Wilson Memorial 
Hospital 
 
 
Sichuan (Szechuan) Province 
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                       
Hospital Name 
US ABFMS — American Baptist Foreign 
Mission Society/  
American Baptist Mission Northern Baptists 
Mei jinli hui   美浸禮會 
 
Baptist  
 
Yazhou 
(Yachowfu) 
 
Yibin 
(Suifu) 
Briton Corlies 
Memorial Hospital 
 
1. Men’s Hospital 
2. Women’s Hospital 
 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
 
Paoning Henrietta Bird 
Memorial Hospital 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
Daying jiao hui       大英教會 
Yinghang jiao hui   英行教會 
Anglican 
 
Mianzhou 
(Mienchu) 
 
General Hospital 
GB FSC — Friends Mission 
Friends’ Service Council/ 
Quakers 
Gongyi hui公誼會 Gongxin hui  公信會 
Friends 
 
Suining  
 
Dongchuan 
(Tungchwang) 
 
Friends’ Hospital 
 
Friends’ Hospital 
US MEFB/MEC — Board of Foreign Missions 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
Meiyi mei hui  美以美會 
Methodist 
Chongqing 
(Chungking) 
 
Tzechow 
Syracuse in China 
Hospital 
 
General Hospital 
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US SDA — Seventh-Day Advent  
Jidu fulin anxiri hui  基督複臨 安息日會 
Advent 
 
Daqianlu 
(Tatsienlu) 
 
Tibetan Mission 
Hospital 
CANADA UCC — United Church of Canada 
Jianada lianhe hui  加拿大聯合會 
Protestant Union 
 
Chongqing 
(Chungking) 
 
Chongzhou 
(Chungchow) 
 
Fowchou 
(Fowchow) 
 
Rongxian 
(Junghsien) 
 
Luxian 
(Luhsien) 
 
Ziliujing 
(Tzeliutsing) 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
 
 
General Hospital 
US WFMS — Womens’ Foreign Missionary 
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
Meiyi mei hui (nü bu) 美以美會（女部） 
Methodist 
 
Chongqing 
(Chungking) 
 
Gamble Memorial 
Hospital 
CANADA UCC, MEFB/MEC —  
Protestant Union 
Tertiary Education 
Chengdu 
(Chengtu ) 
 
 
West China Union 
University: 
1. Men’s Hospital 
2. Women and 
Children’s Hospital 
3. Eye, Ear, Nose 
Throat Hospital 
 
 
 
Yunnan (Yunnan) Province 
 
 
Country Mission Society  Location 
                         
Hospital Name 
INTN’L CIM — China Inland Mission 
Neidi hui   内地會 
Inter-denominational 
 
Yuanjiang 
(Yuankiang) 
Mission Hospital 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
Daying jiao hui     大英教會 
Yinghang jiao hui   英行教會 
Amglican 
 
Kunming 
 
General Hospital 
GB MMS — Methodist  Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui  大英循道會 
Methodist 
Zhaotong 
(Chaotung) 
General Hospital 
US  PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North/Presbyterian Church in the United 
States 
Board of Foreign Missions 
Changlao hui (mei bei)  長老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Jiulongjiang 
(Kiulungkiang) 
 
 
General Hospital 
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Zhejiang  (Chekiang) Province 
 
Country Mission Society  Location                       Hospital Name 
US ABFMS — American Baptist Foreign 
Mission Society 
Mei jinli hui  美浸禮會 
Baptist 
Ningbo 
(Ningpo) 
 
Shaoxing 
(Shaohing) 
 
Jinhua 
(Kinhwa) 
Hwa Mei Hospital 
 
 
Christian Hospital 
 
 
Pickford Memorial 
Hospital 
 
GB CMS — Church Missionary Society 
Daying jiao hui  大英教會 
Yinghang jian hui  英行教會 
Anglican 
 
Hangzhou 
(Hangchow) 
 
Kwangchi Hospital 
US MES/MECS — Methodist Episcopal 
Church South 
Jianli hui監理會 
 
Huzhou 
(Huchow) 
General Hospital 
GB MMS  — Methodist  Missionary Society 
Daying xundao hui 
大英循道會 
Methodist  
 
Wenzhou 
(Wenchow) 
Blyth Hospital 
US PN — American Presbyterian Mission 
North/Presbyterian Church in the United 
States 
Board of Foreign Missions 
Changlao hui (mei bei)  长老會(美北) 
Presbyterian 
 
Ningbo 
(Ningpo) 
McCartee Hospital 
US PS — American Presbyterian South 
Chang lao hui (mei nan) 长老會(美南) 
Presbyterian 
Jiaxing 
(Kashing) 
 
Kashing Hospital 
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Appendix IV – Maps   
 
 
 
Map 1: Provinces of China under the Republic1 
 
                                                 
1 Fairbank, J.K, (ed.), The Cambridge History of China, Republican China 1912–1949, Vol., 12, 
Part 1,  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 30. 
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Map 2: Numerical Distribution of Protestant Mission Hospitals  
by Province, 19362 
 
 
 
Map 3:  Numerical Distribution of American Mission Hospitals  
by Province, 1936 
                                                 
2 Maps 2–9 compiled by the writer from individual mission society archives and Boynton, Handbook, 1936.  
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Map 4:  Numerical Distribution of Canadian Mission Hospitals  
by Province, 1936 
 
 
 
Map 5:  Numerical Distribution of British Mission Hospitals by 
Province, 1936 
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Map 6: Numerical Distribution of European and New Zealand Mission 
Hospitals by Province, 1936 
 
 
 
Map 7: Numerical Distribution of International Mission Hospitals by 
Province. 1936 
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Map 8: Numerical Distribution of Jointly supported Mission Hospitals  
by Province, 1936  
 
 
 
 
Map 9: Numerical Distribution of Higher Education Mission Hospitals  
by Province, 19363 
 
                                                 
3 The Peiping Union Medical College (PUMC) at this time was independent of missionary control. 
